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HMS (CVL) Unicorn for me! http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Unicorn_(I72) Thank You for being insane Grey Hunter.
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# ¿ Dec 9, 2014 07:22 |
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# ¿ May 17, 2024 02:08 |
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Jimmy4400nav posted:Can I ask, I always hear jokes about Tokyo Bay Fortress in GH threads, but for the life of me, I'm still trying to figure out what its referencing. Is it literally one of the islands in Tokyo Bay or am I missing something?
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# ¿ Dec 11, 2014 02:26 |
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I could understand if it involved stuff like The Krait and Z-Force. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MV_Krait Otherwise I think Microsoft train simulator might be a better choice.
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# ¿ Dec 11, 2014 09:38 |
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Splode posted:how fast does your average torpedo go, in knots? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_14_torpedo (46 knots) The Japanese ones are the most fun because they run on compressed oxygen http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_93_torpedo (52 knots)
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# ¿ Dec 15, 2014 09:39 |
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I'm sorry Grey Hunter san. There is only one honourable thing for you to do now.
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# ¿ Dec 18, 2014 08:51 |
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Noumea and Fiji then cut off China. Focus on interdicting supplies to the forward areas. If you expand too far or too fast you just sacrifice your ability to deal major pain to the US industrial hammer falls.
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# ¿ Jan 2, 2015 00:29 |
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How about videos. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zQvnIPihy1U
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# ¿ Jan 17, 2015 01:41 |
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A White Guy posted:Personally, if one of you tank spergs could do some googling on how the Japanese dealt with tanks during the Pacific war, I would be fascinated . The wikipedia page on the Type 95 Ha-Go is actually a decent potted history of tank warfare for the Japanese. But you specifically asked for how the Japanese dealt with tanks during the pacific war and that is much more interesting: The Lunge Mine e;fb quote:Perhaps the oddest of these antitank charges is the so-called "Lunge Mine" encountered on Leyte Island. This weapon—an armor-piercing charge on the end of a pole—derives its name from the way in which it must be thrust against the side of a tank in order to detonate. Or perhaps the Hook Charge (Same Source - The pictures are worth a look)? quote:When attacking a tank with this pole charge, presumably from ambush, the Japanese soldier is supposed to pull the cord and ignite the fuze as he approaches his target. On reaching the tank, he is supposed to hook the wire hooks of the charge over the tank cannon or machine gun. As he retreats he pulls the bamboo pole loose from the charge, and the demolition hangs freely in position on the gun until the charge explodes. Why not use a hand held mine? quote:The first Japanese antitank grenade was a hand-thrown grenade, which had a simple 100 mm diameter cone HEAT warhead with a simple "all the way" fuse system in the base. (If dropped accidentally with the pin removed, it would explode). It had what looked like the end of a mop head on the tail end of the warhead. A soldier would remove the antitank grenade from its sack, pull the pin, and throw it gripping the mop-head as the handle. This was dangerous, as there was no arming safety after release and the thrower could strike something in his back swing before release. Penetration was reported only around 50mm.
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# ¿ Jan 28, 2015 08:05 |
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Here's what an English tanker who fought in Normandy has to say about Fury: http://www.theguardian.com/film/filmblog/2014/oct/24/fury-movie-tank-veteran-sherman-verdict-realistic And here's a story I hadn't heard before that is pretty amazing (Nothing to do with Fury, WitP alas and dreadful source): http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/the-heroic-wwii-mission-to-capture-a-deadly-820143 I am however reading SPECIAL SERIES NO'0. 34 1 AUGUST 1945 JAPANESE TANK AND ANTITANK WARFARE, which I found looking for info on Japanese antitank gear.
