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jonnypeh posted:Iraqi tanks had hand-cranked turrets so while they were turning those around a Bradley could launch and reload TOW missiles. Bullshit. The Iraqi T-72s came in four flavors: 1) The Soviet built T-72M - an analog of the original Soviet T-72 Ural 2) The Iraqi license-built T-72M (assembled from imported parts kits) 3) The Soviet built T-72M1 - an analog of the Soviet T-72A (1979 model) 4) The Iraqi built Lion of Babylon - a domestically produced and upgraded version of the T-72M1. Laser rangefinders, Belgian night sights, laminated armor on the front hull, a Chinese electro-optical countermeasure pod, etc. (Aside from those upgrades, ALSO assembled from imported parts kits). The Soviets exported tanks exactly one generation behind their current production vehicles - except for those vehicles they strictly did not export (like the T-64). When they were producing the T-72A they sold the T-72M. When they were producing the T-72B they sold the T-72M1. Similarly when they started making the T-72BM, they sold the T-72S. You saw a lot of bullshit propaganda flying around after the war making wild claims about how the Soviet built version was TOTALLY STRONGER THAN WEAK EXPORT MODEL BECAUSE *COMPLETELY UNSUBSTANTIATED REASON* - which isn't really surprising when you consider Russia was still seeking to sell a shitload of T-72s and did everything they could to muddy the waters right down to changing the model number of the newest T-72 to T-90. Hell, before Syria spawned a million Youtube videos of such things happening there were a shitload of people claiming the whole catastrophic explosion thing (the one that famously launches the turret into the air) was just a big lie invented by the US. T___A posted:The west pretty much ignored the T-64 and assumed it was a monkey model T-72. Warbadger fucked around with this message at 00:57 on Sep 21, 2014 |
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Sep 20, 2014 17:08
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A Buttery Pastry posted:I'm not just talking about Ukraine, which I've admitted is a sticky situation which will require some skillful politicking from the West to at least partially unfuck, but your entire perspective on NATO-Russian relations since the end of the Cold War. If that's the case, then I'm not sure what you mean about being unwilling to have NATO risk any sort of confrontation. I'm perfectly willing for them to confront Russia diplomatically on a host of issues. I just think it's really stupid to take moves that we know will cause them to behave exactly the opposite of what we want, and that includes expanding NATO things and planting ABM sites in former Warsaw Pact countries. MeLKoR posted:It's really no surprise that a lot of people are calling you out, if everybody is "getting you wrong" maybe you should try to figure out what is making people think that? The reason why people are getting me wrong is because they aren't actually reading what I'm writing, and that clearly goes for you too. It also is because apparently people in the other thread have a difficult time distinguishing between, "I think this is right/wrong" and "I think this would be helpful/unhelpful." quote:I've been reading your posts on both threads and despite your occasional statements that "Putin is the bad guy" the actual content of your posts boils down to: Let's add a couple more factors into this analogy: 1: There is no police to phone in this case, because...well, there is no world police. States exist in an anarchic environment. A college freshman could tell you that. 2: In this analogy, you and your neighbor both have guns pointed at each other. 3: Your neighbor also has a gun pointed at his wife. 4: You're too far away to disarm him and it's pretty clear that if you make a dash for him, he'll start shooting. What I am advocating is that we try to talk said neighbor down off the ledge. You seem to be in favor of trying to bullrush him. quote:Then why have you spoken against sanctions as just another form of escalation? When have I ever done this?  I'm all for sanctions.
Majorian fucked around with this message at 18:03 on Sep 20, 2014 |
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Sep 20, 2014 17:50
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MeLKoR posted:Correction, why the Kremlin says it is doing it. We already know why they claim they are doing what they are doing, we just think they are full of poo poo. Someone compared it with Nazi Germany and apart from the obvious fact that Putin isn't Hitler the rest of the comparison is sound. First of all why should we believe what "Germany" claims are their motivations and second why should we care what their motivations are when they are trouncing their neighbors? Do me a favor - if you're not going to actually read what I've written, try reading some of the articles I posted in the OP. They do a really good job of spelling out why the invasion of Ukraine is about security concerns, and why this isn't just some sort of Nazi Germany-type land grab. The Kremlin isn't saying security concerns are their motivations; they're saying that they're trying to protect ethnic Russians in Eastern Ukraine. They haven't said anything about being afraid of Ukraine joining NATO and getting more nukes/ABMs placed on their border. So it's ridiculous for you to imply that I've somehow bought into Kremlin propaganda that doesn't exist.
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Sep 20, 2014 17:58
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Majorian posted:I genuinely love this. Is the rest of this show any good? I think I have it on Netflix Streaming. First season is worth a watch- it repeats itself too much after that in my opinion. The Thick Of It, the show it inspired, I quite enjoyed. And nary do I go a day without watching a bit of Clarke and Dawe. Majorian posted:Do me a favor - Naturally in Terence Stamp's voice Dilkington fucked around with this message at 18:07 on Sep 20, 2014 |
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Sep 20, 2014 18:05
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Majorian posted:If that's the case, then I'm not sure what you mean about being unwilling to have NATO risk any sort of confrontation. I'm perfectly willing for them to confront Russia diplomatically on a host of issues. I just think it's really stupid to take moves that we know will cause them to behave exactly the opposite of what we want, and that includes expanding NATO things and planting ABM sites in former Warsaw Pact countries.
