International Security & NATO (The Second Best Exotic Clancychat Thread)

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Nintendo Kid: Aug 4, 2011; by Smythe

Majorian posted:

Irrelevant - even if it were a hot war and NATO managed to somehow close off the Baltic and Black Sea choke points and prevent Russian submarines from getting through, they couldn't close off Murmansk or keep the Red Banner Northern Fleet from projecting its power into the Atlantic.

Nuking Murmansk would sure as hell close it off. Don't even try to pretend that full scale conflict with Russia wouldn't go nuclear.

# ? Mar 9, 2015 18:08

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# ? Apr 24, 2024 23:07

Majorian: Jul 1, 2009; Inverted Offensive Battle: Acupuncture Attacks Convert To 3D Penetration Tactics Taking Advantage of Deep Battle Opportunities

Nintendo Kid posted:

Nuking Murmansk would sure as hell close it off. Don't even try to pretend that full scale conflict with Russia wouldn't go nuclear.

You're dodging the point, which is that you were wrong to claim that Russia was encircled in any meaningful way during the Cold War.

# ? Mar 9, 2015 18:11

Nintendo Kid: Aug 4, 2011; by Smythe

Majorian posted:

You're dodging the point, which is that you were wrong to claim that Russia was encircled in any meaningful way during the Cold War.

I wasn't. They absolutely were encircled. Enslaving a bunch of countries to be encircled with them didn't make them non-encircled.

# ? Mar 9, 2015 18:18

Majorian: Jul 1, 2009; Inverted Offensive Battle: Acupuncture Attacks Convert To 3D Penetration Tactics Taking Advantage of Deep Battle Opportunities

Nintendo Kid posted:

I wasn't. They absolutely were encircled. Enslaving a bunch of countries to be encircled with them didn't make them non-encircled.

What is your definition of "encircled," fishmech? (oh God, I can't believe I'm asking fishmech to define something)

e: And more importantly, do you have any evidence that Russians do not currently actually feel like NATO is encircling them as former Warsaw Pact/Soviet states join it? Because that seems to be the implication of this derail you're taking us on.

Majorian fucked around with this message at 18:32 on Mar 9, 2015

# ? Mar 9, 2015 18:20

Numlock: May 19, 2007; The simplest seppo on the forums

Everybody on their border hated and feared them during the cold war.

Everybody on their border hates and fears them now.

The only thing that changed is how many expendable (as in not ethnic russian) cannon fodder they have to throw at potential enemies.

# ? Mar 9, 2015 18:36

Majorian: Jul 1, 2009; Inverted Offensive Battle: Acupuncture Attacks Convert To 3D Penetration Tactics Taking Advantage of Deep Battle Opportunities

Numlock posted:

The only thing that changed is how many expendable (as in not ethnic russian) cannon fodder they have to throw at potential enemies.

Eh, unfortunately not entirely true. U.S. and NATO interests have also changed since the Cold War, and we need Russia's cooperation on a lot more issues than we used to. Without them, issues like WMD proliferation, ISIS, North Korea, Iran, global climate change, etc, become a lot more complicated.

# ? Mar 9, 2015 18:44

MeLKoR: Dec 23, 2004; by FactsAreUseless

Majorian posted:

Eh, unfortunately not entirely true. U.S. and NATO interests have also changed since the Cold War, and we need Russia's cooperation on a lot more issues than we used to. Without them, issues like WMD proliferation, ISIS, North Korea, Iran, global climate change, etc, become a lot more complicated.

As demonstrated in the 90s Russia's ability to gently caress with other countries is a function of their economic strength. Since apparently there is nothing that won't make them sperg out it seems like it's in everyone's interest to gently caress them up economically, thus limiting the damage they can do. Since the russian people was already told that we are trying to gently caress them economically we might as well do it, it's not like they'll hate us twice.

At least this one isn't predicated on Putin being a nice guy at heart that will play nice if we lower our ears and put our tail between our legs and has a proven record of actually working.

# ? Mar 9, 2015 18:58

Majorian: Jul 1, 2009; Inverted Offensive Battle: Acupuncture Attacks Convert To 3D Penetration Tactics Taking Advantage of Deep Battle Opportunities

MeLKoR posted:

As demonstrated in the 90s Russia's ability to gently caress with other countries is a function of their economic strength.

In part, yes, but it's also only part of what motivates them to act aggressively towards their neighbors.

quote:

it seems like it's in everyone's interest to gently caress them up economically, thus limiting the damage they can do.

You're forgetting that a bankrupt Russia is at least as dangerous to the world in general as it is now. As the 90's demonstrated, an imploding Russia creates a massive proliferation risk, and could also make it even more of a home for terrorist and organized criminal groups than it already is. Far better that we actually address the motivation behind them acting aggressively, instead of trying to address a moderately-sized problem (Russian aggression against Ukraine) and creating a considerably larger one (Russia as a WMD proliferation risk).

e: Also, it would probably be wise not to economically disrupt the country that provides as much energy to Europe as it does.

# ? Mar 9, 2015 19:06

Nintendo Kid: Aug 4, 2011; by Smythe

Majorian posted:

What is your definition of "encircled," fishmech? (oh God, I can't believe I'm asking fishmech to define something)

e: And more importantly, do you have any evidence that Russians do not currently actually feel like NATO is encircling them as former Warsaw Pact/Soviet states join it? Because that seems to be the implication of this derail you're taking us on.

Surrounded by countries actively in alliance against them, and countries that are at most neutral, with no "friendly" countries that aren't themselves cordoned off.

If Russia only feels like it since the Warsaw Pact states started joining then they are silly to the extreme, since the major job was completed 40 years prior. Hell most of the ones that have joined NATO weren't all that friendly long before they were finally let in to NATO.

# ? Mar 9, 2015 19:13

Majorian: Jul 1, 2009; Inverted Offensive Battle: Acupuncture Attacks Convert To 3D Penetration Tactics Taking Advantage of Deep Battle Opportunities

Nintendo Kid posted:

Surrounded by countries actively in alliance against them, and countries that are at most neutral, with no "friendly" countries that aren't themselves cordoned off.

That's a ridiculous definition - countries surrounded by other neutral countries aren't "encircled" in any meaningful sense. One could argue, by this logic, that NATO was as surrounded by the Warsaw Pact states as vice-versa. And even by your own bad definition, Russia wasn't encircled - they had the Arctic Ocean and their Pacific coastline.

quote:

If Russia only feels like it since the Warsaw Pact states started joining then they are silly to the extreme, since the major job was completed 40 years prior. Hell most of the ones that have joined NATO weren't all that friendly long before they were finally let in to NATO.

You can call it silly all you want - it doesn't change the fact that it's a perception we have to find a way to change if we want Russia to stop acting aggressively against its neighbors.

# ? Mar 9, 2015 19:20

MeLKoR: Dec 23, 2004; by FactsAreUseless

Majorian posted:

Far better that we actually address the motivation behind them acting aggressively, instead of trying to address a moderately-sized problem (Russian aggression against Ukraine) and creating a considerably larger one (Russia as a WMD proliferation risk).

The motivation behind them acting aggressively is that they want as much of their imperial influence back as they can get away with. If it once wasn't - in the 90s, when they were down - it sure is now. Is there actually any solution you propose that doesn't by definition end up with Ukraine and potentially others just left at Russia's mercy? I never got that. Is there any scenario you envision where Ukraine is not a russian vassal?

quote:

e: Also, it would probably be wise not to economically disrupt the country that provides as much energy to Europe as it does.

If push came to shove we would endure it far better than they would.

# ? Mar 9, 2015 19:27

Nintendo Kid: Aug 4, 2011; by Smythe

Majorian posted:

One could argue, by this logic, that NATO was as surrounded by the Warsaw Pact states as vice-versa.

One could not, because the Warsaw pact was a wholly contiguous lump welded to the Soviet Union, with NATO touching it from the North, West, East and even the South in many significant areas.

# ? Mar 9, 2015 19:27

Majorian: Jul 1, 2009; Inverted Offensive Battle: Acupuncture Attacks Convert To 3D Penetration Tactics Taking Advantage of Deep Battle Opportunities

MeLKoR posted:

The motivation behind them acting aggressively is that they want as much of their imperial influence back as they can get away with.

