Surveillance in the 21st Century: Press CTRL-C to Copy the Internet (NSA Thread)

The Something Awful Forums > Discussion > Debate & Discussion > Surveillance in the 21st Century: Press CTRL-C to Copy the Internet (NSA Thread)

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Kobayashi: Aug 13, 2004; by Nyc_Tattoo

Blazing Ownager posted:

I am honestly surprised to see people defending the spying on German (amongst other) soil around here though. It feels like every bit of new information on US intelligence operations is just more depressing and I don't know how anyone can feel we have any moral high ground whatsoever. We've pretty much begun burning all the good will we've built up over the last few years now with the rest of the world.

This is puzzling to me too. Reasonable people can disagree about whether such programs are necessary to "prevent terrorism," but what does Merkel have to do with that? And, more than that, the people who claim that this is just what spies do seem to imply that it's the US vs. everyone -- that "good will" as you say and inter-ally cooperation aren't important. I just don't understand that worldview.

# ¿ Oct 27, 2013 18:09

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# ¿ Apr 28, 2024 10:54

Kobayashi: Aug 13, 2004; by Nyc_Tattoo

ANIME AKBAR posted:

Feinstein doesn't like it because she and her committee were left out of the game.

Either that, or she ran out too far ahead of things when all this started and is using this incident to throw the NSA under the bus. I'd like to believe in naked populism, but I suspect your answer is closer to the truth.

# ¿ Oct 29, 2013 04:11

Kobayashi: Aug 13, 2004; by Nyc_Tattoo

Elotana posted:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world...a4dd_story.html

Essentially, MUSCULAR appears to be the backdoor counterpart to PRISM, done without the companies' consent (well, explicit consent).

I feel very comfortable saying the NSA has no business engaging in full-take tapping domestic cables, especially not data links between the servers of massive, private companies.

Arkane posted:

efb...I'll leave the image, though.

Was just going to post that. Best quote:

The Article posted:

Two engineers with close ties to Google exploded in profanity when they saw the drawing. �I hope you publish this,� one of them said.

# ¿ Oct 30, 2013 17:58

Kobayashi: Aug 13, 2004; by Nyc_Tattoo

confused posted:

The diagram seems to be saying that Google's internal traffic is not encrypted. I believe it is saying that the traffic in encrypted between the load balancers / front ends and the end users, but not between the front end servers and the internal services. Even if Google's internal traffic was encrypted, the way level 7 load balancing works the traffic would be decrypted and reencrypted on the load balancer which means that it would pass through memory there in plain text.

You may be saying the same thing, but the impression that I got was that the NSA was intercepting Google data being sync'd/backed up between its various datacenters. :nsa:

# ¿ Oct 30, 2013 23:41

Kobayashi: Aug 13, 2004; by Nyc_Tattoo

cr0y posted:

I am confused. They say they need $200k to cleanup the source code and release it as a f/oss project....but then they say backers will get binaries and the source only goes to $1k+ contributors?

I believe it's early access to source and binaries. The award packages are essentially symbolic. In any event, some security researchers claim Lavabit was not as secure as Ladar claimed it was.

# ¿ Nov 6, 2013 05:06

Kobayashi: Aug 13, 2004; by Nyc_Tattoo

New from Greenwald et al:

Huffington Post posted:

Top-Secret Document Reveals NSA Spied On Porn Habits As Part Of Plan To Discredit 'Radicalizers'

WASHINGTON -- The National Security Agency has been gathering records of online sexual activity and evidence of visits to pornographic websites as part of a proposed plan to harm the reputations of those whom the agency believes are radicalizing others through incendiary speeches, according to a top-secret NSA document. The document, provided by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden, identifies six targets, all Muslims, as �exemplars� of how �personal vulnerabilities� can be learned through electronic surveillance, and then exploited to undermine a target's credibility, reputation and authority.

The NSA document, dated Oct. 3, 2012, repeatedly refers to the power of charges of hypocrisy to undermine such a messenger. �A previous SIGINT" -- or signals intelligence, the interception of communications -- "assessment report on radicalization indicated that radicalizers appear to be particularly vulnerable in the area of authority when their private and public behaviors are not consistent,� the document argues.

Among the vulnerabilities listed by the NSA that can be effectively exploited are �viewing sexually explicit material online� and �using sexually explicit persuasive language when communicating with inexperienced young girls.�

The Director of the National Security Agency -- described as "DIRNSA" -- is listed as the "originator" of the document. Beyond the NSA itself, the listed recipients include officials with the Departments of Justice and Commerce and the Drug Enforcement Administration.

"Without discussing specific individuals, it should not be surprising that the US Government uses all of the lawful tools at our disposal to impede the efforts of valid terrorist targets who seek to harm the nation and radicalize others to violence," Shawn Turner, director of public affairs for National Intelligence, told The Huffington Post in an email Tuesday.

Yet Jameel Jaffer, deputy legal director of the American Civil Liberties Union, said these revelations give rise to serious concerns about abuse. "It's important to remember that the NSA�s surveillance activities are anything but narrowly focused -- the agency is collecting massive amounts of sensitive information about virtually everyone," he said.

"Wherever you are, the NSA's databases store information about your political views, your medical history, your intimate relationships and your activities online," he added. "The NSA says this personal information won't be abused, but these documents show that the NSA probably defines 'abuse' very narrowly."

