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Taerkar posted:I like the entire idiocy of a military being capable of only being either offensive or defensive and that's why the Germans pushed them back like they did, rather than the well known facts of the disassembly of the original Stalin Line along the Polish border and the incomplete state of the Molotov Line along the new border leaving them with unfortified defensive positions. Oh and of course the reorganization and officer purges of the Red Army at the time. And on top of that any commander who deviated from the book, got a formal and nicely written invitation by Lavrentiy Beria to visit him for tea and cake in the cellars below the Nkvd building.
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Dec 11, 2015 14:52
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Taerkar posted:I like the entire idiocy of a military being capable of only being either offensive or defensive and that's why the Germans pushed them back like they did, rather than the well known facts of the disassembly of the original Stalin Line along the Polish border and the incomplete state of the Molotov Line along the new border leaving them with unfortified defensive positions. Oh and of course the reorganization and officer purges of the Red Army at the time. To nitpick a bit, the Stalin and Molotov lines were largely irrelevant, and even if they were fully built and manned, hunkering down in static fortifications wasn't exactly a winning concept when it came to defending against the Germans in WW2. The main reasons why Barbarossa went the way it went was that the Soviets had a far too ambitious war plan considering the shape the Red Army was in at the time and that they misjudged where the main German offensive would take place. They basically made the worst moves possible in the opening stages of the war, and that cost them massively.
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Dec 11, 2015 15:20
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Maybe we can get back on track with a different topic. How about military leaders? Best/worst and most over/underrated generals and admirals of the war?
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Dec 11, 2015 16:25
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vyelkin posted:Maybe we can get back on track with a different topic. On the Anglo-American side I think a case can be made that Stilwell and Wingate don't get nearly the credit each of them deserve, and Monty gets far, far too much.
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Dec 11, 2015 17:02
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I humbly submit Douglas MacArthur as being overrated. He bungled the defense of the Philippines, and his insistence on engaging in a jurisdictional pissing match with Nimitz cost the USN two great opportunities for really sticking it to the IJN: a sub campaign in The Slot, and the Battle of Leyte Gulf.
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Dec 11, 2015 17:05
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I hate MacArthur too but I'm curious how Leyte wasns't a smashing success against the IJN? Halsey bungled it to be sure but we still destroyed the last of their (albeit useless at that point of the war) carriers and a Yamato class.
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Dec 11, 2015 17:10
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It wasn't wrong, but it could have been more right.
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Dec 11, 2015 17:12
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Personally I've always been a fan of Wavell and O'Connor's handling of the North African campaign. They were admittedly helped by the sheer incompetence of the Italian Army but they still achieved miraculous results with numerical inferiority, and it seems like a lot of the subsequent defeats came about due to political interference (Churchill pulling forces away to send to Greece, Iraq, and Syria), not helped by O'Connor's capture, even as they were also due to the arrival of the Afrika Korps.
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Dec 11, 2015 17:14
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gradenko_2000 posted:I humbly submit Douglas MacArthur as being overrated. He bungled the defense of the Philippines, and his insistence on engaging in a jurisdictional pissing match with Nimitz cost the USN two great opportunities for really sticking it to the IJN: a sub campaign in The Slot, and the Battle of Leyte Gulf. The thing about MacArthur for me isn't his uneven record of command so much as it is his transparent egomania, to the point where he went out of his way to marginalize ever other Army commander in the Pacific. I mean seriously, everyone can at least name Eisenhower, Patton, and Bradley as notable US Army commanders in Europe, but who other than dug-out Doug can most people think of in the Pacific?* The extent to which MacArthur controlled media access and reports to make himself seem the indispensable linchpin of America's Pacific strategy has to be his key accomplishment of the war. *Well ok, maybe Simon Bolivar Buckner, but only because he got his fool head blown off.