Nobody's denying it, but you have a lot of very seasoned experts (and an admittedly less-seasoned me) tell you that another big part of it is fear of encirclement by NATO. You must realize that your opinion that Russia's aggression is motivated purely by them wanting their imperial influence back is not shared by the people who actually have worked on this subject for most of their careers.

quote:

Is there actually any solution you propose that doesn't by definition end up with Ukraine and potentially others just left at Russia's mercy?

Given that direct military intervention is unlikely in the extreme, I don't think that there's any option on the table right now that won't leave Ukraine under some level of Russian influence.

quote:

If push came to shove we would endure it far better than they would.

I'm sure, but I don't think it's something that the populations of European countries would really accept gladly.

Nintendo Kid posted:

One could not, because the Warsaw pact was a wholly contiguous lump welded to the Soviet Union, with NATO touching it from the North, West, East and even the South in many significant areas.

Fascinating. Now back to the West needing to change Russia's perception of being encircled if we want it to stop acting aggressively...any thoughts on that?

Majorian fucked around with this message at 19:33 on Mar 9, 2015

# ? Mar 9, 2015 19:31

Nintendo Kid: Aug 4, 2011; by Smythe

Majorian posted:

Fascinating. Now back to the West needing to change Russia's perception of being encircled if we want it to stop acting aggressively...any thoughts on that?

This is impossible, because they factually are encircled, and they can not be deluded into thinking they aren't. The only thing that can make them not encircled is full capitulation to "the west".

# ? Mar 9, 2015 19:33

Majorian: Jul 1, 2009; Inverted Offensive Battle: Acupuncture Attacks Convert To 3D Penetration Tactics Taking Advantage of Deep Battle Opportunities

Nintendo Kid posted:

This is impossible, because they factually are encircled, and they can not be deluded into thinking they aren't. The only thing that can make them not encircled is full capitulation to "the west".

They didn't seem to feel terribly encircled in the early 90's - or, if they did, it didn't cause them as much concern as it does now. If anything, they felt that they were going to be accepted into the brotherhood of European states.

e: Changing their perception is not impossible - just difficult. We need to signal to them that the West is not conspiring against them, and that we are not still trying to undermine Moscow at every turn like we were during the Cold War.

Majorian fucked around with this message at 19:41 on Mar 9, 2015

# ? Mar 9, 2015 19:37

Nintendo Kid: Aug 4, 2011; by Smythe

Majorian posted:

They didn't seem to feel terribly encircled in the early 90's. If anything, they felt that they were going to be accepted into the brotherhood of European states.

They were still militarily encircled though. Like I said, the only way for them to stop being so is to actually join in and repudiate their freedom of action.

# ? Mar 9, 2015 19:41

Majorian: Jul 1, 2009; Inverted Offensive Battle: Acupuncture Attacks Convert To 3D Penetration Tactics Taking Advantage of Deep Battle Opportunities

Nintendo Kid posted:

They were still militarily encircled though. Like I said, the only way for them to stop being so is to actually join in and repudiate their freedom of action.

So how, exactly, do we get them to do that?

# ? Mar 9, 2015 19:43

Nintendo Kid: Aug 4, 2011; by Smythe

Majorian posted:

So how, exactly, do we get them to do that?

It certainly can't involve making them think they aren't encircled or being encircled, as that essentially involves lying to them and deluding them. You can't get lasting policy change that way.

# ? Mar 9, 2015 19:46

Majorian: Jul 1, 2009; Inverted Offensive Battle: Acupuncture Attacks Convert To 3D Penetration Tactics Taking Advantage of Deep Battle Opportunities

Nintendo Kid posted:

It certainly can't involve making them think they aren't encircled or being encircled, as that essentially involves lying to them and deluding them. You can't get lasting policy change that way.

The way you do it is to signal to them that NATO is not an enemy, and not intent on encircling and weakening them. This can be achieved through confidence-building measures, like furthering the arms reduction process, abandoning ABM sites in Eastern and Central Europe, signing back on with the ABM Treaty, etc.

e: That's the thing that I think a lot of the more hawkish types in this thread are missing: this isn't exactly terra incognita as far as diplomacy is concerned. There are tried-and-true methods for talking powerful nations down from the ledge; it seems kind of silly to me to automatically assume that they won't work, just because "Russia = SCARY."

Majorian fucked around with this message at 20:25 on Mar 9, 2015

# ? Mar 9, 2015 19:48

Koesj: Aug 3, 2003

Majorian posted:

Irrelevant - even if it were a hot war and NATO managed to somehow close off the Baltic and Black Sea choke points and prevent Russian submarines from getting through, they couldn't close off Murmansk or keep the Red Banner Northern Fleet from projecting its power into the Atlantic.

The first part of your statement is highly contentious, since 'somehow' closing the Baltic and the Black Sea would ultimately only entail mining those straits. A tough break for shipping yes, but if you're looking at a major war with the USSR/Russia it might well be tempting (and it was planned for, historically). Of course such a blockade could be broken by invading the surrounding terrain, but then you've pretty much arrived at a point where NATO was going to make a use or lose decision re: nuclear weapons, i.e. occupying either Turkey (which still only gets you into the Med) and Denmark/southern Sweden+Norway (which still only gets you into the North Sea).

Preventing the USSR from getting into the Atlantic in force (to do what and when, by the way) was of course a much tougher issue, but the interlocking GIUK (Greenland - Iceland - UK) complex of SOSUS, barrier Anti-Submarine Warfare forces (ASW patrol planes, surface task forces, NATO's own submarines) was a really big obstacle to overcome. Especially during the latter two thirds of the Cold War. In the 1960s and 70s for example, NATO forces routinely tracked all Soviet nuclear submarines operating in peacetime, and wartime would have given them the entire Norwegian Sea as a nuclear depth charging glacis (does either side escalate over such use?). This changed with better Soviet sub technology in the 1980s, and the situation was a bit different in the Pacific with them operating out of Petropavlovsk of course, but from all I've read the Soviet Navy was anything but bullish about offensive contributions in a conflict with the West.

Upthread you stated that "[NATO] at least maintained naval parity with Russia in the Atlantic", but I'd argue that this was patently not the case. NATO (and the US+Japan on the other side of the world for that matter!) was far, far stronger than the USSR in the naval realm, and the Gorshkov-inspired push to build a matching blue-water Navy was sensibly superseded by a way more defensive outlook. Longer-ranged submarine launched missiles made the Soviet second-strike nuclear capability far better defensible from their own soil (the Bastion concept), and IIRC I've argued in the TFR Cold War thread that the 1970s/80s surface navy projects had more to do with defense-industrial considerations than trying to 'break' the NATO grip on the naval realm.

Now all this might be stupidly nitty-gritty detail in the face of more high-minded global strategic concepts like encirclement, but I feel that a more bottom-up systems point of view can inspire more nuanced metaphors and metonymies than all-encompassing 'encirclement' or whatever.

# ? Mar 9, 2015 20:32

Horns of Hattin: Dec 21, 2011

As I've discussed, NATO expansion can not explain Russian antagonism toward the West. It does make for easy Russian rhetoric made up decades later that's easy to buy into, but by studying the events chronologically paints a different picture. First there was the ultra-liberal Russian foreign minister Andrey Kozyrev serving until 1996, who indicated that Russia did not object to former Warsaw pact nations joining NATO. Then NATO always diplomatically engaging with Russia, signing the "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation" in 1997, creating the "NATO+1" council. Also Europe signing an adaptation of the "Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe", to account for the shifting balance of power in Europe in 1999.

A bit earlier in 1999, three countries joined NATO: Poland, Czech Rep. and Hungary. No additional NATO bases were built in these countries to satisfy the text of the abovementioned agreements. Neither can I understand how these three countries are "encircling" Russia or how they are "threatening" Russia when they are nowhere close to the Russian border.

