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Branching off once again from the Eastern Europe thread, I am creating this thread to talk about international security, geopolitics, and the future of NATO and Russia! Here is the previous thread. Same rules apply: don't be loving dicks to each other. Seriously. That shouldn't be that hard. Let's start from where we left off in the Eastern Europe thread: Friendly Tumour posted:Namedropping does not make the case. Your whole argument is also completely irrelevant to what is happening right now, isn't it? Namedropping does not make the case, no, but it does demonstrate that you characterizing my position as "I think it would be this way because I believe it to be so" wasn't really fair. And yes, this whole part of the argument is irrelevant to the facts as they currently stand, except as partial explanations for how events took the turn that they did. The reason why we're still talking about it is because people objected to me saying that NATO expanding eastward was a mistake. Best Friends posted:Thank you! I'll take these point by point. 1 - By the collapse of the USSR, Russia didn't have the resources to hold onto and administer states like Ukraine or the Baltics. That is, indeed, an important factor in why the USSR fell at all. All available evidence indicates that most Russians, and the Russian government, were more than willing to live alongside their neighbors in peace in the early 90's. 2 - There actually has been quite a bit of talk about NATO encirclement, both from politicians and in the Russian popular culture. 3 - You say there is zero possibility that Russia would not have been dominated by nationalism by this point in an alternate history. On what are you basing this? Sure, there was always going to be a nationalist, revanchist faction in Russia. But that faction started out small and marginalized. We didn't need to work so hard to help it grow.
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Mar 4, 2015 23:58
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Majorian posted:
Yes but critically not invasion or destruction which is what would predicate fear. So the issue becomes why be afraid of NATO encirclement. Yes Russia should fear for NATO bombing on some level if not for its nuclear and military deterrent, but it has both of those, in spades. The primary Russian issue with NATO isn't fear of being destroyed, it's of losing its "sphere." And that's what this all comes down to, should Russia be allowed its sphere of influence. That's the entire Ukrainian conflict. I can see an argument that Russia should be allowed to dominate its neighbors from an argument of "this will stop nuclear war." (Thankfully, that's out). But absent that, we should support the freedom of its neighbors. That means a security agreement. Which in turn fuels Russian anger at NATO, not because they expect NATO to invade them, because they are not idiots. Rather, because NATO prevents them from doing what they want. No entity likes being prevented from doing what it wants. Just like the Russian military umbrella and deterrent protected Cuba from American meddling and in turn drove the Americans ballistic with anger, so too is Russia going ballistic that it can't properly gently caress with the baltics. quote:You say there is zero possibility that Russia would not have been dominated by nationalism by this point in an alternate history. On what are you basing this? Sure, there was always going to be a nationalist, revanchist faction in Russia. But that faction started out small and marginalized. We didn't need to work so hard to help it grow. People yearning for lost lands and empires has fueled nationalism every place that empires and lands have been lost. Russia's loss of land and empire was more sudden, traumatic, and recent than any other. So, we can expect even more nationalism. More critically though, Russia doesn't even need to be dominated by nationalism to be doing what it's currently doing. Russia has been loving with its neighbors its entire history. This is not some unusual thing we need to really figure out what crazy circumstance has led to - this is normal. It's worth noting that your primary counterpoint to Russia always doing this is the brief period of time in the 90s when Russia was barely even a state. Your argument is, again, completely ahistorical. It relies on Russia becoming something completely different, based on a situation that could never have arisen.
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Mar 5, 2015 00:37
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Majorian posted:We didn't need to work so hard to help it grow. "We" includes the nations that all chose of their own accord to join NATO because they did not feel that Russia was willing to guarantee their sovereignty. You keep ignoring the will of other nations when trying to make your arguments in favor for this alternate reality that had absolutely no guarantee of coming to pass, while also simultaneously treating Russia as a nation incapable of making decisions that don't involve running roughshod over former Soviet states. It is always a victim of circumstance, drawn inexorably to performing such actions because other people were mean to it first.
