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CommieGIR posted:Congrats. You are making the logic equivalent of putting your fingers in your ears and going 'LALALALALALA I CAN'T HEAR YOU' Again, I think we've misunderstood one another. I never purported to offer logical proof of God's existence (which I think is almost surely impossible), but merely to characterize a more modern take on a very inventive and compelling argument - specifically, how S5 in modal logic (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S5_%28modal_logic%29) establishes that if you can convincingly characterize God as necessary being in any possible world, you have proven God's existence. I thought it was a good topic to bring into the finding out if God exists thread. CommieGIR posted:Nope. Either you prove how he is somehow a necessary component to reality, or you stop trying to make claims you can't back. I did. I did drop the necessity claim, because I agree that it's not evidently true or something that is easy (or even possible) to prove. Which is why I'm content to remain an atheist. And I was not necessarily trolling - pushing the envelope on the ontological argument (even if it is in a fair, philosophically accurate way) does seem to piss some people off though. [/quote] CommieGIR posted:You make claims to imply god is a necessity to everyday reality and materialistic objects. I did no such thing! Something necessarily existing doesn't imply that it's responsible for everything (or anything) else.
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Dec 11, 2014 02:54
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Ernest Hemingway posted:Again, I think we've misunderstood one another. I never purported to offer logical proof of God's existence (which I think is almost surely impossible), but merely to characterize a more modern take on a very inventive and compelling argument - specifically, how S5 in modal logic (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S5_%28modal_logic%29) establishes that if you can convincingly characterize God as necessary being in any possible world, you have proven God's existence. I thought it was a good topic to bring into the finding out if God exists thread. I don't think you know how this actually works. Ernest Hemingway posted:Again, I think we've misunderstood one another. I never purported to offer logical proof of God's existence (which I think is almost surely impossible), but merely to characterize a more modern take on a very inventive and compelling argument - specifically, how S5 in modal logic (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S5_%28modal_logic%29) establishes that if you can convincingly characterize God as necessary being in any possible world, you have proven God's existence. I thought it was a good topic to bring into the finding out if God exists thread. No, it doesn't.
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Dec 11, 2014 02:57
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CommieGIR posted:No, it doesn't. How so? Have I mischaracterized S5? (This is a very real possibility since I'm by no means an expert in modal logic.) ...or do you reject S5 altogether?
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Dec 11, 2014 03:03
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Ernest Hemingway posted:How so? Have I mischaracterized S5? (This is a very real possibility since I'm by no means an expert in modal logic.) No, you utilized S5 correctly, but as someone pointed out earlier, you could use this logic to apply to....anything imaginary. Unicorns. Perfect Girlfriends. Anything. quote:The fallacies of the argument are issues which a clever theologian could fix with some rewording and addition of some other premises. However, the argument can be completely broken and made laughable by simply changing "God" to "The Most Perfect Island" (or something similar). The argument remains structurally valid (that is, nothing in the symbolic formulation of the argument is incorrect), however, we come to the laughable conclusion that "The Most Perfect Island" must exist. You could also replace "God" with "Unicorns" and define "Unicorns" as "that than which no greater horse can be conceived". We now have an argument for the existence of unicorns, another mythological creature.
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Dec 11, 2014 03:07
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CommieGIR posted:No, you utilized S5 correctly, but as someone pointed out earlier, you could use this logic to apply to....anything imaginary. Unicorns. Perfect Girlfriends. Anything. I've already spoken to this. The 'that which no greater can be conceived' issue speaks to older formulations (specifically, Anselm's), and while it is by no means a trivial response, it is a basic and obvious one that has been well addressed and which loses relevance once you get into more modern formulations such as the modal approach that I've done my best to describe in this thread. It's why you're more likely to encounter 'the perfect island' response to Anselm in high school or introductory undergraduate courses than in actual philosophy discourse. When it comes to the ontological argument, the conversation really has moved past that point.