NATO sought further co-operation with Russia by creating the NATO-Russia council in 2002. It was only in 2004 that Russia showed displeasure with the second NATO expansion, primarily due to the Baltic states slipping away. The most that came of it was when Russia's defense minister Ivanov showed irritation during his speech during a trip to Washington that year. However, in the same speech Ivanov also criticized NATO's policy in Kosovo and Iraq, so it's impossible to pretend that NATO expansion was the only issue that upset Russia.

So if NATO expansion cannot explain Russia's antagonism, then what can? I've stated this before - it was NATO's intervention in the Yugoslav wars, particularly the bombing campaign of Serbia during the Kosovo war. The tactlessness of NATO's actions in Yugoslavia with regards to Russia is really shocking, especially when compared to the accommodating way it handled NATO's expansion.

There are two very important Russian domestic issues that must be mentioned in order to understand the situation. First, by 1998 Russia's economy was in the toilet. GDP dropped by 40% compared to 1991. Then the 1997 Asian financial crisis tanked the demand for Russia's exports, so Russia was forced to default on its debts and had to re-denominate its currency. it wouldn't be an overstatement to say that Russia was at rock bottom at that point.

The second issue was Chechnya. The first disastrous and bloody Chechen war ended in 1996 with the withdrawal of Russian forces from the republic. So a de-facto independent Chechen republic existed in 1998, which was populated by a non-Russian Muslin ethnicity that didn't want anything to do with Russia and which could accuse Russia of war crimes committed in its territory. If you know a single thing about Kosovo, you know where this is going.

Here, I started writing about the Russian perspective on the Kosovo war, but apparently I did not need to do that, because it's already been done by contemporaries to that conflict. So instead, I'll quote them. All emphasis is mine, just to highlight the points I would have made and break the monotony of the rather long text.

quote:

Discourse on NATO In Russia During the Kosovo War.
By Vladimir Brovkin

In contemporary Russia views on NATO define one's political philosophy and one's view of Russia vis-�-vis the West generally. These attitudes are inseparably intertwined with the domestic Russian politics and struggle for power. According to conventional wisdom today Russia views NATO with hostility. Irreparable damage has been done to Russian perception of NATO through the three policies NATO had undertaken in 1999, 1.Expansion of NATO by way of including the three new members; 2. Modernization of American high-tech weaponry and most importantly 3. The bombing campaign in Serbia.

No doubt these policies have subjected Russian perceptions to severe strain and may in fact have contributed to the anti-American hysteria prevalent in Russia during the bombing campaign. However, this approach to NATO-Russia relations focuses on what the West has done and by implication on what the West has done wrong that ended up in alienating the benevolent Russians. This approach necessarily would lead its proponents to searching what the West should do right to compensate for the anti-Russian mistakes of the past year.

By far a more productive approach to explaining the Russian-NATO stormy relations over the past year is to view them in the context of Russian domestic politics. The key assumption here is that whatever Russian actors did vis-�-vis the West and NATO was a reflection of Russian domestic priorities. Furthermore President Yeltsyn has changed his tune in regard to NATO at least three times likewise in response to his political struggles over that turbulent year. From Partnership For Peace, he led Russia to a near confrontation over "NATO aggression" and then again to business as usual at the G8 summit. The purpose therefore is to untangle this web of contradictory policies and statements and to explain the meaning of the domestic context of Russian policy to NATO.

August 1998: Falling Ruble, Falling Gods.
When the ruble collapsed in August 1998, with it collapsed the faith in the Western style economic reform among the Russian general public. This simple fact has not quite yet been appreciated in the US. The August debacle has wiped out the confidence among the emerging middle classes that life were getting better. It hurt most the very classes, which had believed that pro-western Russian reform would eventually lead Russia to prosperity and democracy. The ruble collapse had discredited the government of Kirienko and with it the entire group of the so-called young reformers Gaidar, Nemtsov, and Chubais, whom Larry Summers had called the dream team of reformers.

17 August 1998 has marked the passing of an era, an era of belief among the Russian middle class that market reform, democracy and prosperity were a part of the same deal. Among the people in their thirties, engaged in a variety of business ventures the West, the USA, NATO and market economy were positive notions. They did not fear NATO and they welcomed the American ways and American investment. Clearly this constituency was not a majority in Russia. Yet it probably was a majority in the big cities. It was clearly the up and coming political force that most definitely was instrumental in voting for Yeltsyn in the 1992 and 1996 presidential elections.

Yeltsyn in the 1992 and 1996 presidential elections. Already in the run-up to the August disaster liberal politicians like Grigorii Yavlinsky and his Yabloko party, the steadfast democratic critics of the Yeltsyn regime, had been warning that true economic reforms had not been undertaken, that dependence on Western loans for balancing the budget would get the reformers into trouble, and that an oligarchy was being created. Most of these critical voices were left unnoticed both in Russia and in the West. Western banks were enthusiastic about Russian high yield GKO market. Clinton's administration was happy with Yeltsyn and did not want to hear anything about corruption, theft,or embezzlement of state funds.

In August 1998 the time had come to pay the bills. Reformers were discredited and with them the pro-Western course in economy. Conditions were ripe for the forces to emerge who had been known for reserved if not outright hostile policy in regard to the NATO.

Yevgenii Primakov's appointment was a reflection of this new climate in the country. Primakov had a reputation of a tough foreign minister that stood up for Russia's perceived rights as a superpower. He had earned himself the applause of the Communists and the nationalist-democrats like mayor of Moscow Yurii Luzhkov on numerous occasions. The appointment of Primakov was an admission by Yeltsyn that the pro-western course was discredited. The question was only to what extent the antiwestern course would prevail, and how far Russia would go along this path.

Primakov turned out to be a virtuoso of compromise. He did not make any rough moves. He kept the Communists and the Nationalists and the Democrats content by simply holding on tight and preventing the economy from spiraling downwards. What was expected of him by the Communist nationalist forces was to show that Russia could stand up to the West, that it could not be ignored or manipulated as a third world country. The painful negotiations with the IMF had already created an atmosphere that the West was controlling Russian economy with unceasing demands. The West was offering loans and then imposing controls. As a result, Russia was reduced to dependence on Western loans and investments, which were not forthcoming.

Primakov's priority was not in seeking confrontation with the West. As is clear in retrospect, it was in curtailing the power of the oligarchs, the business clans, who had monopolized most of Russia's industry in their hands and who had brought disaster to Russian economy by their speculative ventures of 1996 -1998. In order to move forward, Russia needed to clip the influence of the oligarchs and that was Primakov's priority.

He made his move in January 1999 and it looked for the moment that Berezovskys and Chubaises and Potanins were in jeopardy. Investigations were open against major companies. Banks were allowed to go insolvent. Public debate was launched on the plausibility of admitting Western banks into Russian domestic market. For the first time in Russian history the Prosecutor General asked the Kremlin to account for state revenue. Domestic concerns, and fight against corruption dominated the national agenda in January and February 1999. Mere three weeks later all this was conveniently forgotten and the media focused on NATO aggression against Yugoslavia. Whether it was coincidental or not, the shift of focus was very convenient for Yeltsyn.

NATO Moves:
Primakov and Skuratov's attempt at genuine reform of the corrupt system did not find encouragement in Washington. From the very beginning he was not a friend. Chubais's friends and admirers in Washington kept on downgrading him as a neo-Communist, former KGB official whose departure would be welcome and the return of the so-called democrats i.e. Chubais's clan was desirable. Exactly at the time when Primakov and Prosecutor General Yurii Skuratov were launching investigations into abuse, theft and financial improprieties of the most powerful men in Russia, when they questioned financial dealing of the Kremlin, the NATO decided to force Serbian President Milosevic comply.

The fact is the US did not show support to Primakov and revealed two prongs of its new NATO doctrine signaling to the Russians that their reaction was not very important or relevant.The US would pursue its NATO policy and the Russians would just have to live with it. That was the message to Russian in March 1999.

The first irritant to the Russian hawks was of course the bombing of Iraq at the end of 1998 during the impeachment of President Clinton. It made the Russian General Staff furious. Russia's ally was bombed and Russia was not even notified in advance. Her reaction was irrelevant and Yeltsyn's regime was helpless. This inaction at the turn of the year contributed to the rise of the mood to resist NATO and US next time. Some Western analysts believe that Milosevic calculated his moves taking into account this mood in Moscow. His intransigence increased pushing NATO leaders to a forcible solution.

