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I'm loving the crap out of this thread. Thirding this, because I'm 2 years into my undergrad degree and I'm strongly considering getting a masters in History, but I'm not exactly sure how I can turn that into a living. Miss Fats posted:
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| # ? May 30, 2010 01:28 |
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| # ? May 23, 2013 21:03 |
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Perestroika posted:That's pretty heartwarming. That's a bit bizarre. I mean, presumably the bomber pilot would be back in a new or repaired bomber, dropping HE and incendiary on German cities and civillians. I understand letting someone surrender instead of killing him, or leaving him to fight another day if he's only fighting you and other military people (a la WW1 fighter aces), but WW2 bombers did lots of collateral damage.
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| # ? May 30, 2010 05:11 |
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ManicParroT posted:That's a bit bizarre. I mean, presumably the bomber pilot would be back in a new or repaired bomber, dropping HE and incendiary on German cities and civillians. Of course the tale might spread, causing fellow Allied aces to maybe let a disabled bomber live or make the bomb crew that was still alive in that burning wreck double check their bombing sights to avoid hitting a school when they were targetting a factory. Then again maybe the surviving pilot said "Ha ha sucker" and went on to firebomb Dresden. We'll probably never know. I don't want to derail this wonderful thread though, the OP and others have been writing some really great replies that are much easier to read then most dry history lessons. I had no idea about the difference in US and Soviet Nuclear Doctrine. I loved the line "The Soviets just thought it was an awesome new way to use artillery" I was wondering if anyone had any ideas on the current situation with Korea that I mentioned, I wonder what percentage of the population is willing to die for their Glorious Leader due to propaganda and how many secretly wish for something better as they see their southern neighbors kicking rear end at Starcraft while they kick rear end to get it to pull the plow.
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| # ? May 30, 2010 18:27 |
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Crane posted:Maybe he was like the Predator and didn't think it sporting. Or it could have been "this guy's got balls of steel and deserves my respect" like the captain of the British destroyer HMS Glowworm who engaged and rammed a German heavy cruiser and was recommended for the Victoria Cross by the German captain.
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| # ? May 31, 2010 03:14 |
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I've got a question about the Roman army after the Marian Reforms. First, how did one join the army? Were there recruiting offices that any dude could just walk into? Second, what was the training like? Did you basically get sent to some camp for a few weeks? Third, was the armour, weaponry, and equipment government issued?
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| # ? May 31, 2010 06:42 |
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Here are two WWII questions I often think about; 1)How effective was strategic bombing (ie bombing population centers) in WWII? Did it have a noticeable positive effect or would resources have been better off being used to target military/industrial targets? I have always thought the bombing of civilians (by all sides) to be one of the most morally reprehensible acts of the war, especially the fire bombing of Dresden, Tokyo and Coventry. My own thoughts are that the Blitz did little to dampen the British fighting spirit, instead it may have fueled the desire to beat the Hun at any cost. Is this the same with the other sides in the War? 2) I have engaged with my friends (who are also non-historians) on the role of the Soviets in the war. There can be no argument that they made a huge (and un-recognised) sacrifice, and did more to beat the Nazis than anyone else. BUT. a) Is it right to say that they were 'on our side', and b) Is it right to call them the 'bad guys', even if we also call the Germans 'the bad guys'. My own views are that the Soviets were as much of a threat to Britain/France as the Nazis, except that geography had placed the Nazis closer and the Soviets further away. If the geographic locations had been swapped, would WWII have been the allies fighting the Russians, with German help?
