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That didn't keep the Soviet Union from maintaining a dedicated interceptor air force, or the US from keeping interceptor units throughout the Cold War.
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Nov 27, 2010 17:42
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Alekanderu posted:That didn't keep the Soviet Union from maintaining a dedicated interceptor air force, or the US from keeping interceptor units throughout the Cold War. Initially...but the winds of change were blowing. Different missions were kept apart for a long time but it was eventually realized that modern fighters were capable of filling the interceptor role just as well as a dedicated force. In the late 70s that the US rolled CONUS air defense into Tactical Air Command. And even then, F-106s remained in service for another decade until the job was completely taken over by F-15s and improved F-16s. A doctrinal change of that magnitude takes a long time to really put into effect when you're not in a crisis situation. Godholio fucked around with this message at 19:33 on Nov 27, 2010 |
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Nov 27, 2010 19:31
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Mr Crustacean posted:Not really, any armoured vehicle is not going to fare well in city blocks, where its mobility is restricted and is vulnerable to attack from infantry anti-tank weapons, shermans faced this exact problem as well, and they won because there were far more of them. Yes, that's pretty much what I was getting at. Lighter, faster, more maneuverable and numerous Shermans are going to fare better in built-up areas than heavier, slower Panthers, who are only going to be more vulnerable given their lesser numbers. There's no point hauling lots of heavy armor and weaponry into an environment where it can't be utilized. My latter point followed from that - Abrams and Bradleys are two completely different vehicles, developed for two completely different roles. The Germans, it seems to me, were still trying to use the same vehicles for both functions - sending heavy tanks designed for conflicts at Kursk or El-Alamein into built-up environments that nullified most of their advantages. That's why the US, while they do use Abrams in Iraq, don't use them to patrol cities, as I said before.
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Nov 27, 2010 20:02
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Alekanderu posted:Firstly, it is true that Hitler cared mostly about beating the Russians and for a long time viewed the western ETO as mostly an irrelevant distraction. However, in no way was the fact that German tanks were better armed and armored anything but an advantage for the Germans, no matter what other shortcomings afflicted them. Again, I'm no expert, but that's sort of my point. Given a limited amount of production capacity, you can either turn out a couple of lighter Shermans or a single heavier Panther (I have no idea what the ratios might be). While the Panther will beat the Shermans in certain circumstances every time (say, in the environments that saw large-scale tank warfare during WW2, like Russia or North Africa), in other circumstances the advantages of the Shermans will outweigh the advantages of the Panther. The more developed and confined environments of Western Europe provide an example of the latter - in a somewhat built-up area, the longer ranges of the Panther's weaponry will often be nullified by close-range encounters, and multiple nimble Shermans will have little trouble maneuvering themselves into positions where they can attack the vulnerable points on the Panther, negating its advantage in heavier armor. Do you see what I'm getting at? Of course it's always going to be better to have a "similar but better armed tank", but the realities of production make that impossible - there's always going to be tradeoffs involved. If the Germans could have turned out the same number of tanks as they did, but made every one a fabled Ratte, of course that would have been better (and I'm sure America wouldn't think twice about magically transforming every ship in the fleet into a fully-armed USS Ronald Reagan). But ignoring the limitations of production is to ignore one of the most basic elements of war. The Germans tanks being better armed and armored did cost them in the West, I think, when said (necessarily-fewer) tanks had to face larger numbers of lighter tanks in environments where the advantages of heavier tanks were largely nullified. Basically, I guess I'm wondering if I'm correct in assuming that the lighter Sherman was better suited to warfare in the West, and that that was a sort of happy coincidence for the Allies - they just happened to be producing the kind of tank that was better suited to the environments in which it ended up fighting. I certainly understand that German tanks were, on paper, superior to those they were fighting, but I'm wondering if the environment in which they fought was such that it negated most of their advantages. I also realize that the general collapse of the German military, especially the loss of the Luftwaffe and most logistics, played a huge role. PS - Sure, there's lots of open ground in France, but there's a reason you never saw a Kursk-type battle fought around Marseilles. PPS - I'm really not trying to be snarky, here - I'm just not sure I'm communicating my ideas too well, so I'm trying to be as thorough as possible. Thanks for your patience.
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Nov 27, 2010 20:39
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5inc posted:Yes, that's pretty much what I was getting at. Lighter, faster, more maneuverable and numerous Shermans are going to fare better in built-up areas than heavier, slower Panthers, who are only going to be more vulnerable given their lesser numbers. There's no point hauling lots of heavy armor and weaponry into an environment where it can't be utilized. No, the US absolutely uses tanks to patrol cities, see fallujah, where they were used extensively to provide infantry support, also, there is absolutely a point in hauling lots of heavy armour and weaponry, just cause you're fighting in a city doesn't automatically negate the adantages of better armour and firepower. Look at the hedgerows of normandy for instance, which were exactly the cramped, terrain limiting evironments you describe and were where the allies met the fiercest resistance and took the worst casualties. Shermans were not better suited to tank combat on the western front, they were inferior to panthers in every way, but for reliability and having far, far superior numbers.