The three prongs of NATO policy before the Kosovo war were: inclusion of the three new members into the alliance; modernization of the Pentagon's nuclear forces; and expansion of NATO role in the world in the new doctrine. All this was being discussed with many fanfares in preparation for the Fiftieth anniversary of NATO.

Timing is everything in politics. The timing of these initiatives was bad for Russian domestic politics. The public opinion was already relatively anti-Western as a result of the
failure of Western prescribed policies. President Clinton's reputation was tarnished by the impeachment proceedings. His friend Boris was vastly unpopular. The bombing of Iraq inflamed passions. In this climate of recrimination and looking for a scapegoat NATO unveiled its plans. The fact that the three new members were welcomed into the alliance with such fanfare the Russians perceived as adding insult to injury.

The three countries in the popular mind used to be Russia's allies. They used to belong to the Warsaw pact. In the popular conscience, the Red army had liberated the three countries from the NAZI rule. Now they were joining NATO, the most powerful military alliance in the world, which not only did not cease to exist after the collapse of the Warsaw pact but also remained and expanded at the expense of Russia's allies. This reasoning appealed to many.

The traditional liberal argument that the countries of central Europe were free to join any alliance, and that they were sovereign nations and that Russia had no right dictating
its neighbors which alliances to join, this argument was not very popular. It still hurt national pride that these countries chose to exercise their sovereignty by joining NATO rather than seek alliance with Russia for example. This choice by Poland and Hungary immediately generated arguments that these two countries had been anti-Russian throughout their history. The choice of the Check republic generated a sense of frustration and betrayal. They too, those whom we had liberated from the Nazis. Few remembered Soviet occupation of 1968 on that occasion.

The admission of the three central European states into NATO even though it had been known to take place and even though the Russians had long ago made peace with this decision, still generated a sense of injured isolation. Russia was alone in Europe. Russia was abandoned by its former allies. Russia was being bankrupted by the West who had stolen its riches and its allies. The admission of NATO's new members emphasized Russia's loneliness, which the Communists equated with uniqueness, separateness and anti-Westernism.

Equally ill timed were the debates in the US Congress on the modernization of US forces. The Russian public perceived this desire to modernize with consternation. Why did the Americans need a new supersonic fighter? Why were they planing to build nuclear defense systems? As in the past, any attempt to verbalize a calm response to these questions generated vehement denunciation. Arguments that the US needed modern weapons against rogue states and international terrorists did not sound very convincing in Russia. The implication drawn by many Russian politicians was that the US kept on arming when Russia could no longer afford it. A few months later this crystallized in a decision to modernize Russian nuclear forces no matter what the cost.

The third prong in NATO's strategy was that NATO had a right to intervene military beyond the strictly confined area of North Atlantic and the Mediterranean basin for peacekeeping operations. This rather innocuous policy statement was perceived as usurpation of the right to intervene anywhere in the world. The Russian military observers clearly read into this policy change intent by NATO and the US to intervene military anywhere in the world including Russia. Military action in support of humanitarian objectives was a cover-up of an aggression, argued Russian analysts. The NATO and US were striving to acquire world hegemony. This in turn generated a strong impetus to hold
on to those international organizations where Russia still had a voice such as the UN.

Not so much the substance of the new NATO polices as the style, the pompous omnipotence, and the demonstration of disregard to Russia's views and the fanfare of the fiftieth NATO anniversary tended to alienate Russia. Almost all political forces were now ready to welcome a tough stand vis-�-vis NATO. Russia was not going to be ignored. Russia was not going to be excluded from Europe. Russia is still a power to be reckoned with. These were the sentiments widely shared as March 1999 came.

Kosovo:
The war over Kosovo did more damage to Russia-NATO relations than any other event since 1991. This is not to imply that NATO should not have pursued the policy it had. The war over Kosovo crystallized the tendencies that had already been in the making anyway. It speeded up the unfolding of attitudes and feelings that had been there already. The war made it painfully clear that Russia was no longer the Great Power, and that the West pursued its policy in Europe and elsewhere regardless of Russian objections. Russia had no allies in Europe, other than Serbia, an ally that would not even listen to the advice of its only benefactor. Russia was alone, weak, ignored, not paid attention to. This was the main source of anti-Americanism. This was the main source of a hysteria that had seized the Russian media.

The Russian Objections:
What was most striking in the spring of 1999 was the unanimity with which Russians from various walks of life and political parties condemned NATO bombing. Opponents of NATO launched several Russian web sites where a vigorous debate raged on the merits of NATO actions and the Russian possible response. Many authors pointed out that the historical record since 1992 did not look favorable to NATO. Russia withdrew from the countries of Eastern Europe, has disbanded the Warsaw pact, has limited its forces, and the NIS have abandoned nuclear weapons, whereas NATO expanded to the East, created new arms programs and violated the sovereignty of a European state.

Russian critics and experts wrote article after article arguing that the entire system of international relations was based on the UN and its authority. Launching the military action
without UN sanction, NATO was undermining the very foundation of the world order. Moreover, most international agreements signed in building the world order stipulated the condemnation of a use of force or a threat of a use of force against a sovereign state. Therefore NATO's action could be qualified as an aggression.

Particularly unacceptable for Russia was the principle that NATO could unilaterally decide to use force for whatever reason against any country where human rights were ostensibly violated. Why then not bomb Northern Ireland or Russia itself? Russia's national interests as a European power were at stake. They would then start talking about human rights and loss of human life in senseless bombing and the suffering of the civilians. Any attempt to remind them that the bombing started in order to stop human suffering inflicted upon civilians by Serb security forces would trigger a quick response to the effect that Serb security forces were fighting against the separatists and terrorists and
the refugees were running away from NATO bombing. Boris Fedorov, the democrats and a reformer, former Minister of Finance was just as adamant. His objections were quite sound at first sight. By bombing Serbia NATO acted unilaterally without decision of the UN Security Council. Therefore he reasoned the NATO acted in violation of the International law.

Information Gap.
A great discovery for a Western observer was that the Russian media which was supposedly free and fair was completely and totally one-sided in its coverage of Kosovo events. It
essentially reproduced Serbian propaganda lines and footage. Refugees were fleeing American bombing. Hundreds of thousands of refugees were the result of NATO bombing. This was repeated day after day. No wonder common people condemned NATO bombing.

This was an example of the Soviet era manipulation of the media. The difference with the Soviet times was that then people were in the habit of disbelieving official propaganda. Now loads of propaganda lies were perceived as true coverage. Meeting academicians, professors, informed people in April 1999, who I thought had to know what the real situation was, I was astonished to find out that they, for the most part, believed official media coverage and hence condemned NATO. To the question about ethnic cleansing they usually answered that Milosevic was a criminal and that they objected to inhumane bombing of NATO rather than to Milosevic's hold on Kosovo. Lack of explanation as to the rationale of NATO action united for a brief time all them in opposition to NATO. A prominent columnist, editor-in- chief of Nezavisimaya Gazeta Vitalii Tretiakov scolded in his editorial those liberals and Democrats in Russia who while mildly criticizing NATO, still Tretiakov went on to argue that it was morally wrong for Europe to agree to American dictates and to condone killing of innocent Serbs for the sake of enforcing human rights. Tretiakov's editorials, always highly regarded in Russian political discourse, are an indication that the centrist Russian opinion was shocked by the unanimity of Europe and the US. He couched his criticism by claiming a moral high ground. He blamed the
West of not living up to observing human rights. Yet the logic of his reasoning suggested that in principle it was proper to defend human rights which implied in turn that the Russian defenders of NATO's action had a valid point.

Most definitely the anti-American hysteria was manipulated by those political forces that strove to turn the NATO action to their political advantage. The Communist party felt triumphant for the moment. Russia was on the side of Slavic and Orthodox brothers fighting aggression of NATO defending the Muslims. NATO somehow always defended the enemies of Russia was the implication of this reasoning.