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| # ? May 31, 2010 16:37 |
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if i may reply to Lord Tomungus in part: the targetting of specific targets was more or less impossible for most of the war. even when an easily identifiable target was found bombing inaccuracy was still great. the Dambusters raid is a nice example of an attack on a specific target, it was a great morale boost but actual damage & disruption to the Nazi war effort was quite limited with some of the dams back to normal within weeks. there were also several pinpoint attacks by Mosquito squadrons later on in the war that show how good a precision attack could be, bombing a prison in France letting resistance fighters escape and a Gestapho facility in Denmark but they were specialist opperations. destruction of population centres tied to manufacturing was about the only viable way of hitting the enemy, while the morale impact is probably less than was thought (see how people reacted during the Blitz on London for an example) the damage to infrastructure (railways, canals & bridges) did hamper supply and deployment of forces later on in the war. the Blitz was a blessing in disguise for the RAF as their infrastructure was starting to fall apart, continued attacks on the airfields would have severely disrupted the air defence network so while the Home Chain Radar was still working they would have been unable to get their fighter planes to intercept incoming bombers in time. as to whether an actual landing could have been accomplished on the English coast is another matter entirely. involvement with the USSR at the time was a marriage of convenience, nobody had any doubts of that. the fact that Churchill (a total anti-communist) was willing to work with them shows how serious those times were. the working principle of: "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" should be applied to the situation at that time. not sure that the USSR was in any way expansionist outside of wanting a buffer zone of friendly states between them and the rest of the world and this was more or less what they got after the war with the setting up of communist regimes in nearly all of the countries they shared borders with. (USER WAS PUT ON PROBATION FOR THIS POST)
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| # ? May 31, 2010 19:30 |
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Lord Tomungus posted:Here are two WWII questions I often think about; Well first off, strategic bombing isn't just bombing civilians, it's more about bombing industry, railroads, etc. I'll give a try at answering some of this: The first air raids by Germany on the UK (the Blitz) were not specifically targeted at civilians, they were meant to set the stage for an invasion. However, bombing was very inaccurate, so of course civilian targets were hit. This did put a great strain on the population, but the bombing stopped when Hitler decided it was time to attack the Russians. After the RAF raid on Lubeck, Hitler ordered bombing on purely civilian and cultural targets in the UK. By this point in the war, the RAF was dominating the skies so the retaliation had little effect on British morale. The British strategic bombing did have a substantial effect on German morale though. After the Germans lost the Battle of Stalingrad in early 1943, German morale was plummeting. More and more people were beginning to openly express contempt towards Hitler and the Nazis as it became obvious the war was being lost. Now their homes were being destroyed and it was the breaking point for a lot of people. From what I've read, many people just felt numb and apathetic after their cities were bombed. They had accepted defeat, they knew the war was lost, and felt that the Russians would treat them brutally. On top of that, the bombing was severely crippling German war production.
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| # ? May 31, 2010 19:38 |
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Lord Tomungus posted:Here are two WWII questions I often think about; While this is anectdotal since it was a while ago and I don't remember any references and such, I had an economy history teacher in Japan when I studied there who liked to discuss the economy of wartime and post-war Japan. According to the statistics that SCAP gathered directly after the war to plan the rebuilding of Japan, the strategic bombing of Japanese cities had very little effect on the Japanese war effort. Hundreds of thousands of people died, but the production of factories etc. was pretty unharmed by it. What totally hosed them over was the complete rear end-kicking the Allies delivered to the badly guarded Japanese convoys. That campaign drastically limited the ability to ship troops, the ability to supply troops and the ability to get raw materials from SE Asia to Japan to turn into supplies. The low number of remaining lorries and trains also surprised SCAP. It turned out to be a huge bottleneck in the rebuilding efforts, and the first pushes to turn Japan from the brink of starvation was to import a ton of lorries and to kick-start the coal mining. The lack of transportation at the end of the war and the immense drag on the Japanese economy it meant made it obvious that if strategic bombing had been aimed at railroads and transport centers, it would have impeded Japan far more than the relatively ineffective (if you don't count dead bodies) city terror bombings. I haven't really studied the effects of strategic bombing in Europe though, might have been different there. lilljonas fucked around with this message at May 31, 2010 around 19:43 |
| # ? May 31, 2010 19:39 |
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Strategic bombing includes a variety of targets. Civilians (thanks, Douhet  ), manufacturing, government facilities, logistics nodes, POL (petroleum, oil, lubricant) facilities, and lines of communication (literal comm lines, major roads, supply routes, etc) are all potential targets. How effective a strategic bombing campaign will be depends heavily on the adversary. Against a highly autonomous enemy, targeting communications centers will be less effective than it would be against an enemy using former Soviet doctrine (highly centralized C2). Destroying POL facilities isn't going to be as effective if the enemy is highly reliant on infantry rather than tanks (though it will still have a noticeable impact).Targeting civilians is of limited use. At some point Douhet might be right and the will of the people to fight will erode to the point that they make changes in favor of peace, but frankly it's better to target the warmaking/fighting machines instead.