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Dec 11, 2014 03:23
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Ernest Hemingway posted:I've already spoken to this. The 'that which no greater can be conceived' issue speaks to older formulations (specifically, Anselm's), and while it is by no means a trivial response, it is a basic and obvious one that has been well addressed and which loses relevance once you get into more modern formulations such as the modal approach that I've done my best to describe in this thread. It's why you're more likely to encounter 'the perfect island' response to Anselm in high school or introductory undergraduate courses than in actual philosophy discourse. Doesn't really prove/disprove god, nor make him a 'necessity' still. That's the problem: Proving god a necessity requires showing that he is somehow felt through a real and tangible and observable phenomenon. That is the biggest problem with Metaphysics and why Naturalism is king: You can postulate all you want about the philosophical implications, but at the end of the day its just mental exercises with no real benefit or end
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Dec 11, 2014 03:28
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Ernest Hemingway posted:God is an entirely perfect being. Necessary existence is a trait of an entirely perfect being. Immanuel Kant demonstrated quite handily that existence is a property of concepts, not a property of objects, so this statement is utter bullshit. EDIT: Oh wait you already tried addressing this.
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Dec 11, 2014 03:33
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Unless I'm missing something he's conflating necessary existence (i.e., anything that necessarily exists) with God, which still begs the question (even if you're only predicating God in this one way).
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Dec 11, 2014 06:07
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ShadowCatboy posted:Immanuel Kant demonstrated quite handily that existence is a property of concepts, not a property of objects, so this statement is utter bullshit. To be fair, in issuing this statement I was only stating the assumption behind my previous claim that "There is a possible world where a necessary supernatural being exists." (which is arguably also bullshit). And you're exactly right about Kant, who has been the schoolyard bully of the ontological argument for centuries. That said, his argument in The Critique isn't quite the death knell it is often made out to be. While it certainly made people shut up out the ontological argument for awhile, more recent attempts to revive the argument that operate via modal considerations are intriguing and can't be dismissed off-hand. Ultimately, Kant's objection may hold - but it is still important to be able to demonstrate how it holds in the face of more sophisticated formulations of the ontological argument. Modal logic appears to offer, at the very least, some wiggle room for would-be rationalizing theists. e.g. Plantinga's response is well known: http://mind.ucsd.edu/syllabi/02-03/01w/readings/plantinga.html
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Dec 11, 2014 06:28
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Ernest Hemingway posted:To be fair, in issuing this statement I was only stating the assumption behind my previous claim that "There is a possible world where a necessary supernatural being exists." (which is arguably also bullshit). Have you considered the possibility that the existence or nonexistence of gods makes absolutely no difference to your lived experience, as you suffer alone and without purpose in an indifferent universe just as you would if there were no gods?
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Dec 11, 2014 07:49
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Ernest Hemingway posted:You're thinking in terms of existence/non-existence and not in terms of necessary existence/contingent existence - your conception of the perfect cookie might include it's existence - but as Kant established, existence is not something that can be predicated onto something- i.e. regardless of what qualities A consists of, it either exists or it doesn't (You can have a real or imaginary A with qualities C,B,D - but you can't have an imaginary A that also exists ) this is why "The perfect (X) argument fails to address a more refined understanding of the ontological argument. When you imagine the perfect cookie existing, you don't imagine it necessarily existing - and you couldn't because cookies can't necessarily exist (i.e. there is at least one possible world where the cookie is not on the table). I don't say this really ever, but lay off the pot.
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Dec 11, 2014 08:59
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Jack Gladney posted:Have you considered the possibility that the existence or nonexistence of gods makes absolutely no difference to your lived experience, as you suffer alone and without purpose in an indifferent universe just as you would if there were no gods? I think that's a little too meta for this thread. But yes, I am a fan of Woody Allen if that's what you're asking.
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Dec 11, 2014 15:57
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Perry Mason Jar posted:Unless I'm missing something he's conflating necessary existence (i.e., anything that necessarily exists) with God, which still begs the question (even if you're only predicating God in this one way). The entire logical argument is begging the question, because necessity requires some form of materialism, one way or the other.
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Dec 11, 2014 16:11
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Ernest Hemingway posted:While it certainly made people shut up out the ontological argument for awhile, more recent attempts to revive the argument that operate via modal considerations are intriguing and can't be dismissed off-hand. They kind of can. I have to already accept the existence of this so-described God to prove the existence of Him. It's almost nonsensical: "accepting that of course God exists, we can now use that to prove that God exists. QED."
