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Phyzzle
Jan 26, 2008

Ytlaya posted:

The only exception are paradoxes related to the concept of infinity, which don't really bother me much for some reason.

All the infinity paradoxes evaporate when you think of infinity as a direction, not a number.

"One car goes Left, and another car goes Left twice as fast, and yet they are both still going Left!"

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Phyzzle
Jan 26, 2008
Bob has two children. The younger one is a girl. What are the odds that the older one is a boy?

About 50%

Bill has two children. One is a girl. What are the odds that the other one is a boy?

67%. Yes.

Phyzzle
Jan 26, 2008
His dick extends forever in the dickwise direction, so a wind going that way provides spatially unlimited suction.hth.

Phyzzle
Jan 26, 2008
There are 4 equally likely outcomes when you have 2 kids:
Boy Boy
Boy Girl
Girl Boy
Girl Girl

In Bob's case, we know
B G
G G
Are the only two possibilities.

In Bill's case,
B G
G B
G G
Are three equally likely possibilities.

Phyzzle
Jan 26, 2008

GAINING WEIGHT... posted:


Take it to the extreme; a family has 100 kids and 99 of them are girls, but we don't know the order. Does that make it a 99% chance the other is a boy? No.

Yes.

What are the odds that the last coin flip is heads? What are the odds that one of the hundred coin flips is heads?

Phyzzle
Jan 26, 2008

GAINING WEIGHT... posted:

That second question isn't quite the same though. Asking: "if I flip a coin 100 times, what is the probability that any is heads?" is not the same as "if I flip a coin 100 times and 99, in any order, are tails, what is the probability that the other one is heads?" In the second instance, for 99 of the flips, the probability of heads is now 0, which changes the overall total a bit.

It is the same. For 99 of the flips, the probability of heads is now 0, which does not change the probability of the other flip.

"If I flip a coin 100 times, and 99, in any order, are tails, what is the probability that #1 is heads Or #2 is heads Or #3 is heads Or #4 is heads Or #5 is heads Or . . . "

Phyzzle
Jan 26, 2008

Phyzzle posted:

"If I flip a coin 100 times, and 99, in any order, are tails, what is the probability that #1 is heads Or #2 is heads Or #3 is heads Or #4 is heads Or #5 is heads Or . . . "

GAINING WEIGHT... posted:

To put a finer point on my above reasoning with the 100 coins example, your treating of "no heads" as one option is mistaken. It's actually 100 options: the coin we didn't know about is the first, and it was tails; the coin we didn't know about was the second, and it was tails; etc.

See the 'Or' in the statement about one heads result? You're statement about no heads has semicolons, but they don't represent 'Or', do they? They represent 'And'. A bunch of 'And's strung together to make one unlikely case, instead of a bunch of cases connected by 'Or's to make one much more likely case.

Phyzzle
Jan 26, 2008

GAINING WEIGHT... posted:

Of course they mean or?

Oh! Well taking another look, the problem must be this:

quote:

To put a finer point on my above reasoning with the 100 coins example, your treating of "no heads" as one option is mistaken. It's actually 100 options: the coin we didn't know about is the first, and it was tails; the coin we didn't know about was the second, and it was tails; etc.

So the "it" in the sentence refers to coin we don't know about? Then you're assuming that probability of it being tails is 1/2, so that the sum is 100/200 for all coins. But assuming the 1/2 begs the question.

Phyzzle
Jan 26, 2008

GAINING WEIGHT... posted:

I'm sorry, I don't follow. Why would the probability of a coin being tails being 1/2 be begging the question? We're assuming fair coin right?

A fair coin doesn't always have a 1/2 probability of being tails, any more than a 'fair' child must always have a 1/2 probability of being male.

So, when you say that 100/200 = 1/2 must be the right probability, because the treating of "no heads" as one option is a mistake, because it's actually many options, because 1/2 is obviously the right probability, that's begging the question.

Phyzzle
Jan 26, 2008
You can also just flip a pair of coins.

H H you win

H T or T H you lose

T T you toss the result

If H T and T H are really a *nested* pair with a 50% probability, you should come out even with a lot of flips. Would you play that one in a casino?

Phyzzle
Jan 26, 2008
A man flips two coins. One comes up H, but the other one rolls under a desk. The other one has a 50% chance of being T.

A man flips two coins, and they both roll under a desk. His wife looks under the desk and says, "It's dark, but I can see one of them, and it's H". The other one now has a 67% chance of being T. For the man. Since he doesn't know which coin came up H, there are three equal possibilities for him:
TT, TH, and HT.

But since his wife is looking directly at one specific coin rather than hearing a report of "at least one H", the other coin still has a 50% chance of being T. But only for her.

Something seems amiss here . . .

Phyzzle
Jan 26, 2008

wateroverfire posted:

When his wife tells him "I can see one of them, and it's H.", TT is eliminated and the possibilities are only TH or HT.

Or HH.