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| # ? May 31, 2010 21:02 |
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Looks like Admiral Snackbar decided the job market was too tough and went the way of Hitler in the bunker.
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| # ? May 31, 2010 22:47 |
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JohnnyDangerously posted:I'm loving the crap out of this thread. I don't have a Masters in Military History, but rather Historic Preservation, and my job is pretty relevant. I'm an architectural historian for a consulting company that does a lot of historical and cultural resource work for federal agencies, predominantly the military. I work with archaeologists, historians, environmental historians, and other architectural historians. Most of the time I'm researching the histories of specific installations and then writing reports about how their buildings, structures, and landscapes reflect that history. Probably my favorite project so far has been researching the history of the CCC and WPA works on Department of Defense installations nationwide. It's staggering how much got built nationwide in the late 1930s when we knew that war was on the horizon and still needed to put people to work.
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| # ? Jun 1, 2010 03:50 |
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new home, old colors, same Arsenal
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WTF is SCAP? Well I looked it up for you. Supreme Commander Allied Powers. AKA Douglas McArthur. Should also be noted that Germany had no decent strategic bomber. German high command was well aware of this but Hitler being Hitler wanted to bomb English cities instead of military installations. Definitely a reason why the Battle of Britain was a strategic failure.
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| # ? Jun 1, 2010 10:17 |
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Spartan421 posted:WTF is SCAP? Well I looked it up for you. Supreme Commander Allied Powers. AKA Douglas McArthur. While the Americans referred only to Douglas McArthur as SCAP, but the Japanese used the term for his entire administration including all the American staff etc. EDIT: the occupation of Japan is also interesting from a military history point of view since it is one of extremely few succesful military occupations that left most people happy, the country rapidly developing and ushered a more progressive and tolerant society. The Japanese had a huge sobbing farewell party for ol' Douglas when he was sacked and had to leave. lilljonas fucked around with this message at Jun 1, 2010 around 10:58 |
| # ? Jun 1, 2010 10:40 |
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Thanks for the info guys. I read that strategic bombing was uselessly inaccurate (ie the average bomb was over a mile off target or something). If I remember from 'Fog of War', the film about Bob S Macnamara, they did some analysis on the strategic bombing and it wasn't that good. Did British bomber command know how useless their bombers were and how ineffective strategic bombing was? If so, why did they continue?
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| # ? Jun 1, 2010 13:24 |
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Lord Tomungus posted:Thanks for the info guys. I read that strategic bombing was uselessly inaccurate (ie the average bomb was over a mile off target or something). Not so. Strategic bombing frequently caused serious disruptions in German production. Panther production was almost totally derailed, for example, after the RAF hammered the primary engine production plant, the major manufacturing bottleneck. Only the fact that the Germans had just gotten a second factory up and running prevented Panther production from grinding to a halt. While frequently inaccurate, strategic bombers provided an awesome amount of firepower; during Operations TRACTABLE and COBRA in Normandy, strategic bombers were used in a tactical role and assisted the Canadians and Americans in breaking through the German lines.
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| # ? Jun 1, 2010 14:32 |
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The bomb-sites themselves were adequate. The problem was navigation. It's not like the Germans kept the radio navigation aids up and running to help the US bombers find their way. Navigation back them involved a lot of dead reckoning and using ground landmarks. The problem with that is Europe is frequently cloudly, and high altitude winds are strong and unpredictable. So often times, the bombers would get to the target area, and find that the target city just wasn't there. Or they get confused and bomb the wrong city. They figured bombing a city was better than nothing at all. A couple of times the navigation was so poor that they bombed Swiss cities by mistake, thinking they were German cities. You can imagine the political shitstorm this caused. This also led to the Swiss airforce actively intercepting Allied bombers to protect their own country. They obviously couldn't do anything against the huge thousand-ship formations, but lone bombers (often damaged and lost) were frequently attacked and shot down by the Swiss airforce. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombin...II#Schaffhausen INTJ Mastermind fucked around with this message at Jun 1, 2010 around 18:35 |
| # ? Jun 1, 2010 18:31 |
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Sorry for the extended absence! Tax assessments in my town went up an average of %50 this year, and I've spent the last two weeks getting information together to show that, even in the current market, my house is not actually worth %50 more than it was in 2006. Stressful, aggravating, and even a little funny...Wastrel_ posted:So, certainly, the ascendancy of the Confucian clique at the imperial court played a large role in ending China's naval supremacy, but there were practical concerns as well. Lord Tomungus posted:1)How effective was strategic bombing (ie bombing population centers) in WWII? Which brings me to your second question. I agree that the Soviet contribution in World War II is generally neglected in Western histories to an embarassing degree. As to whether or not they were "on our side," I would say yes, at least for the duration of the war in Europe itself. It should be remembered that by the time of WWII, the Soviet government, under the direction of Josef Stalin, had more or less given up on expanding communism throughout Europe, at least for the time-being. Indeed, expansionist tendencies didn't really resurface in the USSR until the Brezhnev regime, some twenty years later. Admitting as much to the public, on either side of the iron curtain, would not have been good politics, however; so the specter of a greedy Red Menace was kept carefully alive. To explain our alliance with the USSR during the war, it was usually held that we sided with the "bad guys" against the "worse guys." Still, I think Roosevelt's habit of calling Stalin "Uncle Joe" may have hinted at a less cynical relationship (whether or not that would have been a good idea).
