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gohuskies posted:Link to it here The conclusion to be drawn is: If your country is a possible target for NATO and a modern air force of a great enough scale is economically impossible then you need both the highest quality AD systems you can get AND highly motivated, intelligent and professional officers/SNCOs. I have no idea how it is in other forces, but in America ADA/LAAD postings tend to not be highly sought after. Likely because we have no real air threat that wont be destroyed on the ground or shortly after in a lopsided air battle. Perhaps in other nations, and I don't find this very likely, AD postings are of greater prestige than in American forces. edit: Essentially, Col. Zoltan was likely an outlier amongst AD officers. Moreover, his successes were as much the result of his own actions as well as the failings of NATO planners. Veins McGee fucked around with this message at Jul 12, 2011 around 19:19 |
| # ¿ Jul 12, 2011 17:34 |
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| # ¿ May 19, 2013 06:03 |
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Danger - Octopus! posted:If you're interested in USSR military doctrine, I'd strongly suggest reading this study of the Soviet war in Afghanistan by the Russian general staff. Pretty sure it has some very detailed analysis of infantry/tank doctrine and how it was forced to change during the war. If I had my copy to hand (it is at the bottom of a pile somewhere) I could quote some. It's very dry, but worth a read if you're interested in the period. http://www.amazon.co.uk/Bear-Went-O...f=pd_rhf_shvl_3 Same idea, some vignettes of Russian/mujaheddin engagements and the Soviet thinking that went into planning and executing the operations.
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| # ¿ Jul 12, 2011 19:23 |
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Ruse posted:First world-ish? None of those countries are first world(either by the Cold War definition or developed vs developing). edit: Maybe some of those Eastern Bloc countries are getting close but still pretty solidly in the developing category.
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| # ¿ Nov 19, 2011 09:27 |
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Smiling Jack posted:How does the Soviet invasion of Afganistan play out with pro-US states on two Afghan borders? In either case, the term 'invasion' is almost a misnomer. The Soviets invaded and caused a regime change, but the central government remained allied with the Soviets.
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| # ¿ Nov 26, 2011 06:57 |
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mlmp08 posted:Airshows notwithstanding, most of my extremely low buzzes have come from doing IADS (Integrated Air Defense Systems) exercises. The Marines liked to scream over our sight just barely high enough to avoid communications arrays in Harriers and F-5s, then the Air Force joined in with a couple of F-16s. Got the same sort of show from a Cobra section when I was in Iraq. We had a section chopped out to us doing surveillance ahead of our movement to find pickup trucks or something. When they had about 5 minutes of on station time left they asked us if we wanted a show. Couple of mock strafing runs, some acrobatics and then they flew back to wherever they came from to eat ice cream. Also, had an F/A-18 fly inverted over my platoon at like 500M.
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| # ¿ Nov 26, 2011 22:05 |
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Sjurygg posted:Yeah, that's basically it, so much that the few A-90s built would cover the rather marginal (as compared to other deployment methods relevant for the mission) job of putting a mechanized battalion or so anywhere within a few hundred kilometers somewhere not too heavily protected in a few hours. And the Lun, like iyayaa01 said, could potentially make the day very interesting indeed for a carrier group with six Moskits strapped to its back. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A-90_Orlyonok This?
