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People die for a lot of things dumber then convenience so that's a fairly weak argument.
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Apr 6, 2016 15:34
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Killer-of-Lawyers posted:People die for a lot of things dumber then convenience so that's a fairly weak argument. "Man, traffic's gonna be a bitch today. Better do everyone a solid and clear the roads." *bites cyanide capsule*
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Apr 6, 2016 15:37
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Convenience has no value to you when you're dead.GlyphGryph posted:Most of my individual cells cannot directly experience anything experienced by many of my other individual cells.
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Apr 6, 2016 15:37
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vintagepurple posted:The part where you aren't dead. There's another human walking around with your memories and feelings but it isn't you. You're dead. If you're okay with it then are you simply claiming you have no fear of death? No, but I've argued that the bad aspects of death-as-we-know-it - bereavement, loss of my memories, loss of future opportunity - would not apply to death-by-transporter. (Oh, and I've also specified painlessness.) It is the content of my thoughts that I want to continue, and it would (in my duplicate's head). I can't really see any intrinsic merit in this particular bodily organism continuing to function, when another body could have my thoughts better. But I think the question of whether my duplicate would be 'me' is just a verbal choice of what we shall apply pronouns to, it doesn't matter to me and would not affect my transportation decisions.
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Apr 6, 2016 15:44
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Oh dear me posted:Isn't this also just a restatement of the premisses? We know very well the original organism is dead, because we disassembled it. I would go through a (painless) transporter because the world afterwards would have someone who was the same as me in all important respects, but more conveniently located. If you wouldn't, what is it about being 'the original organism' that matters to you? OK now it's a non-destructive scanning and at the end of it, after they've sent out the scanned information, you step out of the scanning booth and get shot in the face. Would you still step in?
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Apr 6, 2016 16:09
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Piell posted:OK now it's a non-destructive scanning and at the end of it, after they've sent out the scanned information, you step out of the scanning booth and get shot in the face. Would you still step in? No, that sounds painful and risky.
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Apr 6, 2016 16:14
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It's the same situation except one looks better.
Piell fucked around with this message at 16:18 on Apr 6, 2016 |
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Apr 6, 2016 16:15
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Piell posted:It's exactly the same situation. You know it isn't: you yourself wrote the post changing the specs. What are you trying to argue? That methods of death don't matter?
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Apr 6, 2016 16:21
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Oh dear me posted:No, but I've argued that the bad aspects of death-as-we-know-it - bereavement, loss of my memories, loss of future opportunity - would not apply to death-by-transporter. (Oh, and I've also specified painlessness.) It is the content of my thoughts that I want to continue, and it would (in my duplicate's head). I can't really see any intrinsic merit in this particular bodily organism continuing to function, when another body could have my thoughts better. Your memories and opportunities are just as gone as if you'd been shot. A copy of them exists but it isn't you. You'd not experience any of the opportunities, reminisce about the past, or see your future children-a doppelganger would. Your last memories will be of stepping into a teleporter and then 'you' will cease. A new person convinced they're you will step out the other end and proceed to experience a world that you will never know. The intrinsic merit is seeing and experiencing your future, rather than merely dying with the knowledge that it will be. Ultimately the teleportation device presented is just killing and replacing you, which under normal circumstances is horrifying- but make the killing quick and the replacement convincing and suddenly it's a resounding 'meh, ok'? Like put another way, if I design a functional AI that's convinced it's Louis XVI, or hell, scan the guy's skeleton with amazing future technology and clone him memories intact, no matter how convinced that clone is that he is Louis revived, the fact will never change that the man commonly known as Louis XVI died under a guillotine's blade, and the last thing he saw was a crowed cheering his death. If I zap my own brain, delete my memories, and believe myself to be Louis XVI, I'm still not Louis. He's dead and he'll never feel grass under his skin or learn the future fortunes of France. Oh dear me posted:You know it isn't: you yourself wrote the post changing the specs. What are you trying to argue? That methods of death don't matter? Why should one method of quick painless death over another change your decision? You've already chosen to die, is a few seconds at most being put down by a reliable gunman somehow a game changer? vintagepurple fucked around with this message at 16:39 on Apr 6, 2016 |
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Apr 6, 2016 16:36
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roymorrison posted:I think consciousness is just an evolutionary trick our brain plays on itself so we don't realize we're just a computer stuck in a physics problem
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Apr 6, 2016 16:37
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Kilroy posted:Even if we were, you'd still be dead. Regardless of whether we live in a simulation or not, at the most fundamental level you are still a mathematical object, configured according to the laws of quantum mechanics. Destroying that configuration, or more accurately changing that configuration such that your agency doesn't seem to exist anymore, and moving stuff around somewhere else to create a new configuration somewhere else, which agent really behaves an awful lot like the one just destroyed, still kills the first agent. You're still dead, even in the computer. Naively, the 'new you' will probably 'feel' like you, will have all your memories and personality, and probably won't be able to tell the difference, and probably no one else will either. The new you should certainly be afforded all the human rights you had, being a human after all. That's all well and good, but you're still dead. Then the question becomes a "What is 'you'?" China Meiville's Kraken has a fun take on this problem, it features a character who can teleport himself and others/objects Star Trek style. He is haunted by hundreds of his own ghost.