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Sep 20, 2014 18:24
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Dilkington posted:First season is worth a watch- it repeats itself too much after that in my opinion. The Thick Of It, the show it inspired, I quite enjoyed. Oooh, that one's on Hulu for free! And it's got Peter Capaldi in it! Nice. I will definitely binge on that today! quote:Naturally in Terence Stamp's voice "The Limey" Stamp, or General Zod-Stamp? Because I could see it working either way.
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Sep 20, 2014 18:25
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A Buttery Pastry posted:Yeah, that's the "minor risk in return for protecting millions" I was talking about in the other thread. I don't buy the idea that NATO expansion played a significant part in triggering Russia's current behavior, Why not? There are a lot of experts that have a lot more experience in this field than you or I do that say otherwise. Why was George Kennan wrong when he predicted that eastward NATO expansion would lead to exactly the sort of behavior from Russia that we're seeing now? Where do Professor Blank or Ambassador Matlock's arguments go wrong, in your view? quote:rather, the short period after the collapse of the USSR was an aberration caused by everyone with any sort of power being distracted by power struggles. There's no reason to believe Russia dropped its imperialism with the Soviet Union, since Russian imperialism has basically been the state ideology for half a millennia, and was never occupied or treated in a fashion that could truly dissuade them from further imperialism. (Unlike for example Germany and Japan.) How do you explain their behavior during the 90's, though? It wasn't all a uniform period of them being too weak to lift a rifle, and they could have behaved aggressively against their neighbors. Hell, even when Putin was in power, they didn't even act aggressively after the Orange or Rose Revolutions, when they easily could have. So why did they start in 2008? I'm not saying that Russia's cultural mindset as a "Great Power" that deserves to be respected and feared went up and smoke the second midnight on Dec. 31, 1991 struck - obviously it didn't. But there was a notable shift in behavior in Russia, that corresponds with shifts in how the Western powers treated them. The historical record simply doesn't back up the notion that Putin and his government are mini-Hitlers who won't stop conquering unless NATO sends in their own troops. quote:It's perhaps not so much that you explicitly argue not challenging the Russians ever, but your interpretation of their actions and motivations are simply so generous that any kind of challenge automatically becomes unreasonably aggressive. But that's not true - again, I'm fully supportive of well-targeted sanctions and engaging them diplomatically over this issue. The fact that I don't support NATO military action in Ukraine doesn't mean that I categorically oppose any sort of military confrontation with Russia in any scenario. And my reading of Russian actions and motivations is intended to suss out how the U.S. and its allies can best get Russia and its proxies to leave Ukraine alone, while sacrificing the minimal number of Ukrainian lives, and while trying to leave open the possibility of a constructive relationship with Moscow in the future. (which is something that the U.S. really, really wants)
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Sep 20, 2014 18:41
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One issue is that NATO and the EU both need firm and open red lines that they are willing and able to defend, I believe there is a will to defend NATO's current borders and friendly Western "associates" like Finland and Sweden. However, outside of that sphere, it comes far more murky and NATO's ability to seriously project against an adversary with modern weaponry is limited, more than most of the public would believe at this point. The US has interests around the world, but that blade cuts two ways especially since the US doesn't seem to be able to "wrap up" its other distractions. The weakness of European NATO has already been talked about. In the end, in a practical sense the West has to pick and choose its battles at this point, it has the economic resources and technology to enforce its will in a practical sense but Norquistism and austerity has unquestionably taken a toll. So basically either the West pulls back somewhere or a radically different ideological push needs to come, and Putin has sensibly bet on the former. I don't think this is news, but needs to be spelled out. Personally, I don't think Russian intentions are purely defensive, obviously imperialism and expansionism is to play in a large part. However, I think NATO's expansion in a time of Russian weakness caused its own paranoia, which is predictable. Ultimately, in the end, it was worth it to allow NATO to expand during that period despite Russian objections, those nations wanted to join and it would ultimately benefit the West to have a "defensive" belt in the East. The issue though is the West as a whole has severely underestimated Russian resolve to not only retake up expansionism but how far that paranoia has gone. In addition, I think there has been a sever underestimation of Russian militarily professionalism and training, that goes back to the first Gulf war. quote:Bullshit. The Iraqi T-72s came in four flavors: You are forgetting the "Saddam" locally built models of the T-72, which supposedly did not have many of the features of the T-72M1 or the "Asad Babil." Also, I have heard conflicting information about many of the features of the "Asad Babil" itself especially that some of its steel might have been subpar. Also, there is skepticism that they even had laser rangefinders or laminated armor, at least across the bulk of the tanks. Also, the T-72M1/T-72A was still obviously inferior to the T-72B or various T-72B variants that were being produced from 1985 to 1991. I think the argument still holds that the US especially vastly underestimated their capabilities to the experience of the Gulf War and Saddam's particular way of running his very large and useless military.