President Yeltsyn had to play along with the nationalist hysteria. He had to admit that NATO action was wrong. He used strong epithets and even had to say that Russia would not get involved militarily. The fact that he had to explain whether Russia would or would not get involved suggests that his Communist and nationalist opponents managed to create a
situation when he had to explain why not. In other words, domestic politics was driving the response to the NATO action.

General Boris Gromov who has a reputation of a tough "patriot" a hero of Communist resistance to Yeltsyn in 1993 voiced the opinion echoing that of Yeltsyn and of the
'patriots" "The policy of Russia must be principled and firm. We will not accept NATO in the role of the World's policeman." However went on Gromov, providing military assistance to Yugoslavia would imply a return to the Cold War, which was unacceptable. This political stance was hardly distinguishable from that of Yeltsyn's: tough rhetoric and no action.

General Lebed was willing to go much farther. He proposed at the Federation Council to declare Yugoslavia a zone of Russia's geopolitical interests. Russia was to oppose NATO aggression and provide military assistance to Yugoslavia. According to Lebed Russia in the role of a fighter would consolidate its dignity and unify the nation. This option in other terms implied confrontation with the West for the sake of domestic spiritual revival and a claim to Great Power status abroad.

The Communist faction at the Duma took up the cause of brother Slavs, Christians as its own. Fiery speeches were made about the unity of the Slavic and Christian peoples. The CP leader Gennadii Ziuganov went to meet Milosevic and prepared a clever move, a vote in the Serbian parliament to the effect that Yugoslavia would join Belarus and Russia in a confederation. The message to the West was that in such a case Yugoslavia would be defended by Russian nuclear might. The chair of the Duma Security Committee, a staunch nationalist and anti-Semite Viktor Iliukhin proposed that Russia abandon the sanctions regime against Yugoslavia and provide it with military assistance including sophisticated air defense systems capable of shooting down American aircraft. A Communist paper wrote with enthusiasm in an article "Clinton's Gang Should Face Trial". The Communists tried to whip up anti-Western hysteria and to blacken Yeltsyn "the friend of Bill" by association. The friends of the West in Russia, the so-called democrats had already been discredited with their failed economic policies; the US was signaling that it did not care about Russian objections and Yeltsyn was mumbling condemnation but ruling out any military action on behalf of the Serbs. This was the situation in April.

The Communists managed to put Yeltsyn on the defensive. He could not comfortably explain why Russia was inactive when its "brothers" were being systematically bombed into the ground. The only explanation that came to mind was Russia's weakness, which the opposition claimed was the result of Yeltsyn's pro-Western policy. The salvation for Russia, so the argument went was not to seek favors from the West, not to kowtow to the NATO, not to swallow insults but to show that it still was a power to be reckoned with. Russia had to show to the world that no European problem could be resolved without her. This was the official line of the Russian President echoed in stronger terms by the Communists and Nationalists.

In trying to explain why Russian nationalists were so enthusiastic about defending Serbia from what was called "American aggression" it is useful to turn to the thoughts of Alexander Dugin, one of the staunchest nationalists in Russia, a writer whom many have called an ideologue of Russian Fascism. For him Serbia was a hero nation worthy of emulation. It was a country that defied NATO and the United States, a country that despite the overwhelming might of the West preferred to defiantly stand up for its Orthodoxy, Identity, and Integrity. Fighting the Muslims it was fighting a proxy of the real enemy, the USA. For people like Dugin fighting the West for Serbia was Russia's destiny. It was its way to salvation out of the slavery to which the current Russian regime was leading the country. It was in a noble fight that the Serbs and the Russians would discover their true destiny.

NATO became a symbol of the enemy for Russian nationalists. In their periodicals and web site pages, they talked about uniting all true Russians for a Holy war against NATO and the West. "With us are all those who preserve memory about the last war [i.e. World War II] on the side of the enemy is the Jew Allbright in the role of a Himmler of the Serbian Holocaust." What needed to be done upon victory argued the author of that article was to deport from Russia all those who are collaborationists of the West.

Some hotheads went even farther, especially in an uncensored Internet discussion. They argued that Russia should lead the world in a noble fight against American dictatorship in
the world. It should unite Belarus, Yugoslavia, Iraq, China and other countries in a worldwide movement against the United States, even if that would lead to World War Three. Better now than later while Russia still had credible nuclear forces. Traitor Yeltsyn had to be impeached and dismissed and Primakov take over his place as acting President.10 This agenda so eloquently expressed made it clear that a nationalist hysteria if left unchecked could sweep Yeltsyn from power.

The Voices of Reason.
--- cut out for the sake of space ---

Rank and File:
--- cut out for the sake of space ---

Defiant Confrontation: Pros and Cons.
Who would have benefited the most from a confrontation with the NATO over Serbia and Kosovo? Who in the Russian political landscape would have lost the most had it happened? At first sight the answer to these questions is obvious: the Communist and nationalists of various stripes would have benefited and Yeltsyn would have lost had the course of confrontation with NATO been pursued further. On the other hand, a confrontation with NATO could have created a situation of a national emergency, which could have been used as a pretext to ban the Communist party, thus effectively canceling elections in December 1999.

Much has been and much will be written about the dash of Russian paratroopers to Pristina airport. For the purposes of this discussion, i.e. Russia's relations with NATO, it is
crucial to interpret the meaning of this incident for the domestic Russian politics. Let us start out with the assumption that Russian paratroopers stationed in Bosnia would not have dared to march to Pristina on their own. They had orders from very high authority. Did this authority involve the commander in chief? That is the question?

The General Staff Plan:
The General Staff worked out a plan of a military seizure of a part of Kosovo thus creating facts on the ground, facts NATO had to live with or face a military confrontation with the Russian troops. In an intriguing interview to a Russian newspaper General Leonid Ivashov one of the key planners of this operation admitted as much. The main impetus to action according to Ivashov was the refusal of the NATO powers to grant Russia a military zone of its own. The arguments presented to the President were that Russia could not afford to come across as submitting to NATO demands. "If we had retreated, the world would have taken it as a serious defeat of Russia. Our positions in Europe would have been undermined."

The Generals argued that NATO interpreted diplomatic agreements in its favor and presenting the entry of NATO troops as victory whereby the role of the Russians was to deliver Milosevic. Ivashov continued: "They lied to us. They treated us as a fifth rate power." According to Ivashov, it was President Yeltsyn who after extensive reports by the Minister of Defense Sergeev and Foreign Affairs Minister Ivanov gave the orders to launch the operation. Either Ivanov lied that he knew nothing about the operation or, which is more likely, this "lack of knowledge" was a posture adopted in order to gain time for the unfolding of the operation.

As to its wisdom and risks, Ivashov responded: "I can tell you only this: all political and military consequences were calculated in greatest detail. Detachments to reinforce this battalion were kept in full readiness, but this turned out to be not necessary." To the question as to whether it was the refusal of Hungary to grant air space, Ivashov answered: "Requests which we did in this regard, this is the plan "B". I repeat: everything was calculated. And international law was on our side." In other words, the plan was that a small contingent from Bosnia would seize the airport and military aircraft would bring a much more sizable force to be reckoned with. This is definitely in the style of the Russian General Staff. The seizure of Kabul in 1979 followed the same script.

One hundred seventy one soldiers and officers in fifty-five vehicles made the 650 kilometers drive in ten hours. This suggests that there were only three men per vehicle. Obviously the plan was based on a speedy arrival of men to fill in the vehicles and seize a large area under Russian control. According to the soldiers and officers of the battalion, they were certain that the purpose of the move was to make the arrival of reinforcements possible. As one of them put it: "After the arrival of the rearguard column from Bosnia, reception of aircraft with the main contingent of paratroopers from Russia would be assured. That was the reason for starting the whole thing."