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Apr 6, 2016 16:51
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Nevvy Z posted:Then the question becomes a "What is 'you'?"
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Apr 6, 2016 16:55
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Kilroy posted:Well, not for me anyway since I answered that in the second sentence of the post you quoted. Maybe you think you did, but that's just like, your opinion man.
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Apr 6, 2016 16:56
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I was thinking about this in the shower. Say I'm a euthanasia doctor. I'll help anyone, not just the terminally-ill, no questions asked. Angsty teen got dumped? I'll drive over to their neigbourhood, and, with absolute discretion, painlessly and instantly kill them. But there's a twist. I have in my possession the technology to create a perfect copy of the person to be killed. Before administering death, if the patient desires, I can copy them and send the copy about its day, again with absolute discretion- the copy will be so perfect that no one, including the copy itself, will ever suspect that this occurred. The copy will possess all memories exactly as the patient does, except instead of contacting me, it will remember a brief but benign crisis after which it ceased feeling suicidal and went home. This way, the suicidal patient can end their life without suffering and, as a bonus, avoid bereaving their loved ones or leaving works unfinished. If a person would, given the option, take my copy-euthanasia services, is that person suicidal? Would you recommend they seek mental treatment rather than going through with it? If yes, in what way is teleportation in this manner not merely assisted suicide? vintagepurple fucked around with this message at 17:10 on Apr 6, 2016 |
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Apr 6, 2016 17:07
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vintagepurple posted:I was thinking about this in the shower. But, are they still suicidal if they request, instead of killing them, an operation to put their brain in the state that their doppelganger would have been in?
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Apr 6, 2016 17:13
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This is always a fun argument, because everyone seems to think the answer is obvious, but then splits about 50-50 on what it is. To me, this seems like it's mainly an argument over semantics: many people seem to be saying "this would/wouldn't cause you to die, because this is what 'die' means" or "the teleported person would/wouldn't be the same person as the pre-teleportation one, because I'm going to use this definition of 'the same person'." To which my response is: okay, sure, use whatever definitions you want, as long as you're clear about them, but what you really need to do to convince people is explain why your notion of "dying" or "being the same" is the one they should care about. The people who aren't doing this seem to fall into two(ish) camps: 1. People stating that "continuity of consciousness" (or something to that effect) is important. Obvious questions: what's consciousness? why, exactly, is its continuity important? Less obvious question: if time turns out to be fundamentally discrete on some small scale, does this present a problem? 2. People saying there actually is a meaningful difference between a teleported person and a person moved in the conventional sense. Assume they were asleep during this process, so they don't know if they've been teleported or just physically carried somewhere. They wake up, how can they (or someone else) determine whether they were teleported or not?