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Dec 11, 2014 18:51
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In addition to what's already been posted: 1) How are we to define "perfection"? While I think semantic quibbling is normally a poor substitute for an argument, given the initial argument rests on unspoken assumptions about the nature of "perfection", I don't think it's unreasonable to ask for at least a provisional definition of what "perfection" actually entails. What other predicates, for example, could one attach to a "perfect being" besides that of existence? Would a perfect being be "perfectly good" for example? Could we not then suggest that a being who is simultaneously perfectly good and perfectly evil is a more perfect being than one which is merely perfectly good? Or could a perfect being be simultaneously perfectly black and perfectly white? Or would that just make it imperfectly grey? Are there gradations of perfection, or is it a binary thing - you're either perfect or you're not? Am I more perfect than Sisyphus, say, by virtue of my existence? Or would other factors (like my less than super-human strength) also have to be taken into consideration? Or would we be forced to say that there is no such thing as a perfect human being? If not, why not? 2) Why would we automatically assume that existence would be a necessary aspect of perfection? More pointedly, why wouldn't we assume that non-existence would be a more reliable indicator of perfection? Let's take the example of a "perfect circle". The point here is that the perfect circle does not exist - indeed, cannot exist - beyond the rarefied logic of mathematics. Any attempt to create or identify an existing "perfect circle" would be met with failure: there is no possibility of a perfectly enclosed, two dimensional shape, in which all points of the shape are precisely equidistant from its centre, ever existing. The point is not merely that such a shape does not exist, it's that it cannot exist - its non-existence must therefore be taken as a necessary condition of its perfection. Why would we not similarly assume that God would be made more perfect by rising above the messy, contingent world of existence and being placed in the transcendent, unchanging world of (non-existing) pure concept? Or, as a slightly more oblique point, take the issue of mythology. The scholar Kenneth Burke coined the term "perfectionism" for the tendency in myth to gradually strip away all situating, real-world factors over the course of generations of re-tellings, until it is finally left as bare narrative, unencumbered by the messy details which pertain to actual, existing events (which I write about in more detail in here if anyone is interested). To use the Sisyphus comparison again, could we not say that he is more perfect than I by virtue of not being bound to any specific time and place? Or that he never has to eat, or sleep, or poo poo? Would we not be able to say that his transcendence of circumstance into the realm of pure concept makes his non-existence decidedly more perfect than my own existence? Could we not similarly say that a mythical God would be more perfect than a God bound by circumstance to our own messy, contingent realm of existence? That the Mythical God of Christianity and Islam is more perfect than an existing God who must commit himself to supporting the claims of one side over the another?
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Dec 11, 2014 20:05
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To see if I've followed https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%27s_ontological_proof correctly: We define a set of properties as "positive" with some rules (if A is positive ¬A isn't. If A is positive and implies B, B is positive). We say something, is "goddy" if it has all positive properies. We further assume "goddiness" is a positive property. We then assume that if a property is positive, we can prove it is.(*) We also assume that necessary existence (suitably defined) is positive (**) From this, we can prove that there is a goddy thing in our model. I'm going to assume the logic holds here, did I get it right? If so: why are "positive" properties good things? Why is the "goddy" thing a god and not something else? Why the hell are we assuming (*)? That looks really loving powerful. Lots of people seem to be questioning (**), which actually seems pretty watertight, it's the dodgy class of "positive" properties that seems off to me, along with (*).