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Dec 11, 2015 17:58
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Taerkar posted:I like the entire idiocy of a military being capable of only being either offensive or defensive and that's why the Germans pushed them back like they did, rather than the well known facts of the disassembly of the original Stalin Line along the Polish border and the incomplete state of the Molotov Line along the new border leaving them with unfortified defensive positions. Oh and of course the reorganization and officer purges of the Red Army at the time. There's actually no difference between offensive positioning of units and a defensive one. You just start walking in a straight line forwards for attack and backwards for defense. It's not that the military is Only in "defense" or "Offense" but the fact of the matter is the lack of defensive planning. Look at Eastern front, once the german attack was halted the entire front began to buckle. I talked about this briefly, but what was found on soviet soldiers was very offensive in nature. Maps and phrase books of GERMAN controlled areas, but a very significant lack of topographical maps of soviet territory. Why would a defensive force not plan out their defense and make sure every level Platoon+ knew where to go? When Germany began Barbarossa they caught most of the soviet troops off guard, and large swathes of land were taken because of this. The soviet army was extremely organized, but was caught off guard by the fact that Germany had surprised them with the attack, which resulted in a route, namely because of those soviet troops lacking knowledge of how to mount a defense. To expand on that point a little, I don't mean his troops didn't know how to defend themselves, however if you lack any knowledge of where your comrades are while you're getting shot by fascists you may die a lot quicker. Aswell as the way troops and units are positioned when mounting a defense versus preparing an offense. Because you lack any real knowledge of warfare other than what you learned in High school History class when your teacher told you about WW1. Oh yeah forgot, no difference between defense and offense https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_military_tactics#Offensive_tactics Why would you put your troops infront of a landmine field if you planned on retrating. Aswell as this quote in 1925 by Stalin, "Struggles, conflicts and wars among our enemies are...our great ally...and the greatest supporter of our government and our revolution" Gee can't imagine why Stalin would want to exhaust the allies or anything.  As you can see these troops are not offensive or defensive.
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Dec 11, 2015 18:17
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My "favorite" idiotic anticommunist argument was that, because Soviet rail lines all go east to west instead of north to south, they really were the aggressors all along, or whatever.
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Dec 11, 2015 18:38
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You did not seriously just cite a screenshot of HoI3 as proof of you understanding military science did you?
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Dec 11, 2015 18:49
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First, Stalin didn't want to risk Hitler's going to war earlier than necessary. He knew there were plentiful indications of a nearing war, but he wanted as protracted peace as possible, believing that Hitler would have little reason to hurry up opening a new front as long as the economic treaties between Germany and the USSR were in force (why grab loot by force if you can just ask for it nicely?) Second, because of this cautiousness, Soviet command acted indecisively, deployment of troops to the frontlines was slow, mobilization was delayed, and the Soviets tried to maintain plausible deniability by claiming their troop movements were only part of wargame preparations. Third, for the same reasons the Soviets' work on entrenchments in designated fortified areas was lax, troops of the second echelon were deliberately placed outside the useful range where they could support the first echelon (not to provoke the Germans), armored forces were poorly distributed along the front line forces, and the air force remained undeployed. Zhukov later wrote the Staff expected the opening stages of the war would include a period of border skirmishes during which the Soviets would remedy their well-known weaknesses. Fourth, while these careful and disastrously short sighted preparations were going on the Staff remained completely indecisive about the nature the war should take. Plans for a preemptive attack against Germany occupied portion of the Soviet leadership, including Timoshenko and Zhukov, til the day of the German attack, reducing the effectiveness of the already miserably insufficient defensive preparations. So to sum up the "problem", the Soviets were poorly prepared for defence because they didn't want to give an impression they were gearing for war, and their equipment and provisions were poorly adapted for defence because their leaders didn't have a coherent concept of the coming war, were in fact considering a preemptive offensive / a swift counter-offensive as a possibility til the last moments of peace, and because the Soviets failed to take a lesson from France and underestimated the mobility of their enemy, thinking their unaddressed shortcomings would be sorted out in the slow first days of the war, during which the Red Army would be reorganized correspondingly to whichever strategy would deem to be the most appropriate. tl;dr: The Soviets had neither defensive, nor offensive plans to speak of, their decision making prior to the war was clouded by fear, which prevented them from making effective precautions, and the Red Army as a whole was categorically out of position to lead both a defensive and an offensive campaign.