None of the six individuals targeted by the NSA is accused in the document of being involved in terror plots. The agency believes they all currently reside outside the United States. It identifies one of them, however, as a "U.S. person," which means he is either a U.S. citizen or a permanent resident. A U.S. person is entitled to greater legal protections against NSA surveillance than foreigners are.

Stewart Baker, a one-time general counsel for the NSA and a top Homeland Security official in the Bush administration, said that the idea of using potentially embarrassing information to undermine targets is a sound one. "If people are engaged in trying to recruit folks to kill Americans and we can discredit them, we ought to," said Baker. "On the whole, it's fairer and maybe more humane" than bombing a target, he said, describing the tactic as "dropping the truth on them."

Any system can be abused, Baker allowed, but he said fears of the policy drifting to domestic political opponents don't justify rejecting it. "On that ground you could question almost any tactic we use in a war, and at some point you have to say we're counting on our officials to know the difference," he said.

In addition to analyzing the content of their internet activities, the NSA also examined the targets' contact lists. The NSA accuses two of the targets of promoting al Qaeda propaganda, but states that surveillance of the three English-speakers� communications revealed that they have "minimal terrorist contacts."

In particular, �only seven (1 percent) of the contacts in the study of the three English-speaking radicalizers were characterized in SIGINT as affiliated with an extremist group or a Pakistani militant group. An earlier communications profile of [one of the targets] reveals that 3 of the 213 distinct individuals he was in contact with between 4 August and 2 November 2010 were known or suspected of being associated with terrorism," the document reads.

The document contends that the three Arabic-speaking targets have more contacts with affiliates of extremist groups, but does not suggest they themselves are involved in any terror plots.

Instead, the NSA believes the targeted individuals radicalize people through the expression of controversial ideas via YouTube, Facebook and other social media websites. Their audience, both English and Arabic speakers, "includes individuals who do not yet hold extremist views but who are susceptible to the extremist message,� the document states. The NSA says the speeches and writings of the six individuals resonate most in countries including the United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, Kenya, Pakistan, India and Saudi Arabia.

The NSA possesses embarrassing sexually explicit information about at least two of the targets by virtue of electronic surveillance of their online activity. The report states that some of the data was gleaned through FBI surveillance programs carried out under the Foreign Intelligence and Surveillance Act. The document adds, "Information herein is based largely on Sunni extremist communications." It further states that "the SIGINT information is from primary sources with direct access and is generally considered reliable."

According to the document, the NSA believes that exploiting electronic surveillance to publicly reveal online sexual activities can make it harder for these �radicalizers� to maintain their credibility. "Focusing on access reveals potential vulnerabilities that could be even more effectively exploited when used in combination with vulnerabilities of character or credibility, or both, of the message in order to shape the perception of the messenger as well as that of his followers," the document argues.

An attached appendix lists the "argument" each surveillance target has made that the NSA says constitutes radicalism, as well the personal "vulnerabilities" the agency believes would leave the targets "open to credibility challenges" if exposed.

One target's offending argument is that "Non-Muslims are a threat to Islam," and a vulnerability listed against him is "online promiscuity." Another target, a foreign citizen the NSA describes as a "respected academic," holds the offending view that "offensive jihad is justified," and his vulnerabilities are listed as "online promiscuity" and "publishes articles without checking facts." A third targeted radical is described as a "well-known media celebrity" based in the Middle East who argues that "the U.S perpetrated the 9/11 attack." Under vulnerabilities, he is said to lead "a glamorous lifestyle." A fourth target, who argues that "the U.S. brought the 9/11 attacks on itself" is said to be vulnerable to accusations of �deceitful use of funds." The document expresses the hope that revealing damaging information about the individuals could undermine their perceived "devotion to the jihadist cause."

The Huffington Post is withholding the names and locations of the six targeted individuals; the allegations made by the NSA about their online activities in this document cannot be verified.

The document does not indicate whether the NSA carried out its plan to discredit these six individuals, either by communicating with them privately about the acquired information or leaking it publicly. There is also no discussion in the document of any legal or ethical constraints on exploiting electronic surveillance in this manner.

While Baker and others support using surveillance to tarnish the reputation of people the NSA considers "radicalizers," U.S. officials have in the past used similar tactics against civil rights leaders, labor movement activists and others.

Under J. Edgar Hoover, the FBI harassed activists and compiled secret files on political leaders, most notably Martin Luther King, Jr. The extent of the FBI's surveillance of political figures is still being revealed to this day, as the bureau releases the long dossiers it compiled on certain people in response to Freedom of Information Act requests following their deaths. The information collected by the FBI often centered on sex -- homosexuality was an ongoing obsession on Hoover's watch -- and information about extramarital affairs was reportedly used to blackmail politicians into fulfilling the bureau's needs.

Current FBI Director James Comey recently ordered new FBI agents to visit the Martin Luther King, Jr. Memorial in Washington to understand "the dangers in becoming untethered to oversight and accountability."