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Apr 6, 2016 17:39
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^ hah, I was thinking of that last thing you said in a way, too, but I felt it was a little too crazy. But, what is moving through space? In physics we imagine infinitesimally small pieces of time/space (calculus, etc.). But still, how do you get something from x to x + dx? What is space? Reminds me of Zeno's paradox about the turtle and the race. Nobody understands the connection between mind and body, so we don't know a solution to the problem of actually teleporting your self. Breaking down the body and rebuilding it would kill you/your self, no matter how carefully you arrange things. The unscientific way of resolving this problem is assuming a "soul" exists which is tied to the body. I mean that's really the end of the line, I think. There's no scientific theory of the self so I don't see how you'd be able to rebuild it in the first place. It's a big assumption that just the arrangement of matter/energy in your brain will reproduce an exact copy. I imagine this process resulting in, at best case, the creation of a body identical to the person sent into the machine, but ... without a mind? Maybe it would be like a baby, a blank slate. Or maybe there would just be nothing there but autonomic processes, like a "vegetable". I mean, how do you transfer a will to exist? Reproduction apparently does it, because most (all?) living things are born with the will to live. Living things will fight ferociously to survive. These are hard questions! And that I have no answers for them is what frustrates me and drives my will to think the gently caress out of them. What the hell does "consciousness is an illusion" mean anyways? SHISHKABOB fucked around with this message at 17:47 on Apr 6, 2016 |
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Apr 6, 2016 17:42
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Ape Agitator posted:What would happen if there was an accident and the process of disassembling my old body didn't occur, leaving two of me? I would hope they'd put a framework in place to give the new me a proper identity and live out his accidental life in confusing peace. I mean, that seems like the obvious solution. He can keep the name but one of us will need a new social security number and place of employment but hopefully the teleportation company that made the mistake will provide support for that in an out of court settlement. It's going to be an awful situation for all involved but it's making the best of an industrial accident so patience and understanding will be needed. We'll diverge psychologically from the first moment so we're distinct individuals with common memories. You'd rather hope these types of accidents are rare but with this kind of teleportation I'd insist they create a legal framework for all of the potential results that show up when you're perfecting a Prestige machine. This has a lot of interesting complications, but I think for the sake of brevity you didn't mention the sheer amount of trauma the clone would suffer. Take all the personal connections people make in their lives - parents, siblings, significant others, children and so on. That clone would have a lifetime of memories making those connections only to suddenly be stripped of them. Your clone isn't going to be sleeping with your wife, right? What about the bonding they've done with your children, wouldn't they have a strong argument for at least partial custody? They're the clone's children as much as your own, and they were present in their upbringing exactly as much as you were. How does all that work out? Also, the framing of "industrial accident" makes for a great deal of labor abuses. No need for high wages, you can make a few copies and they work all hours, or they fight each other for the one job that happens to be available. There's the bonus that these clones wouldn't need any time to get up to speed! It's almost as bad as the skillsofts in Shadowrun - chips that contain the skills needed to perform highly technical work that when removed are no longer retained in the mind/experience of the person in question.
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Apr 6, 2016 17:42
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vintagepurple posted:Your memories and opportunities are just as gone as if you'd been shot. A copy of them exists but it isn't you. As I said, I don't care about the question of whether it is 'me', that's just a matter of language. I know it is not the same bodily organism that has them, that is the premiss of the argument. But what I care about is the content of my memories and feelings. A duplicate of those is just as good as the original, just as an exact copy of a digital recording is as good as the original. If I can preserve the image of my late sister playing Agricola, accompanied by the emotional charge it has for me, I'm not going to whinge about it not being original DVD. I would be delighted if my memories of her could live on after me in any body at all, frankly. quote:Why should one method of quick painless death over another change your decision? You've already chosen to die, is a few seconds at most being put down by a reliable gunman somehow a game changer? Yes it drat well is; which was why the question was asked, of course. Any possibility of pain is a disincentive, and instantaneous disassembly by machine is a lot more appealing than relying on some pervy stranger (which I reckon a 'reliable gunman' would have to be), and disposes of the body neatly (which matters to loved ones). And saying seconds don't matter because 'you've already chosen to die' seems to be begging the question, when whether death-with-instant-clone is as bad as death-as-we-know-it is the very thing we're arguing about. And, of course, the timing matters. If I have to die in order for my clone to come into being at a better location, that is a choice I've said I could make. But if my clone is already alive and kicking in that location, why would I choose to die then?