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| # ¿ Dec 5, 2011 14:50 |
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iyaayas01 posted:
It's far more than a mere 'Cactus Air Force' thing that makes STOVL appealing to the Marine Corps. In fact, I don't even think 'Henderson Field' even enters into the discussion regarding the JSF at HQMC.(nice bit of strawman there) The Marine Corps unquestionably needs new aircraft. Marine Harriers are 30ish years old and their Hornets are 20ish. They saved a couple of billion by skipping a generation and not acquiring Super Hornets. Unless we dramatically change the way the ESG and CSG deploy, that replacement must be a STOVL aircraft. For the MEU to be self-supporting, it needs organic fixed wing air. There is no doubt about it. Helos don't have the payload, range(thus, loiter time) or speed of fixed wing air. They don't carry bombs and they're not great at dealing with enemy air defenses. The Harrier has proven the value of V/STOL numerous times. No fixed wing air neuters the MEU and reduces the amount of independently deployable tools to deal with situations abroad. Saying the Marine Corps doesn't need organic fixed wing air in the MEU is pretty shortsighted when CSGs are already stretched pretty thin and the Navy is facing deep cuts. I'm not saying that Harrier replacement needs to be the F-35B but it's currently the only jet in development that meets the requirements. There isn't any other realistic option to replace Harriers and retain the MEU's flexibility in dealing with threats. Besides that, there's the whole sea control ship thing. I don't know how much merit, if any, to attach to the concept but it is a secondary mission for LHAs. While they would never replace or replicate a CVN on a ship for ship basis, not every situation calls for a CSG. See Libya; a not inconsiderable portion of the air war was carried out by Harriers off of a big deck Amphib, not Super Hornets off of a CVN. SCS configured LHAs are a poorman's CVN that holds some appeal in economically tight times. They would technically(and only technically, more like 1.3x) double the amount of capital ships in the fleet. The JSF is unquestionably the epitome of a 'horse designed by committee' but that's the result of input from 3 services and international customers. I'm as unhappy with the cost and the delays as anyone else. The whole program is a giant boondoggle that wouldn't have gotten off the ground had the upfront cost estimates been better upfront. The Navy would have bought more Super Hornets(which they want to do anyways) and the Air Force would have bought more F-22s/F-15s/F-16s. The Marine Corps would have pursued a different, cheaper aircraft that better meets their needs and everyone would be happy.
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| # ¿ Jan 19, 2012 19:34 |
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Phanatic posted:words http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2010/08/4679496/ This guy knows more about jets than either of us. He is not a fan of the F-35, or a huge fan of STOVL, but acknowledges the importance of fixed wing aircraft operating off of amphibs in the design of the MEU. At this point, the only point that I can see being debated is the necessity of the MEU(and thus the Marine Corps as a whole). Side note: 1)The MEU is embarked on ships tasked to an ESG which also includes an Aegis cruiser, ASW capable ships and an SSN. 2)I was misinformed about the Harrier. My b.
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| # ¿ Jan 20, 2012 00:30 |
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Phanatic posted:And he seems to be a big fan of the Hornet. He's got a whole section in that article, "ARGUMENTS FOR THE F/A-18F," where he's basically saying (I think) that the USMC should operate Hornets off of Navy carriers: The gist of what I got: He argues that the Marine Corps should purchase whatever F-35Bs are necessary to meet MEU ACE requirements and the balance Super Hornets to fly off of carriers/paved runways rather than convert the entire fixed wing compliment of the Marine Corps to F-35Bs and a few F-35Cs. Other than flying off of amphibs, there isn't any demonstrable need for STOVL aircraft. It's expensive, complicated, eats fuel and lessens payload. The concept of basing Harriers close to the fight was proven unnecessary and untenable in OIF. But, he accepts that the MEU concept doesn't work without fixed wing air in the ACE. Also: The F-35 is a radical departure from previous Marine aircraft procurement efforts. Instead of picking up some older proven aircraft or piggybacking off of Navy procurement, they're going all in, and essentially independently, on an expensive program with no fallback option(Likely intentional). iyaayas01 posted:Shack, x-ring, whatever other military analogies for spot on you care to use. Shack? Also, sure. WWII, not just Guadalcanal, is responsible for the Marine Corps we know today. CAS, amphibious ops, etc.