Phyzzle
Jan 26, 2008

VitalSigns posted:

It's twice as likely for there to be HT/TH than TT. But if it's TT she's twice as likely to see a tails so they cancel out. Her husband knows she only saw one coin so he has the same information she does.

Ah, I see. Because the wife is not an accurate Heads detector, but is randomly sampling one of the coins, then that probability goes in.

Phyzzle
Jan 26, 2008

Dzhay posted:

"I'm really bad at maths" isn't a paradox.

The paradox is that anyone is good at maths.

Seriously, that's called Quine's Paradox or something. That manipulating little symbols by human-made rules and syntax can match the behavior of nature so well.

Phyzzle
Jan 26, 2008
Nah, the concept of paradox was already destroyed thoroughly enough that they added the third definition here:

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/paradox

: a statement that seems to say two opposite things but that may be true

I mean, "The Twin Paradox" in Relativity has been around since the 1920's, but it never actually indicated a contradiction.

Phyzzle
Jan 26, 2008

twodot posted:

This is an English problem and not a math problem.

Yeah, or an 'information' problem. There are some subtleties of information that seem difficult to hold onto.

"I examined both coins, and I'm willing to tell you for sure that at least one came up H."

"I found one coin [that randomly bounced to where I can see it], and it was H, so now I can tell you for sure that at least one came up H."

The conclusions are the same, but there is information lurking in the premises that you can use on that set of two coins.

Phyzzle
Jan 26, 2008

wateroverfire posted:

Hear me out, man, and follow the logic below to the end.

I know this looks intuitive but it's wrong. TH and HT are outcomes that become mutually exclusive when information is added about the outcome of one of the coins - even if we don't know which coin we have information about.

So say you tell me "at least 1 coin is T" and show me a T, so we end up with the table of results in your quote above.

1) If Coin 1 is T, the only possible outcomes are TH and TT. This is correct and should also be intuitive if you think about it, but if you disagree then show how and let's talk it through.

2) If Coin 2 is T, the only possible outcomes are HT and TT by the same reasoning.

Therefore, the probability that we are in a world in which the other coin is H is the following:

P(Coin you showed is Coin 1) * P(TH conditional on Coin1 being T) + P(Coin you showed is Coin 2)*P(HT conditional on Coin 2 being T)

We have only two coins so

P(Coin you showed is Coin 1) = 50%
P(Coin you showed is Coin 2) = 50%

It's this step here. P(Coin you showed is Coin 2) is not 50%.

If VitalSigns looked at Coin 1, and sees that it's not tails, he moves on to Coin 2. He only shows you Coin 2 in the case of HT, and this does not have a 50% chance of happening.

Phyzzle
Jan 26, 2008

Strom Cuzewon posted:

Doesn't that mean we just have to be a bit more careful in distinguishing between logical paradoxes and intuitive ones?

Sure, though I might call logical paradoxes "inconsistencies" instead. Like Russel's Paradox on "all sets that don't contain themselves" showed an inconsistency in naive set theory.

Phyzzle
Jan 26, 2008

wateroverfire posted:

What you're talking about is adding two pieces of information to what I know that are not present in the original problem.

1) That VS shows me the first coin that pops T.

2) That I know when VS skips coin 1 (or, alternately, that I know which coin VS is showing me).

Conditional on those two pieces of info, I know that when VS shows me Coin 2 the probability that Coin 1 is H is 100% since the only possibility is HT. If VS shows me Coin 1, the probability that Coin 2 is H is 50% since the two possibilities are TH and TT. But that is a totally different problem then the one we've been analyzing. =P

No, piece (1) is not being added: whatever coin he grabs first becomes #1 (if they are not marked), so you knew that.

And piece (2) is not being added either: You have no idea when he skips coin 1, or which coin he is showing you.

Phyzzle
Jan 26, 2008

wateroverfire posted:

Ok, sure, if you like. So he grabs a coin that popped T and shows it to me, and we call that Coin 1.

P(Coin he shows me is Coin 1) = 100%. P(Coin he shows me is coin 2) is 0% so we drop that term.

The possible outcomes are TH, TT as before.

P(TH conditional on Coin 1 being T) = 50% (obvious, right? Two possible outcomes, of which that is one)

P(Coin he shows me is Coin 1) * P(TH conditional on Coin 1 being T) = 100% * 50% = 50%

Yes, that's the case where grabs a coin that popped T and shows it to you. Which is not the only possible case.

Phyzzle
Jan 26, 2008

wateroverfire posted:

What other case would you lik to consider?

All of them. Every possible way for one coin to be Heads must be considered to find the probability of one coin being Heads. Like he grabs one coin, and it's Heads, so he then grabs another.

Phyzzle
Jan 26, 2008

wateroverfire posted:

Do the math and show me what you're talking about.

You did do the math in this post:

wateroverfire posted:

1) If Coin 1 is T, the only possible outcomes are TH and TT. This is correct and should also be intuitive if you think about it, but if you disagree then show how and let's talk it through.