James Bamford, a journalist who has been covering the NSA since the early 1980s, said the use of surveillance to exploit embarrassing private behavior is precisely what led to past U.S. surveillance scandals. "The NSA's operation is eerily similar to the FBI's operations under J. Edgar Hoover in the 1960s where the bureau used wiretapping to discover vulnerabilities, such as sexual activity, to 'neutralize' their targets," he said. "Back then, the idea was developed by the longest serving FBI chief in U.S. history, today it was suggested by the longest serving NSA chief in U.S. history."

That controversy, Bamford said, also involved the NSA. "And back then, the NSA was also used to do the eavesdropping on King and others through its Operation Minaret. A later review declared the NSA�s program 'disreputable if not outright illegal,'" he said.

Baker said that until there is evidence the tactic is being abused, the NSA should be trusted to use its discretion. "The abuses that involved Martin Luther King occurred before Edward Snowden was born," he said. "I think we can describe them as historical rather than current scandals. Before I say, 'Yeah, we've gotta worry about that,' I'd like to see evidence of that happening, or is even contemplated today, and I don't see it."

Jaffer, however, warned that the lessons of history ought to compel serious concern that a "president will ask the NSA to use the fruits of surveillance to discredit a political opponent, journalist or human rights activist."

"The NSA has used its power that way in the past and it would be na�ve to think it couldn't use its power that way in the future," he said.

So to recap: We have a program of "de-legitimization" of "radicalizers," based solely on their speech. The program is being discussed outside the NSA, with the DOJ and the DEA. None of the targets are "involved in terror plots." The NSA also analyzed the social graph of the targets and found... nothing particularly interesting. The program appears to operate in conjunction with the FBI, much like the way the NSA partners with GCHQ to get around its own limitations.

The language that has landed these people under the NSA microscope is what scares me the most. I know Snowden's documents only tell part of the story, but it doesn't seem like they're accused of saying anything much more radical than what you'd find here in D&D. The idea that by idly stating I think the NSA is ushering in an Orwellian state could lead the NSA to start compiling a dossier on my porn habits is terrifying. The moral of the story seems to be: Don't have a funny sounding name and anti-American opinions.

Burn the NSA to the ground, salt the remains.

# ¿ Nov 27, 2013 08:32

Kobayashi: Aug 13, 2004; by Nyc_Tattoo

Well we just got confirmation that the NSA is checking up on our porn habits, so I figure it's only a matter of time before we learnt hat medical records have been compromised too. Whether this is the story to do so or not, I don't know, but I'm already resigned to the fact that it's coming.

# ¿ Nov 29, 2013 03:54

Kobayashi: Aug 13, 2004; by Nyc_Tattoo

I wonder if Snowden has any from senior NSA officials or anything like that -- documents that speak to individual malfeasance, as opposed general indictments of the entire agency. If he does, I'm even more impressed that he's kept the focus on the organization as a whole, and not made it about individuals.

# ¿ Dec 16, 2013 18:29

Kobayashi: Aug 13, 2004; by Nyc_Tattoo

Paper Mac posted:

Snowden hasn't had anything to do with the choice of documents released, as far as I know. His reason for providing them to journos is so that they could make arm's-length decisions about which particular parts of the document cache were in the public interest to release, independent of Snowden's personal judgement.

True. At the beginning though, there were allusions to kind of contingency plan if Snowden was "disappeared." He also worked with journalists he trusted. So more accurately, I wonder if the 1.7 million documents Snowden took included emails from NSA leadership.

# ¿ Dec 16, 2013 21:34

Kobayashi: Aug 13, 2004; by Nyc_Tattoo

Paul MaudDib posted:

http://www.humanipo.com/news/38209/facebook-records-unpublished-message-study/

Not directly related, but I saw that and thought of the "they can see your thoughts as you type" thing. Sending the text back instead of metadata wouldn't be difficult.

Google Instant is similar, in that it always "knows" what you're thinking / accidentally pasting into the search box. Advertiser surveillance is creepy and awful too, but at least we know that no matter how powerful Google becomes, it will never know what Facebook knows.

# ¿ Dec 17, 2013 12:35

Kobayashi: Aug 13, 2004; by Nyc_Tattoo

Kurt_Cobain posted:

http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-nsa-uses-powerful-toolbox-in-effort-to-spy-on-global-networks-a-940969.html
If you can imagine it, they are probably doing it and then some.

I was just going to post this. I'm not sure what I think of this particular disclosure. I read the whole article, and while it is fascinating, it seems more like spy porn than useful disclosure. This seems like exactly the kind of high-touch, expensive, targeted surveillance that an intelligence agency should be engaged in. The Der Spiegel article doesn't even hint at any impropriety or abuses. Even the NSA's interest in Mexico is justified in that article. Overall, it's hard to fault the NSA on this one. The TAO comes off as a division of professionals.

On the other hand, I guess this is what happens when you operate a ridiculously overzealous surveillance dragnet. gently caress the NSA and its privacy-invading bullshit. This kind of arguably-harmful disclosure is its own damned fault and I'm not going to blame Snowden or Der Spiegel for it.

# ¿ Dec 29, 2013 18:55

Kobayashi: Aug 13, 2004; by Nyc_Tattoo

In case anyone hasn't seen this yet, the NSA is sucking up about 200 million text messages a day, mining them for contacts, financial records, and location information. I read this mean the NSA is basically monitoring text banking, flight updates, and missed call alerts.

The Guardian posted:

The National Security Agency has collected almost 200 million text messages a day from across the globe, using them to extract data including location, contact networks and credit card details, according to top-secret documents.