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Nov 27, 2010 22:10
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5inc posted:Again, I'm no expert, but that's sort of my point. Given a limited amount of production capacity, you can either turn out a couple of lighter Shermans or a single heavier Panther (I have no idea what the ratios might be). While the Panther will beat the Shermans in certain circumstances every time (say, in the environments that saw large-scale tank warfare during WW2, like Russia or North Africa), in other circumstances the advantages of the Shermans will outweigh the advantages of the Panther. The more developed and confined environments of Western Europe provide an example of the latter - in a somewhat built-up area, the longer ranges of the Panther's weaponry will often be nullified by close-range encounters, and multiple nimble Shermans will have little trouble maneuvering themselves into positions where they can attack the vulnerable points on the Panther, negating its advantage in heavier armor. I'd argue that just the sheer weight of the tank is less important than mechanical complexity and choice + availability of materials when it comes to production. There were far fewer Tiger tanks produced than Panthers, even though production of the Tiger started earlier, but that's not just because the Tiger was a heavier tank - it was way more complex, too. The Allies kept churning out Shermans because that was the design they had settled for and all the factories were equipped for producing it at maximum efficiency. Now that's not really a bad thing in itself, since Shermans with better guns turned out to perform quite well vs German tanks and later on became very successful at fighting tanks. But they could just as easily have started out with, say, a bigger gun, just like the one they got around to adding after the initial combat experiences vs heavier German tanks. quote:Do you see what I'm getting at? Of course it's always going to be better to have a "similar but better armed tank", but the realities of production make that impossible - there's always going to be tradeoffs involved. If the Germans could have turned out the same number of tanks as they did, but made every one a fabled Ratte, of course that would have been better (and I'm sure America wouldn't think twice about magically transforming every ship in the fleet into a fully-armed USS Ronald Reagan). But ignoring the limitations of production is to ignore one of the most basic elements of war. The Germans tanks being better armed and armored did cost them in the West, I think, when said (necessarily-fewer) tanks had to face larger numbers of lighter tanks in environments where the advantages of heavier tanks were largely nullified. That's not really true; you're assuming a dichotomy where you have to make a tradeoff between lots of lighter, crappy tanks or few heavier, better tanks. This is not really the case, or at least it's nowhere near that simple; look at how the Soviets churned out T-34s, arguably better tanks than anything else produced pre-1943. Production isn't just a question of "Tank X weighs 50% more than Tank Y therefore we can make 50% more of Tank Y", other factors are more important. Even doctrine plays a big role - the Americans could have had a heavy tank in the ETO much earlier than they did, but didn't because of doctrine. quote:Basically, I guess I'm wondering if I'm correct in assuming that the lighter Sherman was better suited to warfare in the West, and that that was a sort of happy coincidence for the Allies - they just happened to be producing the kind of tank that was better suited to the environments in which it ended up fighting. I certainly understand that German tanks were, on paper, superior to those they were fighting, but I'm wondering if the environment in which they fought was such that it negated most of their advantages. I also realize that the general collapse of the German military, especially the loss of the Luftwaffe and most logistics, played a huge role. Sort of, but not really. Yes, many of the advantages were negated in short range fighting since in a way it equalizes gun and armor performance, and the Panther did have trouble with its weak side armor, especially in the Bocage, but there's no way you could argue that Shermans on the whole were somehow particularly well suited to the fighting in France, either; parts of the terrain just made them relatively less crappy in tank vs tank combat. In the engagements that the Sherman won it was because of numbers, mechanical reliability, good positioning/tactics and better trained crews. Not to mention support from excellent tank destroyers and artillery. I would argue that with better armed tanks - which was well within their capability to produce and field, mind you, it's not at all some fantasy case of replacing every tank with a Ratte - the Allies would have done even better in France. What you seem to be saying is that the Germans made the erroneous "choice" to produce more heavily armed and armored tanks instead of lighter armed and armored but more numerous tanks and that doing the latter would have been better in France. There is some truth to that in that the Germans most likely would have been better off not producing the Tiger (or its bigger and even less practical variants) at all and just focusing on perfecting and mass producing the Panther; while the Panther was a lot more efficient to produce than the Tiger it was still needlessly complex in several areas and had problems with reliability that should have been worked out. There's no way in my mind, though, that it could be argued that they would have been better off using more numerous and weaker tanks like, say, Pz3s, especially since they couldn't match the Allied industrial might anyway; their only hope was to rely more on quality than quantity. Unfortunately for the Germans other factors, in addition to the fact that they simply didn't produce enough of the tanks they did have, doomed them anyway. quote:PS - Sure, there's lots of open ground in France, but there's a reason you never saw a Kursk-type battle fought around Marseilles. Sure, the main reason being that both sides deployed far less troops in France in 1944 than on the Eastern front in 1943.
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Nov 27, 2010 22:22
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Alekanderu posted:That's not really true; you're assuming a dichotomy where you have to make a tradeoff between lots of lighter, crappy tanks or few heavier, better tanks. This is not really the case, or at least it's nowhere near that simple; look at how the Soviets churned out T-34s, arguably better tanks than anything else produced pre-1943. Production isn't just a question of "Tank X weighs 50% more than Tank Y therefore we can make 50% more of Tank Y", other factors are more important. Even doctrine plays a big role - the Americans could have had a heavy tank in the ETO much earlier than they did, but didn't because of doctrine. That's not really true -- a M26 Pershing did take up twice the shipping space of a M4 Sherman. Further, a 76mm armed M4 Sherman was, as I said earlier, roughly equivalent to the T-34-85, and the 75mm armed M4 Sherman was slightly better than the 76mm armed T-34, so it seems a bit strange to call the Sherman junk and the T-34 better tanks than anything else produced. Shermans and T-34's met in Korea, and the Shermans preformed better.
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Nov 28, 2010 00:43
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I'm pretty sure I already know the answer but what the hell; how much of Harry Turtledove's stuff isn't complete poo poo?
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Nov 28, 2010 03:48
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How did Russia maintain sovereignty over so much land in the 18th and 19th centuries? They have always been the largest 'western' country. What kept the locals loyal to the Tsar when Moscow was thousands of miles away? Also, how come they didn't expand more in the Far East? It seems that they could have taken Mongolia, northern China, and possibly Korea and made them Russian colonies during the mid 19th century before Japan became a world power.
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Nov 28, 2010 04:45
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Konstantin posted:How did Russia maintain sovereignty over so much land in the 18th and 19th centuries? They have always been the largest 'western' country. What kept the locals loyal to the Tsar when Moscow was thousands of miles away? Also, how come they didn't expand more in the Far East? It seems that they could have taken Mongolia, northern China, and possibly Korea and made them Russian colonies during the mid 19th century before Japan became a world power. I've taken a class on Chinese history and read a book on Russian history, so hopefully I don't butcher this too badly (if I do then please correct me): Russia didn't fully 'expand' into the lands it claimed until the mid-19th century. Until then, the locals probably didn't even know that their lands were property of the Tsar. These areas weren't really incorporated into the Russian state until after the 1917 revolution. The reasons the Russian tsars didn't try to expand to the east much was because of simple logistics. It was hard to march an army across Russia to China. As far as I know it was only done a couple times in the 16th century, and both times ended in rather ignominious Russian defeats; the Tsar ended up ceding eastern lands to China each time. This is the main reason (aside from difficulties on the home front) that the Russians didn't participate in the great chinese land-grab following the Opium Wars as fast as the other European powers.
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Nov 28, 2010 07:56
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The trans-Siberian railway solvied some of these problems in the 1890s.
