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My first thought was Scheer, but then I thought the leftmost dude was Ludendorff.
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# ¿ Nov 28, 2011 19:31 |
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# ¿ Apr 26, 2024 20:30 |
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Some certainly professed contempt. Most famous, almost ubiquitous, is Moltke the Elder's dismissal of the "armed mobs," specifically, that "there is nothing to be learned by two armed mobs chasing each other around the country," which is a shockingly benighted view.
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# ¿ Dec 13, 2011 04:52 |
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Throatwarbler posted:I'm constantly surprised that the French don't get more credit (if you could call it that) for this innovation, I guess tube artillery just doesn't look as cool in action as machine guns or P-51s. The Soixante-Quinze was a hell of a gun in 1914, but 75mm just isn't enough of a charge to do much to entrenched troops, so when you prep entrenchments with them, then go over the top, you are in for a nasty surprise. The heavy Krupp/Skoda guns (of August) were an innovation of similar import, I'd say. gohuskies posted:The Warrior Generals - Combat Leadership in the Civil War by Thomas Buell ($0.25 used on Amazon!) are two excellent books that go into the challenges faced by ACW commanders and how different commanders dealt with it. I enjoyed the hell out of this book, but Buell really, really likes Thomas. And he should, but it had the whiff of fanboyism, which made me uneasy about his other conclusions. (e.g. Grant was kind of a jealous dumbass)
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# ¿ Dec 13, 2011 05:19 |
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INTJ Mastermind posted:2 Iowa class battleships This list is misleading, because the text of the first section of the bill is just tonnage for capital ships/aircraft carriers/cruisers/destroyers/subs, not specific orders. In fact, of course, only two of the Alaskas were built out of the 385,000 tons allocated for capital ships, and many more than the allocated tonnage of 200,000 for aircraft carriers.
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# ¿ Dec 31, 2011 01:17 |
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The Union certainly did during the ACW - the medical director of the Army of the Potomac, one Major Letterman, was one of the innovators in logistics of that conflict. Besides an ambulance corps and certified surgeons, there were forward aid stations and mobile field hospitals, as well. All by 1862, as I recall they saved a lot of lives at Fredericksburg. I believe this system was standardized across all Federal armies later in the war.
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# ¿ Jan 8, 2012 14:46 |
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Acebuckeye13 posted:2. Standard doctrine didn't lend itself to the strengths of the repeating rifle, and it's doubtful that even if they had been made standard issue that the soldiers using them and the officers commanding them would have made the best use of them. I have to disagree with you here, considering the character of the later years of the War, especially in the West. Somewhat famously, Sherman snarked about his veterans digging in as soon as the columns would stop. Skirmish order was almost the norm in several notable engagements - men who dig in automatically and make full use of cover and concealment are going to welcome repeating longarms or breechloaders quite readily and with deadly purpose. We do have examples of units armed with Spencers, of course. Take, for example, Wilder's "Lightning Brigade". Offered the opportunity to buy Spencers at their own expense, the men overwhelmingly agreed. Their performance at Hoover's Gap speaks for itself and the probable efficacy of veterans armed with Spencers or an equivalent.
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# ¿ Jan 11, 2012 01:20 |
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Staying away from the more fanciful bullet points there, the German commitment to North Africa was limited to far less than an Army Group. Even assuming keeping the Med free of the RN, there isn't the shipping to support that kind of force, the road network (i.e. the Via Balbia) can't carry that kind of traffic, but most constraining of all, the ports in Libya just don't have the capacity to handle more cargo, even Tripoli and Benghazi.
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# ¿ Feb 9, 2012 14:06 |
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This is all true, though supplies piled up at Tripoli in that case partly because the RMI largely suspended delivery to points East after July '42. I suppose if you magic away the RN, the question becomes 'how much can ships at Tobruk offload using lighters and their masts as cranes,' to which the answer is 'not enough'. Van Creveld has an essay on this in Supplying War, though it's mostly a starting point and his exact numbers have been called into question. There are some deeper articles, but they're almost all in Italian.