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| # ¿ Jan 20, 2012 09:31 |
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iyaayas01 posted:I would seriously pay good money for a quality movie to be made about the Angolan Bush War. (Actually, I'd probably pay good money for a quality movie to be made about the other Rhodesian Bush War as well.) It was posted a page or two back, but if you are at all interested in the Bush Wars, you should really read this link... There are a lot of memoirs and monographs about the Rhodesian Bush War that have come out recently. These are all pretty interesting reads. Rhodesia Tactical Victory/Strategic Defeat A paper analyzing the war written by two Marine officers We Are Everywhere The Rhodesian Bush War from the perspective of African fighters. The Bush War in Rhodesia. Memoirs from a guy who was in the RLI and Selous Scouts(False gang Security Forces operation). Since it's not ghost written, it's not very polished.. Fireforce Memoirs from a solder in the RLI. A little more polished than Croukamp's but still rough. Mukiwa Peter Godwin's memoirs from childhood through 1983ish. He was a police officer but Rhodesian police were more of a military force than our own. Rhodesian's Never Die An anaylsis of the war and it's effect on society. Pretty expensive. more of a textbook. Veins McGee fucked around with this message at Jan 23, 2012 around 20:04 |
| # ¿ Jan 23, 2012 08:19 |
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Throatwarbler posted:This is literally the opposite of the truth, since they've kicked the poo poo out of everyone they've fought - Indians, Americans/South Koreans, North Vietnamese (They captured all the cities they set out to capture and inflicted more casualties than they took which is A Thing when you're attacking fortified cities), South Vietnamese, etc. They didn't do so well against the Nationalists on Kinmen/Matsu or the Soviets. The Korean War ended in a stalemate after the initial successes by Chinese forces. They managed to ensure the survival of the North Korean state but not much more than that can be tallied in the victory column. UN forces pushed the combined Nork/PVA forces back to the 38th parallel after being forced out of the North. The Sino-Indian War ended the border stabilizing in their favor(which was their main goal). Despite provoking the Chinese time and time again(and after receiving repeated warnings), the Indians failed to properly plan to fight the Chinese. The Chinese will admit that, despite achieving the limited strategic goals of the Sino-Vietnamese war(capture some border cities, threaten Hanoi, and disengage), the army performed poorly and China did not force Vietnam to adopt a more conciliatory attitude. Vietnam did not stop their 'imperial ambitions' in Cambodia. Casualties(depending on the reporting) were roughly the same. However, the war did highlight to the Vietnamese that the Soviet Union was not the ally they expected. The war also forced the Vietnamese to maintain a high state of readiness that hampered growth and limited the ability of Hanoi to conduct the reforms they desired. There is a common theme in all 3 of these conflicts: They(UN in Korea, India, Vietnam) poked the tiger and then wondered why it mauled them. edit: Here's a picture of a Cobra in Iraq. 
Veins McGee fucked around with this message at Feb 17, 2012 around 14:37 |
| # ¿ Feb 17, 2012 14:23 |
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VikingSkull posted:At least he correctly pointed out that my post was based on my opinion. He made an argument in the Ask/Tell history thread that was substantially similar to this. He tried to say that 1)China never enjoyed any real advantage in manpower and thus 2)The narrative of human wave attacks and massive Chinese casualties is false. He even went so far as to suggest that during the initial portion of the Chinese intervention the UN Forces enjoyed numerical supremacy. This is despite the fact that the Chinese pushed 30 divisions(with more following) across the Yalu to face 18 divisions in Korea. That's 18 divisions total, not 18 divisions in the vicinity of the Yalu. This is a quote from an article about the 1979 war with Vietnam. The operational tenets preached by the PLA: Xiaoming Zhang "China's 1979 War with Vietnam" posted:The real question for local Chinese military planners was to what extent the objective of teaching Vietnam a lesson could be achieved or measured. The conventional wisdom of the PLA always lays special stress on annihilation of enemy vital forces (yousheng liliang). One of the PLA's operational traditions is the employment of an absolute superior force to ensure victory. By mid-January 1979 more than one-quarter of the PLA's field armies were assembled at the China-Vietnam border, a total of more than 320,000 troops. Drawing from his own combat experience and based on the operational and tactic style the PLA had developed in the past, Xu Shiyou responded to the central leadership's war requirements with an approach known as niudao shaji (using a butcher's knife to kill a chick). The conduct of this engagement encompassed three basic elements: strikes must concentrate on the vital parts of the enemy's defence, but not on the enemy's strong point; overwhelming force and firepower should be used to smash the enemy defence at the point of engagement; attacking troops must move as quickly as possible to go deep, and strike all the way into the heart of the enemy. In this way, Xu expected his forces to cut the enemy defences into pieces, break opponent resistance, and then annihilate the opposition.52(footnote points to 'Zhou Deli', The Last Battle, pg 123-124)
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| # ¿ Feb 20, 2012 23:20 |
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Not likely. You don't to give a reemerging geopolitical rival that kind of leverage. We don't like your support of X, no spare parts for you. The Russians probably aren't selling their newest fighter to Canada, noted ally of the United States. It's a bit of a security issue. Also, export market Russian military equipment is usually pretty gimped compared to the real deal.