2) If Coin 2 is T, the only possible outcomes are HT and TT by the same reasoning.

Therefore, the probability that we are in a world in which the other coin is H is the following:

P(Coin you showed is Coin 1) * P(TH conditional on Coin1 being T) + P(Coin you showed is Coin 2)*P(HT conditional on Coin 2 being T)

We have only two coins so

P(Coin you showed is Coin 1) = 50%
P(Coin you showed is Coin 2) = 50%

Following 1), P(TH conditional on Coin1 being T) = 50%
Following 2), P(HT conditional on Coin 2 being T) = 50%
Plug everything in and 50%*50% +50%*50% = 25% + 25% = 50% probability the other coin is an H. Proving what we know from having defined the coin flips as independent events.

I am saying, P(Coin you showed is Coin 2) is not 50%. He only shows you Coin 2 in the case of HT, which does not have a 50% chance of happening. There is no added information needed. You don't know if the coin being showed is #1 or #2. Without knowing that, P(Coin you showed is Coin 2) is still not 50%. Do you agree that P(Coin you showed is Coin 2) is not 50%? If so, your final result is also not 50%.

Phyzzle fucked around with this message at 18:26 on Sep 7, 2016

Phyzzle
Jan 26, 2008
Okay, here's another one that got me thinking.

Take this distribution for the weight of adult males.

(You turn it into a probability distribution by dividing it all by the area under the curve, to give it a new area of 1.)
We can conclude from this distribution that "If you are an adult male, you probably don't weight 50 or 500 lbs." So picking an adult male from a phone book and getting a 50 pounder is not very likely.

Doing the same thing with the distribution of population as a function of year,

We see that "If you are a human life, you are more likely to happen in the 21st century than in the 1st century."

Okay, makes sense, it is likely that you would be alive now, when people are finding it particularly easy to be alive.

But . . . what about the time after the 21st century? If the population keeps going, or at least levels off, that would put you at a tail-end extreme of the distribution. This is not very likely. Thus, the fact that you are living now serves as evidence that it is unlikely that the human population will not be sticking around over 7 billion for long, and we are in for a catastrophic population crash in the near future.

Phyzzle
Jan 26, 2008

rudatron posted:

But actually dealing with the paradox head on, I don't think it's legitimate to attempt to derive a distribution in general from a skewed example - taking the previous set up as the 'experiment', you're only sampling people who are alive right now, not in the future, so it's obviously 'very likely' that'd you be sampling people 'in the tail end' of the distribution, even assuming a plauteu for the next million years, because you're not a time traveler.

So samples are very likely to be in the tail end of the distribution ... if you are, in fact, sampling people who happen to be right now in the tail end of the distribution? But that's the whole question: what is the likelihood that you are sampling people who happen to be in the tail end of the distribution?

computer parts posted:

Basically the second graph is not actually a probability distribution, though it might appear to be. All it's reporting is the number of people in a certain timeframe. You can extrapolate from that that people are more likely to be born when there's more people (for obvious reasons), but it's not relaying the same information.

Forgetting the weights, what about this time distribution?

Can we say of a given yttrium radioactive decay product: "this probably decayed less than 150 years after the lump of strontium formed"? Or would looking at a particular yttrium atom that took 200 years to form skew the distribution, so that we cannot make statements about it's probable age?

rudatron posted:

I mean the fact that the same argument works in 2000 B.C, and reaches a different conclusion to using it today, should be the tip-off that it's bullshit.
But the conclusion may have been correct back then! Saying that a future population explosion is unlikely isn't saying that it's impossible. Also, while a 2000 B.C. observer may predict little likelihood of a future population explosion, that doesn't seem like such a foolish prediction to make at that point in time. Just because it turned out to be incorrect, does not mean that the belief was unjustified.

Phyzzle
Jan 26, 2008
Brain Bugs?! Frankly, I find the idea of a Bug that thinks offensive.

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Phyzzle
Jan 26, 2008

VitalSigns posted:

E: serious answer, you can't draw conclusions about the population "all humans who will ever be born" from the nonrepresentative sample "all humans born before 2017"

So by 'nonrepresentative', you mean 'having a specific range of values in the parameter of interest'?

I could see that. Knowing the distribution of weights under 190 lbs. tells you absolutely nothing about the distribution of weights over 190 lbs.. Even though it really looks like part of a bell curve, it's mathematically illegal to just draw in the rest of the curve. You would need some other information about human weight, like "adults rarely triple in size from diet and genetic differences."

computer parts posted:

The other thing is that in probability distributions you try to make it as close to a consistent system as possible - for example, the first graph might be "distribution of adult male weight for 2012", so the consistent part is that all the data was from one year. In the second graph, there's a clear shift about 1500 AD that makes it unlikely that the previous data has any relation to the succeeding data.

Hmm, perhaps such a relation has the opposite effect: the succeeding data might have a very sensitive dependence on events related to previous data. That would also make it very unlike a probability distribution.

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