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# ¿ Feb 9, 2012 23:07 |
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Oxford Comma posted:Anyone ever read David Hackworth's autobiography? I loved it when I was a teen and wondered what the opinions of others are. It does seem a bit self-serving but I admire him for his change of politics at the end. I did (About Face). I'm also looking back from rather a long distance, but it's a good read for a memoir, and though he does have a very personal view, it's not a general whitewash and feels quite authentic, especially about small details and distaste for institutional idiocy. He takes the piss out of SLA Marshall in entertaining fashion, as I recall. You also get some (scathing) insight about the nuclear army in the Eisenhower years. His later stuff wasn't as good, in my view, though you can (anecdotally) point to a number of the scolding points in his piece about Somalia as having been implemented (e.g. consolidation of various quality of life efforts at Natick Solider Center). It ain't scholarly, but I enjoyed it. e: also, you can use it to stop doors, crush bugs, or as a weapon of last resort. The Merry Marauder fucked around with this message at 03:53 on Feb 10, 2012 |
# ¿ Feb 10, 2012 03:48 |
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New Division posted:drat, Kentucky is hosed. No, no, they're OK; plenty of mine shafts.
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# ¿ Feb 21, 2012 21:59 |
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gohuskies posted:I should have clarified that my source was as of 1959. Maybe, but you're crediting the Powers with late-80s technology except for the early-warning. I don't know of any real rail-based ICBMs until the handful of SS-24, and you can't do counterforce for poo poo with the CEPs in '59. You're not giving a whole lot of consideration to the bomber element of the triad, either.
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# ¿ Feb 24, 2012 20:42 |
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Koesj posted:Umm maybe the soviets could have put an early R-7 version in flight but otherwise you're looking at no ICBMs in '59. Ah, yeah, your edit beat me. You could also say there were no SLBMs, as well, but my point is that the environment is vastly different in 59-62 than 87-89 (arbitrary ranges), and so too must be the strategic thinking.
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# ¿ Feb 24, 2012 20:52 |
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gradenko_2000 posted:I was referring to navies in general between 1905 and 1914, but thanks! I never realized that Tsushima was still pre-dreadnought. Sorry I missed this, but yes, enormous advances. Director fire control only came into being shortly before WWI, with the Dreyer/Pollen drama - adventures in early computing - which, while not widely deployed at first, certainly was a change on par in scope with those of Dreadnought. Local control was, and continued to be, a mess.
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# ¿ Mar 8, 2012 16:38 |
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gradenko_2000 posted:How and how effective were submarine wolf-packs implemented by the US Navy? My knowledge is limited, but I recall Admiral Momsen was involved in the development. They were called "coordinated attack groups." I believe the American method was more rigid, in that three boats were expected to transit together, approach independently, and attack in coordination (one boat would initiate, then fall back as 'trailer,' while the two 'flankers' hit the convoy simultaneously - theoretically). The difficulties are obvious. One success story that used this specific method (that I know of) involved Shark, Pintado, and Pilotfish (all Balaos) off the Marianas - they made a series of tag-team attacks on a reinforcement convoy heading to Saipan and sunk much of it. I know there were 'flights' of submarines that slipped past the minefields into the Sea of Japan late in the war, and acted as discrete tactical units. There's even a lovely Reagan movie about it! (Hellcats of the Navy - not about fighters, oddly)
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# ¿ Apr 4, 2012 05:57 |
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Alchenar posted:That's not true. The MkI was developed specifically to be an armoured vehicle and the development was contracted to a tractor company because that's what cross-country vehicles are in 1915. It was called a 'tank' because the first units were shipped labelled as 'water tanks' for the sake of secrecy and the name stuck. No, no, I think you'll find the Spitfire was designed by a secret society who worshipped draconic aliens - probably an offshoot of the Druids. The fighter was their attempt to mass produce an idol of their gods imbued with appropriate martial fury.
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# ¿ May 17, 2012 18:58 |
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Not so! There was a problem with inefficiency with regard to the Tomahawk, but some bright boys in Arlington were thinking "outside the envelope" and decided to load the TLAM with a hyper-efficient package. Apparently it weighed 200 kilotons or something without any increase in size! Goodness, the marvels of modern technology!
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# ¿ May 17, 2012 19:06 |
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Vincent Van Goatse posted:Those were actually anti-torpedo bulges. Beyond that, some ships were bulged during and after the inter-war period, as refits tended to add a lot of topweight, so the bulges were necessary to improve stability. Also, WebDog specifically referred to "skirting around class designation by tonnage," and the thing that leaps to mind there is Mogami - that class was built as a light cruiser with a lot of weight-saving, with the intention that her triple 6" turrets would be swapped for twin 8". I won't bore anyone with the details of naval treaties. Of course, they were very tippy, had lovely welds, endless compromises etc etc. "They must be building their ships out of cardboard or lying," is a famous quote; I like to say they were built of graham crackers, given their survivability. Anyway, point is, they were bulged to solve some of the stability issues, and that may be what you're thinking of.
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# ¿ May 25, 2012 02:49 |
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Dr. Tough posted:I unironically agree with this statement. "This Kind of War" by TR Fehrenbach is the seminal overview, I believe.