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| # ¿ Mar 30, 2012 13:34 |
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Invalido posted:You could certainly use some hill or hole to make the barrel point higher than would be possible on flat land. The problem lies in figuring out just where the gun is pointing. I think the tank sights would be fairly useless for this (seeing only sky). A smartphone could act as compass, inclinometer, ballistics computer, GPS... You probably had some sort of quadrant sight that never came out of the armory that would allow indirect fires. A tank would make a pretty lovely indirect fire weapon since you could never alter the charge behind the round(artillery/mortars can) leaving only inclination to adjust the range the round travels. http://www.trngcmd.usmc.mil/G4_Docs...20TAMCNs%29.pdf see pg 140 Invalido posted:Another flaw that I personally found really annoying was how the co-axial MG fired while the main turret switch was set in "stabilized" mode (i.e. the gun being slaved to either gunner's or commander's gyroscoped sight). The MG fire/no fire criteria were the same as for the the main gun, or at least set waaaay too strict for the purpose of suppressive fire while on the move. If we drove fast in rough terrain and wanted to machine gun with any success, the loader needed to manually depress the big lever that in turn depressed the trigger on the machine gun. If the gunner held his trigger down, all you'd get was little unimpressive bursts of 1-3 rounds every now and then as the gun passed through the very narrow window of acceptable firing solutions for hitting things far away. The thing is, as a tanker I obviously don't care if my MG fire spreads far and wide - I want spread! I want any soft-skinned enemies ahead of me to keep their heads down, and I have lots and lots of 7.62 to pour every place I'm even suspicious about. If i had to fight in a leo2 and that stupid thing wasn't fixed, I'd make my own jury rigged pedal switch or something for the gunner if at all possible. Nerfed tanks forsooth! Not really all that important. You're more likely to be operating in support of infantry as a base of fire for their assault. Besides that: bounding over-watch and the advantage of out ranging most infantry portable weapons. Sit out or range and lob HE or bound in closer and deliver accurate coax fires. Veins McGee fucked around with this message at Apr 12, 2012 around 10:55 |
| # ¿ Apr 12, 2012 10:45 |
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Invalido posted:Perhaps not super important, but retardedly sub-optimal and limiting. Reconnaissance son, they're the tip of the spear. Tanks aren't eyes, although they have great optics, they're fists or w/e analogy you wanna make. The recon element should gain and hold contact until heavier forces can be brought to bear. Because of the backblast and then optics whiteout, most TOW-like weapons need a standoff of a couple hundred meters. But, Javelins(fire/forget) or rockets don't.
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| # ¿ Apr 13, 2012 00:39 |
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Myoclonic Jerk posted:1) Why did they leave? According to Wikipedia, it was a combination of DeGaulle being mad that NATO wouldn't help him oppress the Algerians and retarded French nationalism DeGaulle being a drama queen is part of it. After World War II, French national pride was at an all time low. They were unhappy with their quickly declining international prestige and importance as their colonies disappeared and the United States became hugely influential in the 1st World. National pride was further dampened by their failure in Indochina and the Suez Canal Crisis* and the increasingly bloody and unpopular Algerian conflict. Their relative unimportance compared to the US or Soviet Union was highlighted and underscored throughout the 50s. Finally, the refusal by the United States to support or condone the war against the FLN in Algeria was probably one of the last straws. Internationally; Rather than be seen as being fully in the American sphere, they chose to withdraw from NATO in an attempt to reinforce French independence and agency. Nationally; it was an move by DeGaulle to gain support from certain voters, specifically the Army, who were active politically in a big way, and French Nationalist partys. But yeah, saying the French were butthurt isn't too far off the mark in many respects. * The Israelis were supposed to attack across the Sinai and then a joint British/French paratroop force was would jump in, ostensibly to ensure free passage of the canal. Afterwards, the Israeli army would advance on Cairo and overthrow Nasser. After the war, the British/French were supposed to administer the canal to ensure free passage of shipping. The Americans intervened, at the behest of the Soviet Union, and slapped the British and the French on the dicks for loving around in Egypt.