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Dec 11, 2014 23:30
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Ernest Hemingway posted:God is an entirely perfect being. Necessary existence is a trait of an entirely perfect being. Hoooold up there cowboy. Are you saying a contingent truth (this world) or a possible truth (other worlds) are all necessary truths? Because that would break a lot of logic! edit: Oh I see, S5. Huh. I'm going to need to scratch my head over that one a bit. duck monster fucked around with this message at 08:55 on Dec 12, 2014 |
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Dec 12, 2014 08:48
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Dzhay posted:Lots of people seem to be questioning (**), which actually seems pretty watertight, it's the dodgy class of "positive" properties that seems off to me, along with (*). Well that's exactly the point I was trying to make above. According to Godel's proof which you posted above: quote:Definition 1: x is God-like if and only if x has as essential properties those and only those properties which are positive I'm not sure how the positive attributes -> God -> necessary existence train of logic can ever really be sustained, even according to the hermetic logic of theology. Why should we necessarily accept that existence is an intractably "positive" (or "perfect") quality of a being such as God, when many theological traditions would claim the opposite? We needn't even run as far as Buddhism for an exploration of the idea that the most perfect, insuperable element of the universe might be nothingness. How would those proffering such ontological proofs deal with the traditions of negative or apophatic theology in both Christianity and, more prominently, in Islam? To quote from that wiki article: quote:John Scotus Erigena (9th century): "We do not know what God is. God Himself does not know what He is because He is not anything. Literally God is not, because He transcends being." Why should we take this categorisation of God (where his non-existence is taken as a sign of his perfection) less seriously than the positive ontological "proof" of Anselm?
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Dec 12, 2014 10:34
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Ernest Hemingway posted:There is a possible world where a necessary supernatural being exists. There is a possible world where a necessary supernatural being exists. If it is possible that it is necessary for a supernatural being to exist, then it is necessary that this supernatural being exists. It is necessary that this being (Dracula) exists. There is a possible world where a necessary celestial teapot exists. If it is possible that it is necessary for a celestial teapot to exist, then it is necessary that this celestial teapot exists. It is necessary that this celestial teapot exists. Piell fucked around with this message at 18:21 on Dec 12, 2014 |
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Dec 12, 2014 18:17
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Piell posted:There is a possible world where a necessary supernatural being exists. If the aim of the ontological argument is to 'define things into existence', or predicate existence onto a contingent subject, then it surely fails... and so much has been established through Gaunilo and Kant. The response has to be that it aims to do something else - and in the modal case it is trying to establish the possibility of a necessary being. And this being is usually characterized as something like a being "of maximum greatness", which includes an argument for why only this being could be considered a necessary being. To avoid the risk of sounding like a lunatic again, I won't elaborate, and will leave it to you to figure out why this approach wouldn't apply to Dracula or anything else that would be substituted into the 'lost island' rebuttal. GAINING WEIGHT... posted:They kind of can. I have to already accept the existence of this so-described God to prove the existence of Him. It's almost nonsensical: "accepting that of course God exists, we can now use that to prove that God exists. QED." I hate to nitpick, but the argument doesn't depend on the initial assumption of God existing - it depends entirely on establishing that it is possible for God to exist. It is by no means successful in doing this. But it is important to account for this turn if one wishes to respond to it effectively - (i.e. not with the drat island argument). Blurred posted:I'm not sure how the positive attributes -> God -> necessary existence train of logic can ever really be sustained, even according to the hermetic logic of theology. Why should we necessarily accept that existence is an intractably "positive" (or "perfect") quality of a being such as God, when many theological traditions would claim the opposite? We needn't even run as far as Buddhism for an exploration of the idea that the most perfect, insuperable element of the universe might be nothingness. How would those proffering such ontological proofs deal with the traditions of negative or apophatic theology in both Christianity and, more prominently, in Islam? Yeah, I've never really understood how anyone purports to import value statements into what is essentially supposed to be an analytical argument....however once you established the logical 'proof' of God's existence, you could resort back to usual theological channels to account for the 'apparent' negative qualities one might associate with God in any given religious tradition. The argument seeks to prove God's existence, not explain God's behaviour. I think for it the argument to work in the way that theists want it to, you really have to begin with accepting the assumption that there is a moral order to the universe - otherwise you'll never accept the characterization of 'perfection' that religious philosophers start to work with. To be fair to Plantenga, he understands this point and withdraws the 'proof' for a weaker conclusion: Alvin Plantenga posted:But obviously this isn't a proof; no one who didn't already accept the conclusion, would accept the first premise. The ontological argument we've been examining isn't just like this one, of course, but it must be conceded that not everyone who understands and reflects on its central premise -- that the existence of a maximally great being is possible -- will accept it. Still, it is evident, I think, that there is nothing contrary to reason or irrational in accepting this premise. What I claim for this argument, therefore, is that it establishes, not the truth of theism, but its rational acceptability. And hence it accomplishes at least one of the aims of the tradition of natural theology.
