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GlyphGryph posted:Does anyone really argue you don't die? quote:The question is whether the parts of you that you value live. That's why concepts like self and consciousness become relevant, because people find those bits or some particular arrangement of those bits important. quote:For the biological end, if you split an animal that can survive being split, and the pieces grow back together, did the organism die? quote:What if you keep the halves seperated, and they replace their lost halves? Did the original organism die? When did it go from being alive to dead? If one of these new 'wholes' was killed, did the organism die at that point? It's pretty inarguable that an] organism died, but is the original organism dead? Oh dear me posted:Isn't this also just a restatement of the premisses? We know very well the original organism is dead, because we disassembled it. I would go through a (painless) transporter because the world afterwards would have someone who was the same as me in all important respects, but more conveniently located. If you wouldn't, what is it about being 'the original organism' that matters to you?
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Apr 7, 2016 14:31
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Yeah, I should've read this thread before replying (both times). Looks like a lot of what I've said is well-covered territory.
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Apr 7, 2016 14:34
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Peta posted:If the scenario is such that the original you dies, and you know this, and you step into the teleporter anyway, then you've just committed suicide. The replica on Mars is not you. It does not share your numerical identity. You're dead now. As for myself, I selfishly don't want to die. There's also the matter of psychological ramifications for friends and loved ones who know that Peta1 died and Peta2, i.e., a clone of Peta1, is the one with whom they are now interacting. Imagine, for example, how this knowledge might make Peta1's wife feel. (I'm not trying to conflate metaphysics and moral philosophy here but I think this helps clarify the concept and importance of numerical identity. It really doesn't, it makes me wonder (again) how you can think numerical identity matters. I, too, selfishly do not want to die in the current way of dying, because I want my thoughts to go on. I would have no objection to dying in the transporter, because my thoughts would go on. Likewise if a clone of my late sister came into being, all my sadness would be turned to joy; I cannot think of anything more wonderful. So I suppose it depends how you react to this: David Hume posted:“For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception…. If any one, upon serious and unprejudic'd reflection thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continu'd, which he calls himself; tho' I am certain there is no such principle in me.” Oh dear me fucked around with this message at 15:01 on Apr 7, 2016 |
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Apr 7, 2016 14:56
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Oh dear me posted:It really doesn't, it makes me wonder (again) how you can think numerical identity matters. I, too, selfishly do not want to die in the current way of dying, because I want my thoughts to go on. I would have no objection to dying in the transporter, because my thoughts would go on. Likewise if a clone of my late sister came into being, all my sadness would be turned to joy; I cannot think of anything more wonderful. So I suppose it depends how you react to this: Your thoughts do not persist. The thoughts of your replica - who, for the most fleeting moment is qualitatively identical to you, but who becomes immediately distinguishable from you as his new and sudden existence immediately sets him on a path that is distinct from yours as your constituent particles sizzle out of existence in the teleportation chamber or whatever - are the ones that persist.
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Apr 7, 2016 15:08
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As for a clone of your late sister, that would not be the same person as your late sister. You could be happy in a selfish sense, because your life is once again graced with qualities identical or similar to the qualities exhibited by your late sister, and you could also be happy for this newborn individual as a person in her own right, but your actual sister - the individual who came from the same parents as you, who shared a history with you, etc. - is still dead, and I'd imagine that you would still mourn her.
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Apr 7, 2016 15:12
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Peta posted:Your thoughts do not persist. The thoughts of another individual who, for the most fleeting moment is qualitatively identical to you, but who becomes immediately distinguishable from you as his new and sudden existence immediately sets him on a path that is distinct from yours as your constituent particles sizzle out of existence in the teleportation chamber or whatever, are the ones that persist. Firstly that is a misunderstanding of the phrase 'my thoughts', which I have been over before. It is not the material substrate, or location, of my thoughts that I care about - it is their content, which would be identical in the clone at the moment of transfer, and then of course - I should hope - develop in the future, as would happen whoever has them. I do not find this process horrifying in this organism, and would not in another. What I'd want the transporter to ensure is that the development starts from my current mental position. As for the rest, I do not care that the clone would not be me, so saying it would be someone else is not going to alarm me. Honestly, most of the arguments on your side in this thread seem to me to be just repeating the original problem, but in a horrified tone.