Another interesting detail is that the commander of the battalion General Viktor Zavarzin was traveling in civilian clothes in a diplomatic car with air conditioning. This was
clearly a sign that if something went wrong deniability could be assured that a rogue force led by junior officers undertook the action on its own. The first thing the battalion did upon arriving in the airport was to establish satellite communications with Moscow and the first message that came from Moscow was a promotion in the rank for General Zavarzin by Yeltsyn. This puts to rest the question as to whether Yeltsyn knew about the operation. He knew and he let it go forward. The plan "envisioned Russian occupation of the Northern and industrial sectors of Kosovo populated primarily by the Serbs."

The large force would have created a Russian zone in Kosovo defying NATO to confront Russian troops. The calculation must have been that NATO, divided as it were, over escalation of the conflict, would have ducked and avoided a confrontation, especially since the pay-off was relatively cheap -- a Russian zone in Kosovo. Having a Russian zone would have enabled the Serbs to retain a foothold in Kosovo and any trouble in that province would have been to their advantage. It would have been grinding down NATO resolve to remain there in the conditions of low intensity warfare. From the Serbs' point of view, the Russians simply replaced them there and NATO could not touch them. It was safe to abandon Kosovo since the Russian presence would keep it safe for Serbia.

If this plan had worked, Russia would have come out triumphant from a near confrontation with NATO having rescued Serbia from a humiliating defeat and having established a
foothold on the Balkans and a role of a world power. In terms of foreign policy, with this move Yeltsyn would have signaled to the West that Russia could not be bullied or given orders. Why was then the mission that had promised so many benefits aborted?

Mission Aborted:
--- cut out for the sake of space ---

The Fallout:
--- cut out for the sake of space ---

Conclusion:
Discourse on NATO allows to make some observations on the Russian domestic politics. The nationalists and the Communists have managed for the first time since 1991 to mobilize public opinion favorable to their point of view, thus effectively altering the national agenda from issues of poverty, corruption and economic crisis to national dignity, Western imperialism and external threat to Russia. This undoubtedly is their great achievement. Nationalist forces have tasted what a powerful vehicle for mass mobilization a nationalist anti-western hysteria could be and they are likely to remember to use this tool again. Even though their gains are temporary and the national agenda has begun to refocus on domestic economic concerns, still, a major shift has occurred. It is no longer possible in the current Russian political climate to advocate Russia's entry into NATO. Such a stance, possible in 1996, now is suicidal for a Russian politician.

Critics of NATO expansion in the West would use this as an argument that NATO expansion was wrong by alienating Russia, isolating the Democrats and strengthening the Nationalists and the Communists. In fact, this reasoning blames the wrong party. The policies of President Yeltsyn have more to do with such an outcome of debate on NATO expansion in Russia than with NATO expansion itself.

Yeltsyn's policy has consistently been that of one step forward two steps backward. He has been trying to maneuver between pro-Western course and reform and hard-line neo-
Communism all along. That was his chosen modus operandi. He had chosen to distance himself from NATO and yet to conclude Partnership for Peace, to embrace nationalist rhetoric in 1997 and yet come to a deal over inclusion of three new NATO members. Cooperation with NATO always went hand in hand with appeasement of Communists and Nationalists. By this strategy Yeltsyn sought to keep nationalists at bay and to keep good graces with Western partners at the same time.

For a while he was successful. Clinton's administration has regarded his team in power as indispensable, as a best defense against possible Communist resurgence. However, by embracing nationalist mantle himself, by refusing to explain that partnership with NATO was in Russia's national interests, by trying too hard to placate the General Staff Yeltsyn became their hostage without realizing himself that that was what had happened. Just as in economic reform he had become the hostage of corrupt tycoons, manipulators and intriguers, in foreign policy vis-�-vis NATO Yeltsyn became a hostage of the General Staff and the Communist-Nationalist opposition.

To be fare to Yeltsyn, he tried hard during the Kosovo war as well to continue his please everybody tactics. He tried to please the nationalists by calling NATO's action an aggression, and tried to keep his distance from their aims by saying that Russia would not be dragged into war. He first let the General Staff stage the Pristina dash, and then pulled the plug when the operation was in motion. He tried to score a point as a nationalist and to keep the situation under control. He may have been trying to create a situation, which could be used to ban the Communist party as those guilty of bringing Russia to the brink of war.

Most definitely Yeltsyn was maneuvering between contradictory policies which he himself so eloquently expressed in July 1999 that Russia would not quarrel with NATO too much but would not be too friendly either. So successful with his maneuvers in the past, Yeltsyn this time, it seems, has reaped a failure that may still ruin him or his hold on power. As we have seen, the army hates Yeltsyn now with an intensity that can only be compared to 1993. Many Generals regard his deal on Kosovo a "Balkan Munich".

Second: Russian political establishment is likely to be more assertive in the months to come. An experience that the West and NATO imposed a political settlement on Yugoslavia and Russia will be remembered. In any future problem Russian General Staff and Russian nationalist forces would demand a tough stand against NATO.

Third: Most dangerous are not the zealots like Dugin and folks from the newspaper Zavtra, but the rise of a so-called moderate nationalist leadership, as an alternative to the return
of the Communists. Yeltsyn's regime may be replaced not by a Ziuganov, but by forces led by Primakov, Luzhkov and Lebed, who all are on record of advocating tough response to NATO. These people are for a market economy but also have threatened Latvia (Luzhkov) advocated military assistance to Serbia (Lebed) and tried to build an anti-Nato alliance (Primakov).

Fourth: Dreams of the early 1990s that Russia will be quickly integrated into the Western democratic club of nations need to be cast aside as premature. Russia has not found itself yet. It is not ready to join the West. The legacy of the Soviet past has turned out to be too strong. The old mental stereotypes still guide the vision of most of her politicians. Russia still is in the grip of its past.

I'll write the epilogue later.

# ? Mar 9, 2015 20:43

Regarde Aduck: Oct 19, 2012; c l o u d k i t t e n; Grimey Drawer

Job Truniht posted:

Let's be realistic here and say that if NATO didn't exist, the Europeans & Russians would probably go back to doing what they do best: dividing up Poland. \\

I bet there are probably still people in Germany that unironically fantasize about liberating the "good parts".

These views are outdated. The German people now want nothing more than to be a Russian vassal state. They're currently trying to figure out how to sell out the entire EU.

# ? Mar 9, 2015 21:13

Majorian: Jul 1, 2009; Inverted Offensive Battle: Acupuncture Attacks Convert To 3D Penetration Tactics Taking Advantage of Deep Battle Opportunities

Great post, Koesj! I really love reading good analyses like that, even if I don't 100% agree with them:

Koesj posted:

Upthread you stated that "[NATO] at least maintained naval parity with Russia in the Atlantic", but I'd argue that this was patently not the case. NATO (and the US+Japan on the other side of the world for that matter!) was far, far stronger than the USSR in the naval realm

I don't think that's a completely fair assessment. NATO had advantages, certainly, but at its height, the Soviet Navy had somewhere around 650 submarines, compared to the U.S.' less than 300. They had a very different naval strategy than the U.S.', though - as you've pointed out, theirs was one centered on defending the "bastion" areas and making nice, easy zones for their SSBNs to launch missiles at the U.S., while ours emphasized surface ships, particularly carriers, and patrolling the oceans. There's no question that NATO controlled more of the Atlantic than the Warsaw Pact did, but that doesn't mean that both sides didn't maintain effective naval parity, or that the Soviets couldn't project power into the Atlantic. It just underlines how different their strategies were.

# ? Mar 9, 2015 21:16

Majorian: Jul 1, 2009; Inverted Offensive Battle: Acupuncture Attacks Convert To 3D Penetration Tactics Taking Advantage of Deep Battle Opportunities

eigenstate posted:

It does make for easy Russian rhetoric made up decades later that's easy to buy into,

I've shown you that non-Russian experts were telling us that NATO expansion was having the effect I've said it's having, while it was happening. So you can't claim that it was "easy Russian rhetoric made up decades later," because it was actually none of those things.

quote:

but by studying the events chronologically paints a different picture. First there was the ultra-liberal Russian foreign minister Andrey Kozyrev serving until 1996, who indicated that Russia did not object to former Warsaw pact nations joining NATO.