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Nov 28, 2010 14:35
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Alekanderu posted:That's not really true; you're assuming a dichotomy where you have to make a tradeoff between lots of lighter, crappy tanks or few heavier, better tanks. This is not really the case, or at least it's nowhere near that simple; look at how the Soviets churned out T-34s, arguably better tanks than anything else produced pre-1943. Production isn't just a question of "Tank X weighs 50% more than Tank Y therefore we can make 50% more of Tank Y", other factors are more important. Even doctrine plays a big role - the Americans could have had a heavy tank in the ETO much earlier than they did, but didn't because of doctrine. You're absolutely right that it isn't nearly so simple as that - I was just trying to express the idea as simply as possible. Still, you have to admit that, when moving from a lighter tank to a heavier tank, there are going to be numerical tradeoffs due to a number of factors. One is straight up material requirements - if you're only turning out so many tons of armor plate, you can only built so many tanks that require X amount of it. As X increases, the number of tanks produced (Y) will decrease. A related factor in production will be factory and worker capacity. A heavier tank will almost inevitably require more parts and more production time than a lighter one, simply due to the forces involved (in the same way that a reliable heavy gun must be manufactured far more precisely than a lighter one, as the margin for error seems to decrease exponentially as the amount of force involved increases. On that note, a heavier-armed tank will also require heavier munitions, which will in turn require more production time due to increased required precision, more materials, and more logistical capacity to bring to where they will be needed). Related to that is the almost unavoidable impulse of designers to hang more bells and whistles on a heavier tank, because there's room for them - features that, again, may not be utilizable in certain environments. Another factor, as Comrade_Robot mentioned, is transportation. Granted, this was more of an issue for the Allies, what with having to cross an ocean and all, but it still played a role for the Germans - tanks simply aren't made for long-distance movement. You can only fit so many tanks of a certain size on a traincar. A related factor in this area that did especially impact the Germans over the Allies is the increased need for supplies for larger tanks. Fuel, in short supply to begin with, would be consumed at a far higher pace by the exponentially-lower efficiencies of heavier tanks (due to basic physical laws), and so much more would need to be transported to the front. A similar phenomena could be expected for spare parts, which will be almost inevitably more numerous and heavier for a heavier tank. A final possible impact in this area would be the number of available crew. A heavier tank is almost inevitably going to require more and better-trained crew to operate it, due again to its likely higher complexity compared to a lighter model. That's going to mean, again, a higher logistical load, as replacements will take longer to train and the increased number of them will require more basic support in terms of food and other necessities. In conclusion, while you're right to say that 'Production isn't just a question of "Tank X weighs 50% more than Tank Y therefore we can make 50% more of Tank Y"', I think that when the other impacts of a heavier tank are taken into account, that simplistic equation could easily end up being very close to the truth of the matter.
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Nov 28, 2010 14:52
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5inc posted:In conclusion, while you're right to say that 'Production isn't just a question of "Tank X weighs 50% more than Tank Y therefore we can make 50% more of Tank Y"', I think that when the other impacts of a heavier tank are taken into account, that simplistic equation could easily end up being very close to the truth of the matter. Well yeah, generally heavier tanks means you get less of them. However the issue wasn't really whether you can build 100 Tigers at the same pace as 100 Shermans, but whether the Germans "should" have done like the Allies and used larger numbers of "worse" (sort of) tanks, and also whether it's a choice between "many bad tanks" and "a few good tanks". Given that the Allies had an enormous industrial advantage, trying to match them in numbers wouldn't have worked. All else being equal (which it wasn't, of course, but whatever) if you're up against 500 tanks, and you have a choice between 100 tanks that have identical performance or 75 tanks that have superior performance you should probably pick the better tanks. That said, like I said earlier, the Germans probably shouldn't have bothered with the Tiger, and definitely not with the crazy impractical supertanks they were working on late in the war. That doesn't mean they should have stuck with Pz3s the whole war, either. Do you think they would have done better against the Allies in France if they'd been relying on smaller tanks with smaller guns and worse armor? I sure don't. The outcome of that battle was hardly decided by the quality of the tanks involved, so it might have made no difference in the end, but they definitely wouldn't have done better. As for fewer good tanks vs more bad ones, it's as much a question of design and doctrine as it is of the cost of materials and complexity of construction. You can't just say "welp we can either pay 500 dollars and get a good tank or 250 and get a bad tank" because you could easily get a good tank for 300 dollars if you change the way you intend to employ it and subsequently the design. If the Americans hadn't stuck to the doctrine of "tanks vs infantry, tank destroyers vs tanks" - which the British knew to be flawed from their earlier experience that tank vs tank combat is inevitable - and started upgrading the Shermans earlier they would probably have suffered less casualties. Comrade_Robot posted:That's not really true -- a M26 Pershing did take up twice the shipping space of a M4 Sherman. Further, a 76mm armed M4 Sherman was, as I said earlier, roughly equivalent to the T-34-85, and the 75mm armed M4 Sherman was slightly better than the 76mm armed T-34, so it seems a bit strange to call the Sherman junk and the T-34 better tanks than anything else produced. I should probably have said "better than anything the Germans produced", pre-1943. I've also never called the Sherman "junk", but it was clearly worse in most aspects of tank vs tank combat than the heavier German tanks. Alekanderu fucked around with this message at 15:38 on Nov 28, 2010 |
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Nov 28, 2010 15:24
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Rabhadh posted:The trans-Siberian railway solvied some of these problems in the 1890s.
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Nov 28, 2010 16:26
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Alekanderu posted:
Which makes perfect sense because that was relatively rare and wasn't US Army doctrine at the time. Tanks were generally intended to be infantry support, leaving the armor-to-armor fights to the tank destroyers. It took a long time for the other camp to finally overthrow that line of thinking.