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Apr 7, 2016 15:22
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Peta posted:I'd imagine that you would still mourn her. No, I would not, I would be overjoyed. I would not mourn the old organism any more than I mourned every time she cut her toenails. It was not her 'being the original organism' that I loved.
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Apr 7, 2016 15:26
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Oh dear me posted:Firstly that is a misunderstanding of the phrase 'my thoughts', which I have been over before. It is not the material substrate, or location, of my thoughts that I care about - it is their content, which would be identical in the clone at the moment of transfer, and then of course - I should hope - develop in the future, as would happen whoever has them. I do not find this process horrifying in this organism, and would not in another. What I'd want the transporter to ensure is that the development starts from my current mental position. If anything, this thread has highlighted for me how 1) smart people can get hung up on language in uninteresting ways and 2) smart people can reason their way into believing the absolute dumbest things in uninteresting ways. edit, for content: If you don't care that the clone would not be you, and are content that something exactly like you will continue in your place while you cease to exist, you should probably be in treatment for depression. =(
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Apr 7, 2016 15:29
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Oh dear me posted:Firstly that is a misunderstanding of the phrase 'my thoughts', which I have been over before. It is not the material substrate, or location, of my thoughts that I care about - it is their content, which would be identical in the clone at the moment of transfer, and then of course - I should hope - develop in the future, as would happen whoever has them. I do not find this process horrifying in this organism, and would not in another. What I'd want the transporter to ensure is that the development starts from my current mental position. If you recognize that they are not your thoughts then stop calling them your thoughts. They merely coincide with what your thoughts would be if you were in your replica's situation. But it seems like there's nothing more for either of us to say here. If you're fine with killing yourself as long as another individual who thinks and acts like you persists then by all means please jump in. quote:As for the rest, I do not care that the clone would not be me, so saying it would be someone else is not going to alarm me. Honestly, most of the arguments on your side in this thread seem to me to be just repeating the original problem, but in a horrified tone. Well, yes. I fall in the camp that would not use the teleporter. I wanna loving live.
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Apr 7, 2016 15:30
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Oh dear me posted:Honestly, most of the arguments on your side in this thread seem to me to be just repeating the original problem, but in a horrified tone. And as evidence I cite: Peta posted:If you're fine with killing yourself as long as another individual who thinks and acts like you persists then by all means please jump in. wateroverfire posted:If you don't care that the clone would not be you, and are content that something exactly like you will continue in your place while you cease to exist, you should probably be in treatment for depression. =( So yes, I agree there is probably nothing more that can be said, and we have not progressed beyond Hume at all.
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Apr 7, 2016 15:35
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Oh dear me posted:No, I would not, I would be overjoyed. I would not mourn the old organism any more than I mourned every time she cut her toenails. It was not her 'being the original organism' that I loved. 
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Apr 7, 2016 15:35
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Dzhay posted:Bolding mine. I'm saying that there is no post-teleport me. I was killed in the moment of teleportation. A copy of me, MePrime, who is numerically distinct from me, appeared at the destination. Dzhay posted:The second bolded statement reads like the sort of thing I was complaining about. Why should I care about this notion of "killed" where the person* is still there afterwards? What, exactly, has been lost? You, a third party, won't be able to tell and might not not care whether what pops out of the teleporter is me or MePrime. I, as the person who is going to die, certainly care because I would rather continue to exist.
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Apr 7, 2016 15:36
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"I'd trade my sister for a stranger as long as I love the stranger's qualities more than my sister's."
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Apr 7, 2016 15:37
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We don't know anywhere near enough about the physics of subjective consciousness to answer this question and all we can do is argue from gut feeling and semantics. Instead of arguing in circles I'd rather talk about books and other stuff that explore this concept in an interesting way. I haven't read Blindsight but I am halfway through Altered Carbon which sort of toys with the idea a bit. What else is there?
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Apr 7, 2016 15:38
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Peta posted:"I'd trade my sister for a stranger as long as I love the stranger's qualities more than my sister's." You lying shitstain, that is not what I said at all. Hint: I did not murder my sister.
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Apr 7, 2016 15:41
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Oh dear me posted:And as evidence I cite: Like many thought experiments in philosophy, it's really not that interesting a problem and all its permutations were thoroughly explored hundreds of years ago.