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| # ? Jun 1, 2010 19:22 |
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The Swiss forced down aircraft that violated their airspace to protect their neutrality; they would shoot them down only if they resisted. The Swiss forced down and interned aircraft well before Schaffhausen, because they couldn't afford to seem partial to either side.
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| # ? Jun 1, 2010 20:20 |
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Admiral Snackbar posted:Regarding strategic bombing, this is one of those topics where it depends on who you ask. For myself, I think the effectiveness of strategic airpower has been consistently overplayed since the inception of the idea after World War I. The basic idea of paralyzing the enemy's civilian populace, and therefore his entire war effort, has never really been an effective one. To give some examples for comparison, terrorizing civilians in order to weaken the French war effort was the primary goal of England's chevauchees during the Hundred Years' War. It didn't work. Terrorizing Israeli citizens to compel them to leave the occupied territories has been the goal of groups like the PLO and Hamas for decades. It hasn't worked. Terrorizing the civilian populace of the US to get American forces out of the Middle East was the goal of the 9/11 attacks. It didn't work. The Shock and Awe campaign at the beginning of the second Gulf War was supposed to scare the Iraqi military into giving up without a fight. It didn't work. Strategic bombing, whose basic premise is fundamentally the same (ie, pound away civilian population and industrial centers until they lose all will to fight), also never really worked the way its propnents said it would, even during its heyday in World War II. If you look through the US Strategic Bombing Surveys that were completed shortly after the war (available separately for Europe and the Pacific), you'll find that German industrial output actually increased steadily throughout the war, despite all of the 8th Air Force's best efforts. Indeed, German factories were often either not seriously damaged by attacks, or put back into action in a very short time. If you check the European SBS under the Ball-Bearing Attack section, you'll see a fairly representative scenario. In the Pacific, as lilljonas wrote, attacks against convoys generated far better results than strategic bombing. Interestingly enough, these conclusions were basically reached by the US government itself in the SBSs, but the US airforce continued to concentrate on its strategic bomber force anyway. I guess they thought that such an approach would somehow work better against their "backwards" Soviet foes? Your vision of strategic bombing is a bit narrow. Targeting civilian populations is not a good idea...yes it was one of the earliest theories, but it's been proven wrong time and again as you mentioned. Bringing up the Schweinfurt fiasco is an example of a failed strategic bombing campaign, yes, but it's probably the most glaring one possible. The tactics and technology weren't really ready to deliver the results expected by the theory. More recent examples that did work as planned would be the Linebacker campaigns of Vietnam, the air campaign of Desert Storm, and the kickoff of OIF (to a lesser degree). Aside from WWII, there just aren't many examples (good or bad) of a real strategic bombing campaign. Most attempts have been controlled by career ground-combat experts or civilians.