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Dec 11, 2015 18:50
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No but you see this ideological lip service Stalin gave in the 1920s totally shows that he was going to invade in the 1940s!!!!!
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Dec 11, 2015 19:11
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HerraS posted:No but you see this ideological lip service Stalin gave in the 1920s totally shows that he was going to invade in the 1940s!!!!! http://theeasternfront.org/mein_sozialismus/downloads/articleI.pdf
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Dec 11, 2015 19:19
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LeoMarr posted:Oh yeah forgot, no difference between defense and offense just want to preserve this post where you prove the Soviets were the bad guys that the Nazis had no choice but to fight against by quoting wikipedia articles about defensive and offensive tactics and a hearts of iron screenshot.
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Dec 11, 2015 19:20
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I want you to look at this in the context of the events of May 1940 and think for a good long while about those implications.
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Dec 11, 2015 19:21
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Mans posted:just want to preserve this post where you prove the Soviets were the bad guys that the Nazis had no choice but to fight against by quoting wikipedia articles about defensive and offensive tactics and a hearts of iron screenshot.  (USER WAS PUT ON PROBATION FOR THIS POST)
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Dec 11, 2015 19:25
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Ted Cruz says he's fighting for the rights of the working man. Also what Effectronica said.
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Dec 11, 2015 19:27
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This in case that Germany would emerge victorious from the war. We must, however, envisage the possibilities that will result from the defeat as well as from the victory of Germany. In case of her defeat, a Sovietization of Germany will unavoidably occur and a Communist government will be created. We should not forget that a Sovietized Germany would bring about great danger, if this Sovietization is the result of German defeat in a transient war. England and France will still be strong enough to seize Berlin and to destroy a Soviet Germany. We would be unable to come effectually to her assistance/to the aid of our Bolshevik comrades in Germany. 
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Dec 11, 2015 19:34
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LeoMarr posted:This in case that Germany would emerge victorious from the war. We Stalin is here talking about a rerun of WW1- a collapse of Germany's civilian morale followed by a left-wing uprising. In this instance, the USSR would be able to support and seize control of this uprising, where the Spartacists failed due to the SPD aligning with the Freikorps and Stahlhelm.
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Dec 11, 2015 19:39
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Effectronica posted:Stalin is here talking about a rerun of WW1- a collapse of Germany's civilian morale followed by a left-wing uprising. In this instance, the USSR would be able to support and seize control of this uprising, where the Spartacists failed due to the SPD aligning with the Freikorps and Stahlhelm. He goes on to say Therefore, our goal is that Germany should carry out the war as long as possible so that England and France grow weary and become exhausted to such a degree that they are no longer in a position to put down a Sovietized Germany. As I read into this further I realize that Stalin really didn't care about the US/UK and exhausting them. He was concerned about exhausting the UK/France. Obviously France was exhausted very quickly.
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Dec 11, 2015 19:43
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LeoMarr posted:He goes on to say Yes, he's talking about a rerun of WW1, with extended trench warfare. His entire proposal was made brutally, obviously obsolete in May 1940.
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Dec 11, 2015 19:46
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LeoMarr posted:Originally that Poland wouldn't let Russian troops support Czechoslovakia because of Soviet aggression. okay getting back to your original point, you disbelieve that Stalin was fearful of the Axis and Allies teaming up correct? In that document you link there's a handy quote from Stalin that states: "We are absolutely convinced that if we conclude a mutual assistance pact with France and Great Britain, Germany will back off from Poland and seek a modus vivendi with the Western Powers. War would be avoided, but further events could prove dangerous for the USSR." Now on the defensive thing, Mobilization Plan-41 was designed to have Soviet units at full strength by early 1942 which can be seen by how undermanned and under equipped the 1st and 2nd echelons on the border were. Now when that plan was completed, the Soviets could have launched an offensive but in the mean time had set up defensive positions but, due to aforementioned lack of men and equipment, were hopelessly overrun the first days of the war.