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Mar 5, 2015 00:40
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fivegears4reverse posted:"We" includes the nations that all chose of their own accord to join NATO because they did not feel that Russia was willing to guarantee their sovereignty. I actually meant "we" to refer to the US and its older NATO allies. Sorry, should have clarified. I'm not ignoring the will of the other former Soviet/Warsaw Pact nations at all. I understand that they genuinely wished to join a powerful Western-backed alliance to protect them from Russian aggression. That's not what's being disputed. What is being disputed is the assumption that NATO membership was the best guarantee of their safety. I am arguing that it was not - that there are other security structures that could have worked, without also providing fuel for the Russian nationalist fire during the 90's and early 2000's. Best Friends posted:Yes but critically not invasion or destruction which is what would predicate fear. So the issue becomes why be afraid of NATO encirclement. Yes Russia should fear for NATO bombing on some level if not for its nuclear and military deterrent, but it has both of those, in spades. The primary Russian issue with NATO isn't fear of being destroyed, it's of losing its "sphere." It's actually a fear of being forced to return to the chaos and economic freefall of the 90's. They're afraid that the more we encircle them and weaken their ability to defend themselves, the more we'll be able to impose our political will upon them. quote:People yearning for lost lands and empires has fueled nationalism every place that empires and lands have been lost. Russia's loss of land and empire was more sudden, traumatic, and recent than any other. So, we can expect even more nationalism. So why didn't we see this trend dominate Russian politics in the 90's? e: Seriously, why were they as game for trying reform as they were? All available evidence suggests that they really did try to coexist peacefully with their neighbors throughout the decade. Majorian fucked around with this message at 01:22 on Mar 5, 2015 |
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Mar 5, 2015 01:12
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Majorian posted:
And this is where I think you're delusional. The two issues are contradictory and could not be resolved. Any process that guaranteed the freedom and security of the Eastern European nations was going to piss off Russia because they regarded those nations as their legitimate sphere of influence. Any solution other than Russian domination was going to have the same result. There was no way to square the circle. The only option was triage. Admitting them into NATO guaranteed their security. Once that was done, placating Russia came next.
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Mar 5, 2015 01:24
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Deteriorata posted:And this is where I think you're delusional. The two issues are contradictory and could not be resolved. Any process that guaranteed the freedom and security of the Eastern European nations was going to piss off Russia because they regarded those nations as their legitimate sphere of influence. Any solution other than Russian domination was going to have the same result. Well, but this ignores the fact that there are grades of umbrage that a nation can take to another nation's (or group nations') actions. Moscow probably wouldn't have liked the WEU taking in the former Warsaw Pact states, but I doubt it would have driven them over the cliff the way that letting those countries into NATO did. e: If you disagree with me on that, though, I'd be very open to hearing why. I absolutely can be convinced on this issue. But a lot of international security/foreign affairs experts certainly thought it wouldn't elicit the same overreaction from Russia. Majorian fucked around with this message at 01:39 on Mar 5, 2015 |
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Mar 5, 2015 01:27
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Majorian posted:I'm not ignoring the will of the other former Soviet/Warsaw Pact nations at all. You have, repeatedly, and have been called out for it just as often. quote:I understand that they genuinely wished to join a powerful Western-backed alliance to protect them from Russian aggression. That's not what's being disputed. What is being disputed is the assumption that NATO membership was the best guarantee of their safety. I am arguing that it was not - that there are other security structures that could have worked, without also providing fuel for the Russian nationalist fire during the 90's and early 2000's. You arguments essentially consist of "Well, these guys said so, and I agree." You're trying to argue reality with ideas that not only did not get put into practice, but there is NOTHING that can suggest that what they suggested, and you believe it, would guarantee a different or better outcome. Not only that, there is actual evidence available RIGHT NOW that suggests Russia is willing to trample over any agreements that are in place right now for its sole benefit, regardless of the cost to the nations it affects. quote:It's actually a fear of being forced to return to the chaos and economic freefall of the 90's. They're afraid that the more we encircle them and weaken their ability to defend themselves, the more we'll be able to impose our political will upon them. Then perhaps Russia should stop trying to impose its political will on its neighbors, and get upset when they object to it and want to form economic and military alliances that are not directly aligned with their interests. AGAIN you continue to insist that Russia is completely incapable of being able to make better decisions, on top of assuming that they simply would be a nicer, safer Russia to live next to if only every effort was made to build up some other military alliance in place of NATO. And you do this while forgetting or deliberately downplaying the fact that said alliance would still include nations that have historical reasons to maintain their animosity and distrust towards Russia. That they would likely still require the help of richer and more powerful countries, likely former NATO countries, to even be considered a viable military or economic deterrent to Russia. And you have not once been able to bring up evidence that suggests with absolute certainty that this would NOT be at all provacative to Russia, since in your fantasy world, Russia's economy would have not to poo poo the bed so hard that it is influenced to become what it is today.
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Mar 5, 2015 02:47
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Poor Russia, how dare it's neighbours not want to become satellite states or get invaded. Haha just kidding, gently caress Russia.
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Mar 5, 2015 04:04
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Plucky little Russia, with its large population, largest territory on Earth, and largest nuclear stockpile on Earth.
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Mar 5, 2015 04:09
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Surely all this evidence that Russia is directly supporting the Ukraine conflict is just all made up by the CIA/USA.