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# ¿ May 29, 2012 17:50 |
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Nenonen posted:What would be the biggest modern warships that were captured during the war and then put into service against their former owners during the same conflict? I know of torpedo boats and the like that were captured during WW2, have there been anything bigger? The Italians captured a fair amount of the Royal Yugoslav Navy, including some older destroyers, which might have been reclassified as TBs in other navies, and a German light cruiser (Niobe) The Merry Marauder fucked around with this message at 16:06 on Jun 10, 2012 |
# ¿ Jun 10, 2012 16:03 |
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In fact, the Soviets were building rapidly just before the war, with large orders of destroyers and submarines, not to mention the Sovetsky Soyuz battleships. Several of the designs are very similar to Italian classes; there was a fair amount of Italo-Soviet cooperation in the mid-30s. I feel compelled to mention that the British transferred the R-class battleship Royal
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# ¿ Jul 18, 2012 13:10 |
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NathanScottPhillips posted:This nation also aggressively placed very accurate first strike nuclear weapons as close as possible to the other's territory, when that other nation tried to do the same it was threatened with a blockade and war. Sorry, but I got a good laugh out of calling Jupiters (CEP 1.5km) "very accurate."
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# ¿ Aug 10, 2012 18:42 |
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VikingSkull posted:I'd have to disagree on the point that the USSR could just retool their factories into making locomotives in the middle of the war that quickly, but I'm not an expert in what goes into producing them in that era, so you may be right. I'd like to think that they would have if they could have. You are entirely correct. The destruction of Army Group Center was supplied by American trucks and American rolling stock/locomotives, not to mention the Fronts marching on American boots. It is completely possible to acknowledge these facts without denigrating the enormous military successes of the late-war Red Army. Small fact: the USSR produced 92 locomotives during the war - the US delivered almost 2,000. Re: Retooling factories - you cannot spare the downtime if you are the Soviets, nor do they have the infinite industrial capacity you credit them with.
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# ¿ Aug 18, 2012 15:06 |
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Mans posted:Also, how did people board ships? I assume the Jack Sparrow "fling yourself from a rope onto the other boat" style wasn't the most used method. Generally how you'd expect, clambering over gunwales and up ropes with grapnels. Usually you'd lash the ships together first. Of course (sorry for those who've heard this before), the Romans, when contesting control of the central Med against Carthage were not a sea power. At all. So, they developed the corvus, basically a fixed, retractable heavy boarding bridge with an iron spike to latch onto a target ship. This allowed the legionnaries to storm across without getting their feet wet, so to speak. Worked well enough for a while, I suppose, except having a high, heavy object well forward is...not good in any kind of weather. It didn't last long as a tactic.
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# ¿ Aug 25, 2012 15:37 |
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DasReich posted:So in a scenario where an MBT platoon is forced to engage helicopters would it be safe to say they are pretty well hosed anyway? i.e. lack of support, air cover, infantry, etc? There are plenty of tube-fired missiles with a anti-helicopter capability. Israel and India use the LAHAT, for instance, and there is a whole line of ex-Soviet/Russian weapons of this type.
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# ¿ Sep 11, 2012 17:29 |
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Buttonhead posted:Can anyone recommend a book that details Victorian British military history? I figure there's got to be one book that details all the little wars and interventions that took place through the mid and late 19th century, even if it only devotes a chapter or two to each. I'd love to learn about the Great Game, and the Indian Mutiny, and the Crimean War, and so on, but without buying individual books on each. Unironically, read the Flashman series if you haven't. Educational and a fun ride. I own this, but I think it's in storage. A bit broader than you'd like, but it's a good overview, as I recall.
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# ¿ Sep 14, 2012 04:59 |
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gradenko_2000 posted:Thanks for the summary. I thought their bad planning for Sealion was just a one-off thing, but also "They jumped separate from their weapons."? Incredible. There's at least one reason to do this - if you don't drop with a full combat load, you can be dropped substantially lower to the ground, and thus the sticks disperse in and around the DZ less.
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# ¿ Dec 15, 2012 05:51 |
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Socal Sapper posted:What is, in your opinion, the best non academic book on the Revolutionary War? I personally enjoy "Almost a Miracle," by John Ferling.