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Dec 11, 2015 19:49
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Effectronica posted:Yes, he's talking about a rerun of WW1, with extended trench warfare. His entire proposal was made brutally, obviously obsolete in May 1940. Very true, but the desired effect was to allow germany to exhaust the allies and take over germany . While that happened much quicker than Stalin had hoped, he still was preparing for an offensive war up until the 22nd of June, 1941. Raskolnikov38 posted:okay getting back to your original point, you disbelieve that Stalin was fearful of the Axis and Allies teaming up correct? In that document you link there's a handy quote from Stalin that states: I have no doubt that Stalin was afraid of the allies and axis teaming up. But not in the sence that these two factions would sign a peace treaty and start burning down leningrad. But let's look at this for a moment On the other hand, if we accept Germany's proposal, that you know, and conclude a non-aggression pact with her, she will certainly invade Poland, and the intervention of France and England is then unavoidable. Western Europe would be subjected to serious upheavals and disorder. In this case we will have a great opportunity to stay out of the conflict, and we could plan the opportune time for us to enter the war. Isn't this a game changer with an Axis/Allies alliance versus Comintern? Stalin states that accepting the M-R Pact will mean that no alliance is possible between the factions. Stalin wanted Hitler to take Poland so that France/UK would intervene. That's a pretty simple move to divide and conquer the capitalists. Obviously France being taken in less than 2 months was not desirable to Stalin at all, so he prepared for a sneak attack by starting the 2 year draft in 1939, changing the military age from 21 to 18. Even in 1928 when the 5 Year plans started The USSR was readying for a repeat of 1914-1918. Plan 1 Collectivise and Industrialize, Plan 2 Prioritized heavy industry, Plan 3 Militarize. All of these things from 1920s onwards indicate Stalin was readying for an extremely aggressive war. Had France/UK actually lasted long enough to exhaust Germany, then Stalin's plan would have become reality. But France died in less than 2 months. So basically france losing to hitler saved us from a communist continent. 
WAR CRIME GIGOLO fucked around with this message at 20:10 on Dec 11, 2015 |
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Dec 11, 2015 19:55
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LeoMarr posted:Very true, but the desired effect was to allow germany to exhaust the allies and take over germany . While that happened much quicker than Stalin had hoped, he still was preparing for an offensive war up until the 22nd of June, 1941. Stalin was saying that a grinding war would result in the same scenario that was seen in Germany at the end of WW1, only this time the USSR could intervene with success and save the revolution in Germany. Two months later Hitler was in Paris and that entire speech meant nothing.
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Dec 11, 2015 20:08
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Mans posted:Stalin was saying that a grinding war would result in the same scenario that was seen in Germany at the end of WW1, only this time the USSR could intervene with success and save the revolution in Germany. ftfy I wouldn't say it meant nothing, but it meant that The USSR would have to step up its game and actually take Germany instead of sidelining. The USSR just saw Germany wipe out the French, and push a 300,000 man force into the sea at Dunkirk. Do you really think that defense was on STAVKA's mind? Because If you look at 1942, as soon as Germany was thrown into a defensive war it lost very quickly. WAR CRIME GIGOLO fucked around with this message at 20:15 on Dec 11, 2015 |
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Dec 11, 2015 20:10
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LeoMarr posted:ftfy The Stavka (the word is not an acronym) was not established until 1941, and there is no clear evidence that an attack was planned in the aftermath of 1940. The most likely explanation is that Stalin convinced himself that Hitler wouldn't be stupid enough to attack until after defeating the British, which would give him years to work with and rejuvenate the RKKA.
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Dec 11, 2015 20:19
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LeoMarr posted:Do you really think that defense was on STAVKA's mind? Yes, because the fundamental nature of Soviet foreign policy under Stalin was defensive and paranoid. The underlying assumption of all Soviet foreign policy in the 20s and 30s was that the capitalist states (which included literally everyone who wasn't the USSR--Germany, France, UK, US, Italy, Japan, all were just lumped in as "capitalist" states) were eventually going to invade the USSR because they couldn't abide the existence of a communist country. The vast majority of the speech you linked is discussing Stalin's plan to stay out of a European war, not to start one. He's basically saying "There are two choices: either we sign a pact with Britain/France and stop German expansion, which means the capitalists will inevitably team up to invade us, or we sign a pact with Germany which means Germany and Britain/France fight each other and leave us alone while we build up for the inevitable capitalist/communist war." Yeah there's some stuff thrown in there about a German revolution and Soviet support for them, but the primary thrust of the speech is "We want everyone to leave us alone while we build our army and industry." Soviet references to some unspecified eventual war are not signs of Stalin's secret plan to take over the world but signs of the recurring Soviet doctrine that a capitalist invasion was inevitable.
