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If the certain-set-of-interactions called consciousness can effectively be transmitted causally over your medium, then you'll be fine. Eg- wait for a neuron not to fire, produce a neuron at the other end, and 'wire' the new neuron to replace the old neuron, through whatever magic you're using to teleport. No duplicates, no deletion, no death.
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Apr 5, 2016 23:13
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That's only because we don't have a rigorous formulation of consciousness in terms of neural/information/whatever. If we had, then the definition would be 'if it preserves the X-constant/is able to Y continuously'. So long as you can assume it exists, that answer to this exercise still works.
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Apr 5, 2016 23:58
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The fact that you may be inclined to protect your son/family doesn't mean you're the same person, or part of the same 'self', or that you're part of an 'organism', or that being part of the same 'organism' necessitates a shared self. If they were, you'd be able to experience what you son feels directly, which might be somewhat disconcerting.
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Apr 6, 2016 03:18
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Cicero posted:The plot of SOMA (by Frictional Games, makes of Amnesia: The Dark Descent) is relevant to this, as it involves being able to digitally replicate/transmit consciousness. Example: rudatron fucked around with this message at 03:29 on Apr 6, 2016 |
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Apr 6, 2016 03:22
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Convenience has no value to you when you're dead.GlyphGryph posted:Most of my individual cells cannot directly experience anything experienced by many of my other individual cells.
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Apr 6, 2016 15:37
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Death is not an 'experience', is the end of experience. Saying death is just another experience is like asking what happens 'after' time ends. The time difference isn't an issue - if I freeze you with magic for 1000 years, then let you continue, you haven't died, because you still have a continuous self. But any break in a continuous self, for whatever period of time, is automatically death.
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Apr 7, 2016 01:01
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Arguing that an evolution through time is equivalent to death is super strange, because the process of thought is a, well, process, so it means that you don't consider 'thinking' to be something a living thing could ever do. If you're going that far, then you can't really consider anything alive or having self, in which case you might as well commit suicide. If that doesn't appeal to you, if you're rather be alive than dead, then there's clearly some kind of self that you are preserving.
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Apr 8, 2016 01:22
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That's a distinction without a difference, if your past selves are dead as soon as they change, that still applies to a 'grand participatory process'. Every moment you live is followed by your death, ergo there's no difference from your point of view in just killing yourself. Are you saying you'd still pull that knife across your throat if you could magic away any other external excuse (your parents/friends/family would worry, etc etc.)? Hell, is anything even alive under this framework?
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Apr 8, 2016 03:25
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Do you need to be able to give rigorous answers to those questions to address him? The reason you know that you're still you with a robot arm, is that the arm is something you experience, not something you are. That analogy doesn't extend to neural firing patterns, because if I short circuit them, you are absolutely dead, because I've removed the ability for you to do anything you could recognize as constituting self. All you have done with your overarching system approach, is moved the problem of self onto an interaction between systems, in which case that is absolutely still destroyed by a teleporter. Self isn't fungible just because it's dynamic, that doesn't follow. Nor are memories, values or context the sole constituents of self or consciousness, because all 3 are replicable. If you meet someone else that had all three the same as yours, could you really say you were the same person?
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Apr 8, 2016 06:49
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Dzhay posted:"Just because things are the same doesn't mean they're the same"
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Apr 8, 2016 13:20
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Comparing continuity to the soul is absurd, the better analogy is software. A program running is a process, which can be sped up or slowed down, even stop or started, but a 'break' in the process is the termination of that program. You can copy it, but the old process is still gone. Now obviously, consciousness is not an arbitrary process, it's a certain kind of process, but the fact that it's not isomorphic to the transistors or the medium does not make it not real. Thus a copyer that copies every measurable property of a person is not necessarily a continuity of that process. Note that the inability to describe exactly what that conscious process is, to 'prove it' as some posters have demanded, does not change the previous logic in the slightest. To deny the previous logic is to deny that consciousness exist at all, that you are therefore already dead, and that there is no meaningful difference with the way you are now, with your rotting carcass. If you prefer to stay alive, then you must have a meaningful difference as the basis of that preference, and that thing is life. rudatron fucked around with this message at 05:02 on Apr 11, 2016 |
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Apr 11, 2016 05:00
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Shbobdb posted:You are reifying the self. crowoutofcontext posted:Yes you would, because your personal awareness comes from your brain, and its your brain that has been transferred not some impostor brain. Just because two things are exactly the same in their properties, does not mean they are the same thing.
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Apr 12, 2016 01:19
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So here's the real problem: the televangelists are confusing state information (using the CS term here) with causal information. Every measurable property of a system can be reduced to its state at this time, that is true. Given two states related in time by an infinitesimal amount, it is still possible to say that one leads into another, that is related to but not solely dependent on the information stored in any one of those states. Any motion of an object, internally or externally, must necessarily involve a change in state, yet they can still be called the same object through that change in state. There's nothing recorded in either state to signify that, but the demand that there has to be, as the televangelists continue to claim, is to demand that any causal information must be recorded in state information, which is impossible.
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Apr 12, 2016 01:29
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I know what you're saying, but it's true of almost every post itt, e.g. - all the little thought experiments are functionally identical. I'm just deploying different language to try and communicate the point effectively, and seeing how it pans out.
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Apr 12, 2016 01:50
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Shbobdb posted:The self is an illusion, yo.
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Apr 12, 2016 06:20
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Saying that a self will exist at the end of the teleporter is not the same thing as saying yourself will end up there. If you can admit that selves exist, there are multiples of them, and they are distinct, then you are facing the task of what makes yourself different from others you see. This still works even if they are genetic (and mental) clones of you, they are separate from you in the way that future versions and past versions of yourself are not. That difference is causal continuity (more precisely, a certain kind of causal continuity). There's nothing magical about it, this conceptualization is totally in line with materialism and, personally, my experience. None of the proceeding logic is at odds with self as contingent or conditional process, in fact I'm failing to see how believing self is either of those things necessarily leads to your line of thinking. If anyone is making assumption of magic, it is you: how exactly is something that is based entirely on the existence of experience an 'illusion', when illusion is still experienced? What does saying 'self is an illusion' meaningfully communicate, other than a kind of enlightened contrarianism on your part? You still haven't answered that question. Like the issue here isn't even Hume, it's Descartes. But okay, if you believe spouting some buddhist mumbo jumbo is going to make things more meaningful, then by all means, spout away. I guess that's your right. But the onus is on you to demonstrate its relevance and any insight. If your just going to pull this dumb poo poo stint of scare quoting "exotic phrases", you'll just be wasting everyone's time.
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Apr 12, 2016 14:29
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Causal information has to be real, because otherwise you couldn't be having system states connected at all. One state leads into another, that's a relationship that exists, if you denying that, then you're denying the existence of time itself. For you, it's important because you experience time, and you could cease experiencing if that relationship isn't 'right'.
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Apr 12, 2016 14:37
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Wrong, read my post again, I'm saying that a claim of self being 'illusory' is nonsensical and self-contradictory, not that self has the properties of an illusion. You may as well talk about a wet color, synesthesia aside. This is not an empiricism versus rationalism conflict, this is you trying desperately to repurpose materialism to argue against causation as a meaningful category, something which (now having been spelled out for you) should appear absurd. I don't know why you chose to do this, but I'm guessing you feel more comfortable pretending that you're arguing against spiritualists/anti-materialists then you would against the actual positions.
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Apr 12, 2016 15:00
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