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Apr 7, 2016 15:41
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Boing posted:We don't know anywhere near enough about the physics of subjective consciousness to answer this question and all we can do is argue from gut feeling and semantics. I'm often tempted to adopt this opinion - especially for split-brain scenarios, organisms splitting in half, etc. - but I think we know enough to say, for example, that quantum teleportation requires the annihilation of the original matter and that teleportation is therefore suicide. And I think there's plenty of evidence, both philosophical and scientific, for the assertion that if I kill and clone myself I don't wake up in my clone's body, because, well, I've killed myself. That much is obvious. The people on the other side are by and large accepting this premise and saying they're fine with it.
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Apr 7, 2016 15:41
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Oh dear me posted:You lying shitstain, that is not what I said at all. Hint: I did not murder my sister. You're devaluing numerical identity and interpersonal history and insisting that your sister is replaceable.
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Apr 7, 2016 15:44
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Peta posted:You're devaluing numerical identity and interpersonal history and insisting that your sister is replaceable. I see no value in numerical identity. I see huge value in interpersonal history, which in my opinion is not tied to numerical identity - and in my sister, who in my opinion would not have been tied to numerical identity if we had a transporter machine (that being the whole point of the discussion).
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Apr 7, 2016 15:48
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Oh dear me posted:I see no value in numerical identity. I see huge value in interpersonal history, which in my opinion is not tied to numerical identity - and in my sister, who in my opinion would not have been tied to numerical identity if we had a transporter machine (that being the whole point of the discussion). Do you think your sister would be indifferent between continuing to exist and dying, to be replaced by SisterPrime?
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Apr 7, 2016 15:49
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Peta posted:I'm often tempted to adopt this opinion - especially for split-brain scenarios, organisms splitting in half, etc. - but I think we know enough to say, for example, that quantum teleportation requires the annihilation of the original matter and that teleportation is therefore suicide. And I think there's plenty of evidence, both philosophical and scientific, for the assertion that if I kill and clone myself I don't wake up in my clone's body, because, well, I've killed myself. That much is obvious. Well, even this requires an assumption that our continuity of consciousness is not linked in some way to the specific configuration of our brains, and other people have an interesting enough point about how you're not actually the same person you were 5 minutes ago, let alone 5 years ago, and none of the cells that make up your body are the same, and 'continuity of consciousness' is a really weird loving idea anyway to be the centre of your being, so I wouldn't go so far as to call it 'obvious'. Instead of asking "would you be teleported by deconstructing and reconstructing your constituent atoms?", I have a different thought experiment (inspired by the Prestige): Say you're dying and you need some experimental drugs that could cure you or that could make things horribly worse. You could make a perfect clone of yourself and try the drugs on them, then kill them, as a sort of test run. Would you do this? Ignore for the sake of argument the morality of killing another human being (as similar as they might be to you) and just think about this in selfish Randian terms. It seems weird to me, but I have a sense that there is a 50% chance that what you think of as your consciousness would actually inhabit the clone, and not your original body. Because as soon as there is a clone of you, there are two of your consciousnesses, both with the same memories - and at that point, what you think of as your memories might actually be the memories of the original body. So even before you've been cloned, what you're experiencing now might just be a future memory of your clone self. The more clones you make, the lower the probability of your actual consciousness belonging to the original body. Split brain stuff makes this even more fun.
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Apr 7, 2016 15:52
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Oh dear me posted:I see no value in numerical identity. I see huge value in interpersonal history, which in my opinion is not tied to numerical identity - and in my sister, who in my opinion would not have been tied to numerical identity if we had a transporter machine (that being the whole point of the discussion). You did not share a history with the clone of your sister. You shared it with your sister. This is not up for debate; it's a fact that you have to acknowledge unless you want to redefine "interpersonal history" so radically that you risk stripping the term of its meaning/significance. The feeling that you have an interpersonal history with this clone, who is an individual whom you've just met, is an illusion. The clone is not your sister. The clone did not come your mother. Your sister is dead; the clone is effectively an organic simulation of her.