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Mar 5, 2015 04:10
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Isn't it a little weird to call Russians emigrating to neighboring countries "colonialism"? I mean sure Russia orchestrates the policy and seeks to control those countries, but it sets up a really ugly and personal dynamic. (Yes, I realize the dynamic is centuries old.) Can't you have Russian nationals without them being a fifth column? Can't you deplore Russia's policies and be strongly nationalist without encouraging hatred towards individuals?
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Mar 5, 2015 04:26
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SedanChair posted:Isn't it a little weird to call Russians emigrating to neighboring countries "colonialism"? I mean sure Russia orchestrates the policy and seeks to control those countries, but it sets up a really ugly and personal dynamic. (Yes, I realize the dynamic is centuries old.) Can't you have Russian nationals without them being a fifth column? Can't you deplore Russia's policies and be strongly nationalist without encouraging hatred towards individuals? It is somewhat colonialist now that Russia has used the presence of a Russian-speaking population as justification for invasion.
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Mar 5, 2015 04:27
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Majorian posted:I actually meant "we" to refer to the US and its older NATO allies. Sorry, should have clarified. There is a difference between peacefully co-existing with your neighbours because of fundamental weakness and co-existing from a position of strength. You are forced to in the first and choose to in the second. Ultimately there is no security arrangement that could have been created post fall that would have been acceptable for all of the parties. Let's look at three options: Option 1 Finlandization of all Eastern European or the post soviet republics. This option would have worked throughout the 90s and possibly the early 2000's. However it would have left both sides feeling extremely uneasy. The primary strategic goal of Moscow has always been the creation of a glacis of dependent states on the border of the Russian homeland. Russia is unlikely to have accepted the fact that it could not dominate these states in defence of the motherland, and would more than likely have begun to interfere with the internal politics of these states as soon as Russia started to regain stability. Further, any attempt for these states to integrate themselves with the rest of the world would have been met with strong resistance politically, and if the state continued to pull away there may have been a situation similar to what we face now. Russia believes that strategically, it cannot allow any border state to be anything but allied or at the very least a Russian leaning neutral. Long term, anything else courts disaster. This of course totally disregards the internal will of these countries, who may not have wanted to be forced into neutrality and forced to balance their relations between. This likely would have limited their growth severely and would continue to foster corruption throughout these states. Finally, NATO and the EU would have been severely unhappy with this situation. They likely would have seen the establishment of a large swath of Eastern Europe as neutral territory, with necessarily strong Russian interests, merely as a continuation of the Cold War. Add this to the fact that tensions would have inevitably risen because countries, even only semi free countries (like Eastern Europe would likely have been), are drawn to the power that gives them the most benefit. This would have still been Europe, Russia had neither the wherewithal nor the inclination to supply the necessary investment. As these countries were drawn to Western Europe, Russia would have been forced to interfere more and more blatently to secure its strategic position. Eventually a mistake would be made and we would be in the exact position we are now, except with a much smaller NATO and a much more confusing Eastern Europe with the potential for any flare up to spread much further. Option 2 Creation of a larger Eastern European alliance This option is essentially a non starter for a couple reasons. First, like with the Finlandization option, you run into the problem of Russian strategic imperatives. They will interfere with the internal politics of the bloc, they will try to prevent ties between the bloc and the west, and they will make it their number one strategic goal to ensure that this bloc was Russian aligned. This is essentially a reversion to the Cold War. And any attempt by a country within the bloc to leave would spark much the same problems as option 1. Further this bloc would be incomplete. Despite the fact that it would have a very large conventional military at the outset, it is unlikely that they would have been able to maintain that state for long. The required investment to rebuild their countries would have severely strained the budgets of all of these countries, and like with the Finlandization option, corruption would likely have flourished more so than it does without NATO and the EU breathing down their necks. Finally, this bloc would be incomplete because it lacks a nuclear anchor. Alliance blocs more or less require a nuclear anchor country if it is in competition with another nuclear equipped bloc. Lack of a nuclear arsenal puts the bloc at a instant major disadvantage vis-a-vis any competing bloc. Considering that this notional bloc would have been sandwiched between two nuclear blocs, with both having the inclination to dominate them (economically or politically) they would inevitably chose a side, seeking a nuclear umbrella, leading us back to either the Cold War 2.0 if it chooses the Russians or our current situation if it chose the west. Or possibly it breaks up and we have a free for all for influence in Eastern Europe. Option 3 Withdrawal of North America from NATO and the expansion of the EU to the east. Notionally this idea has much to recommend. It includes nuclear powers, it would have a massive conventional force, and it would have a wealthy core of countries to help the bloc along. However, major problem: the Russian strategic imperitive. Russia would not be willing to give up its buffer zone quietly and while the new EU would be strong, it would also be brittle. I doubt it would have the credibility to defend its eastern border. Why is this? Remember, that in this option you would