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# ¿ Jan 9, 2013 05:41 |
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Xiahou Dun posted:How true is the chestnut about Americans using "guerilla tactics" in the American Revolution? I know they obviously didn't invent it, as is taught, so I assume the rest is bullshit. "Guerrilla tactics" are probably overrated when speaking of the War of Independence; "guerrilla operations" would be more to the point. Partisan bands were absolutely a thing, and worked in much the way you'd expect from most other examples - they make the occupying power spend a great deal of effort communicating or supplying, and allow isolated supporters or small outposts to be ground away. Alchenar - you don't really need to control cities or ports to win an irregular war.
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# ¿ Jan 16, 2013 20:31 |
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Don't discount Greene's Southern Campaign, either, but yeah, dumping all the credit on the French is an incorrect distillation.
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# ¿ Jan 16, 2013 20:50 |
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Philosophically? No. Politically? Sure, you just need to convince the other guy to quit, or over-commit. And yeah, Mans, as we've peripherally discussed, the Jersey militia and Continental detachments rendered it necessary for simple dispatches to be escorted by a troop of cavalry. Henry Clinton was not totally irrational in remaining ensconced in New York. It's a victory for the strategy, if not in the overall war.
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# ¿ Jan 17, 2013 00:46 |
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SeanBeansShako posted:I imagine it only lasted a handful of minutes before one of the two sides finally had enough and broke. I only mention this because of your avatar, but it's the climax of a Sharpe book. Sharpe's Sword
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# ¿ Feb 1, 2013 03:49 |
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KYOON GRIFFEY JR posted:I'm curious as to why the French used lancers as well, because I've found very little to support their utility. I suspect that the effectiveness of the Polish regiments influenced this as well, since the Poles fought very well with lances. This led to the lance being perhaps over-rated by the French. The Grand Ol' Duke of York seems to have been pretty well persuaded that lances were fait fureur. After all, British Lancers charged at Balaclava.
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# ¿ Feb 3, 2013 18:32 |
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Sure, you sink ships by letting in water, not air. I'm not quite as sanguine as gradenko about a Nimitz blithely absorbing multiple Kitchen hits, but in that scenario, the carrier is there to protect the merchies, who are rather less survivable.
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# ¿ Feb 9, 2013 15:11 |
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"Oh, poo poo, build more Burkes," for instance.
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# ¿ Feb 9, 2013 18:21 |
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Throatwarbler posted:Can you tell us at least what the hell a "CSS-5m4" even is? It's a Dongfeng 21 variant.
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# ¿ Feb 9, 2013 18:25 |
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Yeah, I know. Really, the shift is because the Navy was putzing around with the whole brown-water/littoral combat thing after the Cold War because the DoD budget wars exist. Now, what with a medium-range credible threat and the satellite network to acquire the target, USN has to change doctrine and procurement a bit. I'm not as assured as bewbies that ASW is a solved problem, but, on the bright side, moving to deeper waters away from the East Wind makes that easier!
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# ¿ Feb 9, 2013 18:36 |
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Throatwarbler posted:I thought the SSN-22 that closed the final distance t the target at Mach 4 or whatever was supposed to be a pretty serious threat? Or have they solved that problem already? Relatively tiny range. Still easier to engage than a goddamn ballistic warhead. Also, not to be overly pedantic, but it's SS-N-22. Surface-to-Surface, Naval. SSN-22 is a submarine.
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# ¿ Feb 9, 2013 18:43 |
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Koesj posted:If you're having your carrier group come under AVMF attack in the seventies or eighties you're most assuredly not escorting merchant shipping. How much doctrine are we taking seriously? If the CVBG isn't protecting SLOCs in the North Atlantic (or elsewhere, I guess), is it raiding Soviet coastal installations and running out of SAMs really fast?
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# ¿ Feb 10, 2013 02:46 |
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Koesj posted:To me, they both look to be a lovely way of either effectively or safely employing carrier based air assets in that kind of war. Sure, but using carriers as an extra airfield isn't terribly cost-efficient or politically viable either. I don't know, if you're John Lehman, I guess you throw your hands up and decide to invade Vladivostok so you have something to do under Naval auspices. Koesj posted:How about two naval forces looking at each other over an empty Norwegian/Bering/Okhotsk sea while their air assets are being stripped away by other interests? That sounds about right.
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# ¿ Feb 10, 2013 05:41 |
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# ¿ Apr 26, 2024 20:30 |
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Veins McGee posted:That's a short history of stormtroopers but I already knew most of that from articles on the topic. Gudmundsson, the author of the book you linked, revised On Infantry, which you should read anyway, and is more readily available. I can't locate my copy at the moment, but I know he talks about Stosstrupp implications on defense and beyond. Read it, but off the top, NCO agency was a partner of, but did not stem from, those tactics.
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# ¿ Feb 10, 2013 18:41 |