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Apr 6, 2016 17:57
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vintagepurple posted:The part where you aren't dead. There's another human walking around with your memories and feelings but it isn't you. You're dead. If you're okay with it then are you simply claiming you have no fear of death? You'd die for convenience? Death is going to happen, it is pretty damned inevitable, and that inevitable death is a lot more serious to me than the death you're describing here. What I fear is dying with my life unlived, my potential unreached, my goals unaccomplished, any legacy squashed and my contributions to the future left undone. I fear the impact an untimely death would have on my loved ones and that it could retroactively invalidate much of what I have accomplished through it's repercussions. I fear the pain and confusion and agony many types of death will bring. None of the parts of death I fear occur in this situation. So I guess I could say that no, I do not fear death. I fear a lot of things that are pretty tightly associated with death, especially untimely death, but I'm not afraid of the whole ceasing to be bit. vintagepurple posted:I get that after you're dead you won't be able to care, but you're not dead yet. I assume everyone posting here has some sense of self-preservation and would rather keep living than not, all things considered. rudatron posted:They are part of your body, not self, they're as separate from your experience as a bug on the sidewalk. Treat both of them well, but they're not you. All that matters is that set of interactions. The person I was talking with was making an argument based on the concept of a biological organism, you do realize your statement is actually supporting my point, right? vintagepurple posted:Like put another way, if I design a functional AI that's convinced it's Louis XVI, or hell, scan the guy's skeleton with amazing future technology and clone him memories intact, no matter how convinced that clone is that he is Louis revived, the fact will never change that the man commonly known as Louis XVI died under a guillotine's blade, and the last thing he saw was a crowed cheering his death. If I zap my own brain, delete my memories, and believe myself to be Louis XVI, I'm still not Louis. He's dead and he'll never feel grass under his skin or learn the future fortunes of France. I disagree? I think in that scenario he'll have died, and then you'll have brought him back to life, or at least brought a good chunk of him back enough to life I'd have no problem referring to him as Louis XVI and treating the same way as if he'd gotten to that state through some other weird avenue of partial replacement or whatever-the-gently caress instead. vintagepurple posted:If a person would, given the option, take my copy-euthanasia services, is that person suicidal? Would you recommend they seek mental treatment rather than going through with it? If yes, in what way is teleportation in this manner not merely assisted suicide? If they still want to be alive at the end of it, I'm not sure if suicidal works. I think they should seek mental health treatment either way, since it doesn't sound like they're doing it as a lark (and if they were doing it on a lark, I don't think think it matters). You're right in that it's functionally the same scenario, or at least similar enough that I don't know why my answer would change? Hell, I'd pay quite a bit for some sort of insurance policy that mirrored that, since it would comfortable allow me to take a lot more risks knowing I had a recent brain clone ready to take over should I bite it. Solkanar512 posted:This has a lot of interesting complications, but I think for the sake of brevity you didn't mention the sheer amount of trauma the clone would suffer. Take all the personal connections people make in their lives - parents, siblings, significant others, children and so on. That clone would have a lifetime of memories making those connections only to suddenly be stripped of them. Your clone isn't going to be sleeping with your wife, right? What about the bonding they've done with your children, wouldn't they have a strong argument for at least partial custody? They're the clone's children as much as your own, and they were present in their upbringing exactly as much as you were. How does all that work out? This all seems more practical than philosophical, and I image it would involve agreement among the individual whose been duplicated. Like, it's his wife and children too, after all. I think for practical purposes you'd either want to agree to form one big family (if you're the sort that could live with yourself) or split off one of you at random from those immediate attachments and take a more extended family role - one of you becomes the "Uncle" of the children, the family ends up treating it as if your parents had twins at birth, that sort of thing. Mantis42 posted:Also, since I'm functionally identical to whoever comes out on the other side, and since there's already one of me around, I should legally be allowed to do whatever I want to the other me, right? Like, unless they're handing out birth certificates at the teleportation station, dude's got not citizenship and no human rights. Theoretically I should be able to program a teleporter to not destroy the original while creating many copies, then experimenting on them to see how I would react in given situations. Could I beat a gorilla in a fight? Probably not, but I would be morally justified in killing untold numbers of copies to find out. Well, you'd be justified I guess in committing suicide lots and lots of times, assuming it (and the intentional clonemaking) was actually legal. I'd argue you should probably retain the right to renege on your suicidal plans at any time you choose, though. So you'd probably end up with dozens of copies who all refuse to do whatever stupid things you didn't want to do but thought, for some weird-rear end reason, they (with your exact same mind) would somehow agree to? GlyphGryph fucked around with this message at 18:38 on Apr 6, 2016 |
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Apr 6, 2016 18:27
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Dzhay posted:This is always a fun argument, because everyone seems to think the answer is obvious, but then splits about 50-50 on what it is. I think we lack good language for talking about consciousness and it trips us up. To your point 1: Does the question "what is consciousness" really matter? If we can agree that we are conscious and that all things equal we would rather not permanently cease to be conscious I think it's not a problem if the phenomenon is a black box. Whatever the thing is, we possess that quality now and would prefer not to permanently cease to possess it. That means continuity is important in the sense that *I* want to remain the entity having my experience of consciousness. If I shut off and some other person picks up with my affairs, even if they are identical to me in every respect, my experience of consciousness is over and everything else considered I'm NOT indifferent to that even if no one who isn't me can tell the difference. I think discrete time doesn't really matter in the same sense as an exact definition of consciousness doesn't matter. If we're destroyed and rebuilt from moment to moment that is interesting trivia but doesn't change the subjective experience of consciousness or the desire to not stop being conscious. Whatever this ride actually is, I want to stay on it. To your second point.. Of course there's a meaningful difference. In the case of transport, there is one continuous being (in the sense we're interested in) that goes to sleep at one end and wakes up at the other. In the case of teleportation, there's are two beings - one that gets killed, and another that gets copied and sent on its way. Whether anyone alive after the teleportation can tell the difference doesn't make the fact that someone was just killed inconsequential, I would think.