have three or four major poles within the alliance. France, which has never really played that well with others, would most likely have remained aloof and strayed from the other powers. England, ever the euro sceptic, would likely have continued to align more with the U.S. and the anglosphere. Germany would have been preoccupied with the reconstruction of its eastern half, and Italy would have been too disorganized politically to do anything. Finally, throughout the 90s all four governments relied on the "peace dividend" to patch holes in the budget. They cut their militaries to the bone in an effort to save money. Without a U.S. guarentour their would not have been possible while maintaining a semblence of security. Therefore, the bloc would have to choose between more ruinous military spending, forgoing a lot of the rebuilding in Eastern Europe for a stronger military, or forgo the needed military and accept Russian influence/domination. The bloc would essentially be politically leaderless. Finally, the biggest credibility problem that such a bloc would have is the nuclear credibility problem. To head off a conventional war you either need a large conventional force and a nuclear arsenal and the willingness to use it. The Russians would have to be convinced that if they went to war or meddled militarily in Europe that European conventional forces would be able to crush their forces decisivly or that in the event of a conventional loss that Europe would respond with nuclear arms. As it stands right now, I'd figure western Europe would win a conventional defensive war. I have no idea what a Western European military would look like without the U.S., but I'd bet that Western Europe would be able to win as well if they committed. The question is, would they? I'm not so sure. Lastly they would be relying on France and he UK for their nuclear deterrent if things got out of hand conventionally. I'm not sure that either of these would be likely to risk annihilation over Riga. (I have the same doubts about the U.S. willingness to use nukes to defend NATO, but I'm much more confident in their ability to win a conventional war.) None of these three options guarantee the security of the Eastern European countries. All of them actually increase the overall danger for the former Warsaw pact states. The security of Eastern Europe is mutually exclusive to Russian security. For Eastern Europe to have security, Russia cannot have control of them; for Russia to have security it must control the border states. There cannot be any inbetween because any such setup is inherently unstable, and will collapse, resulting in a situation that is far more dangerous than the current one. As a final thought. The basis of my thoughts on this are based on a central premise. Russia seeks to dominate their neighbours to protect the Russian heartland. This has been the central governing strategic imperitive of the Russian state for roughly four hundred years. While it is true that during the 90s the Russian government had a period where they were more cooperative with their neighbours than usual, this is not unusual during periods of Russian weakness. Regardless of the actions of the west this fundamental imperitive would have re asserted itself eventually. Abandoning the Eastern European states, refusing to engage with them as we have would not have prevented Russia from seeking dominance, I doubt it would even have delayed it. Gorau fucked around with this message at 04:44 on Mar 5, 2015 |
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Mar 5, 2015 04:28
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fivegears4reverse posted:You have, repeatedly, and have been called out for it just as often. People have called me out for it because they've misunderstood my arguments. That's mostly been my fault, I admit - I haven't communicated my point all that well. But my argument does take the will of those countries into account; it just tempers them with the unfortunate reality that Russia right now holds more cards in Ukraine than we do. quote:You arguments essentially consist of "Well, these guys said so, and I agree." You're trying to argue reality with ideas that not only did not get put into practice, but there is NOTHING that can suggest that what they suggested, and you believe it, would guarantee a different or better outcome. The argument is based on decades of diplomatic and analytical experience with Russia, and an unparalleled understanding of Russian political psychology. quote:Not only that, there is actual evidence available RIGHT NOW that suggests Russia is willing to trample over any agreements that are in place right now for its sole benefit, regardless of the cost to the nations it affects. They certainly are more willing to do that now that nationalists are in power, and nationalist/irredentist sentiment rules the voting public, yes. But the evidence you cite doesn't suggest that this form of nationalism was an inevitable feature in the Russian political arena, nor does it suggest that they cannot be talked down from the ledge. quote:Then perhaps Russia should stop trying to impose its political will on its neighbors So how do we get them to do that? I want to know what you think.
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Mar 5, 2015 04:28
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What if one or both sides are afraid the other has been compromised by extraterrestrials as seen in the classic SG1 bottle episode 'Full Alert'?
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Mar 5, 2015 04:34
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I thought we should have begun a process of ceding sphere of influence to the Russians back in the Bush administration, when it looked like the Yeltsin chaos had come to an end. Instead we blatantly asserted to them that they weren't going to get to be colonialist any more, which is frankly kind of ridiculous and provocative given their history and resources.
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Mar 5, 2015 04:36
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SedanChair posted:I thought we should have begun a process of ceding sphere of influence to the Russians back in the Bush administration, when it looked like the Yeltsin chaos had come to an end. Instead we blatantly asserted to them that they weren't going to get to be colonialist any more, which is frankly kind of ridiculous and provocative given their history and resources. Cheney was willing to start World War 3 over South Ossetia but Bush was a pussy.