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Sep 20, 2014 20:06
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Majorian posted:Why not? There are a lot of experts that have a lot more experience in this field than you or I do that say otherwise. Why was George Kennan wrong when he predicted that eastward NATO expansion would lead to exactly the sort of behavior from Russia that we're seeing now? Where do Professor Blank or Ambassador Matlock's arguments go wrong, in your view? Majorian posted:How do you explain their behavior during the 90's, though? It wasn't all a uniform period of them being too weak to lift a rifle, and they could have behaved aggressively against their neighbors. Hell, even when Putin was in power, they didn't even act aggressively after the Orange or Rose Revolutions, when they easily could have. So why did they start in 2008? I'm not saying that Russia's cultural mindset as a "Great Power" that deserves to be respected and feared went up and smoke the second midnight on Dec. 31, 1991 struck - obviously it didn't. But there was a notable shift in behavior in Russia, that corresponds with shifts in how the Western powers treated them. The historical record simply doesn't back up the notion that Putin and his government are mini-Hitlers who won't stop conquering unless NATO sends in their own troops. Majorian posted:But that's not true - again, I'm fully supportive of well-targeted sanctions and engaging them diplomatically over this issue. The fact that I don't support NATO military action in Ukraine doesn't mean that I categorically oppose any sort of military confrontation with Russia in any scenario. And my reading of Russian actions and motivations is intended to suss out how the U.S. and its allies can best get Russia and its proxies to leave Ukraine alone, while sacrificing the minimal number of Ukrainian lives, and while trying to leave open the possibility of a constructive relationship with Moscow in the future. (which is something that the U.S. really, really wants)
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Sep 20, 2014 20:55
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A Buttery Pastry posted:Just because you predict what's going to happen does not mean you've accurately identified the cause. No, but the fact that I have evidence that backs up my argument certainly suggests that I have. I'm fully open to talking about why you think that I haven't accurately identified the cause, but you're going to have to be specific, and I'd advise you to check out my cited sources, because they may answer some of your critiques already. I'm not saying these sources are infallible, either, of course. But they do make strong arguments, so if you disagree with what they're saying, please be specific there as well. I'd genuinely welcome a fruitful, honest, and well-thought-out discussion on this topic that brings new perspectives to the table.  quote:Yeah, that's probably why I've never argued they were. So what, exactly, are you advocating? What, do you think, would be the best course of action in dealing with Russia, moving forward? quote:As for the other two, I don't recall, what were their arguments? I have them up in the OP - part of Kennan's is quoted.
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Sep 20, 2014 22:05
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Ardennes posted:You are forgetting the "Saddam" locally built models of the T-72, which supposedly did not have many of the features of the T-72M1 or the "Asad Babil." I actually mentioned the Saddam, that was the license built T-72M. I've also heard the "totally inferior steel" thing before. However, given that the domestically produced variants were only *assembled* in Iraq from imported kits I'm going to call that one bullshit too. The only armor plate for a T-72 actually produced in Iraq was the laminate armor plate they slapped on the front of the hull - for which I've seen zero actual evidence for it being of poor quality steel. And of course the Iraqi 1970s and upgraded early 1980s T-72s were inferior to the mid-80s variant. However, that isn't what the "monkey model" claims tend to be about. Warbadger fucked around with this message at 00:29 on Sep 21, 2014 |
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Sep 20, 2014 23:42
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Majorian posted:"The Limey" Stamp, or General Zod-Stamp? Because I could see it working either way. A Buttery Pastry posted:Yeah, that's the "minor risk in return for protecting millions" I was talking about in the other thread. I don't buy the idea that NATO expansion played a significant part in triggering Russia's current behavior Majorian posted:Why not? There are a lot of experts that have a lot more experience in this field than you or I do that say otherwise. Why was George Kennan wrong when he predicted that eastward NATO expansion would lead to exactly the sort of behavior from Russia that we're seeing now? Where do Professor Blank or Ambassador Matlock's arguments go wrong, in your view? It shouldn’t have been surprising that Ukraine moving out of Russia’s orbit would provoke a response, and potentially a NATO-Russia confrontation. I think what ABP meant, and what I’ve previously argued was that a coercive Russia influence would exist in Ukraine even without NATO expansion (you addressed Russian aggression in the absence of NATO in a previous post here). I want to point out three questions that were frequently floated in the Eastern European thread, and I think were sometimes confused with each other: 1. Is NATO “culpable” for the Russian invasion of Ukraine? 2. Did Russia have interests in Ukraine so vital that they felt they needed to invade? 3. Did Russia have those interests because of a general trend in NATO expansion? If you answer the third question in the affirmative, then I think you would also have to say “yes” to the first question. The second is evidently “yes.” One problem in this debate I think is that you Majorian have provided very strong evidence for the second question being “yes,” but not as much for the third question being “yes.” I’ll lay out again briefly why I think myself and some others are negative on the third question, and then I’ll address your evidence: I think we could reasonably imagine a scenario in which NATO hadn’t expanded into the former Warsaw Pact, but Russia still invaded Ukraine in response to Yanukovych’s losing control, even if NATO had explicitly signaled that Ukraine would never be admitted to the alliance . I cannot, however, imagine a Russian invasion of Ukraine if Russia did not have interests that demanded a coercive influence on that country’s internal politics. These are big assumptions, but I make them in part because I don’t view Russian actions in Ukraine as being motivated by radically new conditions, or inconsistent with past behavior. I’m going to quote myself from the EE thread: quote:Great powers try to influence other states sometimes in a harsh, hegemonic way, and sometimes in a subtler way. The USSR's domination of the Warsaw Pact nations was the harsh kind. I think the way the Russian Federation's influence is present in Belarus, Chechnya, the breakaway states, and other places in the near abroad- also, harsh. The expansion and maintenance of this sort of hegemony precludes the influence of other great powers in those countries, and necessarily conflicts with the right of self determination. These define Russian great power ambitions. Russia does these things because it has very good historical reasons for wanting to maximize its own security. This did not change after the dissolution of the USSR. To expand on the above quote: obviously Russia circa 1991 did not become like a middle power and cease trying to