The untargeted collection and storage of SMS messages � including their contacts � is revealed in a joint investigation between the Guardian and the UK�s Channel 4 News based on material provided by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden.

The documents also reveal the UK spy agency GCHQ has made use of the NSA database to search the metadata of �untargeted and unwarranted� communications belonging to people in the UK.

The NSA program, codenamed Dishfire, collects �pretty much everything it can�, according to GCHQ documents, rather than merely storing the communications of existing surveillance targets.

The NSA has made extensive use of its vast text message database to extract information on people�s travel plans, contact books, financial transactions and more � including of individuals under no suspicion of illegal activity.

An agency presentation from 2011 � subtitled �SMS Text Messages: A Goldmine to Exploit� � reveals the program collected an average of 194 million text messages a day in April of that year. In addition to storing the messages themselves, a further program known as �Prefer� conducted automated analysis on the untargeted communications.

The Prefer program uses automated text messages such as missed call alerts or texts sent with international roaming charges to extract information, which the agency describes as �content-derived metadata�, and explains that �such gems are not in current metadata stores and would enhance current analytics�.

On average, each day the NSA was able to extract:

� More than 5 million missed-call alerts, for use in contact-chaining analysis (working out someone�s social network from who they contact and when)

� Details of 1.6 million border crossings a day, from network roaming alerts

� More than 110,000 names, from electronic business cards, which also included the ability to extract and save images.

� Over 800,000 financial transactions, either through text-to-text payments or linking credit cards to phone users

The agency was also able to extract geolocation data from more than 76,000 text messages a day, including from �requests by people for route info� and �setting up meetings�. Other travel information was obtained from itinerary texts sent by travel companies, even including cancellations and delays to travel plans.

Communications from US phone numbers, the documents suggest, were removed (or �minimized�) from the database � but those of other countries, including the UK, were retained.

The revelation the NSA is collecting and extracting personal information from hundreds of millions of global text messages a day is likely to intensify international pressure on US president Barack Obama, who on Friday is set to give his response to the report of his NSA review panel.

While US attention has focused on whether the NSA�s controversial phone metadata program will be discontinued, the panel also suggested US spy agencies should pay more consideration to the privacy rights of foreigners, and reconsider spying efforts against allied heads of state and diplomats.

In a statement to the Guardian, a spokeswoman for the NSA said any implication that the agency�s collection was �arbitrary and unconstrained is false�. The agency�s capabilities were directed only against �valid foreign intelligence targets� and were subject to stringent legal safeguards, she said.

The ways in which the UK spy agency GCHQ has made use of the NSA Dishfire database also seems likely to raise questions on the scope of its powers.

While GCHQ is not allowed to search through the content of messages without a warrant � though the contents are stored rather than deleted or �minimized� from the database � the agency�s lawyers decided analysts were able to see who UK phone numbers had been texting, and search for them in the database.

The GCHQ memo sets out in clear terms what the agency�s access to Dishfire allows it to do, before handling how UK communications should be treated. The unique property of Dishfire, it states, is how much untargeted or unselected information it stores.

�In contrast to [most] GCHQ equivalents, DISHFIRE contains a large volume of unselected SMS traffic,� it states (emphasis original). �This makes it particularly useful for the development of new targets, since it is possible to examine the content of messages sent months or even years before the target was known to be of interest.�

It later explains in plain terms how useful this capability can be. Comparing Dishfire favourably to a GCHQ counterpart which only collects against phone numbers that have specifically been targeted, it states �Dishfire collects pretty much everything it can, so you can see SMS from a selector which is not targeted�.

The document also states the database allows for broad, bulk searches of keywords which could result in a high number of hits, rather than just narrow searches against particular phone numbers: �It is also possible to search against the content in bulk (e.g. for a name or home telephone number) if the target�s mobile phone number is not known.�

Analysts are warned to be careful when searching content for terms relating to UK citizens or people currently residing in the UK, as these searches could be successful but would not be legal without a warrant or similar targeting authority.

However, a note from GCHQ�s operational legalities team, dated May 2008, states agents can search Dishfire for �events� data relating to UK numbers � who is contacting who, and when.

�You may run a search of UK numbers in DISHFIRE in order to retrieve only events data,� the note states, before setting out how an analyst can prevent himself seeing the content of messages when he searches � by toggling a single setting on the search tool.

Once this is done, the document continues, �this will now enable you to run a search without displaying the content of the SMS, especially useful for untargeted and unwarranted UK numbers.�

A separate document gives a sense of how large-scale each Dishfire search can be, asking analysts to restrain their searches to no more than 1,800 phone numbers at a time.

The note warns analysts they must be careful to make sure they use the form�s toggle before searching, as otherwise the database will return the content of the UK messages � which would, without a warrant, cause the analyst to �unlawfully be seeing the content of the SMS�.

The note also adds that the NSA automatically removes all �US-related SMS� from the database, so it is not available for searching.

A GCHQ spokesman refused to comment on any particular matters, but said all its intelligence activities were in compliance with UK law and oversight.

But Vodafone, one of the world�s largest mobile phone companies with operations in 25 countries including Britain, greeted the latest revelations with shock.