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Mar 5, 2015 04:38
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W-ow - now THAT'S a post! Thanks for taking the time to write it, Gorau - this is exactly the type of discussion that I want to be having. I'll respond to it when I get a chance to give it the attention it deserves (probably later this evening).
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Mar 5, 2015 04:41
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What I don't understand is what the danger of Russia being fully in control of its former vassal states is supposed to be. Like OK, say we let Russia take back the SSRs, dominate Poland and the Balkans etc. Then what? Where is the expansionist danger, the lebensraum that endangers anything beyond what Russia already once controlled? What do you think is the more likely scenario, that we have another strong trading partner like China, or that Putin invades France?
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Mar 5, 2015 04:46
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Majorian posted:People have called me out for it because they've misunderstood my arguments. That's mostly been my fault, I admit - I haven't communicated my point all that well. But my argument does take the will of those countries into account; it just tempers them with the unfortunate reality that Russia right now holds more cards in Ukraine than we do. Purely out of curiosity, would you be willing to be estimate a probability (I mean a wide, wide range of probabilities, from 20%-80%) that Russia would be been a peace-loving partner of Europe if not for American imperialism and NATO expansion? You keep saying, "hey, if we'd done X differently, perhaps Russia wouldn't have ended up such vicious bastards." OK, if we'd refused to move NATO eastward, what are the chances in your estimation that Ukraine would still have been within their sphere of perceived influence, and that therefore the overthrow of a pro-Russian president would have been been regarded as a hostile act justifying warfare? Surely it's greater than 0%; how much greater than 0% is it, in your ideal world? Or do you regard the Russians as Belgians or the like, a people who upon losing the Soviet Union acknowledged that they'd lost their empire forever and therefore no longer that any right to a sphere of influence over, say, Ukraine? Given their behavior in Chechnya, I think we can regard that latter idea as objectively false. Objectively, Russia still believes in its empire. The thought that, having lost a huge chunk of it, they were cheerful about it for any reasons other than necessity is frankly bizarre. Tacky-Ass Rococco fucked around with this message at 05:45 on Mar 5, 2015 |
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Mar 5, 2015 05:35
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Jack of Hearts posted:Purely out of curiosity, would you be willing to be estimate a probability (I mean a wide, wide range of probabilities, from 20%-80%) that Russia would be been a peace-loving partner of Europe if not for American imperialism and NATO expansion? You keep saying, "hey, if we'd done X differently, perhaps Russia wouldn't have ended up such vicious bastards." OK, if we'd refused to move NATO eastward, what are the chances in your estimation that Ukraine would still have been within their sphere of perceived influence, and that therefore the overthrow of a pro-Russian president would have been been regarded as a hostile act justifying warfare? Surely it's greater than 0%; how much greater than 0% is it, in your ideal world? If we assume that there wouldn't be any major surprises in this alternate timeline, ie: the Western powers deciding to go with the WEU plan leading to an alien invasion or something else equally unlikely and gamechanging? 80%. That's just a completely shooting-from-the-hip number, but it feels right. All the evidence I've seen suggests that most Russians really, genuinely wanted to leave their past behind once 1992 rolled around. They were as disillusioned as one could be with the Soviet system, and the prevailing sentiment among the younger population especially was, "Leave it all behind - we are Europeans now." One thing that we don't talk about much in the US is the toll that the Afghan War took upon much of the population in Russia. Everybody knew somebody who had died or lost a limb in that horrible bloodbath. There are still homeless veterans missing arms and legs sitting outside of metro stations, begging for money, to this day. By the time the Soviet Empire fell, the Russians were war-weary, and especially the younger generation had no interest in fighting more wars of occupation. They wanted to make the leap into the future and stop this stupid face-off with the West. Unfortunately, they grew disillusioned with what we had to offer them, too, and before long, the nationalists had their opportunities to say, "See? We told you they just wanted to weaken us."
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Mar 5, 2015 06:06
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Ultimately, the question is really over the former Soviet Union minus the Baltic states rather than the entire Warsaw pact. Current Russian nationalism isn't really geared toward the former satellite states but the near-abroad, and ultimately I don't think the expansion or non-expansion of NATO was actually going to change that.
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Mar 5, 2015 06:31
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SedanChair posted:What I don't understand is what the danger of Russia being fully in control of its former vassal states is supposed to be. Like OK, say we let Russia take back the SSRs, dominate Poland and the Balkans etc. Then what? Where is the expansionist danger, the lebensraum that endangers anything beyond what Russia already once controlled? What do you think is the more likely scenario, that we have another strong trading partner like China, or that Putin invades France? The SSR's, Poland and the Balkans etc. all have human beings living in them who should be allowed their sovereignty.