exert a coercive influence on the internal politics of its neighbors. From the very beginning of the post-Soviet period, they tryed to wrangle a not inconsiderable amount of influence in Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Belarus, etc. And why wouldn’t they? It’s not as though Russia’s strategic security improved after the fall. The motivations were still there- geographical and historical reasons why Russia wants to be “big brother” in a region full of non-threatening states (the black box issue: I’ve talked about domestic politics in previous posts; I’ll touch on it again with Kennan). It’s my view that none of the evidence you’ve provided shows the early nineties to be a watershed moment for Russian strategic thinking- i.e. it doesn't address "question 3" as from before. First of all, they’re mostly interviews, not comprehensive ones either, so they’re a lot of supposition and not so much substantive argumentation (not that IR is blessed with a superabundance of concrete arguments). Blank and Schneider talk about Russian perceptions of being threatened by NATO expansion. No mystery there. Matlock is similar; here he is paraphrasing the supposed consensus of experts immediately post-fall: quote:“Do not expand NATO eastward. Find a different way to protect eastern Europe, a way that includes Russia. Otherwise, eventually there’s going to be a confrontation, because there is a red line, as far as any Russian government is concerned, when it comes to Ukraine and Georgia and other former republics of the Soviet Union.” George Kennan: quote:"I was particularly bothered by the references to Russia as a country dying to attack Western Europe. Don't people understand? Our differences in the cold war were with the Soviet Communist regime. And now we are turning our backs on the very people who mounted the greatest bloodless revolution in history to remove that Soviet regime." I find this hard to reconcile with the realism he espoused throughout his career (I haven’t gotten to his biography yet). Domestic politics are a very real and important determinant of a state’s behavior, but so are geography, history, and how many tanks you’ve got. I've always suspected that Yeltsin's retraction of his overture to NATO was because he found the whole Russian political and military establishment arrayed against the idea. As they should! Russia is not “dying to attack Western Europe of course,” but it does have some strategic concerns in common with the former Soviet Union, and ultimately with Nick, Catherine and Peter too. I don't think that's particularly strange, or that there's something in their DNA. If tomorrow China seamlessly transformed into a democracy, it wouldn’t suddenly resolve the conflicts of interests between it and the US+allies. Might make them easier to manage, sure, but it would not fundamentally transform the balance of power in the Pacific. A Buttery Pastry posted:rather, the short period after the collapse of the USSR was an aberration caused by everyone with any sort of power being distracted by power struggles. There's no reason to believe Russia dropped its imperialism with the Soviet Union, since Russian imperialism has basically been the state ideology for half a millennia, and was never occupied or treated in a fashion that could truly dissuade them from further imperialism. (Unlike for example Germany and Japan.) It's perhaps not so much that you explicitly argue not challenging the Russians ever, but your interpretation of their actions and motivations are simply so generous that any kind of challenge automatically becomes unreasonably aggressive. Majorian posted:How do you explain their behavior during the 90's, though? It wasn't all a uniform period of them being too weak to lift a rifle, and they could have behaved aggressively against their neighbors. Hell, even when Putin was in power, they didn't even act aggressively after the Orange or Rose Revolutions, when they easily could have. So why did they start in 2008? I'm not saying that Russia's cultural mindset as a "Great Power" that deserves to be respected and feared went up and[sic] smoke the second midnight on Dec. 31, 1991 struck - obviously it didn't. But there was a notable shift in behavior in Russia, that corresponds with shifts in how the Western powers treated them. The historical record simply doesn't back up the notion that Putin and his government are mini-Hitlers who won't stop conquering unless NATO sends in their own troops. In regards to bold section in your post I quoted- is there any history in particular you can recommend that shows this? I think it’s obvious I’m no Russia history expert. Incidentally, if anyone wants to share book recommendations, e2: redacted e: cleaned up some notes and errors I missed Dilkington fucked around with this message at 08:49 on Sep 26, 2014 |
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Sep 21, 2014 03:08
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Dilkington, my read on Kennan is that he attempted to differentiate mass and elite pressure in choices of foreign policy. His contention that American policy regard the Soviet states as a product of elite appeal informed his elucidation of containment, that is, to contain the mass appeal of Soviet power as the most efficient means by which the Russian peoples could be forced to change their ruling class in a manner most beneficial to American interests. However, it would appear that the current Russian Federation is carrying out the mass appeal of foreign policy, rather the elite interests. While it advances elite interests, its base is in action acceptable to the Russian peoples. That is what makes this Ukranian crisis different: it is not a conflict between American and European foreign policy and Russian elites, it is, at essence, a conflict with Western interests and a population unswayable through soft power in an efficient manner most in line with democratic interests. My Imaginary GF fucked around with this message at 04:10 on Sep 21, 2014 |
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Sep 21, 2014 03:23
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Dilkington posted:George Kennan: From what I've read of Kennan, he was always, ironically, something of a Russophile in his own way, as well as something of a right-wing authoritarian ("I hate democracy; I hate the press...; I hate the 'peepul.'"). That doesn't necessarily make him wrong here.
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Sep 21, 2014 03:36
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Back to dronechat:Dead Reckoning posted:[regarding air launched decoys] The decoys have a 500+ mile range, long enough to be well out of SAM range, and can be launched from C-130s. http://www.airforce-technology.com/news/news120185.html https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GZ6sNtatga8 Since you can buy a thousand MALDs for the price of a single F-35, it seems likely that there will be large numbers of these things used in any near-peer state conflict. This is how Raytheon imagines it will work. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vZyL-zEoMfM LurkingAsian fucked around with this message at 09:53 on Sep 21, 2014 |
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Sep 21, 2014 09:51
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NcHHjTBOMkA http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2014/09/21_a_6229661.shtml Peace march in Moscow utjkju fucked around with this message at 14:38 on Sep 21, 2014 |
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Sep 21, 2014 14:17
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utjkju posted:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NcHHjTBOMkA "World" would be this. If you meant this you should write "peace".