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Nov 28, 2010 16:42
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Alekanderu posted:
Well, I see what you're saying. The major cause of loss of tanks on either side, however, (Allied or German) into the ETO was not other tanks, however. A heavier allied tank would not help against mines or shaped charge weapons (the cause of the majority of Allied tank losses), and a heavier Axis tank would not help against air attack, and would increase the frequency of breakdowns. The Germans, of course, were extremely limited by their economic abilities. I think the creation of heavy 'supertanks' was much less a choice, and much more a decision made in realization that the war was lost unless a miracle occurred. I don't know if you're at all familiar with Frederick W. Lanchester's 1914 model of concentration of force. (This discussion follows the overview from Hughes' _Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice_) Essentially, he said that in 'ancient conditions' limited range and mobility pitted one man against the other in essentially a series of duels (1000 men meeting 1000 men would result in a draw, 1000 men against 750 would result in 250 of the larger force left. Essentially, all else equal, the larger force would suffer roughly equal casualties after the elimination of the smaller force. This bars psychological conditions; IIRC (from Keegan) a majority of the casualties in ancient warfare came during the 'pursuit phase', when one side was running away.) In modern conditions, however, with aimed fire and longer ranges, casualty rate is proportionate to the number of forces, so the ratio of forces increases in favor of the stronger initial force. IE (in simplest form): dA/dt = -B, dB/dt = -A The solution to these coupled equation is: (A0)^2 - (At)^2 = (B0)^2 - (Bt)^2, where A0 and B0 are initial force numbers, and Bt is the number at time t. Now if force A has 1000 men, and force B has 750 men of the same quality, after the battle is fought, about 600 of side A will survive, rather than 250. So Lanchester then asked: Well, what if one side is superior to the other? IE: What if dA/dt = -2B? Well, these equations show us that roughly speaking, for aimed fire, number of fighting units are more valuable than fighting quality. You're better off having twice as many units than with units with twice the effective firepower. Naturally, this is a very simple mathematical model, but it is instructive.
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Nov 28, 2010 17:06
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Remember how the thread died the first time? I do. (incredibly specific bullshit no one cared about except for the two people going back and forth)
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Nov 28, 2010 17:52
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So one of Hitler's earliest goals was unification of German speaking people, which Switzerland had a large number of. Did he ever have any plans on annexing or invading it? Did the Swiss maintain their independence through Vichy-like collusion, or was it their naturally defensible borders?
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Nov 28, 2010 18:13
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Comrade_Robot posted:I don't know if you're at all familiar with Frederick W. Lanchester's 1914 model of concentration of force. (This discussion follows the overview from Hughes' _Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice_) Essentially, he said that in 'ancient conditions' limited range and mobility pitted one man against the other in essentially a series of duels (1000 men meeting 1000 men would result in a draw, 1000 men against 750 would result in 250 of the larger force left. Essentially, all else equal, the larger force would suffer roughly equal casualties after the elimination of the smaller force. This bars psychological conditions; IIRC (from Keegan) a majority of the casualties in ancient warfare came during the 'pursuit phase', when one side was running away. This part of Lanchester's model for battlefield activity is pretty patently wrong. It sounds like it is based on the thoroughly wrong preconceived notions of his time. Getting truly ancient, and going back to Greek hoplite warfare should dispel any notions of that, and unit actions continued through the ancient period, the medieval, and the early modern. The idea of ancient warfare as a series of duels came from the all-too-serious reading of some medieval heroic literature, like the Arthur stories, and some ancient, like the Iliad, as well as misreading of chronicles that emphasized the works of one person without mentioning the men that were with him. Beyond that I think the need to quantify war into mathematical models that are so simplistic is a bit useless. Of course, I personally feel that war is impossible to quantify mathematically due to the difficulty of quantifying morale, motivations, skills, these sorts of things, and the effect of governmental feeling, which has as much to do with the outcome of most wars as the warriors themselves. Spartan421 posted:Remember how the thread died the first time? I do. (incredibly specific bullshit no one cared about except for the two people going back and forth) God forbid we have serious debate here. Let's get some rpg-level writeups of Gaugamela, stat.
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Nov 28, 2010 18:36
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Edit: *I* am in the wrong thread, woopsie
Revolvyerom fucked around with this message at 22:50 on Nov 28, 2010 |
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Nov 28, 2010 20:52
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Comrade_Robot posted:Naturally, this is a very simple mathematical model, but it is instructive. The problem with this model is that it seems to be formulated for meeting engagements without respect to defensive fortification, probably because it was theorized in 1914. It has obvious failings with respect to armor, namely that below a certain threshold firepower reduced in individual strength but increased in overall numbers is nullified. If each individual attack is insufficient to defeat earthworks/penetrate armor no substantial effect is registered regardless of the number of individual attacks. How many quick-firing 75's are required to defeat heavy earthworks versus how many 21cm howitzers? Comrade_Robot posted:That's not really true -- a M26 Pershing did take up twice the shipping space of a M4 Sherman. Further, a 76mm armed M4 Sherman was, as I said earlier, roughly equivalent to the T-34-85, and the 75mm armed M4 Sherman was slightly better than the 76mm armed T-34, so it seems a bit strange to call the Sherman junk and the T-34 better tanks than anything else produced. The T-34 is generally categorized as superior because it entered service in 1940, at which point it was by far the most advanced tank in the world, whereas the M4 was obsolescent by the time it saw heavy combat deployment in Normandy. There is also the matter that the T-34 was deployed as part of a whole complex of Soviet AFVs that filled in the gaps in its capability, whereas the M4 was the pivot of the US army's misconceived tank destroyer doctrine. quote:Shermans and T-34's met in Korea, and the Shermans preformed better. Disparity of crew experience and training between Americans and North Koreans being an insignificant factor, of course.
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Nov 28, 2010 21:51
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I'm enjoying the debate. 