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Mar 5, 2015 06:38
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Majorian posted:If we assume that there wouldn't be any major surprises in this alternate timeline, ie: the Western powers deciding to go with the WEU plan leading to an alien invasion or something else equally unlikely and gamechanging? 80%. That's just a completely shooting-from-the-hip number, but it feels right. If name drops of people you happen to agree with, and percentages drawn from your rear end are how you're going to defend your stance, this "conversation" has been a fantastic waste of time.
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Mar 5, 2015 07:07
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Fojar38 posted:The SSR's, Poland and the Balkans etc. all have human beings living in them who should be allowed their sovereignty. Humanity? Sovereignty? What airy concepts are these? Have we ever done more than pay lip service to them?
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Mar 5, 2015 07:15
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Shut up, Sedanchair, the adults are talking now.
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Mar 5, 2015 08:07
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fivegears4reverse posted:If name drops of people you happen to agree with, Jesus, dude, seriously? You've got a wide gamut of very intelligent people who actually have lifetimes of experience in this field, compared to your, what, couple months of reading internet blog posts on the issue, telling you what their experience has taught them, and you brush it all away as a name drop, because their position doesn't agree with your preconceived notions? Those aren't name drops, those are citations. People who know what they're talking about back my position. Don't get all bent out of shape because I backed up my argument. If that's how you're going to argue against the evidence placed before you, then you're right - this conversation has been a fantastic waste of time. If you'd like to prove me wrong, though, why don't you tell me where the flaws are in those security experts' argument? quote:and percentages drawn from your rear end I was asked to pull a number out of my rear end, and I did it. Sorry someone asked me to do that, I guess? 
Majorian fucked around with this message at 17:41 on Mar 5, 2015 |
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Mar 5, 2015 09:38
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SedanChair posted:Humanity? Sovereignty? What airy concepts are these? Have we ever done more than pay lip service to them? Without knowing what "we" you're talking about uhhh yes I think so?
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Mar 5, 2015 10:06
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Crossposting from the EE thread because I didn't read to the last page before replying:Majorian posted:It presumably wouldn't include the US, and the change in name and officially stated purpose would have a much greater effect than automatically meets the eye. Remember, this whole issue is, among other things, a struggle of perception - one where we're trying to convince the Russian people that we're not out to get them. The missions and history of the EU and NATO are different, and that's a really important factor in a battle of perceptions. The proposed solution is a WEU that does not include the United States, and with that the de-facto creation of a third pole in Europe with its own foreign policy and collective defence agenda so as to boost the perception within Russia that this new WEU is not out to get them. Which ends up meaning that in order for the United States and Western Europe to convince Russia that we're not out to get them, the United States withdraws militarily and politically from Europe, which runs completely contrary to its strategic goals as I understand them. The political fallout resulting from this would have been immense both then and now, and likely introduce a rift in the transatlantic relationship that could have permanently altered the dynamic between the US and Europe. So, who benefits here? Only Russia. The European states suffer from a greatly diminished defence posture, as both then and now the required strategic thinking appears to be largely absent, with Europe more than content to spend on welfare while the US spends on troops. The transatlantic relationship will be in a shambles, and Russia's status as the Eurasian continent's largest and closest superpower would allow them to gobble up any lost territories in short order. I really don't see why the only appropriate response to Russia losing the cold war is the US essentially falling on a dagger to appease their fears, especially when US strategic thinking is so very, very hostile to the emergence of an Eurasian superpower with the ability to shut them out.
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Mar 5, 2015 10:49
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SedanChair posted:What I don't understand is what the danger of Russia being fully in control of its former vassal states is supposed to be. Like OK, say we let Russia take back the SSRs, dominate Poland and the Balkans etc. Then what? Where is the expansionist danger, the lebensraum that endangers anything beyond what Russia already once controlled? What do you think is the more likely scenario, that we have another strong trading partner like China, or that Putin invades France? So these independent nations should not be allowed to decide for themselves? Just to placate Russia? If we started throwing NATO countries under the bus then things have reached a new level of hosed.
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Mar 5, 2015 11:34
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SedanChair posted:What I don't understand is what the danger of Russia being fully in control of its former vassal states is supposed to be. Like OK, say we let Russia take back the SSRs, dominate Poland and the Balkans etc. Then what? Where is the expansionist danger, the lebensraum that endangers anything beyond what Russia already once controlled? What do you think is the more likely scenario, that we have another strong trading partner like China, or that Putin invades France? The sovereignty of independent states is something that should be upheld and fought for. Please don't ask deliberately nitwitted questions. Vincent Van Goatse fucked around with this message at 11:43 on Mar 5, 2015 |
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Mar 5, 2015 11:39
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Also, I think that the Western European countries would not have been particularly interested in committing themselves to Eastern European countries without US backing. The structure of NATO was pretty favorable to France and Germany in the 90s because it allowed them to draw down. One that made them the fulcrum of a defensive alliance would have been really unpalatable. The other option, say, an Eastern European alliance only would have required something like a nuclear Poland, which would basically have pissed off Russia anyway.