As I've pointed out, Russians lost faith in Kozyrev, Yeltsin, and the whole process of Westernization due to the economic and geopolitical disappointments of the early 90's. Populations can change their minds - it's not exactly an unheard-of phenomenon.

quote:

Then NATO always diplomatically engaging with Russia, signing the "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation" in 1997, creating the "NATO+1" council. Also Europe signing an adaptation of the "Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe", to account for the shifting balance of power in Europe in 1999.

Too little, too late. The damage had already been done. The same obviously goes for the half-hearted NATO attempts to placate Russia in the 2000's.

quote:

A bit earlier in 1999, three countries joined NATO: Poland, Czech Rep. and Hungary. No additional NATO bases were built in these countries to satisfy the text of the abovementioned agreements. Neither can I understand how these three countries are "encircling" Russia or how they are "threatening" Russia when they are nowhere close to the Russian border.

Russia feared this heralded encirclement because this wave of NATO expansion signaled a continual eastward trajectory, one that might only stop at Russia's borders.

quote:

Here, I started writing about the Russian perspective on the Kosovo war, but apparently I did not need to do that, because it's already been done by contemporaries to that conflict. So instead, I'll quote them.

The problem with you trying to use this piece as a silver bullet against the argument I'm espousing is that it was written in 1998 - before Putin came to power, before the Russian political system swung hard towards nationalism, before neoconservatism of the Bush era convinced the Russian public that the U.S. would act unilaterally to weaken or destroy any government it didn't like, seemingly on a whim. A lot has changed since 1998.

And to preempt your inevitable complaint that I've cited works from 1995 and earlier, let me remind you that what people like Kennan, Dean, Nunn, and Matlock predicted, did in fact come true. NATO expansion and neoconservative foreign policy helped radicalize the Russian voting public and the government, and that goes a long way to explaining Russia's aggressive stance towards some of its neighbors in the present day.

# ? Mar 9, 2015 21:40

Horns of Hattin: Dec 21, 2011

Majorian posted:

The problem with you trying to use this piece as a silver bullet against the argument I'm espousing is that it was written in 1998 - before Putin came to power, before the Russian political system swung hard towards nationalism, before neoconservatism of the Bush era convinced the Russian public that the U.S. would act unilaterally to weaken or destroy any government it didn't like, seemingly on a whim. A lot has changed since 1998.

I don't understand your complaint, please elaborate.

Also, this piece was not written in 1998, since it references both the Prishtina incident and the first NATO expansion, but before 2000. So if I'm understanding you correctly, you're agreeing with me that the first NATO expansion did not irreparably break Russian-Western relations. Therefore, why are you still beating that dead horse of NATO expansion, when you should be criticizing the bombing of Serbia, the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq? If you're going to piss of the Russians enough to turn bellicose with those other actions, why would you want to leave Eastern Europe defenseless to the Russian backlash?

# ? Mar 9, 2015 21:52

Koesj: Aug 3, 2003

Majorian posted:

I don't think that's a completely fair assessment. NATO had advantages, certainly, but at its height, the Soviet Navy had somewhere around 650 submarines, compared to the U.S.' less than 300. They had a very different naval strategy than the U.S.', though - as you've pointed out, theirs was one centered on defending the "bastion" areas and making nice, easy zones for their SSBNs to launch missiles at the U.S., while ours emphasized surface ships, particularly carriers, and patrolling the oceans. There's no question that NATO controlled more of the Atlantic than the Warsaw Pact did, but that doesn't mean that both sides didn't maintain effective naval parity, or that the Soviets couldn't project power into the Atlantic. It just underlines how different their strategies were.

I'm sorry but I believe your points are a bit too simplistic because of military and political asymmetries. If it's okay with you I suggest we take further discussion about relative levels of naval power to the Cold War thread though, since it all seems a bit beside the point here.

e: or the MilHist thread, it's all good.

Koesj fucked around with this message at 22:05 on Mar 9, 2015

# ? Mar 9, 2015 21:59

A Buttery Pastry: Sep 4, 2011; Delicious and Informative!

Majorian posted:

The problem with you trying to use this piece as a silver bullet against the argument I'm espousing is that it was written in 1998 - before Putin came to power, before the Russian political system swung hard towards nationalism, before neoconservatism of the Bush era convinced the Russian public that the U.S. would act unilaterally to weaken or destroy any government it didn't like, seemingly on a whim. A lot has changed since 1998.

And to preempt your inevitable complaint that I've cited works from 1995 and earlier, let me remind you that what people like Kennan, Dean, Nunn, and Matlock predicted, did in fact come true. NATO expansion and neoconservative foreign policy helped radicalize the Russian voting public and the government, and that goes a long way to explaining Russia's aggressive stance towards some of its neighbors in the present day.

Seems like you're bolting the NATO expansion on to the more likely issue, that being the aggressive foreign policy championed by neoconservatives, which (seemingly) affirmed the aggressive interventionist stance of the US.

# ? Mar 9, 2015 22:00

Majorian: Jul 1, 2009; Inverted Offensive Battle: Acupuncture Attacks Convert To 3D Penetration Tactics Taking Advantage of Deep Battle Opportunities

eigenstate posted:

I don't understand your complaint, please elaborate.

It was written somewhere between 1997 and 1999, according to the NATO website. My point in bringing this up is because it lacks the perspective that the last fifteen years have afforded Russia watchers. Those fifteen years have, as I've pointed out, proven Kennan, Nunn, Matlock, Dean, et al, correct in their predictions.

Moreover, the article you posted doesn't even undermine my argument. All Brovkin seems to be arguing is that it wasn't only NATO expansion that caused Russian bellicosity by the time he wrote that article. But nobody here is arguing that NATO expansion is the only factor that explains this - I certainly have acknowledged that there were other factors, including the economic collapse of the 90's and the Kosovo War.

quote:

So if I'm understanding you correctly, you're agreeing with me that the first NATO expansion did not irreparably break Russian-Western relations. Therefore, why are you still beating that dead horse of NATO expansion, when you should be criticizing the bombing of Serbia, the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq? If you're going to piss of the Russians enough to turn bellicose with those other actions, why would you want to leave Eastern Europe defenseless to the Russian backlash?

If you look at my posts in the past, you'll see that I've criticized NATO's actions in all of these things (except Afghanistan, for obvious reasons). I've also included subsequent waves of NATO expansion, pulling out of the ABM Treaty, planning to put ABM sites in former Warsaw Pact countries, and other bad moves made mostly under the Bush Administration. I've never once argued that the first wave of NATO expansions after the Cold War single-handedly ruptured relations.

A Buttery Pastry posted:

Seems like you're bolting the NATO expansion on to the more likely issue, that being the aggressive foreign policy championed by neoconservatives, which (seemingly) affirmed the aggressive interventionist stance of the US.

I've been tying those things together for months. This is hardly the first time I've mentioned neoconservatism, pulling out of the ABM Treaty, not re-upping the arms reduction process, invading Iraq, etc.

Koesj posted:

I'm sorry but I believe your points are a bit too simplistic because of military and political asymmetries.

I mean, I'm oversimplifying the issue, sure, but keep in mind - this is in response to the assertion that Russia was encircled during the Cold War.

Majorian fucked around with this message at 22:20 on Mar 9, 2015

# ? Mar 9, 2015 22:12

Horns of Hattin: Dec 21, 2011

quote:

Moreover, the article you posted doesn't even undermine my argument. All Brovkin seems to be arguing is that it wasn't only NATO expansion that caused Russian bellicosity by the time he wrote that article. But nobody here is arguing that NATO expansion is the only factor that explains this - I certainly have acknowledged that there were other factors, including the economic collapse of the 90's and the Kosovo War.

Then what is your actual objection to NATO expansion, again? Preventing NATO from expanding into the former Warsaw pact does not magically alleviate all the other factors that caused Russia to go bellicose. All it does is keep those countries defenseless when it happens.

Your "solution" of WEU or whatever does not fix the problem. It just treats the symptoms in the most superficial and self-defeating level.