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Sep 21, 2014 14:27
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Kopijeger posted:"World" would be this. If you meant this you should write "peace". Ok, thanks.
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Sep 21, 2014 14:36
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People on march shout: "Revolution" and "Putin - the thief". It doesn't belong to Ukraine. These are white ribbons. In the same place Nemtsov, Navalny etc.
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Sep 21, 2014 15:03
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Dilkington posted:First season is worth a watch- it repeats itself too much after that in my opinion. The Thick Of It, the show it inspired, I quite enjoyed. And nary do I go a day without watching a bit of Clarke and Dawe. That is a corageous statement to make regarding Yes Minister, minister, and made entirely without consideration of the necessity to set up an interdepartmental commission to consider all possible points of view in the context of an inquiry towards a possible recurrence of themes in this television series in order to evaluate the possibility of making a recommendation as to whether such a recurrence might affect the enjoyability of said television series on the whole. Seconding The Thick Of It, and definitely also watch "Party Games", the final Yes, Minister/first Yes, Prime Minister episode (it's on youtube).
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Sep 21, 2014 16:09
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My Imaginary GF posted:Dilkington, my read on Kennan is that he attempted to differentiate mass and elite pressure in choices of foreign policy. His contention that American policy regard the Soviet states as a product of elite appeal informed his elucidation of containment, that is, to contain the mass appeal of Soviet power as the most efficient means by which the Russian peoples could be forced to change their ruling class in a manner most beneficial to American interests. Thanks for the executive summary MIGF. I think I met you at an IL public policy event? I'll try to get in touch. I've been reading up on Dugin and "4th way politics;" I find it hard to believe that it's a major force in what's usually a pretty canny Russian strategic studies establishment. I know Putin sometimes calls Russia a "Eurasian country" , and that' actually true- but is it also a dog whistle? Dilkington fucked around with this message at 16:34 on Sep 21, 2014 |
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Sep 21, 2014 16:13
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A Buttery Pastry posted:Are you serious? You know, ´the visa free Regime Russia agreed to with Ukraine was a big reason why about 3 Million Ukrainians, who would have propably been Russian loyalists if they stayed in Ukraine, ended up in Russia. Which left Ukraine far more galician than it used to be.
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Sep 22, 2014 06:52
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My goodness, Dilkington - that's a drat good post you've made there! It's late, so I'll respond to it in as detailed a manner as I can manage. If I miss or glaze over an important point you've made, don't hesitate to let me know and I'll respond to it tomorrow. First, and obviously most importantly, the issue of Terence Stamp: it may seem like a tautology, but Stamp is a seriously underrated actor, and that goes double for his later career. One of the things that drove me crazy about that movie "Valkyrie" was how good the supporting cast was, how well they fleshed out the visuals of the Third Reich...and how unbelievably awful Tom Cruise was as Stauffenberg. Stamp was only in what, two scenes? Yet he and Bill Nighy and Kenneth Branagh basically stole that whole movie. (David Bamber was also a surprisingly good Hitler) Secondly, with regard to counterfactuals involving NATO not expanding into Eastern Europe in the 90's: quote:I think we could reasonably imagine a scenario in which NATO hadn’t expanded into the former Warsaw Pact, but Russia still invaded Ukraine in response to Yanukovych’s losing control, even if NATO had explicitly signaled that Ukraine would never be admitted to the alliance . I cannot, however, imagine a Russian invasion of Ukraine if Russia did not have interests that demanded a coercive influence on that country’s internal politics. This is a very valid point to make, but it's also a question that raises other important questions - an alternate history that has a butterfly effect of its own that I think it would pay to follow for a couple steps, and I think you'll see why. If we take as a given the counterfactual that NATO had followed the advice of experts like Kennan, and not expanded into Eastern Europe in the 90's, how might that have affected Russian domestic politics in the aftermath of that decision? Would Yeltsin have been forced into such desperate straits, as far as national approval ratings are concerned? (in reality, Yeltsin left office with an approval rating of 5%) Would Putin have been a shoo-in for his successor? Would Russian nationalism have been as stoked as it has been without NATO expansion? Would Moscow have held such a firm grip on Ukraine if it didn't fear that it would slip out of their orbit into the West's? Would the Orange Revolution have happened as it did? Would Moscow have clung as tightly to Yanukovych as it did? Would the controversy over ABMs in former Warsaw Pact states have taken place? I can think of more, but you get the picture. I'm not saying that any, much less ALL, of these variables would have turned out differently if NATO hadn't allowed the former Warsaw Pact states to join. But I am saying that some or all of these factors may have turned out differently, and if they had, who knows? Maybe we wouldn't be in the situation we are today. Now, I think you're 100% right when you say that Russia wouldn't have invaded Ukraine at all if it didn't perceive its interests there as needing a coercive influence, if threatened. But the point I've been trying to make, as far as this extended discussion is concerned, is that the US and its allies tripped that threshold for perceived threat in a manner that was ultimately unnecessary and counterproductive. I think this was due to a fundamental misreading of how the Russian government (and the voting public) view their interests in the "near abroad" (which includes, but is in no ways restricted to, Ukraine). Misreadings like this are why I can't ever attach myself to schools of thought like Neorealism, for example, by the way - while I like my foreign policy to have a Realist flavor, I'm a Constructivist. Things like power and security and state-level units matter, but the way in which individual states and other entities define these concepts varies from person to person. ~Each nation's collective perception of itself is a beautiful, unique snowflake~ Anyway, what I'm trying to illustrate here is that, while Russia's security interests (and geopolitical interests in general) did not change between the fall of the USSR, the early 90's, and today, their perception of threat has. This is where NATO blundered: by assuming that, since they saw expanding