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| # ¿ May 15, 2012 15:48 |
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Was there something else at work or was it mostly DeGaulle being a butthurt drama queen?
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iyaayas01 posted:
France in the 50s and 60s was probably a pretty crazy place to be. The army, and specifically the paratroopers, seemed to have been constantly planning a coup(would have been amusing since a fair amount of the FFL were former Wehrmacht).
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| # ¿ May 15, 2012 17:02 |
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, understatement of the day right there. And yeah, basically what he said. As far as how they would integrate, remember that France still had troops stationed in Germany for the duration of the Cold War. Also remember that it's not like NATO forces would be this melting pot of soldiers at the platoon level or whatever, the bulk of the coordination between nations was at the division level and higher...which is what the Lemnitzer-Aillert Agreements laid out in detail. French forces continued to exercise with NATO forces throughout the Cold War and would have integrated into the military structure just like any other NATO country's forces.
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Oxford Comma posted:So why did the Army just not use the LAV-25? It seems like that would be the less expensive option, as well as avoiding all the teething problems of a new design. Because the LAVII is poorly suited to what the Army wanted and is a 40ish year old design. -The armor on LAVIIs is rated to 7.62NATO at 100m but I've seen a SAW penetrate the hull. Applique armor, which bumps it up to 14.5mm, adds its own problems in the form of increased component wear, decreased fuel economy, and decreased ability to traverse terrain. Strykers were designed with this weight in mind. They have a more powerful engine, beefier driveline, larger wheels and CTIS to account for the additional weight of their armor(ceramic applique and slat). -The fuel tank in the -25 variant doubles as the troop seat. In all other variants they're mounted on the interior against the side of the hull. LAVIII vehicles have external fuel tanks. -LAVIIIs are all around bigger; wider, longer and taller. The Aussies use a modified LAVII logistics variant to transport 7(on paper, it probably carries less than this irl). The -25 variant carries 4 rifleman comfortably and 6 in extreme discomfort. The Stryker carries 9; to match the capacity of 4 Strykers, you would need 6 LAV-Ls. LAVIIIs are also optimized to disembark the section rapidly through a drop down hatch rather than a set of manual double doors. -The LAVII was designed in a time when radios weren't digital. When LAVs were new, HF was the only long range comm asset. On really old LAVIIs, you can still find the additional gear required to send/receive encrypted. Now we have FBCB2, satcom, longer range VHF/UHF radios and satphones all networked into a digital intercom system. LAVIIIs were designed with these assets in mind; on LAVIIs, they're all jury rigged in there wherever they'll fit and it shows. -The Stryker costs $3mil/unit and an LAV-25 costs between $1.4mil/unit and $2.5mil/unit. I couldn't find a price for a base hull LAV-LA2 LAVIIIs existed before the Army started the acquisition process; the Canadians and the Kiwis both use them. I have no idea what sort of teething issues the Stryker endured during its introduction but I'm sure they weren't anything like those you would encounter in a totally new vehicle. In the end, it wouldn't make much sense to redesign an LAVII to fit the Army's specifications when LAVIIIs already exist and can be adapted to meet their future needs much more readily. Here's some pictures to make up for all the words:    mlmp08 posted:LAV-25s are considered Gen 2 as far as systems and capabilities, and the LAV-III/Stryker are considered Gen 3, though "gens" are often more about selling poo poo than hard combat capabilities. In this case, not really. Except for the gun and optics/fire control suite, GenIIIs are leaps and bounds ahead of of GenIIs.