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Nov 28, 2010 22:00
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Ego-Bot" posted:
The Swiss had naturally defensible borders, yes, but they also (as did most countries on the European continent after 1941, even Portugal, a historically long-time British ally) 'recognized Germany's special position in Europe', giving them favorable trade deals and such. Rodrigo Diaz posted:This part of Lanchester's model for battlefield activity is pretty patently wrong. It sounds like it is based on the thoroughly wrong preconceived notions of his time. I'm probably not explaining this very well. What Lanchester was trying to say is that because a guy with a sword has a very limited range, you can basically model infantry combat as one dude on one dude. But once a bunch of dudes can accurately shoot at one dude, there's a bigger advantage to having a bunch of dudes. EvanSchenck posted:The problem with this model is that it seems to be formulated for meeting engagements without respect to defensive fortification, probably because it was theorized in 1914. It has obvious failings with respect to armor, namely that below a certain threshold firepower reduced in individual strength but increased in overall numbers is nullified. Well, sure, it's a very simple model, and it makes simplifying assumptions. Mathematical models are useful as long as you keep in mind the assumptions of the model. Deviations from the expected results of the model can also yield useful information, because it tells you the effect of the violation of those assumptions. (I have also admittedly done more mathematical modeling of things, so, you know, YMMV.) In this case, the model serves to illustrate the importance of numbers. I am not convinced that this model is entirely unapplicable to armored warfare; German tanks may have had heavier armor, but could still be penetrated from the side or rear, where armor was thinner, so a simple threshold is probably not the solution. The Lanchester model was modified by Fiske for battleships (who found that, for example, a ten percent increase in firepower was worth more than a ten percent increase in armor), so I don't see why it couldn't be applied to tank warfare. EvanSchenck posted:The T-34 is generally categorized as superior because it entered service in 1940, at which point it was by far the most advanced tank in the world, whereas the M4 was obsolescent by the time it saw heavy combat deployment in Normandy. I'm under the impression that when Churchill received his first shipments of Sherman tanks (which first saw combat in North Africa), he praised them as a Godsend, with thicker armor and a bigger main cannon than any British tank. If the argument against the Sherman is that it wasn't a heavy tank ... well, no, it wasn't. As I've repeatedly said, on paper, the two tanks had basically similar characteristics.
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Nov 29, 2010 00:05
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Comrade_Robot posted:The Swiss had naturally defensible borders, yes, but they also (as did most countries on the European continent after 1941, even Portugal, a historically long-time British ally) 'recognized Germany's special position in Europe', giving them favorable trade deals and such. German plans for invasion were drafted though, but they didn't act on those plans. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Tannenbaum
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Nov 29, 2010 06:03
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Comrade_Robot posted:I'm under the impression that when Churchill received his first shipments of Sherman tanks (which first saw combat in North Africa), he praised them as a Godsend, with thicker armor and a bigger main cannon than any British tank. If the argument against the Sherman is that it wasn't a heavy tank ... well, no, it wasn't. In 1942 the Sherman and T-34 had broadly similar characteristics. By 1943 the T-34 had been upgraded to T-34/85 with a better gun and stronger glacis plate. M4s didn't get an improved gun until much later and never got up-armored. As I've said before, the US didn't really understand the speed of the tank arms race, and by the time they did, it was too late to do much about it.
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Nov 29, 2010 06:15
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Comrade_Robot posted:The Swiss had naturally defensible borders, yes, but they also (as did most countries on the European continent after 1941, even Portugal, a historically long-time British ally) 'recognized Germany's special position in Europe', giving them favorable trade deals and such. They also significantly increased military spending and mobilized their military.
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Nov 29, 2010 08:09
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Comrade_Robot posted:In this case, the model serves to illustrate the importance of numbers. I am not convinced that this model is entirely unapplicable to armored warfare; German tanks may have had heavier armor, but could still be penetrated from the side or rear, where armor was thinner, so a simple threshold is probably not the solution. How does a mathematical model account for locally contingent factors of terrain, relative positioning, secondary equipment (gunsights, cupolas, radios, and the like), and crew response such as are critical to the outcome of tank combat? I'm of the opinion that this kind of modeling in warfare is only really useful in very specific conditions which eliminate extraneous factors (naval fighting or meeting engagements on equal terrain) or on such a large scale that such factors are "averaged out." They don't seem useful for comparisons of the type we're making here. quote:The Lanchester model was modified by Fiske for battleships (who found that, for example, a ten percent increase in firepower was worth more than a ten percent increase in armor), so I don't see why it couldn't be applied to tank warfare. Battleship operations are much more conducive to mathematical modeling because the site of the battlefield is the sea, therefore the effect of terrain is nil, and the ships are more or less similar--that is, equally vulnerable to each others' guns from all angles, so positioning is also less important except in rare cases of "crossing the T" or whatever. That said, practical experience with battlecruisers in WWI and WWII indicates that this model is to some degree false--their lighter armor caused substantially worse combat performance in spite of having equivalent firepower. Additionally, if this sliding scale of firepower versus mass is applicable to tank warfare, why were light tanks so useless at it? quote:I'm under the impression that when Churchill received his first shipments of Sherman tanks (which first saw combat in North Africa), he praised them as a Godsend, with thicker armor and a bigger main cannon than any British tank. This was certainly true of British tanks, but as we were talking about German and Russian tanks I'm not sure what you mean to get across. quote:If the argument against the Sherman is that it wasn't a heavy tank ... well, no, it wasn't. Sure, the fact that the Sherman was not a heavy tank is not in itself a flaw, except to the extent that the relative lack of American heavy armor or self-propelled guns meant for front-line service saw the M4 serving in combat roles fulfilled by a number of different specialized designs in German or Russian service. Hence the heavy losses of American armor versus the Germans. quote:As I've repeatedly said, on paper, the two tanks had basically similar characteristics. Again, "basically similar characteristics" means that by 1942 the Americans were deploying a tank that would have been pretty good in 1940. A more logical comparison would be the T-34 versus the PzKpfw IIIG or the M3 Grant, which answers your earlier question as to why the T-34 has such a great reputation while the M4 is generally disrespected. Anyway, I'm not sure what the point of discussing this on a theoretical level might be, since as a practical matter we know that the Sherman came up short against German armor in France and the Ardennes. American successes were in spite of the Sherman (thanks to the weakness of local German forces, close terrain preventing the superiority of German armor from full expressing itself, and American superiority in artillery and air support) rather than because of it.
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Nov 29, 2010 08:53
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I think saying that the Americans won "in spite" of the Sherman is a bit too harsh. The Sherman was obsolete and underpowered, but it fully fit into the US Army offensive doctrine; it was a combined arms weapon. It didn't win the war in the west, because it was never asked to. It was also superreliable, and had a versatility that its German counterparts lacked. Did you know that the Germans, in lieu of a dedicated minesweeping tank like the Sherman crab flail, used the Tiger as a minesweeper? Bulgaroktonos fucked around with this message at 22:11 on Nov 29, 2010 |
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Nov 29, 2010 13:25
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old dog child posted:I'm enjoying the debate. This beats the crap out of the whole "archers vs musketmen" argument. Keep dropping knowledge, gentlemen!