eastward as benign, and so did the states into which they expanded, everyone else saw it as the act of a benevolent hegemon. Unfortunately, this turned out not to be the case. Yet it's not like NATO leadership or the Clinton White House weren't warned - that's part of why I posted the interview with Kennan, after all. (again, I say that as a fan of Clinton's presidency in general) That brings me to the sources I've cited: keep in mind, my aim in posting those wasn't so much to create a comprehensive theory for Russian behavior. My main purpose in citing them was to demonstrate that my analysis of NATO expansion, and the behavior it has partially provoked from the Kremlin, is widely-held among genuine experts who have experience in dealing directly with the Russians. Another part of the reason why I used the sources I did, to be completely honest, was because I simply don't have access to as many academic journal pieces as I'd like at the moment, since I've been out of school for way too long. That said, I'm fairly certain that I could find a more rigorous piece or two on the matter, if that's what you and others would like. I understand completely, by the way, that by citing these sources, there is an implicit appeal to authority in them. I'm usually pretty skeptical of arguments that rely on appeals to authority, but I think in this case they are at least somewhat valid, given that there isn't all that much empirical evidence that can be conducted on counterfactuals, like "What if NATO had never expanded eastward?" One of the major limitations in the realm of political science is that you can't conduct "experiments" with real states or political actors, per se. Actors and/or states interact with one another, history plays out as it does, and it's impossible to actually replicate the result of any one of these interactions, since variables never play out exactly the same way twice. That's a big reason why I'm super-skeptical about the movement among academics to make political science as "hard" a science as possible. At any rate, it's situations like these where experience and insight that has stood the test of time counts for quite a bit, in my opinion, and that's part of why I hold Kennan's opinion to be so important. Speaking of whom... quote:I find this hard to reconcile with the realism he espoused throughout his career (I haven’t gotten to his biography yet). Domestic politics are a very real and important determinant of a state’s behavior, but so are geography, history, and how many tanks you’ve got. I've always suspected that Yeltsin's retraction of his overture to NATO was because he found the whole Russian political and military establishment arrayed against the idea. As they should! MIGF gave a really great response to this part already, but I would add to it (as I think you'll find in the man's bio) that Kennan was no doctrinaire Realist, in the sense that, for example, Kenneth Waltz is. Kennan was a government official/analyst whose job demanded a certain degree of eclecticism. He had to acknowledge that domestic politics played an important role, because hey, guess what, doctrinaire Realists? They do. (the fact that Neorealists downplay these factors so much is yet another reason why I don't like that school of thought) I think you're almost certainly correct when you say that Yeltsin's domestic political troubles played a big role (perhaps the most important role) in his backpedalling away from the possibility of Russia joining NATO. But my point in bringing that case up is that I think it's clear that NATO's inability to react decisively to this proposal just made the situation worse - especially since they never really had a comprehensive response to Yeltsin's wish to join the alliance. quote:In regards to bold section in your post I quoted- is there any history in particular you can recommend that shows this? I think it’s obvious I’m no Russia history expert. Well, this is another area where it gets into muddy causality, but I would say for most of the period between 1991 and 2004, Moscow's relations with Kiev were fairly cordial. Now, obviously, the causality question that arises is, "Well, was that just because the Kremlin had a puppet regime in the form of Kuchma and Yanukovytch?" To which the answer is, "Probably in part, yeah" - but at the same time, as you yourself have pointed out very eloquently, fault lines between states do not disappear overnight. Some still existed between Ukraine and Russia, particularly during the Kravchuk administration: the status of Crimea and Sevastopol, possession of Soviet-era nuclear weapons, Ukraine's continued participation in the CIS, etc. Yet these disputes remained relatively quiet, at least publicly - the Russian government hardly presented itself as aggressive or paranoid during this period. True, part of that was due to their post-Cold War relative state of weakness, but the fact that the calmness in relations between the two countries remained until the early-mid 2000's - when the US began pushing for Ukrainian NATO membership, and the Color Revolutions happened - suggests to me that there's a lot more to this. Russia's geopolitical interests may not have changed between the Yeltsin and Putin eras, but their perception of threat from the West certainly did. I'm sure the fact that we had a President who seemed bent on invading countries for no better reason than that he didn't like their leaders didn't help allay those fears, of course.  Anyway, I'm going to leave off there for tonight, but again, if I've missed a point that you made, let me know and I'll try to address it. Thanks again for the really cool discussion - let's keep it going, and everyone who wants to be involved and can keep it civil, please join in! Majorian fucked around with this message at 09:30 on Sep 22, 2014 |
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Sep 22, 2014 09:28
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Majorian posted:If we take as a given the counterfactual that NATO had followed the advice of experts like Kennan, and not expanded into Eastern Europe in the 90's, how might that have affected Russian domestic politics in the aftermath of that decision? Would Yeltsin have been forced into such desperate straits, as far as national approval ratings are concerned? (in reality, Yeltsin left office with an approval rating of 5%) Would Putin have been a shoo-in for his successor? Would Russian nationalism have been as stoked as it has been without NATO expansion? Now these things depend on the Russian people's perception of NATO expansion as a threat, and I don't think it matters much here. Without active anti-NATO propaganda, it's something they have no real reason to care about because it has no impact on their daily life. They can certainly appreciate NATO enlargement as a failing of Yeltsin, but in the end it's not something they're going to hold over him until election time, because NATO enlargement is a very abstract consideration and it didn't stop the new NATO members from keeping on doing business as usual with Russians. It's something that'd only matter in case of military conflict, and without strong propaganda people don't want conflict anyway. This is separate from Russian decision-makers' perception of NATO enlargement.