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Dec 12, 2014 20:15
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Ernest Hemingway posted:If the aim of the ontological argument is to 'define things into existence', or predicate existence onto a contingent subject, then it surely fails... and so much has been established through Gaunilo and Kant. Is it possible he exists? Yes. Does that make him a necessity seeing as he has no presence on this plane of existence? No. There could be a guy named 'Bob' in another plane of existence. Unless Bob has real effect on this plane of existence, he is an unnecessary entity. He is not PART of the system that is currently a closed loop. Defining god does not make him a reality. A possibility, sure, but that doesn't make him a necessity because he was defined. It makes him a possibility, just like its possible that suns are just really giant light bulbs and not giant fusion reactors. This is almost along the lines of what groups like Freeman On The Land argue, and it doesn't work. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freemen_on_the_land
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Dec 12, 2014 20:31
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Ernest Hemingway posted:To be fair, in issuing this statement I was only stating the assumption behind my previous claim that "There is a possible world where a necessary supernatural being exists." (which is arguably also bullshit). To start with, I feel kind of bad for you because a lot of people were completely misunderstanding your argument. It was pretty clear from early on that 1. you were using "necessary" in a different way than many of the posters replying to you were and 2. that you never claimed that God was, in fact necessary (and that your logic was contigent upon that). One thing I have to ask, though; wouldn't that logic also mean that, if God is necessary, there isn't necessarily just one God? After all, something being necessary doesn't mean that there must only be one of that something (i.e. there can be two greatest things that are of equal greatness). Ytlaya fucked around with this message at 21:13 on Dec 12, 2014 |
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Dec 12, 2014 21:10
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Ytlaya posted:To start with, I feel kind of bad for you because a lot of people were completely misunderstanding your argument. It was pretty clear from early on that 1. you were using "necessary" in a different way than many of the posters replying to you were and 2. that you never claimed that God was, in fact necessary (and that your logic was contigent upon that). quote:Necessity is a property of statements not of objects. It doesn't make sense to claim that an existent thing is logically necessary. Existent things just are, that's all. We have no examples of necessary existence; we just have examples of necessary inferences or judgments. There can be no empirical necessities. http://www.sfu.ca/~swartz/modal_fallacy.htm
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Dec 12, 2014 21:27
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That is is a completely valid point. The concept of something necessarily existing doesn't really make any sense.
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Dec 12, 2014 21:30
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Ytlaya posted:To start with, I feel kind of bad for you because a lot of people were completely misunderstanding your argument. It was pretty clear from early on that 1. you were using "necessary" in a different way than many of the posters replying to you were and 2. that you never claimed that God was, in fact necessary (and that your logic was contigent upon that). In posting in a God thread on the internet I had to be prepared for some unclear semantics... and while for brevity's sake I didn't qualify each statement (i.e. God 'qua necessary being') every step of the way, my phrasing was a little sloppy and muddled at times. And you're right, I don't see why the logic would exclude the possibility of more than one necessary being - but the monotheist would probably respond with something like "A unified perfection is greater than a shared perfection". Ytlaya posted:That is is a completely valid point. The concept of something necessarily existing doesn't really make any sense. Agreed. And while the linked example doesn't speak explicitly to S5 (which I believe is the trick that makes this argument a little more fun), it does employ modal qualifiers to hide the argument's critical assumption. With: PN(G)->N(G) PN(G) ———— N(G) PN(G) cannot really be assumed and it's up to the person presenting the argument to convince us otherwise before we accept N(G). However, including PN(G)->N(G) as the first premise is, I think, a delightfully clever move. EDIT: Grammar Ernest Hemingway fucked around with this message at 22:13 on Dec 12, 2014 |
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Dec 12, 2014 22:08
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Ernest Hemingway posted:In posting in a God thread on the internet I had to be prepared for some unclear semantics... and while for brevity's sake I didn't qualify each statement (i.e. God 'qua necessary being') every step of the way, my phrasing was a little sloppy and muddled at times. I'm not disagreeing with your use of logic, I'm just saying it doesn't really qualify god as existing or not. Its kinda why Philosophy is fun and boring at the same time, we can philosophy all we want, but it won't change reality.