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| # ? Jun 1, 2010 21:51 |
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Godholio posted:Your vision of strategic bombing is a bit narrow. Targeting civilian populations is not a good idea...yes it was one of the earliest theories, but it's been proven wrong time and again as you mentioned. Bringing up the Schweinfurt fiasco is an example of a failed strategic bombing campaign, yes, but it's probably the most glaring one possible. The tactics and technology weren't really ready to deliver the results expected by the theory. More recent examples that did work as planned would be the Linebacker campaigns of Vietnam, the air campaign of Desert Storm, and the kickoff of OIF (to a lesser degree). Actually, strategic bombing is considered to be any bombing campaign that targets economic and industrial assets instead of actual military assets, such as ground or naval forces. If you are specifically not targeting military assets, then, by process of elimination, you are targeting civilan assets. Since most civilian economic and industrial assets are centered around cities, you will therefore need to bomb those cities, thereby immediately involving the nearby civilian population. Therefore, I can see no way to pursue a strategic bombing campaign without attacking civilian population centers. While you may see this as narrow vision, I see it as connecting the dots. As for the idea that, during World War II at least, "The tactics and technology weren't really ready to deliver the results expected by the theory," then I'd say it was a bad theory. Imagine, for a moment, that General Eisenhower came up with the theory that the Normandy invasion should have started off by having the troops carried across in rubber rafts instead of in ships. After all, they'd be way harder to spot, right? After a significant portion of the invasion force drowned en route, and the rest were butchered on the beaches because they were exhausted and unprotected, would you simply claim that the tactics and technology for getting men across the Channel and securing a beach head without naval support simply wasn't advanced enough yet? Or would you accept the fact that it was just a really bad idea? In addition, your claim that Operation Linebacker was successful pretty much ignores the fact the North Vietnam won the war. Finally, to say that, "Most attempts have been controlled by career ground-combat experts or civilians," ignores the efforts of lifelong airmen such as Billy Mitchell, Hugh Trenchard, and Jack Slessor. In my experience, and I don't think I'm alone here, the most vocal proponents of Airpower in general are airmen themselves, and their enthusiasm is rarely borne out in actual events.
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| # ? Jun 2, 2010 00:05 |
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What are your thoughts on the current North/South Korea situation? At any other point in history sinking a military vessel would be a valid excuse for war. Are the South Koreans not confident in their military? Afraid of Chinese support for the North? Are the Americans holding them back?
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| # ? Jun 2, 2010 00:25 |
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Admiral Snackbar posted:Actually, strategic bombing is considered to be any bombing campaign that targets economic and industrial assets instead of actual military assets, such as ground or naval forces. If you are specifically not targeting military assets, then, by process of elimination, you are targeting civilan assets. Since most civilian economic and industrial assets are centered around cities, you will therefore need to bomb those cities, thereby immediately involving the nearby civilian population. Therefore, I can see no way to pursue a strategic bombing campaign without attacking civilian population centers. While you may see this as narrow vision, I see it as connecting the dots. You don't see a difference between firebombing Dresden and the H-Hour attacks of Desert Storm? quote:As for the idea that, during World War II at least, "The tactics and technology weren't really ready to deliver the results expected by the theory," then I'd say it was a bad theory. Imagine, for a moment, that General Eisenhower came up with the theory that the Normandy invasion should have started off by having the troops carried across in rubber rafts instead of in ships. After all, they'd be way harder to spot, right? After a significant portion of the invasion force drowned en route, and the rest were butchered on the beaches because they were exhausted and unprotected, would you simply claim that the tactics and technology for getting men across the Channel and securing a beach head without naval support simply wasn't advanced enough yet? Or would you accept the fact that it was just a really bad idea? In addition, your claim that Operation Linebacker was successful pretty much ignores the fact the North Vietnam won the war. My point on the theory being more or less ahead of it's time is that the major proponents of strategic airpower were far too ambitious. They couldn't deliver what they wanted. Today, we can do a much better job. Regarding Linebacker: It wasn't a bombing campaign to wipe out the hordes and win the war. It was a campaign to shut down the NVA's ability to effectively make war and drive Hanoi to the negotiating table. Which it did. Twice. For any strategic campaign to be effective, you need to have objectives. Campaigns (air or otherwise) with weak/ineffective/no strategic objectives have a tendency to fail. How do you assess success or failure if not to judge whether the stated objectives