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Nov 29, 2010 15:55
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I don't want this to become all about two guys arguing about stuff, so this will be my last response on the topic. We can continue in private messages or whatever, if you really want. In any case, I hope that the mathematical modeling of battles is of interest to at least some people.EvanSchenck posted:How does a mathematical model account for locally contingent factors of terrain, relative positioning, secondary equipment (gunsights, cupolas, radios, and the like), and crew response such as are critical to the outcome of tank combat? I'm of the opinion that this kind of modeling in warfare is only really useful in very specific conditions which eliminate extraneous factors (naval fighting or meeting engagements on equal terrain) or on such a large scale that such factors are "averaged out." They don't seem useful for comparisons of the type we're making here. Well, this model does not, which is kind of both its strength and its weakness. The good thing about this model is that it is extremely simple, and yet it still yields useful information. This model is not intended to model small actions. The original question -- why I introduced the Lanchester model -- was whether Germany would have been better off with more, lighter tanks, or few 'high quality' tanks. And Lanchester type models seem to indicate that, to an extent, you would be better off with more tanks. In any case, the Lanchester model has been tested empirically in several instances. Engel fit these equations to US and Japanese losses during the battle for Iwo Jima, and found that the Lanchester square law model was a fairly good fit. Bracken fit the Lanchester linear model to the Ardennes campaign (by giving each type of force a different weight. There has also been an attempt to fit the VECTOR-2 modification to the Lanchester equations to the Arab-Israeli war, which resulted in a 'result within the envelope of prediction'. Multiple attempts have been made to fit the Lanchester model to the Battle of Kursk, with varying success, depending on who you ask. EvanSchenck posted:That said, practical experience with battlecruisers in WWI and WWII indicates that this model is to some degree false--their lighter armor caused substantially worse combat performance in spite of having equivalent firepower. Additionally, if this sliding scale of firepower versus mass is applicable to tank warfare, why were light tanks so useless at it? A modified Fiske equation has been applied quite successfully to naval combat through WWII and even to the modern day (see Hughes's model for modern missile combat). Apparently I'm not explaining the model well enough; battlecruisers had significantly less armor than battleships, and, as would be expected, preformed worse. Similarly, the Lanchester model says that all else being equal, it is better to have twice as many tanks as tanks with twice as much firepower. EvanSchenck posted:This was certainly true of British tanks, but as we were talking about German and Russian tanks I'm not sure what you mean to get across. At its time of introduction in North Africa, the Sherman tank was the best tank in theater, better than any German, Italian, or British tank. EvanSchenck posted:Sure, the fact that the Sherman was not a heavy tank is not in itself a flaw, except to the extent that the relative lack of American heavy armor or self-propelled guns meant for front-line service saw the M4 serving in combat roles fulfilled by a number of different specialized designs in German or Russian service. Hence the heavy losses of American armor versus the Germans. Again, tank on tank combat was comparatively rare in the ETO. Yes, when it happened, the thinner armor and smaller cannon of the Sherman meant higher casualties for the Americans. However, deploying (necessarily) fewer tanks would have resulted in much higher infantry casualties. EvanSchenck posted:Again, "basically similar characteristics" means that by 1942 the Americans were deploying a tank that would have been pretty good in 1940. A more logical comparison would be the T-34 versus the PzKpfw IIIG or the M3 Grant, which answers your earlier question as to why the T-34 has such a great reputation while the M4 is generally disrespected. Again, the Sherman tank was very well regarded in North Africa. Even the M3 Grant was better than anything the British had, and was successful against the Germans.
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Nov 29, 2010 15:58
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Hiridion posted:I often find that there is a tendency to overrate German achievements in connection with the territorial gains they achieved in March 1918. Putting aside the fact that these operations did not bring victory, that the Ludendorff offensives left the German army in a worse position strategically than it had been in at the beginning of the year, and that the Germans were only able to retrain a small part of their formations in the new stormtrooper doctrine, these tactics were also unable to significantly negate the defender's firepower advantage and were therefore doomed to fail. I think Holger Herwig's comment that the attack on 21 March was more of a gambler's desperate last throw of the dice that a well conceived and integrated operation that had any chance at victory is the most accurate assessment. I don't think I necessarily disagree with anything you've said here, excepting that I think that I hold the German tactical advances in much higher regard (for example, I would argue that the Germans could have done far better against the British defenses had they 1) had a clear strategic objective and 2) had a more mature supply system, or even just enough food). Also, I think that the Spring Offensive, even if it was mishandled badly on a strategic level, was absolutely the right decision. They had a slight numerical advantage thanks to their units from the east, they knew that the arrival of the Americans coupled with the superiority of the British/French economies would eventually beat them, so it made a lot of sense to try and force an armistice before both of those things went down (remember, the notion of "unconditional surrender" wasn't really on the table during this war). They gambled and lost, but not by much, and I can't think of a better (in strategic/military terms at least) course of action for them. Also on the Somme, has anyone read Three Armies on the Somme? I glanced at it on the bookstore on BLACK FRIDAY and the author was trying to make an interesting argument, essentially that the British did a lot better than we give them credit for and the battle was more of a strategic victory than history remembers. I might check it out but I'm not at all sold on that thesis personally. Count Sacula posted:This beats the crap out of the whole "archers vs musketmen" argument.  Seriously though if you don't like nerdsperging debates on military history then 
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Nov 29, 2010 16:39
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Bulgaroktonos posted:I think saying that the Americans won "in spite" of the Sherman is a bit too harsh. The Sherman was obsolete and underpowered, but it fully fit into the US Army offensive doctrine; it was a combined arms weapon. It didn't win the war in the west, because it was never asked to. It is true that the Sherman fit the doctrine in that improving its tank vs tank capabilities was given a low priority since according to the doctrine, tanks would do infantry support, avoid other tanks and let tank destroyers/artillery/whatever fight them. In practice this doesn't really work, and tank on tank combat is inevitable - as the British already knew, which is why they tried to keep at least one Firefly in every Sherman platoon. There's a reason the doctrine was changed. The Sherman was a great basic design, just like the T-34, which is why it survived for so long in many versions all over the world postwar, but in France it just couldn't stand up to the tanks that the Germans were fielding.