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Dec 11, 2015 20:28
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Stalin was so hell bent on world conquest that he didn't give a single kopeck to the Greek communists in their struggle against the nazi collaborators because he didn't want the USSR to involve itself in anything outside their dominated rea.
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Dec 11, 2015 20:59
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vyelkin posted:Maybe we can get back on track with a different topic. Terry Allen. His troops loved him and fought accordingly because of it. He was especially good at night fighting which he saw as valuable because when done properly it was very effective and reduced friendly casualties. His greatest failing was running afoul of his shithead buddy George Patton's dumb 19th century ideas of military discipline and decorum. The rest of the brass didn't like him because he didn't graduate from a military academy and was given a division as a colonel before his "turn".
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Dec 11, 2015 21:10
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LeoMarr posted:When I say Exhaust I don't mean the country of US or UK falls, but by exhaust I mean being unable to stop soviet expansion in continental europe. What's your opinion on what would have happened had D-Day failed, Would you say that a second attempt would have been made? I really don't think it would have. And Stalin was winning before 1944. Previously in this threat some said that the High command knew the war was being lost in 1942-1943, Stalin wanted a second front in 1941. By 1944 when D-Day occurred Berlin was going to fall regardless. I am not arguing that he didn't want a second front. But there was a need for one in 1941 originally, not 1944 as much. Yes, a second attempt would absolutely have been made. What, you think the US and UK would have just thrown up their hands and given up? Meanwhile, the Soviets were winning in 1944, but at an enormous cost, which is why Stalin was so insistent on having the Allies actually provide him meaningful help rather than sitting on their thumbs and throwing money across the ocean while Russia singlehandedly paid the actual human cost of the ground war on European soil. Just because the Red Army was winning didn't mean Stalin was fine with the Red Army being the only Allied power getting shot at by German tanks. Yes, the USSR's situation was less critical in 1944 than it was in 1941, but there were very good reasons for the second front not being opened until 1944 - most prominently, the absence of any Soviet ally with the ability to open a second front. Britain was not at all capable of an amphibious invasion of Europe in 1941, and the US wasn't even in the war yet at that point.
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Dec 11, 2015 21:45
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Main Paineframe posted:Yes, a second attempt would absolutely have been made. What, you think the US and UK would have just thrown up their hands and given up? Meanwhile, the Soviets were winning in 1944, but at an enormous cost, which is why Stalin was so insistent on having the Allies actually provide him meaningful help rather than sitting on their thumbs and throwing money across the ocean while Russia singlehandedly paid the actual human cost of the ground war on European soil. Just because the Red Army was winning didn't mean Stalin was fine with the Red Army being the only Allied power getting shot at by German tanks. Yes, the USSR's situation was less critical in 1944 than it was in 1941, but there were very good reasons for the second front not being opened until 1944 - most prominently, the absence of any Soviet ally with the ability to open a second front. Britain was not at all capable of an amphibious invasion of Europe in 1941, and the US wasn't even in the war yet at that point. Whoa there cowboy, what do you think you're doing bringing these "facts" and "observable reality" into the discussion. Can't you see you're up against an opponent who not only can crib wikipedia and a discredited crank, but also has clearly played several WWII-based videogames?
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Dec 11, 2015 22:00
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vyelkin posted:Maybe we can get back on track with a different topic. Erwin "What the gently caress is logistics" Rommel is probably way up there on overrated as gently caress list Bolow fucked around with this message at 22:20 on Dec 11, 2015 |
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Dec 11, 2015 22:17
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Would it have been possible for the Nazis to defeat the soviets militarily, by employing different strategies, attacking at a different time etc? Or were they always basically destined to lose against a country that was so huge, tough and productive.