Horns of Hattin fucked around with this message at 22:32 on Mar 9, 2015

# ? Mar 9, 2015 22:30

Majorian: Jul 1, 2009; Inverted Offensive Battle: Acupuncture Attacks Convert To 3D Penetration Tactics Taking Advantage of Deep Battle Opportunities

eigenstate posted:

Then what is your actual objection to NATO expansion, again? Preventing NATO from expanding into the former Warsaw pact does not magically alleviate all the other factors that caused Russia to go bellicose. All it does is keep those countries defenseless when it happens.

There's a reason why the turn of phrase "the straw that broke the camel's back" is so ubiquitous. While there were other factors than just NATO expansion, it was a significant factor, and without it, Russia would likely not have been as aggressive as it currently is.

# ? Mar 9, 2015 22:38

A Buttery Pastry: Sep 4, 2011; Delicious and Informative!

Majorian posted:

There's a reason why the turn of phrase "the straw that broke the camel's back" is so ubiquitous. While there were other factors than just NATO expansion, it was a significant factor, and without it, Russia would likely not have been as aggressive as it currently is.

To turn the analogy on its head, maybe it's more like the NATO expansion was a bunch of straws, and neoconservative policies* were the log that would've broken the camel's back no matter what.

*plus all the poo poo eigenstate is talking about.

A Buttery Pastry fucked around with this message at 23:13 on Mar 9, 2015

# ? Mar 9, 2015 23:09

Horns of Hattin: Dec 21, 2011

Majorian posted:

There's a reason why the turn of phrase "the straw that broke the camel's back" is so ubiquitous. While there were other factors than just NATO expansion, it was a significant factor, and without it, Russia would likely not have been as aggressive as it currently is.

Jesus H. Christ, why did I post that long piece? It explains in plain English that NATO expansion was not the most significant factor by a large margin!

I mean, during the Kosovo War, we have:

Russian prime minister Primakov turning his plane around in the middle of the Atlantic ocean when flying to Washington to ask for financial assistance when he was informed that the US started bombing Serbia.
Yeltsin authorized the capture of Prishtina airport by Russian forces, that almost started WW3.
Expelled NATO's representative in Moscow and withdrew its ambassador at NATO headquarters, completely cutting contacts.
Threatened to supply Yugoslavia was anti-aircraft weapons.
Appealed to the UN general assembly and security council to stop the NATO bombings.

Can you actually list anything close to this reaction when NATO expanded (during either time)? I guess defense minister Ivanov criticised the expansion in the same speech he criticised the Iraq war when he visited Washington in 2004. I guess he showed how central that issue was by not even dedicating the whole speech to it.

# ? Mar 9, 2015 23:11

Majorian: Jul 1, 2009; Inverted Offensive Battle: Acupuncture Attacks Convert To 3D Penetration Tactics Taking Advantage of Deep Battle Opportunities

eigenstate posted:

Jesus H. Christ, why did I post that long piece? It explains in plain English that NATO expansion was not the most significant factor by a large margin!

It makes that argument, and it's not terribly convincing, given that it was written during a different context from the one we see now. Nationalist sentiment had only just begun to sweep the Russian political arena, and NATO still had a number of blunders left to make that would make nationalism seem more enticing to the Russian public. I, personally, can't quite tell you why you posted that long piece, because it didn't really support your argument all that much.

quote:

Can you actually list anything close to this reaction when NATO expanded (during either time)?

You're looking at it right now: an entrenched right-wing nationalist regime in power in Russia, feeding off of Russian fear that NATO is out to get them.

A Buttery Pastry posted:

To turn the analogy on its head, maybe it's more like the NATO expansion was a bunch of straws, and neoconservative policies* were the log that would've broken the camel's back no matter what.

I think that's unlikely. If NATO hadn't inadvertently fanned the flames of paranoia and insularity in Russia, I expect that the Bush Administration's even-worse blunders would have caused Russia to balk and stay out of the Iraq, as they did (and as France and Germany did) in real life. But I doubt they would have seen U.S. unilateralism as something that could be aimed at them, at least as clearly as they did when it occurred in the context of NATO's eastward movement.

Majorian fucked around with this message at 23:37 on Mar 9, 2015

# ? Mar 9, 2015 23:31

My Imaginary GF: Jul 17, 2005; by R. Guyovich

Majorian, we don't give a poo poo how every tin-pot dictatorship regards America. We care about America and Americ's allies. You can become an ally of America by convincing Americans you love them more than they do.

# ? Mar 9, 2015 23:33

Majorian: Jul 1, 2009; Inverted Offensive Battle: Acupuncture Attacks Convert To 3D Penetration Tactics Taking Advantage of Deep Battle Opportunities

My Imaginary GF posted:

Majorian, we don't give a poo poo how every tin-pot dictatorship regards America. We care about America and Americ's allies.

Yeah, well, therein lies the problem - because America's interests, and the interests of our Old European allies, do not align with the interests of New Europe all that much in this case.

That hate-title is really unfair to you, by the way.

# ? Mar 9, 2015 23:36

My Imaginary GF: Jul 17, 2005; by R. Guyovich

Majorian posted:

Yeah, well, therein lies the problem - because America's interests, and the interests of our Old European allies, do not align with the interests of New Europe all that much in this case.

That hate-title is really unfair to you, by the way.

"The problem is we didn't consider Herr Hitler's feelings when we provided the UK with destroyers for bases" --- your logic

# ? Mar 9, 2015 23:38

Majorian: Jul 1, 2009; Inverted Offensive Battle: Acupuncture Attacks Convert To 3D Penetration Tactics Taking Advantage of Deep Battle Opportunities

My Imaginary GF posted:

"The problem is we didn't consider Herr Hitler's feelings when we provided the UK with destroyers for bases" --- your logic

Nah, any leadership analyst keeping their eye on Hitler could have told you that he was a true believer who thought that the Nazi regime would lead Germany to a new utopian age. Putin is no millenarian ideologue - he's a cynic.

e: Also, he clearly has no plans to conquer Europe. Anybody who truly believes that is very silly.

# ? Mar 9, 2015 23:40

My Imaginary GF: Jul 17, 2005; by R. Guyovich

Majorian posted:

Nah, any leadership analyst keeping their eye on Hitler could have told you that he was a true believer who thought that the Nazi regime would lead Germany to a new utopian age. Putin is no millenarian ideologue - he's a cynic.

I do believe the analysis of Herr Hitler at the time for most individuals with your minority viewpoint was that he was a cynic. Face it, Majorian, you're in the minority defending Herr Hitler in 1940. Oh of only we'd given him Poland, then only he would have stopped!

E:

Chairman Hitler has no plans to conquer Britain, anyone who believes that is silly.

# ? Mar 9, 2015 23:43

Majorian: Jul 1, 2009; Inverted Offensive Battle: Acupuncture Attacks Convert To 3D Penetration Tactics Taking Advantage of Deep Battle Opportunities

My Imaginary GF posted:

I do believe the analysis of Herr Hitler at the time for most individuals with your minority viewpoint was that he was a cynic. Face it, Majorian, you're in the minority defending Herr Hitler in 1940. Oh of only we'd given him Poland, then only he would have stopped!

E:

Chairman Hitler has no plans to conquer Britain, anyone who believes that is silly.

Oh you.

Nah, A, Hitler was a proven ideologue long before he came to power ("Mein Kampf" being a pretty clear example), and B, Russia doesn't have the military strength needed to take over Europe anytime soon.

# ? Mar 9, 2015 23:47

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# ? Apr 24, 2024 23:07

A Buttery Pastry: Sep 4, 2011; Delicious and Informative!

Majorian posted:

Yeah, well, therein lies the problem - because America's interests, and the interests of our Old European allies, do not align with the interests of New Europe all that much in this case.

Not having Eastern Europe be a basket case like Ukraine is certainly in the interest of everyone in Europe, since it facilitates trade, puts some distance between us and any hot spot, and reduces the risk of cross-border criminal organizations wreaking havoc. Western Europe has no interest in sharing a border with a European Mexico, and possibly even worse, a European Mexico that can't be fixed because Russia is constantly undermining any attempt at fixing poo poo.

# ? Mar 9, 2015 23:51

The Something Awful Forums > Discussion > Debate & Discussion > International Security & NATO (The Second Best Exotic Clancychat Thread)

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