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Apr 6, 2016 19:40
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To me, the existential horror I experience at the idea of such a transportation technology is enough for me to say flat out that I wouldn't use it if it existed. Other science fiction authors, like Iain M Banks, have proposed other technologies in their books, such as the culture's "displacement", which seems to be depicted as simply taking the part of space you're currently occupying and causing it to temporarily be somewhere else. In that scenario you're loving around with spacetime, but hypothetically your bodily integrity is never violated. Both technologies are made up, so take this as a suggestion to scientists of the 24th century to work on the Banks version instead of the Roddenberry version.
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Apr 6, 2016 21:08
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wateroverfire posted:I think we lack good language for talking about consciousness and it trips us up. Bolding mine. The first bolded statement is interesting. Are you claiming that the pre-teleport "you" would actually experience something (the ending of consciousness, whatever that is) that the post-teleport "you" wouldn't recall? The second bolded statement reads like the sort of thing I was complaining about. Why should I care about this notion of "killed" where the person* is still there afterwards? What, exactly, has been lost? *you're going to debate this, I guess. But if the post-teleport version is in every way indistinguishable ** from the pre-teleport one, I really don't understand how you're going to. **other than location, I guess. Though the teleporter could be aimed back at the same place - would that make a difference?
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Apr 6, 2016 21:16
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Dzhay posted:Bolding mine. The new you is distinguishable by the old you by virtue of the old you being incapable of distinguishing anything.
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Apr 6, 2016 21:20
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What if you died then came back to life, would you still be the same person.......
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Apr 6, 2016 21:31
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What are the moral quandaries of uploading your brain into a clone and then beating your old self up for sex purposes
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Apr 6, 2016 21:35
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Is murdering your old self homicide or assisted suicide or just normal suicide. context: what would the prosecution use in a trial when they nail you for life insurance scamming
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Apr 6, 2016 21:36
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Control Volume posted:What if you died then came back to life, would you still be the same person....... SHISHKABOB posted:The new you is distinguishable by the old you by virtue of the old you being incapable of distinguishing anything. What "old you"? The two "yous" don't exist concurrently.
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Apr 6, 2016 21:39
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Dzhay posted:What "old you"? The "you" that existed prior to teleportation, I would assume.
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Apr 6, 2016 21:55
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GlyphGryph posted:Death is going to happen, it is pretty damned inevitable, and that inevitable death is a lot more serious to me than the death you're describing here. What I fear is dying with my life unlived, my potential unreached, my goals unaccomplished, any legacy squashed and my contributions to the future left undone. I fear the impact an untimely death would have on my loved ones and that it could retroactively invalidate much of what I have accomplished through it's repercussions. I fear the pain and confusion and agony many types of death will bring. I think you're going to find that this is where the fundamental disagreement really comes from. Once I cease to be (as in, once my subjective experience of my existence ends), nothing that you've listed will matter to me anymore. In fact, nothing at all will matter to me, and there won't be a "me" anyway. More to the point, that's something that I can recognize right now, and it leads me to the conclusion that my subjective experience is in fact what I really value. The one exception that I'll grant is the effect my death might have on people I care about, but that's less of an argument in favor of teleportation and more of an argument for why I'd be cool with a healthy clone taking my place in the event of terminal illness or something. I wouldn't personally consider this a better outcome, though, except insofar as it's one less thing to worry about as I'm dying. Aside from some specific circumstances, though, it's hard for me to come up with any reason why I'd want a clone of me to live on in my place. Visiting another planet would be cool, but it's not something that "I" would get to subjectively experience, so who cares? It'd be no different, from my perspective, as some completely different person getting to go. And that's fine, but not if I have to die for that to happen.