were met? quote:Finally, to say that, "Most attempts have been controlled by career ground-combat experts or civilians," ignores the efforts of lifelong airmen such as Billy Mitchell, Hugh Trenchard, and Jack Slessor. In my experience, and I don't think I'm alone here, the most vocal proponents of Airpower in general are airmen themselves, and their enthusiasm is rarely borne out in actual events. I certainly don't ignore their efforts. But in the US, development and adherence to effective doctrine were stymied by a long established bureaucracy that was highly resistant to change. Billy Mitchell in particular make enormous strides that were largely ignored until 20+ years later. The air battle over St Mihiel was an event that should have shaken the airpower world and US Army Aviation, but it was dismissed as a fluke...and those lessons learned took more than half a century to really become the backbone of airpower doctrine. Bombing the Ostfriesland caught the public eye (though it wasn't quite the demonstration it was supposed to be, and the Navy had already sunk ships using its own planes). The man predicted Pearl Harbor with a disturbing degree of accuracy, considering it was the mid-20s. And yet, despite all his efforts and being proven right several times, he was still ignored and shoved aside. France and England had a healthier attitude in the early days towards airpower. The basis for Mitchell's expertise was developed working with them (particularly Trenchard). Slessor was very involved in the strategic bombing campaigns as they became more effective (albeit with significant losses). One reason you rarely see airpower proponents' being proven right is because you rarely see airpower employed in such a way as to overwhelm the enemy. Rolling Thunder is pretty much the definition of how to waste airpower. Linebacker helped grind a massive NVA assault to a halt and bring the North to the bargaining table. Linebacker II brought them back to the table, this time in less than 2 weeks. Instant Thunder is pretty much the textbook example of an effects-based air campaign. Massive strategic bombing campaigns obviously aren't the answer to every problem...it certainly wouldn't do much in our current conflicts. But they have their place, and they can certainly be effective. Edit: My god, punctuation. Godholio fucked around with this message at Jun 2, 2010 around 02:32 |
| # ? Jun 2, 2010 02:29 |
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This is a great thread, and I've got some stuff I would love to see Admiral Snackbar expand upon. First, do you think that Douglas MacArthur really deserved the positions and accolades he got? What's your opinion of MacArthur in general? Second, could you expand more on your views on Hiroshima and Nagasaki? Do you think both bombings were necessary, etc.?
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| # ? Jun 2, 2010 04:52 |
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Thanks for this thread, Iv really enjoyed reading it! Today I went to the "National Museum of The Pacific War" here in my little town of Fredericksburg, TX. It was quite good so if your ever coming through I'd really recommend checking it out. I spent 3 or so hours and only got to 1943. One thing I'm really curious about: Who was doing all that filming during the war? It seems like putting a camera in the middle of combat would be their last concern, especially back in the 1940s.
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| # ? Jun 2, 2010 05:37 |
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kinkster posted:
It's vitally important to get accurate estimates about exactly what units have been shot down, sunk, or disabled, and eyewitness accounts are very unreliable. If you can't be sure you sunk that ship, you still have to account for it in your future plans, and that gives an advantage to the enemy.
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| # ? Jun 2, 2010 05:51 |
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Spartan421 posted:What are your thoughts on the current North/South Korea situation? At any other point in history sinking a military vessel would be a valid excuse for war. Are the South Koreans not confident in their military? Afraid of Chinese support for the North? Are the Americans holding them back? They're worried about Seoul getting leveled and a good portion of its population getting killed.
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| # ? Jun 2, 2010 05:52 |
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Isurion posted:They're worried about Seoul getting leveled and a good portion of its population getting killed. Some people don't realize just how close to the border Seoul is. It doesn't take some advanced long range missile to reach it; even if a war in Korea would certainly end in North Korea being defeated, Seoul would most likely come out looking like Beirut or Sarajevo at their worst times. No-one wants this. To understand why the various problems in Korea haven't sparked a war you must realize just how bad a war would be for everyone involved. No-one is really interested in a war, but threats are one of few tools available to both sides to change the behavior of the other side.
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| # ? Jun 2, 2010 06:14 |
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Can't they just you know, relocate the city somewhere else? Just move everything to Pusan. Problem solved! The Soviets did that with their factories during the Great Patriotic War, and Brazil did something similar with Brasilla. Yeah it's going to be a major hassle, but the threat of imminent total destruction at any moment does help with motivation.