�It�s the first we�ve heard about it and naturally we�re shocked and surprised,� the group�s privacy officer and head of legal for privacy, security and content standards told Channel 4 News.

�What you�re describing sounds concerning to us because the regime that we are required to comply with is very clear and we will only disclose information to governments where we are legally compelled to do so, won�t go beyond the law and comply with due process.

�But what you�re describing is something that sounds as if that�s been circumvented. And for us as a business this is anathema because our whole business is founded on protecting privacy as a fundamental imperative.�

He said the company would be challenging the UK government over this. �From our perspective, the law is there to protect our customers and it doesn�t sound as if that is what is necessarily happening.�

The NSA�s access to, and storage of, the content of communications of UK citizens may also be contentious in the light of earlier Guardian revelations that the agency was drafting policies to facilitate spying on the citizens of its allies, including the UK and Australia, which would � if enacted � enable the agency to search its databases for UK citizens without informing GCHQ or UK politicians.

The documents seen by the Guardian were from an internal Wikipedia-style guide to the NSA program provided for GCHQ analysts, and noted the Dishfire program was �operational� at the time the site was accessed, in 2012.

The documents do not, however, state whether any rules were subsequently changed, or give estimates of how many UK text messages are collected or stored in the Dishfire system, or from where they are being intercepted.

In the statement, the NSA spokeswoman said: �As we have previously stated, the implication that NSA's collection is arbitrary and unconstrained is false.

�NSA's activities are focused and specifically deployed against � and only against � valid foreign intelligence targets in response to intelligence requirements.

�Dishfire is a system that processes and stores lawfully collected SMS data. Because some SMS data of US persons may at times be incidentally collected in NSA�s lawful foreign intelligence mission, privacy protections for US persons exist across the entire process concerning the use, handling, retention, and dissemination of SMS data in Dishfire.

�In addition, NSA actively works to remove extraneous data, to include that of innocent foreign citizens, as early as possible in the process.�

The agency draws a distinction between the bulk collection of communications and the use of that data to monitor or find specific targets.

A spokesman for GCHQ refused to respond to any specific queries regarding Dishfire, but said the agency complied with UK law and regulators.

�It is a longstanding policy that we do not comment on intelligence matters,� he said. �Furthermore, all of GCHQ's work is carried out in accordance with a strict legal and policy framework which ensures that our activities are authorised, necessary and proportionate, and that there is rigorous oversight, including from the Secretary of State, the Interception and Intelligence Services Commissioners and the Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee.�

GCHQ also directed the Guardian towards a statement made to the House of Commons in June 2013 by foreign secretary William Hague, in response to revelations of the agency�s use of the Prism program.

�Any data obtained by us from the US involving UK nationals is subject to proper UK statutory controls and safeguards, including the relevant sections of the Intelligence Services Act, the Human Rights Act and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act,� Hague told MPs.

# ¿ Jan 16, 2014 22:02

Kobayashi: Aug 13, 2004; by Nyc_Tattoo

^ Yeah, I've worked with companies with customer service organizations that could do real-time sentiment analysis of the Twitter firehose. If a customer service cost center can do it, I'm sure the NSA can too.

# ¿ Jan 17, 2014 17:52

Kobayashi: Aug 13, 2004; by Nyc_Tattoo

If you read the article, the NSA is also explicitly going after relationship and sexual orientation information, which is infuriating. The NSA has no goddamn business collecting that kind of information, and I'm fine with saying that the CIA or whatever has to do actual, human-based spying if they want to use that kind of information to blackmail someone. Databases of ruin indeed.

# ¿ Jan 28, 2014 00:49

Kobayashi: Aug 13, 2004; by Nyc_Tattoo

Tezzor posted:

Greenwald and Scahill with a new story:

https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/02/10/the-nsas-secret-role/

The site just launched and has been up and down, but the general gist of it is that a new source has come forward from the NSA to detail that the way drone assassination targets are selected is by their phone SIM cards, often with no confirmation or human intelligence whatsoever. We're not targeting people but SIM cards which can and are in the possession of others or even swapped around. Also, US drones are flying over Yemen and acting as false cell towers and essentially wardriving on the scale of cities.

Wait, what the gently caress is this:

quote:

For Bryant, the killing of Awlaki � followed two weeks later by the killing of his 16-year-old son, Abdulrahman al Awlaki, also an American citizen � motivated him to speak out.

I knew about Awlaki, which is bullshit to begin with, but then we turned around and murdered his 16 year old son? What the goddamn gently caress? How did I miss this? How can this possibly be justified? Jesus Christ.

# ¿ Feb 11, 2014 15:03

Kobayashi: Aug 13, 2004; by Nyc_Tattoo

God these people belong in prison.

# ¿ Feb 11, 2014 17:25

Kobayashi: Aug 13, 2004; by Nyc_Tattoo

Mineaiki posted:

Sometimes I wonder if the real purpose of the NSA and other domestic surveillance actors is to monitor people like the Kochs who are trying to subversively spend their way into radically changing the governmental structure of this country and set up a sort of plutocracy. Or Dick Cheney who uses wars to make himself and his friends a lot more wealthy.

I'm curious what has been revealed to date that could possibly make you think that.