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Apr 7, 2016 15:53
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Boing posted:Say you're dying and you need some experimental drugs that could cure you or that could make things horribly worse. You could make a perfect clone of yourself and try the drugs on them, then kill them, as a sort of test run. Would you do this? Ignore for the sake of argument the morality of killing another human being (as similar as they might be to you) and just think about this in selfish Randian terms. I think I understand the scenario but you've lost me with the second paragraph. Where does the 50 percent come from? Could you reexplain?
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Apr 7, 2016 15:59
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wateroverfire posted:Do you think your sister would be indifferent between continuing to exist and dying, to be replaced by SisterPrime? I think my sister would probably have been ok with the transporter, but that is purely a guess based on our general agreement; and I would not want her or anyone to go through the transporter against their will. But my sister is already dead; the issue was whether I'd stop mourning her if her clone were brought to life, and the answer is yes of course, because everything that was important about her would then exist. I think everything that was important about her would then also be very happy to be alive again in her clone. I am bending over backwards here to use language that your side will not object to, but I think this would be more naturally expressed by saying that she would be alive again, but in a new body, and I would not expect either one of us to mourn her old body. (Please do not reply to this by saying it would not be 'her', I really think that I have made it clear that I know it would be a new organism, but that this is not to me an important aspect of personality.)
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Apr 7, 2016 16:00
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Peta posted:I think I understand the scenario but you've lost me with the second paragraph. Where does the 50 percent come from? Could you reexplain? Normally you have your consciousness in one body. However, as soon as you've cloned yourself, you now have two consciousnesses in two bodies. Which one is 'your' consciousness? You could say that you are the original person, since of course you are, but the clone has the exact same memories as you. If you are the clone, you would remember making the decision to clone yourself, but would be surprised to find that you are the clone and not the original. Since there are two of you, and the same memories lead up to each case, I've interpreted that as a 50% chance of you being killed, rather than of you killing the clone. This could be batshit, but I'm interesting in thinking it through.
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Apr 7, 2016 16:03
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Oh dear me posted:I think my sister would probably have been ok with the transporter, but that is purely a guess based on our general agreement; and I would not want her or anyone to go through the transporter against their will. So if we cloned your sister (suppose she's still alive) and presented to you Sisteroriginal and Sisterclone and told you to pick one then you'd be indifferent?
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Apr 7, 2016 16:04
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Peta posted:You did not share a history with the clone of your sister. You shared it with your sister. This is not up for debate; it's a fact that you have to acknowledge unless you want to redefine "interpersonal history" so radically that you risk stripping the term of its meaning/significance. The feeling that you have an interpersonal history with this clone, who is an individual whom you've just met, is an illusion. The clone is not your sister. The clone did not come your mother. Your sister is dead; the clone is effectively an organic simulation of her. I would say the clone would be the same person as my sister, though she would be a different organism from the original. You will no doubt object to my saying she is the same person, because it matters to you that a person should be the original organism. I think it a sensible way to speak, because it only matters to me that a person should have the same personality. Neither one of us can insist that our usage is not up for debate. But it is just a debate about words. Oh dear me fucked around with this message at 16:10 on Apr 7, 2016 |
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Apr 7, 2016 16:07
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Peta posted:So if we cloned your sister (suppose she's still alive) and presented to you Sisteroriginal and Sisterclone and told you to pick one then you'd be indifferent? Yes. How could I possibly tell them apart? How could they? Oh dear me fucked around with this message at 16:11 on Apr 7, 2016 |
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Apr 7, 2016 16:08
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Boing posted:Normally you have your consciousness in one body. However, as soon as you've cloned yourself, you now have two consciousnesses in two bodies. Which one is 'your' consciousness? You could say that you are the original person, since of course you are, but the clone has the exact same memories as you. If you are the clone, you would remember making the decision to clone yourself, but would be surprised to find that you are the clone and not the original. Since there are two of you, and the same memories lead up to each case, I've interpreted that as a 50% chance of you being killed, rather than of you killing the clone. Huh. Isn't this more a matter of how you can know you're the original than a matter of whether you are indeed the original? I'm not sure how your consciousness could exit one body and enter another. I mean, it seems impossible by definition, assuming - which I realize we probably shouldn't given all the confusion and upheaval regarding this stuff in the neuroscientific community - that consciousness is just a projection/illusion generated by bodily (physical) mechanisms. I feel like I'm drastically misunderstanding you.