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Dec 11, 2015 22:18
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Count Roland posted:Would it have been possible for the Nazis to defeat the soviets militarily, by employing different strategies, attacking at a different time etc? Or were they always basically destined to lose against a country that was so huge, tough and productive. Not really. The Germans pretty much had the entire deck as stacked in their favour as humanly possible in 1941, and they still lost in the end.
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Dec 11, 2015 22:23
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vyelkin posted:Yes, because the fundamental nature of Soviet foreign policy under Stalin was defensive and paranoid. The underlying assumption of all Soviet foreign policy in the 20s and 30s was that the capitalist states (which included literally everyone who wasn't the USSR--Germany, France, UK, US, Italy, Japan, all were just lumped in as "capitalist" states) were eventually going to invade the USSR because they couldn't abide the existence of a communist country. But then why is it the germans got within 10 miles of moscow? Couldn't it be argued that as soon as France fell the main objective of the USSR was to assault German held territory to stop Germany from taking over the USSR? Which would coincide with the lack of defensive planning that we saw during the early campaign of Operation Barbarossa. Stalin saw the writing on the wall, in May, 1940 Stalin had until September 1941 to enter the war before his draftees would expire. Hitler attacked in June, 4 months before the invasion of Germany that the USSR desired to happen. Those would have been a critical 4 months to finish the touches on the assaulting force, however the USSR was caught completely off guard by the german attack (History proves this.) Now obviously the Officer purge affected the soviet army, but what really affected the Soviet army was the fact that the officer count was not high enough to match the growth of the Soviet army. In 1940/1941 The officers that were in the army were basically draftees. I mean when your army goes from 1.8 Mil in 1939 to 5 Mil/18Mil reserves, it takes quite an effort to get an officer count to match that, even without a purge it would have been difficult.
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Dec 11, 2015 22:23
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Count Roland posted:Would it have been possible for the Nazis to defeat the soviets militarily, by employing different strategies, attacking at a different time etc? Or were they always basically destined to lose against a country that was so huge, tough and productive. Honestly? Not without going full Harry Turtledove on the whole question. Counterfactuals like this are always easy to break if you toss in enough "but what if" statements, but in reality the Nazis had basically no chance of actually winning the war in the East. At most, you can make an argument that they could've gotten to Moscow in 1941 if Hitler hadn't split efforts along three simultaneous prongs (and even then I tend to doubt it), but even if we grant that unlikely achievement I cannot imagine the Soviets would have shrugged and said "whelp, better retreat permanently behind the Urals and let the Greater Reich set up its new homeland on our territory, from which it plans to periodically attack us anyway since Nazi ideology calls for perpetual conflict to keep the Volk strong." Bolow posted:Erwin "What the gently caress is logistics" Rommel is probably way up there on overrated as gently caress list Yeah he gets off easy as he did pull of some pretty remarkable things and had some impressive strokes of luck, and I have hard time rating any Wehrmacht general that highly who never faced the Russians.
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Dec 11, 2015 22:24
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Captain_Maclaine posted:Honestly? Not without going full Harry Turtledove on the whole question. Counterfactuals like this are always easy to break if you toss in enough "but what if" statements, but in reality the Nazis had basically no chance of actually winning the war in the East. At most, you can make an argument that they could've gotten to Moscow in 1941 if Hitler hadn't split efforts along three simultaneous prongs (and even then I tend to doubt it), but even if we grant that unlikely achievement I cannot imagine the Soviets would have shrugged and said "whelp, better retreat permanently behind the Urals and let the Greater Reich set up its new homeland on our territory, from which it plans to periodically attack us anyway since Nazi ideology calls for perpetual conflict to keep the Volk strong." What about when Japan practically announced that they were not going to attack the USSR and Stalin moved a large army group out of Siberia? Had those divisions not been freed up would Moscow have been liberated?
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Dec 11, 2015 23:04
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LeoMarr posted:What about when Japan practically announced that they were not going to attack the USSR and Stalin moved a large army group out of Siberia? Had those divisions not been freed up would Moscow have been liberated? Did you just refer to the Nazis taking Moscow as it being "liberated"?
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Dec 11, 2015 23:12
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