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| # ¿ May 23, 2012 08:56 |
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LimburgLimbo posted:Yeah, seriously, what the hell. Any poo poo with a DShK could rip an LAV to shreds? That seems ridiculous. They all have applique armor now so the threat is somewhat diminished. Besides that, the odds of Joe Taliban getting a first burst hit against a moving LAV are pretty low. The odds of scoring a first burst kill from an LAV against a relatively immobile HMG are pretty good. The odds of spotting Joe Taliban and his DShK before he can even get his first burst off are also pretty good. LAR units aren't, by doctrine, a mechanized infantry force. In a big war, like OIF, they're used to screen ahead/to the flanks of an advancing Marine division and have a limited ability to attack/defend objectives. The lethality/value of the LAR Bn lies in its speed, optics, comm gear, flexibility and self-sustainability. VikingSkull posted:The only thing I can think of that makes it better is Marines are expendable. I guess. no priznat posted:Have they fixed the rollover risk on the LAV-IIIs and such? I recall there were a couple CF vehicles that rolled in the earlier days of Afghanistan. Probably ensuring the drivers don't do certain things would be the best defense against that. VVV Veins McGee fucked around with this message at May 23, 2012 around 23:38 |
| # ¿ May 23, 2012 19:37 |
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Armyman25 posted:So, Cavalry? Yeah, pretty much LAR=CAV with, I assume, a slightly different mentality. Everyone on the vehicle is trained as a rifleman, the vehicle crew obviously goes onto further training. On the other hand, none of the scouts receive any formal 'scout' training. They're supposed to be trained in light demo work, use/operation of the SMAW and SASR, some basic ford/bridge/route/etc recon and how to operate with the vehicles. The 0311 course covers none of these topics. There isn't a follow-on LAR scout course so there is little institutional knowledge to begin with. Coupled with 8 years of being used strictly as a COIN infantry type force and the knowledge is almost entirely gone. In OIF/OEF, LAR BNs seem to mostly get sent to low density spaces at the periphery of the battlespace where raw numbers(LAR platoon is ~25, with 13 dismounts, compared to 40-50 in an infantry platoon) are less important than ability to cover ground.
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| # ¿ May 24, 2012 00:06 |
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Beardless posted:I found my copy of the Communist Weapons and Equipment Handbook today. It's from 1969, and I figured I'd give it a look, and then it occurred to me that it might be of interest to this thread. It's pretty cool to read what they thought of various stuff at the time, compared to now. It's just ground stuff, no aircraft, but I figured that it warranted a post. For example, in the entry for the T-54 it says that "replacement of the old T-34/85 and the interim T-44 continues as rapidly as production permits". This was published in 1969, and they were still replacing their T loving 34's! I had no idea that they stuck around for that long. If anyone wants to know more feel free to ask. They made T-34/85s into the late 50s. There were probably some 3rd line reserve units equipped with T-34/85s well into the 70s.
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| # ¿ Jun 4, 2012 01:39 |
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Phanatic posted:Christ, RPGs have gotten through-and-through hits on M1s. I'm talking penetrating the side skirt, entering the tank, passing through it, and then penetrating the other side of the tank on the way out. Even the single-stage, non-tandem warheads can penetrate something like 10 inches of RHA. Bradleys MIGHT have killed a few t-55s at close range with the 25mm but, more likely, they were TOW kills. T-34s wouldn't be much of a challenge for Bradley; the armor is thin enough to be penetrated by 25mm, the armor is inferior, and the firecontrol is obsolete. Also, I'd be extremely leery of any claims being made wrt RPG-7s scoring penetrating kill shots on M1s. I've only read of a few M1s being disabled by shots to the rear.
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| # ¿ Jun 4, 2012 16:59 |
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wkarma posted:I've had a bradley gunner specifically tell me that T-72's were engaged and destroyed with APDS (M791 I believe) 25mm in Gulf 1. Quick internet sleuthing seems to support this statement of several T-72 kills by 25mm to the side hull armor, and all aspect kills (especially to the turret ring on the front) to T-55/65, even from medium ranges. OIF saw the introduction of M919 APFDS which is supposedly even better. 25mm penetrates, at most, <90mm of RHA. M919 penetration values aren't released AFAIK but its probably not going to push that penetration number up too much further. I feel like if 25mm could reliably kill T-72s, I would have heard about it at some point. "There have even been reports of kills against Iraqi T-72 tanks at close range.[citation needed]"-wikipedia
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| # ¿ Jun 5, 2012 00:47 |
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VikingSkull posted:Talking about tanks and APC's getting hit by things... Certain types of RPGs utilize a shaped charge(i.e. an EFP), as do most man portable anti-armor weapons.