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Apr 6, 2016 22:33
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Who What Now posted:The "you" that existed prior to teleportation, I would assume. Was that not clear? To put it more explicitly: After the teleport, pre-teleportation-you is indeed incapable of experiencing/distinguishing things; how is this different from the claim that after waiting 5 minutes, 5-minutes-ago-you is incapable of experiencing things?
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Apr 6, 2016 22:38
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Dzhay posted:Was that not clear? To put it more explicitly: After the teleport, pre-teleportation-you is indeed incapable of experiencing/distinguishing things; how is this different from the claim that after waiting 5 minutes, 5-minutes-ago-you is incapable of experiencing things? Because 5-minutes-ago-me doesn't exist in the present.
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Apr 6, 2016 22:45
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Who What Now posted:Because 5-minutes-ago-me doesn't exist in the present. Nor does pre-teleport you.
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Apr 6, 2016 22:53
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vintagepurple posted:If a person would, given the option, take my copy-euthanasia services, is that person suicidal? Would you recommend they seek mental treatment rather than going through with it? If yes, in what way is teleportation in this manner not merely assisted suicide? No, they're not suicidal. Just kind of melodramatic and money-wasting. Like, take the experiment a step further. We improve your copy-technology to the point that it's basically instantaneous. You disappear, spend 0.00000001 seconds not existing, and then reappear exactly in the same spot an instant later. The process would be unnoticeable and have none of the traits that make death-death.
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Apr 6, 2016 23:05
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I'm a bit surprised nobody has brought up Swampman. EDIT: I just noticed that there is a user by this name. This has nothing to do with him. eatenmyeyes fucked around with this message at 00:42 on Apr 7, 2016 |
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Apr 7, 2016 00:20
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GlyphGryph posted:Well, you'd be justified I guess in committing suicide lots and lots of times, assuming it (and the intentional clonemaking) was actually legal. They don't have to agree to it, I have a gun. According the telefailures I'd be okay in setting up gladiatorial combat between my clones, forcing them to fight to the death for my own amusement. Since they are me and suicide is a personal choice.
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Apr 7, 2016 00:29
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Dzhay posted:Nor does pre-teleport you. Yes, but he would had I not teleported. Post teleport I'm dead and there is a new person who just happens to share my DNA and memories.
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Apr 7, 2016 00:51
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Death is not an 'experience', is the end of experience. Saying death is just another experience is like asking what happens 'after' time ends. The time difference isn't an issue - if I freeze you with magic for 1000 years, then let you continue, you haven't died, because you still have a continuous self. But any break in a continuous self, for whatever period of time, is automatically death.
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Apr 7, 2016 01:01
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rudatron posted:The time difference isn't an issue - if I freeze you with magic for 1000 years, then let you continue, you haven't died, because you still have a continuous self. But any break in a continuous self, for whatever period of time, is automatically death. A frozen you, incapable of thought, incapable of action, incapable of anything, isn't. It's an inert object, not a person. Continuance of consciousness ends the moment the freeze begins. Are you seriously going to argue that someone who has been completely frozen, their life stopped in time, is somehow still conscious? This scenario seems to be way more a death of self than teleportation ever would be. SHISHKABOB posted:The new you is distinguishable by the old you by virtue of the old you being incapable of distinguishing anything. This is always true about all possible old me's under all circumstances though. That's what makes them the old me, the fact that they aren't around anymore and this new me has replaced them. Paradoxish posted:I think you're going to find that this is where the fundamental disagreement really comes from. Yeah, that's kind of an integral part of ceasing to be. I'm not making this decision post-cessation though, so it hardly seems relevant. Things that will not occur until after I cease to be still matter to the me that is right now. quote:More to the point, that's something that I can recognize right now, and it leads me to the conclusion that my subjective experience is in fact what I really value. What? This seems like you want it to follow from your previous argument but I'm not in any way understanding the supposed connection,. You seem to be making the argument that since nothing will matter to a dead you, nothing can matter to currently living you if it takes place after you die, which seems weird and nonsensical to me. GlyphGryph fucked around with this message at 02:16 on Apr 7, 2016 |
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Apr 7, 2016 02:05
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This whole thread makes me very excited for the future of neurology and such. Whatever "I" am, I am excited about what science is going to bring to these questions, and if it can in any way make talking about them and defining the words involved easier.
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Apr 7, 2016 03:13
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