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Nov 30, 2010 18:56
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Alekanderu posted:It is true that the Sherman fit the doctrine in that improving its tank vs tank capabilities was given a low priority since according to the doctrine, tanks would do infantry support, avoid other tanks and let tank destroyers/artillery/whatever fight them. In practice this doesn't really work, and tank on tank combat is inevitable - as the British already knew, which is why they tried to keep at least one Firefly in every Sherman platoon. There's a reason the doctrine was changed. Post war studies showed that of all the engagements a tank was involved in, 11% of them were with other tanks, and the most important factor in such combat, more than guns or armor was who fired first.
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Nov 30, 2010 22:35
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I'm happy to see this thread is still active! If I may step into the tank debate, I'd like to offer some observations on the German/Soviet conflict and the pursuant development of armor in the East. I believe this is relevant to the current discussion since the Sherman and the T-34 are often seen as something like kindred spirits. First, to address disparities in production methods and output. Just to make this absolutely clear, German officials decided before the war to deliberately eschew mass production methods in the assembly of their tanks. Their reason for this was because they considered assembly-line production too inflexible to accomodate the future development of as yet immature designs. As some of you may recall, the war started before German military preparations had reached a mature stage, and this unreadyness included their tank designs. German military leaders believed that they would be better served by basically hand-crafting their tanks because they could immediately institute design improvements without having to significantly alter the production process, i.e. retool mass production type factories. The Soviets, in contrast, actively sought the help and tutelage of none other than the Ford motor company to show them how to mass produce all kinds of vehicles, including tanks. When the time came to institute design improvements, there was no stall in production in order to retool. Instead, each individual factory would simply incorporate new improvements as it was able. As a result, a T-34 from one factory would likely possess noticibly different features from one produced elsewhere at the same time. This is particularly evident in T-34 turrets, which underwent numerous changes throughout the war. Some were hexagonal, some were round, some were cast, some were welded, etc. Because there was no attempt at strict standardization and deprecation, Soviet tank production went virtually uninterrupted throughout the course of the war. This often confuses anyone studying Soviet tank development because they did not designate subtypes as the Germans did. A T-34 was just a T-34, not a T-34 Ausf G or anything like that. The results of this disparity in approach were numerous and significant. First, because German tank production relied on skilled labor, Panzer production was increasingly handicapped as more and more skilled workmen were conscripted into the army. Soviet tank production, on the other hand, suffered no such ill effects. Indeed, Soviet tank crews who were awaiting the completion of their vehicles were often pressed into work on the actual assembly line. Their lack of specific manufacturing knowledge meant nothing within the vast automated factories of the Urals, but the addition of another pair of hands to the assembly line could only increase productivity. Second, the reliance of Soviet engineers on similar parts and mechanisms across different tank models allowed the production of enormous numbers of spare parts. For example, the T-34, KV-1, KV-2, and IS series of tanks all used the same 500 HP V-2 diesel engine, with only minor alterations. This was a primary reason for the disparity in speed between the T-34 andthe KV-1. It was also the reason why Soviet tanks remained active for much longer periods than their German opponents. For example, if you are a mechanic in a Panzer battallion equipped with Mark IV Version C tanks, and you receive a replacement transmission for a Version G, you will have to sit and wait until that transmission goes back and is replaced with the correct version. In the mean time, your Version C tank will sit totally useless and immobile. If, however, you are a Soviet mechanic in a T-34 battallion and recieve a KV-1 transmission, there's a really good chance that you will be able to at least jerry-rig a solution until the correct parts arrive. While this is certainly not the optimal situation, it's better than having a completely useless tank. Third, the reliance of German production on traditional privately-owned manufacturers often led to further gross inefficiencies. For example, just to pick on an easy target, the Panther tank went through several design changes before its ultimate production that severely maimed the model. For instance, MAN, the company that ultimately won the production contract, did so by offering features that were not only unnecessary, but downright foolish. They used a torsion bar suspension because they knew that Heinrich Ernst Kniepkamp, the man in charge of all German tank development, favored such a design. This was in spite of the fact that such a suspension was totally unsuitable to the weight requirements placed upon it. Furthermore, MAN designed the tank to be amphibious even though Wehrmacht field commanders had never requested such an ability. The resultant water-tight seals in the engine compartment preciptated numerous engine fires that knocked so many Panthers out of action before they even saw combat. As another example, the development of the Tiger was startingly haphazard. The engines were in fact designed before the chassis had even been started, and, as a result of subsequent increases in armor thickness, were ultimately woefully underpowered. Again, a torsion bar suspension was used which proved to be strikingly vulnerable to land mines. It is no coincidence that the original VW Beetle used a torsion bar suspension, since the mind of Ferdinand Porsche was intimately involved in the design of both vehicles. Herein lies the crux of the problem: German tanks were manufactured by automobile and train companies. Their designers had often been trained in these fields, and simply applied their pre-existing automotive knowledge to these new vehicles. The result was that German tanks were marvelous pieces of engineering, much like German automobiles, but were also very fragile and fussy (again like German automobiles). Soviet tanks, however, were designed and built by actual tank engineers with an eye towards simplicity and efficiency. Now, as for the question of quality versus quantity, this was actually the subject of my Master's thesis. My ultimate conclusion is somewhat self-evident: It doesn't matter if a Tiger tank can achieve a 10 to 1 kill ratio if the Soviets bring at least eleven T-34's to the fight. And that's exactly what happened. The specifics of why this happened, however, are pretty interesting, as are the implications. For example, the development of German tank designs during the course of the war betray a glaring self-contradiction within German armor doctrine. Simply put, tanks are an inherently offensive weapon. Why is this? Mobility. Mobility is the single largest determining factor in the offensive capability of any weapon. An immobile weapon cannot be an offensive one since it cannot move to occupy territory belonging to the enemy. It is fixed and therefore purely defensive. If you take away a tank's mobility, you are left with a simple fortified gun emplacement. As the war progressed, what did German engineers do? They added more and more weight to their tanks in the form of both armor and armament, thus decreasing the mobility of the vehicles and making them less and less offensively oriented. While you might look at this and say, "well that makes sense since they were on the defensive," the fact is that they were trying to carry out a strategic defense by pursuing tactical offensives, such as Operation Citadelle and the Ardennes Offensive. Under these circumstances, the enormous bulk of Panther and Tiger tanks was nothing less than a liability. In contrast, when Soviet designers were faced