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| # ¿ Jun 9, 2012 17:52 |
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daskrolator posted:It's definitely one of the bmp models, look at the high angle of the front of the hull, t-72s don't have that kind of angle. Assuming that thick plume of greyish smoke that jets out as the vehicle picks up speed is exhaust, it's on the wrong side to be from a BMP. T-72s exhaust on the left rear. BMPs exhaust from right center.
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| # ¿ Jun 11, 2012 16:25 |
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Koesj posted:Look at the drive wheel size compared to the road wheels, they're practically the same size on BMPs. Also, the size of the turret compared to the body. BMP-1s/BMP-2s have a small dome shaped turret. BMP-3s have a totally different profile than the vehicle in the picture. Compare the size of the roadwheels to the overall height of the vehicle. BMP-1/2 have much smaller roadwheels relative to their hull than a T-72 daskrolator posted:I don't think that's exhaust, looks more like smoke from the primary and secondary effects of being penetrated by the warhead. mikerock posted:It is coming out of the penetration made by the initial explosion. The smoke appears to be coming from high on the hull and to the rear. The strike, whether IED or AT rocket/missile, appeared to hit approx mid hull beneath the turret. The smoke plume also coincides with the vehicle picking up speed.
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| # ¿ Jun 11, 2012 21:11 |
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Nebakenezzer posted:Yeah, what I've heard is that the T-62-63-64 was everything the Soviets wanted (and the first tank to be called an MBT, the first to mount a smoothbore gun etc.) But it was both "too expensive" (a somewhat tricky statement with Communists) and contained too much advanced technology. So they made the T-72, a modern MBT built to a price. You'd think they would forego building knock down T-72s for export when the tank was designed for export in the first place... 1)Even in a communist/socialist society, you still run into issues of scarcity. 2)The T-72 wasn't strictly an 'export tank'. It was designed to be used in motor rifle units as a general purpose/infantry support tank while the T-64 was designed to fight other MBTs in independent tank units.
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| # ¿ Jun 12, 2012 00:43 |
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Warbadger posted:Point being that the minimum range is pretty short, the T-72 in the previous video probably ate an RPG from an alleyway like that one did. http://therealrevo.com/blog/?p=875 Internet says somewhere between 10-50M.
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| # ¿ Jun 18, 2012 05:53 |
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Snowdens Secret posted:This would surely work well, as it's been a smashing success letting this happen in places such as I don't think its ever been attempted so I don't know what you're getting at. On the other hand, a lot of blame is placed on borders first drawn at the Conference of Berlin and later elaborated upon by the Colonial Powers. The hatred of ethnic group x for ethnic group y is often overstated in an attempt to create an easily digested answer for Westerners. I'm not familiar with the exact administration of every former colony but colonial rulers tended to designate a group to delegate authority to sub-administer. Even in purely settler colonies(Rhodesia for example), one group tended to be seen as more 'white' than other groups. Whatever the case, ethnic rivalries tended to be manufactured by the colonial rulers in order to ease rule and misdirect unrest. You also have to consider the period during which colonies transitioned to self-rule; the Cold War, proxy wars in order to establish the supremacy of one side or the other. Conflict certainly occurred because of ethnic rivalries/hatred/whatever, but its far from the complete story. Read up about the Rwandan genocide and you'll see what I mean. Certainly, there is a difference between Hutus and Tutsis but prior to colonial involvement the difference tended to be more flexible. Also: "Frederick Lugard"/"Indirect Rule" and "The Hamatic Myth" would also be two topics worth reading more about.