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Sep 22, 2014 14:22
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Cat Mattress posted:Now these things depend on the Russian people's perception of NATO expansion as a threat, and I don't think it matters much here. Not just NATO, though - the West in general. Remember, this is after Shock Therapy we're talking about. Russia's economy has been through the ringer thanks to Western economists, the collapse of 1998 takes place, and now the Cold War-era anti-Russia alliance is creeping steadily towards their borders? What are the Russian people supposed to think about that? They certainly aren't going to see it as the actions of a benevolent hegemon. I'm not saying that this counterfactual would have saved Yeltsin's presidency - it probably wouldn't have, on its own. But it seems unlikely to me that NATO not expanding eastward would not have made an appreciable difference in the political mindset of many Russians.
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Sep 22, 2014 15:57
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nuke em NUKE EM ALL NUKES NUKES NUKES NUKES NUKES NUKES NUKES
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Sep 22, 2014 16:35
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SHISHKABOB posted:nuke em Now now, Lucy Heartfilia, you know you don't need an alt account in this thread!
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Sep 22, 2014 16:37
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I'm really sad that you think I'm an alt account. Like seriously. This is a major blow to my psyche. thanks a lot
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Sep 22, 2014 16:44
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 ~Fat Brando was riiiiiight~
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Sep 22, 2014 16:45
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Cat Mattress posted:Now these things depend on the Russian people's perception of NATO expansion as a threat, and I don't think it matters much here. Without active anti-NATO propaganda, it's something they have no real reason to care about because it has no impact on their daily life. They can certainly appreciate NATO enlargement as a failing of Yeltsin, but in the end it's not something they're going to hold over him until election time, because NATO enlargement is a very abstract consideration and it didn't stop the new NATO members from keeping on doing business as usual with Russians. It's something that'd only matter in case of military conflict, and without strong propaganda people don't want conflict anyway. it is amusing to read to the Russian person about thoughts of the Russian people )))
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Sep 22, 2014 17:05
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Majorian posted:Not just NATO, though - the West in general. Remember, this is after Shock Therapy we're talking about. Russia's economy has been through the ringer thanks to Western economists, the collapse of 1998 takes place, and now the Cold War-era anti-Russia alliance is creeping steadily towards their borders? What are the Russian people supposed to think about that? They certainly aren't going to see it as the actions of a benevolent hegemon. NATO's not related to anything economic though? Except maybe for that "at least 2% GDP on defense" thing that isn't enforced and that nobody actually respects. So NATO not extending would not have changed anything wrt. shock therapy. I dispute that NATO enlargement is something that actually bothers the populace, in the absence of propaganda efforts to make them bothered by it.
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Sep 22, 2014 17:26
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Cat Mattress posted:NATO's not related to anything economic though? Except maybe for that "at least 2% GDP on defense" thing that isn't enforced and that nobody actually respects. I'm Russian. I can tell that you don't understand the Russian mentality. You know nothing about Russia and the Russian people. I see that you have no knowledge of how pass history lessons in schools of Russia. Otherwise you wouldn't write that you write. It is difficult to me to explain to foreigners some moments. It is necessary to complete simply a school course of history in Russia, and you will be disturbed by NATO expansion. ) Russia is always ready to war. Russia doesn't trust anybody. We have a saying: "You want the peace - prepare for war" utjkju fucked around with this message at 20:31 on Sep 22, 2014 |
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Sep 22, 2014 17:34
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utjkju posted:I'm Russian. I can tell that you don't understand the Russian mentality. You know nothing about Russia and the Russian people. I don't want war. I'm an American and I have friends in Russia. It would hurt me to see anyone getting messed with on either side. I've always tried to live my life with a little bit of empathy, or maybe a lot - and it has never been really hard for me to understand how a lot of our behavior could very easily be perceived to be threatening. Somewhere amid all the mistrust - there's at least a few of us on both sides who are hoping that things will work out. I'm sure a lot of people on both sides of the coin just want things to get better and work out, not to get worse. I wish we could be more friendly towards each other.
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Sep 22, 2014 18:01
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The argument that the population of Russia is filled with constant warlust makes joining NATO sound like a very good decision.
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Sep 22, 2014 18:11
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Sunset posted:I don't want war. I'm an American and I have friends in Russia. It would hurt me to see anyone getting messed with on either side. I've always tried to live my life with a little bit of empathy, or maybe a lot - and it has never been really hard for me to understand how a lot of our behavior could very easily be perceived to be threatening. Somewhere amid all the mistrust - there's at least a few of us on both sides who are hoping that things will work out. I'm sure a lot of people on both sides of the coin just want things to get better and work out, not to get worse. I wish we could be more friendly towards each other. We have no hatred to Americans, Ukrainians, Europeans or to other people. Even now. But it is necessary to understand. The history of my country has a set of examples of wars. The Russian people try not to forget about these wars. To us since the childhood say that war can begin at any time. And people always prepare for it. It is heavy to me to explain it to you. Well for example, people do stocks of potato, carrot, onions and other products in cellars. People do flour and sugar stocks. So our grandmothers and grandfathers who lived at the time of World War II did. People remember the Siege of Leningrad. At any unclear political actions people first of all will go to buy a bag of buckwheat, a flour and sugar. ) The grandmother always had a reserve of salt, tea and matches. At school of all learn to use gas masks, to tell about different types of the weapon, about chemical and etc. Children learn to rescue itself at leakage of chlorine, ammonia and other poisonous gases.