# ¿ Feb 20, 2014 00:02

Kobayashi: Aug 13, 2004; by Nyc_Tattoo

Just in case anyone hasn't heard, there is a serious bug in Apple's SSL algorithms on iOS (fixed) and OSX (unfixed). I mention it here because the timing of the bug aligns pretty well with Apple being "added" to the Prism program. While there is no direct evidence that the NSA was involved, we're so far through the looking glass that "the NSA planted someone in Apple to sabotage their SSL implementation" is actually within the realm of possibility.

# ¿ Feb 24, 2014 22:27

Kobayashi: Aug 13, 2004; by Nyc_Tattoo

Main Paineframe posted:

What use does the NSA have for...

When has this stopped them from collecting it anyway?

# ¿ Feb 25, 2014 00:03

Kobayashi: Aug 13, 2004; by Nyc_Tattoo

Kalman posted:

Given that the only thing stored is on the phone and it's a hash of your fingerprint, not your actual fingerprint, yes, it is.

Eh, I'm not sure it's that clear cut. I can't really speak to what Samsung is doing, but the sensor in the iPhone is capable of some pretty high-resolution scans. Now, Apple claims that it's all isolated in hardware and completely inaccessible to apps, but it's still a proprietary stack that hasn't been audited by third parties, susceptible to human error. I tend to think of it as like the laptop camera light, which was widely thought to be hardwired to the camera even though that wasn't the case. Personally, I believe Apple's intentions are pure, but security is hard, and the NSA is a bunch of assholes. While it may be far-fetched to think this is something the NSA would try to collect in bulk, I don't think it's that crazy to imagine it as something in the TAO's wheelhouse.

# ¿ Feb 25, 2014 01:59

Kobayashi: Aug 13, 2004; by Nyc_Tattoo

Kalman posted:

Eh, I mean, it could be in TAO's book, but at the point you have a TAO implant set up on you, they already basically know who you are and don't so much care about your fingerprint. But yes, a tailored implant could theoretically capture your fingerprint if Apple is running the fingerprints through the software side of things instead of maintaining it in isolated hardware.

It's possible Apple screwed it up, but I'd think someone probably would have seen the traffic to the central database by now if they were sending it back wholesale. If it's tailored-only, I personally don't care, as I think the NSA being good at obtaining information on specifically targeted individuals and devices is exactly what they're supposed to do, but even if you don't, it doesn't raise anywhere near the questions blanket programs and wouldn't raise that specter.

I tend to agree with you, both that TAO has better things to, and that bulk fingerprint collection doesn't seem to be the kind of information the NSA really cares about. With that said, it looks like Samsung's implementation is more like the scanners in laptops than Apple's custom solution, to the point where it has its own APIs (end of 4th graf). My fear is that fingerprint data (either raw or a hash) represents the start of biometric surveillance. I can't think really think of any immediate dangers per se, but since it almost certainly falls under "the whole haystack," I would feel a hell of a lot better the NSA was legally restricted to collecting the needles instead of collecting all data everywhere forever.

# ¿ Feb 25, 2014 16:33

Kobayashi: Aug 13, 2004; by Nyc_Tattoo

Coach Sport posted:

So the GCHQ has the world's largest database of dick pics? I wonder if they include nudies when they pull someone's dossier.

Databases of ruin indeed.

:nsa:

# ¿ Feb 27, 2014 19:03

Kobayashi: Aug 13, 2004; by Nyc_Tattoo

Main Paineframe posted:

Did you know, that despite what the media would have you believe, white people can be terrorists too? Yes, they can be "actual terrorists", even if they're not Muslim! Domestic terrorists - American citizens born and raised in the good old US of A - are far more of a threat than Al-Qaeda. That's why every time somebody makes a joke or sarcastic remark about harming the president on Facebook or internet forums or anything else public, Secret Service agents show up at their house and interview them. The anti-terrorist agencies want to keep an eye on potential American terrorists just as much as they want to keep an eye on potential foreign terrorists, since all the Afghani surveillance in the world isn't going to stop the next Jared Loughner, Adam Lanza, John Allen Muhammad, Eric Rudolph, or Tim McVeigh.

And a bang up job they did in Boston, too.

# ¿ Feb 27, 2014 20:45

Kobayashi: Aug 13, 2004; by Nyc_Tattoo

Brannock posted:

Is it really worth giving up every last bit of our privacy just so we have a marginally better chance at stopping domestic terrorists?

I'm not convinced even this is true.

# ¿ Feb 27, 2014 21:11

Kobayashi: Aug 13, 2004; by Nyc_Tattoo

JeffersonClay posted:

A software algorithm can:
Perform its function without subconscious or hidden bias
Forget irrelevant personal information
Search text without any comprehension of content
Leave a verifiable record of its imputs and outputs

A software algorithm cannot:
Stalk its exgirlfriend
Fap to your texts
Use its power for personal gain
Gossip to its friends
Lie about its actions or motives

Yes, but those algorithms are written by people -- people who unwittingly introduce bugs, and who (consciously or not) imbue them with their own biases, politics, and predilections. Diane Forsythe wrote about this poo poo decades ago. Nowadays, instead of loving up AI algorithms in the lab, they're the primary inputs behind drone strikes, no-fly lists, and other serious, real-world consequences. Taking an uncritical view of said algorithms is just dangerous as anything a rogue individual can do.