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Mar 5, 2015 12:22
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I don't think a military and economic alliance headed up by France and/or Germany would have been provocative to Russia at all. There's no historical precedence of aggression against Russia there like a US chaired NATO has.
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Mar 5, 2015 13:13
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-Troika- posted:Shut up, Sedanchair, the adults are talking now. I think he's being facetious but it's hard to tell.
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Mar 5, 2015 13:21
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NATO expansion is a huge threat to Russia. Because it generally comes hand in hand with EU membership which requires economic and democratic reforms and anti-corruption measures. Since Russia is a huge mass of corruption and seems to be run by a President-for-life strongman these days, they'd really rather not have their neighbours move away from their model and stop being shitholes in case that makes Russians want the same thing.
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Mar 5, 2015 13:47
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Panzeh posted:Also, I think that the Western European countries would not have been particularly interested in committing themselves to Eastern European countries without US backing. The structure of NATO was pretty favorable to France and Germany in the 90s because it allowed them to draw down. One that made them the fulcrum of a defensive alliance would have been really unpalatable. The WEU option is dumb for another reason. Its newness and lack of a track record would be a detriment to its value, not a strength. What matters most in international relations is not compatibility, but predictability. Russia has a long history with NATO. They understand it. They know that if they do X, NATO will reliably do Y, and vice versa. Russia may not like NATO, but they can predict it. An enemy whose behavior is understandable and predictable is not a strong threat. They can make long-term security and foreign policy plans based on NATO's past behavior. A WEU, on the other hand, was a completely unknown quantity. A new alliance that quickly began bristling sophisticated arms (supplied by the US, since other European nations would have no arms to spare) would scare the poo poo out of Russia (and everybody else, actually) in the short run since it would be completely unpredictable. The leadership, policies, C&C, and everything else would be a cipher. Hence, a new, non-NATO alliance would prompt Russia to start testing its responses to various provocations in order to build a record, if nothing else. They would look to destabilize and undermine it while it was still young, hoping it would fall apart early and leave them in the superior position. It would actually encourage Russian adventurism, rather than prevent it. As I said in the other thread, a new alliance would, at the very best, be no different from putting the countries into NATO to begin with. At worst, it would be ineffective and picked to pieces by Russia, turning the whole operation into a Russian-dominated satellite alliance. And the notion that Russia's national mood was ready for a permanent change in the early '90s is laughable. Yes, they were down and disillusioned at the time, but national moods change constantly and unpredictably. Betting the freedom and future of the entire Eastern Europe bloc on Russia not backsliding into belligerency at some point in the future was foolish. Russia's best response to the expansion of NATO would have been to continue to move into the Western orbit, continue to be a good neighbor, and thereby prove that all the people supporting expansion to be reactionary fools. Instead, Russia chose to prove them right.
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Mar 5, 2015 13:54
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-Troika- posted:Shut up, Sedanchair, the adults are talking now. Hey whoa I thought this was a thread where comity was prized. ALL-PRO SEXMAN posted:The sovereignty of independent states is something that should be upheld and fought for. Please don't ask deliberately nitwitted questions. I'm asking you what the danger is though. A whole lot of folks (or maybe just a few strident ones) in the Eastern Europe thread like to compare Putin to Hitler but I don't think the comparison holds up. Russia prefers to control its buffer states just like we prefer to control Latin America, and when Russia has fiddled around there we have not exactly responded in terms of respect for sovereignty. Such pretty concepts seem out of place in discussing relations between these two powers.
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Mar 5, 2015 14:51
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Majorian posted:Jesus, dude, seriously? You've got a wide gamut of very intelligent people who actually have lifetimes of experience in this field, compared to your, what, couple months of reading internet blog posts on the issue, telling you what their experience has taught them, and you brush it all away as a name drop, because their position doesn't agree with your preconceived notions? Those aren't name drops, those are citations. People who know what they're talking about back my position. Don't get all bent out of shape because I backed up my argument. Like those experts, you consistently and unfailing suggest that their will and their sovereignty is secondary to Russia's. They took a "We know best" approach to their future: whatever the former Soviet states wanted DOESN'T MATTER, what Russia wanted is what mattered. You keep insisting that Russia was some sort of pathetic paper tiger in the 90s, but they still had a significantly larger military than any former Soviet state, and still possessed the greatest number of nukes. That you and those experts essentially believe that wanting a sense of security in the face of that is not only wrong, but that we should have placated Russia's desires without even considering what countries like Poland or Finland may have wanted at the time is why you and I are wasting our time: I believe that their concerns were justified, just as much as Russia's NATO concerns. You feel they are entirely secondary and they should have been ignored in the face of Russia's own concerns. It still fell to Russia to not be lovely neighbors and prove the need for NATO to be unfounded following the collapse of the Soviet Union.They have failed to do this, and all you have is an alternate reality where if everything went perfect, maybe they wouldn't have been "forced" to invade Ukraine.