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# ¿ Jan 29, 2015 04:33 |
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CannonFodder posted:Well he has to take Dutch Harbor somehow and if continuous shock attacks are wrong, I don't want to be right. Ah the vexed subject of the IJA antitank tactics. "SPECIAL SERIES NO'0. 34 1 AUGUST 1945 JAPANESE TANK AND ANTITANK WARFARE' Was a wild ride. Along the way I learned there is a thing called picric acid and the IJA/N seemed to love using it in block form even though: quote:Dry picric acid is relatively sensitive to shock and friction quote:improved safety of munitions manufacturing and storage caused replacement of picric acid by TNT for most military purposes between the World Wars I suppose it wasn't that big a deal for the IJA as the majority of their antitank measures involved suicide in one form or another. Doctrinally they were up to snuff: quote:Summary In an earlier post I made something of the fact that both the British and the US command considered tanks to be worthless in a jungle setting. One of the reasons the Japanese had an effective tank was they deliberately designed the Type 95 light tank to be underarmoured so it could keep up with the mechanised forces it was meant to support. At less than 8 tons (the M3 Stuart is more like 16) it was very able in this role. Hence the successes in Malaya. The Allied commanders weren't complete dopes (about jungle warfare and tanks) however. quote:Two Type 95 tanks were deployed to support the Japanese landing at Milne Bay, in late August 1942. Initially, the tanks proved successful against the lightly armed Australian infantry, whose 'sticky bombs' failed to stick due to the humidity. Although the tanks had proved reliable in the tropical conditions of Malaya, they could not handle the volume of mud caused by intense, almost daily rainfall at Milne Bay. Both tanks were bogged down and abandoned a few days after the landing. For an actual tank battle you have to go to the Phillipines: quote:The 2nd Armored Division on Luzon was the first unit encountered by U. S. forces. It was anticipated that the that the commitment of this Japanese armored force would provide valuable material for the study of Japanese methods in the employment, of massed armor and coordinated infantry-armor-artillery tactics. Actual operations revealled that the Japanese commanders either did not understand the modern concept of armor employment or simply were unable to employ the armored division in accordance with promulgated principles of operation. Instead, the Japanese frittered away the division in piecemeal counterattacks and immobile defenses. They never mounted an attack with more than 16 tanks at one at a time. The principle of mass was never employed. The inherent mobility of the tanks was not utilized, but was negated by committing the tanks to fixed defensive emplacements. The greatest concentrations of Japanese tanks were in San Manuel and Munoz. Here, the armor, committed to a death stand, was dug in so that only the turrets were exposed. Emplacements had heavy adobe revetments, were under heavy foliage, and were a nucleus for all other defensive measures. Tanks were sited to cover the highways and cross-country approaches with mutually supporting fires. Closein security of the armored pillboxes was provided by automatic weapons and infantry (lug in around each tank. Artillery, emplaced in covered positions, supplemented the tanks to complete an integrated fire plan. Last-resort counterattacks were launched at night once the local defenses were doomed. One of the many worrying issues I learned of was that the Japanese tanks were extensively insulated with asbestos. I suppose this shouldn't have surprised me but meant that being in a Japanese tank was even more unnecessarily hazardous than might have otherwise been the case. On the anti tank front: quote:To date, neither antitank rocket launchers nor hollow-charge projectors have been encountered in the hands of the Japanese. They have made some effort to develop effective antitank rifle grenades. But so far the only effective antitank weapon furnished the Japanese infantry has been the Type 1 (1941) 47-mm gun. quote:SPECIFICATIONS: Caliber - 47 mm (1.85 inches). Weight firing. 1,660 pounds. Length of tube . 99.48 inches. Traverse 6O°. Elevation - -11 to 19°. Muzzle velocity - 2,700 feet per second with AP. Sigh t-Straight telescope. They additionally regularly used their 20 mm and 25 mm anti-aircraft guns to some effect in the antitank role.
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# ¿ Feb 3, 2015 06:56 |
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I think the NFPA 704 sign says it all:
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# ¿ Feb 3, 2015 08:08 |
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Returning to the land war in Malaya. I recently started reading 'Singapore the Japanese Version' by Colonel Masanobu Tsuji. He was the chief of operations and planning staff for the 25th Japanese Army in Malaya and was involved in the detailed planning and execution of the campaign for Singapore. The book was originally written in Japanese and was intended as a somewhat revisionist companion to Winston Churchill's fourth volume of his history of WWII 'The Hinge of Fate'. First published in Japan in 1952 one year after Churchill's book it was eventually translated into English due to efforts of H V Howe who had been the military secretary to the Australian minister for the army during the war. It was published in Australia in 1960, it was eventually reprinted as a paperback in 1997. It was the original hard cover version that fell into my possession. OK big wind up so what? It is an amazing insight into the whole IJA with reflections on the experience of the Chinese campaign and the devastating defeat to the Russian army leading up to the preparations for the Malaya campaign. It soon becomes clear that the key to their success was the result of what were experimental jungle warfare doctrines that, although rushed, were the fruits of a determined year long effort. These innovations included, Bicycle engineers and the amphibious landing of horses in the tropics (Thought impossible). At the centre of the whole edifice however was the knowledge that Singapore was undefended from the landed side. Part of the haste was a fear that something would be done about this complete gift despite there being no sign of any measures being employed to rectify it. Possibly the most interesting aspect of the narrative is the translators desire to render it as close to the literal Japanese as possible. Expressions like Doro Nawa (that was the nick name for the Taiwan Army No. 82 Unit) Literally Robber Rope. Expresses the sentiment that you catch the robber then you make the rope to confine them. The nearest English adage is 'Close the door after the horse has bolted' and clearly expresses the view that even before the attack on Pearl Harbour there was a strong sense in the IJA that there had been insufficient preparation and that the forces available weren't properly equipped, trained or experienced to undertake the tasks required of them. This possibly reflects the conservative nature of some in the IJA because they apparently spent ten years training and developing the force for the attack on China. I'm only part way into it but I'll probably finish it before the IJA in this time line take Singapore.
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# ¿ Feb 18, 2015 00:43 |
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I don't know if it is any consolation but if you weren't certifiable you wouldn't be doing this in the first place.
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# ¿ Mar 6, 2015 09:56 |
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# ¿ May 17, 2024 02:08 |
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Bravo for those brave Vietnamese!
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# ¿ Jun 13, 2015 05:45 |