EFB

# ¿ Feb 28, 2014 06:35

Kobayashi: Aug 13, 2004; by Nyc_Tattoo

JeffersonClay posted:

I agree that decisions about surveillance should be made in a risk vs reward framework. Something like (risk of false positives)x(impact of false positives) >/< (chance of preventing crimes) x (impact of crimes), let's ignore the negative impacts of reduced privacy for simplicity here.

The risk of false positives and the impact of false positives, as well as the chance of preventing crime are based not just on the amount of data collected, but how that data is used. For instance, if the data is being used to target drone strikes, the impact of false positives is significantly worse than if he data was being used as probable cause for a search warrant. So I don't see how you can reach a broad conclusion about the costs and benefits of mass surveillance generally.

If you're serious about a risk/reward framework, then it seems like a working definition of "terrorism" would be a good place to start.

# ¿ Feb 28, 2014 23:59

Kobayashi: Aug 13, 2004; by Nyc_Tattoo

Main Paineframe posted:

Or the NSA's surveillance system found signs and the administration ignored them because there wasn't really anything the US could do about it even with advance notice, and the question was dodged because it's basically a "gotcha" question that Alexander can't possibly answer in a way that doesn't either make him look bad or get him in serious trouble? What's he going to do, say "Yes, we were actively spying on Russia's most secret diplomatic and military communications and had full knowledge of everything they were saying" to a room full of reporters?

What exactly are these people being paid for, then?

# ¿ Mar 10, 2014 02:08

Kobayashi: Aug 13, 2004; by Nyc_Tattoo

Main Paineframe posted:

Secret things that they're not allowed to tell people (and especially the people they're spying on) about. If Alexander admitted to reporters that he was able to tap specific Russian communication channels without the Russians' knowledge, then the Russians would find out about it. In particular, there's no way we're going to openly announce that we know what another country's military is going to do before they do it. Also, the administration's lack of action would look worse if it turned out the administration knew about the invasion in advance (even though, realistically, advance notice changes nothing whatsoever); politically, it's far better to pretend to be surprised than to come out and admit "yeah, well, we knew it was coming but it's not like we were going to stick our necks out for Ukraine of all places".

This is why I can never get into modern Marvel comic movie remakes. For me, the notion that the Samuel L. Jackson is flying around on some aircraft carrier in the clouds, protecting me from the real dangers of the world just doesn't strike me as realistic, especially in the face of the heinous poo poo that happens on a regular basis in actual reality. Again, if ubiquitous global surveillance can't stop domestic terror attacks, can't stop international terror attacks, and can't affect international geo-political events like Russia/Ukraine, what is the point?

# ¿ Mar 10, 2014 14:57

Kobayashi: Aug 13, 2004; by Nyc_Tattoo

JeffersonClay posted:

Let's assume the US had full advance knowledge that Russia planned to invade Ukraine, with enough lead time for Ukraine to mobilize its army to resist said invasion. Would a shooting war be better than the status quo?

I'd like to think that the point of all this "intelligence" gathering is to head things off at the pass before "shooting war" and "do nothing" are the only options left. What that would entail, I have no idea, but then I'm not the one advocating for a an ubiquitous, inescapable global panopticon.

# ¿ Mar 10, 2014 18:21

Kobayashi: Aug 13, 2004; by Nyc_Tattoo

JeffersonClay posted:

So you have no idea what the CIA should have done but whatever they did is evidence that they can't do their jobs right?

A ongoing sense of geo-political instability, domestic criminal activity, and ongoing terrorism/radicalism, combined with the history of US policy and past intelligence abuses, failures, and general incompetence? Sure, I'm willing to call it all a waste of time and money.

# ¿ Mar 10, 2014 19:23

Kobayashi: Aug 13, 2004; by Nyc_Tattoo

Snowden says something interesting around the 26:00 mark, which is that not only is mass collection ineffective, it is actually a distraction that takes resources away from legitimate threats. He cites the Boston bombing and the underwear bomber as cases where we had clues, but didn't follow up on them because passive surveillance is easier than actual intelligence.

# ¿ Mar 12, 2014 03:30

Kobayashi: Aug 13, 2004; by Nyc_Tattoo

Tezzor posted:

As someone who has been a consistent critic of the NSA, I honestly think that this is a somewhat bigger deal than these other stories. If oversight was legitimate and honest one could make the argument that at least the system was functioning properly even if it was criminal and unethical. This shows that the intelligence agencies have gone rogue and any talk of oversight legitimizing their actions is a joke.

Yeah, the NSA disclosures seem mostly in realm of what could go wrong (although purposely undermining encryption standards and elevating offense over defense is damaging in its own right). The CIA, on the other hand, is a terrible loving agency that needs to be reined in. In fact, a lot of my trepidation about the NSA stems from the pattern of abuses from agencies like the CIA.

# ¿ Mar 12, 2014 21:58

Kobayashi: Aug 13, 2004; by Nyc_Tattoo

Main Paineframe posted:

The executive branch had promised they wouldn't investigate (not surprising, as the torture was almost certainly authorized by the executive), but the CIA was trying to hide things from a Congressional investigation, which isn't bound by any promises the administration may have made and probably didn't have any direct involvement in the torture program.