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Dec 12, 2014 22:12
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In the interests of keeping this thread going: even if we accept the conclusions of the ontological argument*, what makes the thing whose existence it proves a "god" in any sense in which we'd normally use the word? What makes it even sentient? *we don't. (Someone please talk about something other than the ontological argument...)
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Dec 13, 2014 22:05
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Ernest Hemingway posted:If the aim of the ontological argument is to 'define things into existence', or predicate existence onto a contingent subject, then it surely fails... and so much has been established through Gaunilo and Kant. Defining a being as necessary seems to be begging the question in the first place. A necessary being is one that has to exist (it would be a logical contradiction for it not to exist), so really all you're saying is: if I assume X is required to exist, then X exists. It's not really very interesting. There's no really compelling reason to believe that there is such a class of things that their nonexistence would be a logical impossibility. Dzhay posted:In the interests of keeping this thread going: even if we accept the conclusions of the ontological argument*, what makes the thing whose existence it proves a "god" in any sense in which we'd normally use the word? What makes it even sentient? That's why the real goal of the ontological argument is to give that thing that must exist the same name as some other ridiculous entity whose existence you want to prove (God, Yahweh, babyjeezus, whatever) then from there you trust in that equivocation and your audience's cultural upbringing to make them accept your next proposition that logically this necessary being we call God wants you to drink wine on Sundays/abhor bacon/own slaves/lynch fags/beat your wife/whatever other private obsession the speaker has. VitalSigns fucked around with this message at 22:22 on Dec 13, 2014 |
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Dec 13, 2014 22:19
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Are you guys still arguing about God existing? Yeah, that's cool. Don't worry too much about it, if you ask me.
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Dec 15, 2014 20:34
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So what are we defining as 'God' here? So sorry but it's been rather hard to sift through everything so far. Is this all just pertaining to a Christian 'God', some sort of omnipotent being as 'God', or Aristotle/Aquinas' 'Prime Mover'?
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Dec 16, 2014 05:57
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CommieGIR posted:We can philosophy all we want, but it won't change reality. This is so wrong it hurts.
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Dec 16, 2014 08:17
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Point 1. If God exists then magic exists. Point 2. If magic exists then the laws of reality are meaningless Point 3. If the laws of reality are meaningless then nothing can be proven. Conclusion 1. Therefore all proofs must assume that God does not exist.
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Dec 16, 2014 08:34
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God as defined as the supernatural creature that authored the universe. A super powerful thing somewhere in the cosmos isn't God, no different than I am God to a sugar ant. I'm just 86,000 bigger than it, doesn't mean I can fly or move through walls or create matter from nothing. Each scripture of each religion has tests, each book has clearly defined feats or characteristics of God that the book itself disproves. "God is perfect and omniscient" says many of the books, yet God acts jealous, stupid, or ignorant. It is that simple. God does not exist. I'm hardly the smartest person in the world, in fact I'm a lunkhead, a maroon, but the planet is populated by people that are orders of magnitude dumber than you or I could imagine.
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Dec 16, 2014 09:30
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Kaal posted:Point 1. If God exists then magic exists. This is actually the best proof in this thread. Also holy gently caress there is too many religion threads in D&D, just merge them into one megathread or something to contain the stupid (90% of the stupid comes from kyrie leison). suck my woke dick fucked around with this message at 12:13 on Dec 16, 2014 |
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Dec 16, 2014 12:10
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I CANNOT EJACULATE WITHOUT SEEING NATIVE AMERICANS BRUTALISED!
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Perry Mason Jar posted:This is so wrong it hurts. I meant about the existence of god.