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Sep 22, 2014 18:22
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utjkju posted:I'm Russian. I can tell that you don't understand the Russian mentality. You know nothing about Russia and the Russian people. Everything I ever wanted to know about Russian history I learned from watching Scarface 57 times.
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Sep 22, 2014 18:26
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amanasleep posted:Everything I ever wanted to know about Russian history I learned from watching Scarface 57 times. It means that you didn't want to know something about Russia.
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Sep 22, 2014 18:36
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Cat Mattress posted:NATO's not related to anything economic though? Except maybe for that "at least 2% GDP on defense" thing that isn't enforced and that nobody actually respects. No, but it's a general perception of the West trying to screw Russia over. The Russian public sees the 90's as a period of the West taking advantage of Russia's relative weakness by forcing it (through the IMF) to engage in social engineering experiments that wrecked the economy, and in the meantime encircling it strategically. quote:I dispute that NATO enlargement is something that actually bothers the populace, in the absence of propaganda efforts to make them bothered by it. If you have a look at this preview from Russia Faces NATO Expansion: Bearing Gifts Or Bearing Arms?, you'll see that nearly 40% of Russians viewed the U.S. as a potential threat in 1997 - before even the economic collapse of 1998 and the Kosovo conflict. Opposition leaders and many media sources (which were not as subject to government control then as they are now) expressed vocal opposition to NATO expansion. (you need to register for a free JSTOR account to view that article, but it's definitely worth a read - extremely prophetic for a 1999 piece) Moreover, 43% of Ukrainians viewed NATO as a threat in 2008, while only 15% saw it as a potential protector. Keep in mind, this was when they had a relatively pro-US, anti-Moscow regime in power. That number went up to 46% by 2012, and even right before the Maidan crisis and the overthrow of Yanukovych, more Ukrainians viewed NATO as a threat than a protector. (although the difference had shrunk to 29% vs. 17%, for understandable reasons) e: True, in the late 90's-early 2000's, your average Russian citizen probably would have listed economic and social issues as more important to their day-to-day lives than NATO expansion. But to suggest that didn't care about it at all just isn't borne out by the evidence. --- On a separate topic, I would like to post a fascinating piece from the Arms Control Association (ACA) that I stumbled upon a few minutes ago. It is a critique of a written correspondence between then-Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchinson (R-TX) and the Clinton White House in 1997, regarding the latter's policy of supporting NATO eastward expansion. The whole thing is pretty incredible in how badly the Administration misjudged Russia's likely response to NATO expansion, and how on-point Hutchinson's questions were. Each question-and-answer comes with a critique from the ACA. This particular exchange sticks out the most to me: (emphasis mine) quote:10. When one looks at the threats to American national security interests, foremost among these is Russia's substantial nuclear arsenal. Considerable progress has been made to lessen nuclear tensions through dramatic arms reductions in the past decade. And, for the moment, the current leadership in Russia is becoming reconciled to the likelihood of NATO expansion. But what of tomorrow's Russian leaders? By expanding eastward, are we not creating an incentive for Moscow to withhold its support for further strategic arms reductions and perhaps even develop an early first use nuclear policy? quote:Administration's Response: The objective of our trans Atlantic security policy is an undivided, democratic and peaceful Europe. NATO enlargement is an important part of that strategy. So is our effort to support the development of a Russia that is democratic, prosperous, at peace with its neighbors, and cooperating with us and other states on a range of security challenges, including mutual reductions in our nuclear arsenals. So also is our effort, which bore fruit in May in the signing of the NATO Russia Founding Act, to institutionalize a broad and cooperative relationship between the alliance and Russia. quote:Critique: The administration recognizes that "President Yeltsin and other Russian leaders oppose NATO enlargement," but it rather off handedly dismisses Russian opposition as based on a "misperception" of NATO as posing a threat to Russia's security. The origins of this "misperception" about NATO expansion are left unanalyzed by the administration, but they are not difficult to discern. The administration itself points out that enlargement would "make NATO more effective in meeting its core mission: countering aggression against its member states." And one of the principal, and undisguised, reasons the Central and Eastern European countries seek to join NATO is protection against aggression by Russia. And people wonder why Russia refuses to discuss reductions of its tactical nuclear weapons arsenal. Majorian fucked around with this message at 18:41 on Sep 22, 2014 |
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Sep 22, 2014 18:36
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utjkju posted:But it is necessary to understand. The history of my country has a set of examples of wars. The Russian people try not to forget about these wars. Your country has been in a lot of wars? Really?  Welcome to life in the Old World, everybody has been in a lot of wars. My country has been invaded more times by Spain alone than your country has been invaded by everyone else combined so I guess we have no choice but to provide money\equipment\shelter to Basque separatists because those shifty spaniards are probably preparing the next invasion  right now.
MeLKoR fucked around with this message at 19:13 on Sep 22, 2014 |
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Sep 22, 2014 19:10
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MeLKoR posted:Your country has been in a lot of wars? Really? Dude, don't do this. Yes, every country has had its tough periods. Russia certainly has had its share over the last 100 years. Let's not minimize other people's experiences, please.
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Sep 22, 2014 19:27
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