Should the CIA be punished for illegal activities the president ordered them to engage in, when that president won't be punished for his role? It's an interesting question. Morally, they probably should, but Congress didn't have any problems granting immunity to other entities that violated US law at the president's behest.

Al Jazeera is reporting that the CIA "knowingly misled the [Bush] White House, Congress and the Justice Department," so yes, burn that goddamn agency to the ground.

# ¿ Mar 18, 2014 22:03

Kobayashi: Aug 13, 2004; by Nyc_Tattoo

Video of Snowden's TED interview is up:
http://www.ted.com/talks/edward_snowden_here_s_how_we_take_back_the_internet

# ¿ Mar 19, 2014 15:01

Kobayashi: Aug 13, 2004; by Nyc_Tattoo

Main Paineframe posted:

Were they acknowledged by the CIA as unlawful at the time? Don't forget, Bush had White House lawyers writing legal opinions saying that "enhanced interrogation" was legally permitted and sending copies of those memos to the CIA. If the CIA genuinely thought the tactics were lawful, doesn't responsibility rest with the ones who concocted that legal justification? This isn't just a hypothetical, either - the Obama administration has written similar legal opinions declaring the legality of the NSA mass surveillance, although they're still keeping their legal interpretations and justifications classified and no one has leaked them yet. If your boss hands you a letter from a government lawyer saying the order he gave you is legal, are you really responsible if it turns out to be illegal?

Besides, if everyone that carries out unlawful orders gets off without punishment except for the newly politically unpopular group, the only lesson anyone learns is "lobby harder next time".

As I pointed out above, the CIA went beyond even what the White House and the DOJ at the time authorized. This line of argument hews pretty close the "just following orders" line of Godwin debates, but when you're talking about literally torturing people to death, maybe that's not such a ridiculous comparison to make.

# ¿ Mar 19, 2014 20:18

Kobayashi: Aug 13, 2004; by Nyc_Tattoo

Sancho posted:

I utterly reject the statement that 'privacy is over.' Privacy is coming back in a big way and I'll shell out big bucks for those providers who can strengthen privacy.

Yeah, the more optimistic take on this whole thing is that the era of monetizing exclusively through advertising has hit its peak.

# ¿ Mar 25, 2014 15:52

Kobayashi: Aug 13, 2004; by Nyc_Tattoo

lancemantis posted:

What do you mean by not at all compartmentalized?

One dude shouldn't have unfettered access to absolutely everything. While there does come a point where you have to trust your admins, the fact that the NSA doesn't even know what he took strongly suggests that their internal systems just weren't set up securely at all.

# ¿ Mar 26, 2014 04:31

Kobayashi: Aug 13, 2004; by Nyc_Tattoo

AreWeDrunkYet posted:

People were arguing for the phones as tools for exposing police abuses at protests, not secrecy. If your phone automatically uploads a video that is then shared online, no amount of NSA tomfoollery is going to suppress that. And really, even without a phone how are you going to hide the fact that you were at a protest short of a balaclava (that will promptly get you detained/pepper sprayed anyway)?

And if you want to maintain at least a layer of privacy, buy a burner with cash.

If you want privacy at a protest, wear a ski mask, pad your clothes, vary your gait, and pay someone to carry your cell phone through your "normal" routine so that it doesn't suddenly stop moving while you're away.

# ¿ Mar 26, 2014 23:41

Kobayashi: Aug 13, 2004; by Nyc_Tattoo

Fried Chicken posted:

It's terrifying to think how much could be backdoored onto today's chips. If they had some spyware using just 0.01% of a current microprocessor's power, that is the equivalent of the full usage of a 1994 PC. Those seem quaint now, but you could run a lot of software with those specs.
If they have fast factoring then it means it is both achievable and discover-able in the near term by concentrated effort(the NSA classified mathematics isn't that far ahead from the public). That means the entire global economy is completely hosed. If that were the case you would think you would see their commercial partners start to roll out some sort of change over plan... unless of course the NSA valued preserving the methodology they use to protect the status quo over preserving the status quo itself. That's a possibility, but I'm going to choose to believe it means SSL is further compromised instead, and P stil =/= NP. Because otherwise the rational response is to sit gibbering in a corner sucking my thumb.

Snowden keeps saying encryption works, so I doubt the NSA has broken the underlying math in some fundamental way. They may have various targeted exploits, but it doesn't seem like they a wholesale compromise.

E:

Fried Chicken posted:

I really doubt that is all of them. Greenwald needs to stop doling these out and dump them all so we can find out.

I'd like details too, but pitting the NSA against the private sector seems like it's been a pretty brilliant move on Greenwald's part. Every new story like this is another cycle of PR management from the companies named. Every hamfisted response from the NSA has the potential to breed distrust or a sense of betrayal by the companies named.

Kobayashi fucked around with this message at 02:53 on May 14, 2014

# ¿ May 14, 2014 02:50

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# ¿ Apr 28, 2024 10:54

Kobayashi: Aug 13, 2004; by Nyc_Tattoo

Yeah, loving polio is resurgent in Pakistan because the CIA are a bunch of psychotic shitheads. Anyone who had a hand in approving that program belongs in prison.

# ¿ May 21, 2014 03:42

The Something Awful Forums > Discussion > Debate & Discussion > Surveillance in the 21st Century: Press CTRL-C to Copy the Internet (NSA Thread)

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