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| # ? Jun 2, 2010 07:07 |
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10 million people live in Seoul, man. It's an enormous, densely populated city. Right after the war they could maybe have done something, but now you're talking about tearing up billions upon billions upon billions of dollars worth of infrastructure, compensating private land owners, convincing enormous corporations to relocate their headquarters, evicting 10 million voters from their homes... Good luck with that election campaign.
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| # ? Jun 2, 2010 12:32 |
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Godholio posted:Bombing the Ostfriesland caught the public eye (though it wasn't quite the demonstration it was supposed to be, and the Navy had already sunk ships using its own planes). Sinking the Ostfriesland was a publicity stunt. Mitchell was barely able to sink an uncrewed, unmaneuvering battleship that wasn't shooting back, and to do it he had to violate the parameters of the exercise and try multiple times. There's no wonder that no naval officers took the exercise seriously; it was without even a tinge of realism to it.
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| # ? Jun 2, 2010 13:51 |
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Was chemical warfare used on as large a scale in WWI as I've been led to believe and was it very effective? Was it used to any extent in WWII and if not, why not? What uses has it seen since then, either tactical or strategic? Is there some sort of gentleman’s agreement between warring nations along the lines of "if you don’t use it then neither will we, it would be far more sporting to shoot bits of hot lead at each other"?
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| # ? Jun 2, 2010 15:28 |
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Knifey McSpoon posted:Was chemical warfare used on as large a scale in WWI as I've been led to believe and was it very effective? Was it used to any extent in WWII and if not, why not? What uses has it seen since then, either tactical or strategic? Is there some sort of gentleman’s agreement between warring nations along the lines of "if you don’t use it then neither will we, it would be far more sporting to shoot bits of hot lead at each other"? The Geneva Protocol was signed in 1925 and its main purpose was to prevent the use of chemical weapons in warfare, though like most international treaties it was not strictly enforced. The United States did not ratify it until 1975. The most notable use during the interwar years was by the Italians when they invaded Ethiopia; they used huge amounts of mustard gas. In WWII the use of gas in Europe was mostly controlled by fears over it turning into another WWI catastrophe. The Germans did develop new nerve agents like sarin gas but ultimately chose not to deploy them. The Japanese, however, made widespread use of mustard gas in the Pacific, but only against 'inferior' Asian populations (Chinese) and not Westerners, probably more out of fear of reprisal than anything else. The US used herbicidal agents (Agent Orange) in Vietnam that were also toxic to humans, though they were used in a more indirect manner (destroy crops, disrupt populations). In 1990, George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev signed a treaty to destroy all chemical weapons stockpiles and cease production, and I believe it went into effect sometime in the mid-90s. The Iran-Iraq War is obviously the best known use of chemical weapons in the post-World War era, and it was used with devastating effect on both Iranian military personnel and civilians. Iraq used mustard gas, which was obtained (or the knowledge needed to make it was obtained) from Western sources. According to sources, up to 20,000 Iranian soldiers were killed by mustard gas. For the most part, its use has been restricted since WWI because of the devastation inflicted by it in that war and the fear of retaliation with other 'weapons of mass destruction' if it is ever deployed. For example, Iraq had huge stockpiles of chemical weapons during Desert Storm that remained from the Iran-Iraq War but chose not to utilize them against Coalition forces because of fear of nuclear reprisal. In WWII, it was mostly fear of reprisal with other chemical weapons that would have escalated very quickly.
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| # ? Jun 2, 2010 15:55 |
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This thread has been fascinating so thanks to all involved. I have a question which I don't think has been addressed directly (though maybe I missed it. All this talk about chemical warfare and strategic bombing got me wondering what those who have studied Military history think of ethics in warfare. Things like what is or isn't justified, whether there is such thing as a just war. Just generally the ethics of war. Also it would be interesting to here the actual historical side of that question, the reasoning behind banning this weapon rather than that one for example or how much the beliefs about what makes a war justified has changed and what caused it to change. Edit: if thats too broad a topic just answer as narrowly as you want.
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| # ? Jun 2, 2010 16:24 |
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Knifey McSpoon posted:Was chemical warfare used on as large a scale in WWI as I've been led to believe and was it very effective? Was it used to any extent in WWII and if not, why not? What uses has it seen since then, either tactical or strategic? Is there some sort of gentleman’s agreement between warring nations along the lines of "if you don’t use it then neither will we, it would be far more sporting to shoot bits of hot lead at each other"? This might be pure speculation, but I seem to recall Hitler banning the use of chemical weapons on the battlefield because he was a victim of Mustard gas.