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Mar 5, 2015 18:21
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Guys, guys, the German's just want frontier security, that's why they took Poland and France, who are we to judge?
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Mar 5, 2015 18:25
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Gorau posted:There is a difference between peacefully co-existing with your neighbours because of fundamental weakness and co-existing from a position of strength. You are forced to in the first and choose to in the second. This is certainly true, but the available evidence suggests that both were the case with most of the Russian people, especially the younger generation. The Russians were tired of forcibly occupying countries that didn't want to be part of the USSR anymore. Remember, this is what the August Putsch and the backlash against it were all about : Gorbachev tried to institute reforms that would decentralize the USSR and allow greater autonomy for the non-Russian Soviet countries. Party hardliners, led by that delightful dipshit Ruslan Khasbulatov, attempted a coup against Gorbachev that ultimately failed, in no small part due to the fact that the Russian people were tired of fighting to keep these countries under their thumb. It is true that, in the 1991 referendum, a majority of people in the states that voted (including Russia) supported keeping the USSR together. However, it's important to note that A, this was a newly federalized, decentralized version of the USSR that was clearly moving in the direction of dissolution anyway; and B, that support is tempered with a general lack of will to fight to keep Ukraine and the other non-Russian states in the empire. Indeed, it's incredibly telling that, upon the dissolution of the USSR, Yeltsin didn't even ask for Crimea back. Bear in mind how significant that is, because I'm not saying Yeltsin didn't send in tanks (or little green men) to take it back; I'm saying that he didn't even ask. He could easily have demanded it and then used that demand as a bargaining chip for other concessions, but there was so little support for holding onto these republics that he didn't even do that. This is the general problem that I have with your reading of how this history occurred, and how it could have occurred alternatively: your acknowledged assumption that the Russian strategic imperative of dominating its neighbor states' policies would have been inevitable, no matter what happened. I disagree - I think you're saying that out of hindsight. I genuinely believe that most Russians would have remained unmotivated to "take back" Ukraine and its other neighbors, had they not felt threatened by what they considered eastward expansion of the American empire. Remember, the Russians had been steeped in the notion that NATO was simply a puppet for Washington in the way that the Warsaw Pact was for Moscow. They only started wanting control of those satellite states again when it truly seemed to them that the American Empire was at their doorstep. You are correct that Russian peaceful coexistence with its neighbors has usually only occurred during periods of weakness in Russia. However, it's important to note that the early 90's were a special case. Russians were much more open to accepting Western values and integrating with the rest of the developed world. There was genuine enthusiasm towards bringing Russia into the European political and cultural world. Moreover, we in the West had an unprecedented opportunity to signal our friendly, benign intentions towards them. But instead of going about signaling these motivations to them in a deliberate, thoughtful way, we assumed that they went without saying. We assumed that they knew NATO wasn't an anti-Moscow alliance anymore, and that expansion into the former Soviet republics was less about weakening Russia and more about respecting the will of those countries' populations. In effect, it was the same neoconservative logic that guided George W. Bush's ill-fated foreign policies: we assumed that everybody knew we were the good guys. And, of course, that ended up blowing up in our faces. e: George Kennan said it best back in 1998: (emphasis mine) quote:I think the Russians will gradually react quite adversely and it will affect their policies. I think it is a tragic mistake. There was no reason for this whatsoever. No one was threatening anybody else. This expansion would make the Founding Fathers of this country turn over in their graves. We have signed up to protect a whole series of countries, even though we have neither the resources nor the intention to do so in any serious way. [NATO expansion] was simply a light-hearted action by a Senate that has no real interest in foreign affairs. quote:It shows so little understanding of Russian history and Soviet history. Of course there is going to be a bad reaction from Russia, and then [the NATO expanders] will say that we always told you that is how the Russians are -- but this is just wrong. e: CommieGIR posted:Guys, guys, the German's just want frontier security, that's why they took Poland and France, who are we to judge? Please don't shitpost. Either post an argument of your own or don't post at all. Majorian fucked around with this message at 19:14 on Mar 5, 2015 |
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Mar 5, 2015 18:32
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