with the impending obsolescence of their T-34/76 and KV series tanks, they opted to increase firepower only in the case of the T-34, and mobility in the case of the KV. The results were the T-34/85 (simply an upgunned version) and the IS series. In this way, Soviet designers maintained the offensive character of their tanks whereas the Germans sacrificed theirs. As a result, Soviet armies were able to undertake sweeping offensives without having to pause and wait for their tanks to catch up. See Operation Bagration. There was another inconsistency between German armor doctrine and their tank designs, one which was alluded to in an earlier post. In German doctrine, tanks were supposed to break through the enemy line and create an opening that could be exploited by follow-up infantry. To accomplish this purpose, early German tanks were primarily oriented towards anti-infantry and anti-fortification operations. Mark I and II Panzers were never meant to face enemy tanks. Not until the Mark III arrived did the Germans possess an adequate anti-tank tank. The Mark IV, however, was designed to fill an anti-infantry role, at least in its initial configuration. When the Tiger and Panther were introduced, their role was intended to be as an answer to Soviet armor. This meant that, as the war progressed, German tank designs focused more and more on anti-tank capabilites. As a corollary, their anti-infantry capabilities diminished. Thus, while German tanks became more and more capable in combat against Soviet tanks, they also became more and more constrained by the maneuverability of their accompanying infantry forces since they had little protection of their own against Soviet infantry. Again, German design decisions had reduced the mobility, and therefore offensive suitability, of their vehicles. None other than Heinz Guderian himself had to issue a warning to Panther units not to overreach themselves: "Close attention must be paid to guarding the flanks of the Panther attack! All the other available weapons must be employed in this effort. Panthers need to attack utilizing an especially wide formation to prevent the enemy from flanking the core of the attacking unit." In other words, just because a Panther unit could proceed ahead of accompanying units, it was never advisable to actually do so. As an example of what typically happened when this advice was not followed, the following is a Panzer brigade commander's report concerning an overly ambitious Panther commander: "The commander of Panzer-Regiment “Grossdeutschland” was Graf Strachwitz, the “Panzer-Leowe” (Tank Lion). Working with him was very unpleasant. During the attack, he simply did not come on the radio and operated independently. This went on so far that I was ordered to appear before General von Knobelsdorff (commanding general of the XLVIII.Panzer-Korps) to answer for the brigade headquarters not functioning. In the interim, Strachwitz directed the Panzer-Brigade and employed the Panthers outright crazily. This resulted in continuous mine damage and flank protection was never built up. Therefore, the Panthers, whose sides are vulnerable, were shot up." As for how all this relates to the Western Front and Shermans, I believe that the inconsistencies between German tank production and their armor doctrine resulted in a sort of tactical paradox. In contrast, the synergistic effect of Allied armor production actually complimenting their armor doctrine meant that, basically, the Sherman was the best type of tank they could have asked for at the time.
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Dec 2, 2010 04:07
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Very interesting. Good to have you back. 
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Dec 2, 2010 10:58
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Where've you been, Admiral? We've missed you!
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Dec 2, 2010 16:19
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On a different topic, how long is it theorized that the US helped extend the Cold War through its aggressive policy of containment and non-negotiation with the Soviet Union?
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Dec 2, 2010 18:22
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Shimrra Jamaane posted:On a different topic, how long is it theorized that the US helped extend the Cold War through its aggressive policy of containment and non-negotiation with the Soviet Union? That's kind of begging the question, isn't it?
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Dec 3, 2010 01:46
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Bulgaroktonos posted:I think saying that the Americans won "in spite" of the Sherman is a bit too harsh. The Sherman was obsolete and underpowered, but it fully fit into the US Army offensive doctrine; As I and others have said, US doctrine was not very good, particularly with respect to armored warfare. quote:it was a combined arms weapon. This is true of any weapons system, so it doesn't exactly excuse the Sherman for its faults. I should clarify what I've been saying. Though one must say the Sherman was adequate within the context of overwhelming American superiority, this does not mean that other doctrines and other tanks weren't better. German and Soviet armored vehicles could not always depend on overall superiority so they were were designed to perform tasks independently that American armor could only do with the aid of constant artillery and air support. Luckily the US Army had a surplus of these assets, and seldom had to give battle in environments that limited their effectiveness (as an example of one such case, see the performance of the first stages of the Battle of the Bulge, when air forces were grounded by weather). This means that although the American Army taken as a whole was not markedly inferior by nature to counterparts in Germany or the USSR, particular elements of it varied in quality. Armor is simply an area where where American forces were inferior. As an example of where US forces excelled, American dependence on fire support meant that their artillery and air support was possibly the best in the war; flexible command and communication gave quick and accurate responses to requests for support. Panzeh posted:Post war studies showed that of all the engagements a tank was involved in, 11% of them were with other tanks, and the most important factor in such combat, more than guns or armor was who fired first. Wouldn't this indicate that American tank destroyers, with their powerful main guns, quickly traversing turrets, high mobility, and open-top turrets for maximum crew visibility (e.g. spotting and firing first) were the best for armored battle? I wonder about the data set. Does it include all AFVs, or only the narrow definition of tanks? Does it include light tanks, known to be unsuitable for armored battle and therefore apt to avoid it whenever possible? I'd be more interested in statistics showing what accounted for most destroyed tanks: anti-tank guns, indirect artillery, infantry, air support, tank destroyers, other tanks... I wonder if such exists. It's also misleading to simply say that 89% of a tank's job was infantry support, given that it's the 11% that enables the tank to survive for the other 89%--like saying that the majority of sorties flown by the USAAF in WWII were ground attack missions, therefore air superiority isn't that important. Additionally and with respect to the Sherman, the "whoever fires first" metric isn't very kind to the M4, since its high profile made it relatively easy to spot. A better way to assess what kind of tank was best for the WWII environment is to look at the generation of tanks that entered service immediately after with the lessons of the war in mind, meaning first-generation MBTs like the T-54/55 and British Centurion. EDIT As a further bit, snooping around the internet leads to indications that the Ordnance Department actually perceived that the M4 was becoming obsolete as early as 1943 and commissioned a successor which never entered service because the army's misconceived tank destroyer doctrine argued that it was unnecessary. Schenck v. U.S. fucked around with this message at 06:47 on Dec 3, 2010 |
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Dec 3, 2010 06:39
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Admiral Snackbar posted:
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Dec 3, 2010 07:23
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