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| # ? Jun 2, 2010 18:11 |
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Chade Johnson posted:This might be pure speculation, but I seem to recall Hitler banning the use of chemical weapons on the battlefield because he was a victim of Mustard gas. And I remember a German general stating the simple reason they didn't use gas was "Die Pferde": the horses. Even though you'll find lots and lots of pictures of tanks and trucks in german service the fact is that most transportation was by horse drawn carts.
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| # ? Jun 2, 2010 19:26 |
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Another major problem with chemical/biological weapons is control. Once you release them, there's not much you can do to make sure they don't blow back in your own face. As far as ethics go, it depends on how high the stakes are. Usually, the more deperate the situation is perceived to be, the more extreme the actions taken. For example, the Eastern Front of World War II was generally more vicious than the Western Front. This was largely due to the fact that the Eastern Front was framed as a contest between races in which the loser would be utterly exterminated/enslaved. Also, the tendency toward reciprocity figures in. If one side uses a certain level of force, whether it be small-scale raids, full-scale conventional warfare, or nuclear/chemical/biological, the other side will be compelled to respond in kind (as far as possible). Therefore, the side initiating combat must carefully consider the likely consequences of its actions. Usually, the cost of using extreme measures is too high for the likely gains to be made, except in the aforementioned desperate situations.
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| # ? Jun 2, 2010 20:41 |
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Admiral Snackbar posted:Another major problem with chemical/biological weapons is control. Once you release them, there's not much you can do to make sure they don't blow back in your own face. As far as ethics go, it depends on how high the stakes are. Usually, the more deperate the situation is perceived to be, the more extreme the actions taken. For example, the Eastern Front of World War II was generally more vicious than the Western Front. This was largely due to the fact that the Eastern Front was framed as a contest between races in which the loser would be utterly exterminated/enslaved. Also, the tendency toward reciprocity figures in. If one side uses a certain level of force, whether it be small-scale raids, full-scale conventional warfare, or nuclear/chemical/biological, the other side will be compelled to respond in kind (as far as possible). Therefore, the side initiating combat must carefully consider the likely consequences of its actions. Usually, the cost of using extreme measures is too high for the likely gains to be made, except in the aforementioned desperate situations. This is called the Rules of Engagement. When you apply the same concept to police (such as when a cop can shoot a suspect), it's called the force continuum. That said, my question is on war crimes and their nature. We've all heard of My Lai, the surprise sex of Nanking, Sunchon Tunnel, and the Bataan Death March. How common has this sort of thing been in history, when was the distinction made between a war crime and combat in a warzone (Hague, Geneva?), is there a provoking factor beyond the obvious, and what can be done to prevent them in the future? I realize my questions are as much military theory as they are history, but anything you can shed would be great, thanks.
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| # ? Jun 2, 2010 21:17 |
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PajamaSutra posted:Sinking the Ostfriesland was a publicity stunt. Mitchell was barely able to sink an uncrewed, unmaneuvering battleship that wasn't shooting back, and to do it he had to violate the parameters of the exercise and try multiple times. There's no wonder that no naval officers took the exercise seriously; it was without even a tinge of realism to it. Well, the Army hosed with the parameters real-time, too. Everybody cheated in that one. The Navy didn't ignore it, they already knew it could be done so it wasn't the  huge event folklore would have us believe. That said, a dreadnought like that was a challenge to sink, whether it was airpower or naval combat.
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| # ? Jun 2, 2010 23:08 |
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| # ? May 23, 2013 21:03 |
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Yay, a military history thread, my favorite subject !  A very good thread admiral snackbar. If I may echo an earlier question ( I aplogzie if this is too personal) what exactly DO you do with a Masters in Military History? Because I majored in History as an undergrad, wrote my undergrad thesis on Heinz Gunderian, and as you might expect this has done jack all when it comes to helping out my employment prospects. Nonetheless, I have been seriously considering going back to school and getting a masters, possibly in military history, and I would really like to discuss what you got out of the process I also wouldn't mind making wordy posts about tanks and german ww2 military tactics, although those are certainly much more well known in the west in comparison to soviet cold-war era military thought.
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| # ? Jun 3, 2010 16:18 |
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