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| # ¿ Jun 27, 2012 10:42 |
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Cyrano4747 posted:You realize that while things might go exactly as you say, the process would be a gigantic loving civil war on a continental scale and bloodshed akin to that suffered by Europe between 1914 and 1945, right? Yeah, I don't think they should redraw the borders. In fact, redrawing the borders would just create more poor landlocked countries with poor neighbors and little access to the world economy. I just have a strong distaste for off-the-cuff dismissive remarks. On the other hand, the partition of India makes for a rather poor comparison. Muslims and Hindus(et al) lived all jumbled together. In the African countries I'm familiar with(I'm far from an expert), the various groups tended to occupy their own areas. When colonization began en force, movement was curtailed even further as whites designated land for 'natives' and/or needed a steady supply of compliant labor(i.e. fixed in place).
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| # ¿ Jun 27, 2012 16:28 |
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poo poo like the Holocaust, and even ignoring the political causes for the conflicts, the net result was one of the largest re-drawings of borders in modern history and one of the largest refugee crises the world has ever seen - to find dislocations and permanent movements of people on that scale before then you really need to dig pretty deep.
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Warbadger posted:Sorry, I don't buy the "HURF DURF DEM AYYRABBS CANT FIGHT" theory. The Soviet Union provided trainers and advisors along with the equipment, had a vested interest in their clients winning the various conflicts, and the tactics they employed were generally right out of the Soviet playbook of the time. Unless you're saying Soviet equipment was significantly worse than NATO/US equipment, your conclusion doesn't logically follow. If they were decently equipped and provided with Soviet trainers and advisors, then why were the Arabs generally unsuccessful against Israelis? This isn't to imply that I necessarily agree with the "Arabs can't fight" thesis, but merely to observe that this part doesn't make sense. edit: This answers the question pretty well. http://www.scribd.com/doc/105643224...kjq311abxta9b34 also: with regard to the T-62/T-64, I think you and Forums Terrorist are arguing about different eras. Smiling Jack posted:Also the whole HURRRR AYRABS CAN'T FIGHT thing is kinda undercut by the Yom Kippur war, where the Egyptians and Syrians did rather well initially. element of suprise is a hell of a thing Veins McGee fucked around with this message at Sep 11, 2012 around 21:41 |
| # ¿ Sep 11, 2012 21:26 |
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iyaayas01 posted:As far as air support in dirty wars goes, you need to read Here There Are Tigers...it's the memoirs of a USAF pilot flying covert unacknowledged FAC missions over Laos in the late '60s. Well written and very interesting. As far as war in Africa go, it isn't post-colonial since it was a colonial war but Counterinsurgency in Africa: The Portuguese Way of War is well written and a good read. Another one that's worth reading is Dancing in the Glory of Monsters...I suppose it isn't really "post-colonial" since the war took place after the Cold War in the '90s and '00s, but it is a really good read and covers a conflict that a lot of people in the West know little to nothing about. I wouldn't buy any of these books unless you have an interest in Rhodesia but "Fireforce: One Man's War in the RLI" and "Out of Action" by Chris Cocks, "Mukiwa: A White Boy in Africa" by Godwin and "The Bush War In Rhodesia: The Extraordinary Combat Memoir of a Rhodesian Reconnaissance Specialist" by Croukamp are memoirs about the conflict. "Rhodesians Never Die" by Godwin is an overview of the war/Rhodesian white society. Charles Lohman, Robert McPherson, “Rhodesia: Tactical Victory, Strategic Defeat” is a good overview of the war.
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| # ¿ Oct 14, 2012 14:48 |
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| # ¿ May 19, 2013 06:03 |
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iyaayas01 posted:So all of those are decent reads? I'm always a little leery of stuff about Rhodesia since there's the whole racial component and "mercenary legend" bullshit, so I can never be sure if it's going to be an actual legitimate history/memoirs or a bunch of made up bad-rear end bullshit with some thinly veiled HURR racism. They're legit as far as I can tell. There is a lot of ~badass poo poo~ in Croukamps book but he was a Selous Scout. They're all racists to some extent but none of the books especially offended me. "Once Upon a White Man" is another memoir that wasn't too bad. The part about the war is only a few chapters though. Ian Smith has a memoir out too but I didn't read the whole thing. "Rhodesians Never Die" is an analysis of Rhodesian society and how it was changed over the course of the war.
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| # ¿ Oct 14, 2012 20:35 |
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