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Dec 16, 2014 14:49
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blowfish posted:Also holy gently caress there is too many religion threads in D&D, just merge them into one megathread or something to contain the stupid (90% of the stupid comes from kyrie leison). The Something Awful Forums > Discussion > Debate & Discussion: We tortured some folks › Let's try to find out if God loves purebred babies more than the offspring of miscegenation or not
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Dec 16, 2014 14:51
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Kaal posted:Point 1. If God exists then magic exists. Hmm lets play with this. Point 1 seems reasonable. If a Supernatural (above nature)all powerful being exists, then magic exists. An all powerful being would need to be able to break/bend the laws of reality, or they wouldn't be "all powerful". Breaking the rules would be "magical". Point 2 I would argue something stronger then the meaningless conclusion. I would say if magic exists, then reality does not. If reality is "everything there is, and there is nothing else" and magic is "secret sauce that defies reality" Both of them would have a difficult (if not impossible) time existing together. Point 3 would be changed to, If reality doesn't exist then nothing can be proven. This may seem trivial, "if there is nothing then you can't prove anything" but it points out that a proof relies on limits and boundary. The process of defining something has the duel propose of defining what it is not. If everything has the property "A" and nothing can have the property "not A" then A would be difficult to define. No change to the conclusion.
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Dec 16, 2014 16:59
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Fair enough, either way. To my mind that wording comes across as a little strong, but it effectively means the same thing in this context. Also, I forgot my corollary. It follows so directly from Conclusion 1 that it hardly bears mentioning, but I find that it drives home the point: Conclusion 2: Therefore the properties of any alleged god cannot be known. In short, while one cannot disprove the unknowable, it is clear that if a god exists then we can know nothing about our world, or about that god, or whether or not there are more gods. At that point, the idea of asserting God with a capital G (i.e. the Christian/Jewish/Islamic deity), much less asserting a specific religious tenet (Catholicism, Protestantism, Mormonism, Sunni, Shia, etc.) is patently incredible. Back in antiquity when people didn't know much about their world, and broadly accepted the concepts of polytheism and magic, such religious assertions made a lot more sense. But after thousands of years, wherein scientific understanding flowered rather than imminent apocalypse, and the large majority of religious beliefs were discarded without divine incident, those claims ring far more hollow. They no longer fit with the world that we live in. Kaal fucked around with this message at 20:34 on Dec 16, 2014 |
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Dec 16, 2014 19:25
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Kaal posted:Point 1. If God exists then magic exists. Definitions for 'God', 'magic, and 'the laws of reality' are needed in order to give this fair treatment, but I think I have a few challenges without them: -Point 1 doesn't hold if God is a being that is not 'all powerful', in a reality-breaking sense. i.e., a being that has extraordinary qualities or abilities, but still exists and functions according to 'the rules of reality' - It is impossible, even for an all powerful God, to break 'the rules of reality'. e.g. No being, however powerful, could create a world where a thing exists and simultaneously doesn't exist. -Magic, even if it granted the wielder unimaginable and absurd causal powers (e.g. snapping one's fingers and creating a galaxy), would not contradict or break the rules of reality. It would break (or merely complicate) the 'rules' of science - but science deals with causality and causality is not a law of reality. A magical God then, would simply be an additional causal agent in the universe, albeit an unpredictable one. She could be as active as she wanted, but you could rest assured that 1 and 1 would still equal 2, all bachelors would remain unmarried, and any other formal proof would still hold.
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Dec 16, 2014 21:11
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Kaal posted:Fair enough, either way. To my mind that wording comes across as a little strong, but it effectively means the same thing in this context. To define something is to place properties (limits) on it. When you define things as infinite, you can run into problems. The make a rock so big you can't lift it thing. The definition of reality as "Everything that exists", has these same problems. What if reality is limited by the things we are capable of perceiving/measuring. If our entire reality was represented by a line, and that line existed inside a sphere. We only have a concept of the line, our "observer" (the you that is you) is limited to the line. We can only affect or observe the portion of sphere that intersects the line. Something that exists in the sphere and could interact with, and affect everything in the sphere (which includes our line) would seem very God like and limitless, even if it were simply limited to the sphere. As a "Free Will Fanboy" (at least to some limited extent) I prefer not to think that there was nothing and some event poped reality into being . That this event is the start of all causality, and everything derives from it. Without free will, existence is just a movie with a bad ending. As for defining "this god" in the Abrahamic sense (by the Jews in the 6th century BCE, the Christians in the 4th AD or the Muslims in the 7th) I like your term "patently incredible".
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Dec 16, 2014 21:32
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