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Apr 7, 2016 16:09
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Boing posted:We don't know anywhere near enough about the physics of subjective consciousness to answer this question and all we can do is argue from gut feeling and semantics. Instead of arguing in circles I'd rather talk about books and other stuff that explore this concept in an interesting way. Glasshouse by Charles Stross, Peter F Hamiltons Commonwealth series, and a bunch of Alistair Reynolds stuff.
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Apr 7, 2016 16:13
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These teleporter nuts are diabolical. They despise life. Not only their own but that of their family's too. I hope you use a teleporter with no exit node my friend.
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Apr 7, 2016 16:13
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Peta posted:Huh. Isn't this more a matter of how you can know you're the original than a matter of whether you are indeed the original? I'm not sure how your consciousness could exit one body and enter another. I mean, it seems impossible by definition, assuming - which I realize we probably shouldn't given all the confusion and upheaval regarding this stuff in the neuroscientific community - that consciousness is just a projection/illusion generated by bodily (physical) mechanisms. Yeah it's about knowing which you is you, and nothing to do with your consciousness jumping bodies. The point is you have no way of guaranteeing that you are the original, because you would have the same memories either way. If you decide not to clone yourself, you're fine. If you do decide to clone yourself, it may transpire that you were the clone all along, even before you cloned yourself (and what you think of as your consciousness 'now' is just the memories from before you were cloned).
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Apr 7, 2016 16:14
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I really can't make sense of oh dear me's point unless they're of the belief that they/their sister will just wake up in the new copied body. It's not about the "original organism." It's about you being absolutely dead and replaced. Your thoughts are gone. Your sister is still dead. There's just an uncanny valley clone walking about thinking it's the person you guys were.
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Apr 7, 2016 16:14
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Boing posted:Normally you have your consciousness in one body. However, as soon as you've cloned yourself, you now have two consciousnesses in two bodies. Which one is 'your' consciousness? You could say that you are the original person, since of course you are, but the clone has the exact same memories as you. If you are the clone, you would remember making the decision to clone yourself, but would be surprised to find that you are the clone and not the original. Since there are two of you, and the same memories lead up to each case, I've interpreted that as a 50% chance of you being killed, rather than of you killing the clone. No, there's a 0% chance of you being the clone. Your consciousness isn't being moved anywhere, it's being copied and a brand new copy is being made somewhere else. When you step into that machine you are never coming out.
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Apr 7, 2016 16:14
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Oh dear me posted:Yes. How could I possibly tell them apart? How could they? They could tell each other apart because they would have different memories and experiences post-cloning.
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Apr 7, 2016 16:15
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Oh dear me posted:Yes. How could I possibly tell them apart? How could they? Um. Keep the original in room 1 and generate the clone in room 2? Label their foreheads with permanent marker?
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Apr 7, 2016 16:18
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Oh dear me posted:That is a staggeringly weird argument. The moral badness of cruelty isn't determined by birth certificates. Where's the birth certificate Oh dear me?
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Apr 7, 2016 16:19
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Some people have really different approaches to this kind of question.
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Apr 7, 2016 16:19
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Boing posted:Normally you have your consciousness in one body. However, as soon as you've cloned yourself, you now have two consciousnesses in two bodies. Which one is 'your' consciousness? You could say that you are the original person, since of course you are, but the clone has the exact same memories as you. If you are the clone, you would remember making the decision to clone yourself, but would be surprised to find that you are the clone and not the original. Since there are two of you, and the same memories lead up to each case, I've interpreted that as a 50% chance of you being killed, rather than of you killing the clone. I think we continually get hung up on concepts when we talk about this stuff. You are the original. We'll call you A. A has a stream of consciousness. A is cloned to get B, who is initially identical in every respect but has a distinct stream of consciousness from A. You, A, maintain your original stream of consciousness. You are the original. Your clone, B, believes he is the original but is mistaken. Absent a mixup in the lab, there is 0% chance you are killed and 100% chance B is killed. There is no confusion.
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Apr 7, 2016 16:21
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Peta posted:Um. Keep the original in room 1 and generate the clone in room 2? Label their foreheads with permanent marker? Tautological and I suspect also irrelevant to Oh dear me.
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Apr 7, 2016 16:21
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