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Shimrra Jamaane posted:On a different topic, how long is it theorized that the US helped extend the Cold War through its aggressive policy of containment and non-negotiation with the Soviet Union? Uhh, that's not a military history question. In the same vein though, how many times did Soviet Union/U.S. troops exhange direct fire during the Cold War? Did they ever?
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Dec 3, 2010 10:56
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DarkCrawler posted:In the same vein though, how many times did Soviet Union/U.S. troops exhange direct fire during the Cold War? Did they ever? At least in the Korean war, Soviet pilots flew MiG-15's that had North Korean or Chinese markings and frequently engaged US aircraft, and During the Vietnam war, Soviet crews operated some of the SAM batteries in North Vietnam that shot down B-52's. This was of course all very hush-hush.
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Dec 3, 2010 13:35
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Exactly why is Rommel (his book, strategies) still taught in officers' school in the U.S.?
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Dec 3, 2010 13:57
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EvanSchenck posted:This means that although the American Army taken as a whole was not markedly inferior by nature to counterparts in Germany or the USSR, particular elements of it varied in quality. Armor is simply an area where where American forces were inferior. As an example of where US forces excelled, American dependence on fire support meant that their artillery and air support was possibly the best in the war; flexible command and communication gave quick and accurate responses to requests for support. That's because Lesley McNair was an artilleryman. I don't dispute that American armor was inferior to its Soviet and German counterparts. I'm saying that it was ultimately irrelevant on the Western Front. With a few exceptions, the Western Front lacked the characteristics that enabled large scale armored campaigns like those fought in the East and in North Africa. The ETO was an infantryman's war, and most of the blood was shed by the infantry. There were fifteen (American) armored divisions in the ETO and forty-six infantry divisions. There were four American Armies operating in the ETO, and only one of them was headed by anyone with actual armored experience; the rest were infantrymen. Armor was ultimately a secondary part of the European war. (I should also note that the supposed authority on American armor in the ETO was hopelessly ignorant of the Sherman's strengths and weaknesses.)
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Dec 3, 2010 18:06
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Bulgaroktonos posted:I'm saying that it was ultimately irrelevant on the Western Front. With a few exceptions, the Western Front lacked the characteristics that enabled large scale armored campaigns like those fought in the East and in North Africa. I'm going to call bullshit on that. The blitzkrieg through the Netherlands, Belgium, and France is over the very terrain that you're claiming made armored campaigns irrelevant. The massive armored thrusts into the Balkans near the end of the war were through wooded hills. The combined arms assault into Greece was through mountainous terrain. Hell, Typhoon and Mars were fought in wooded and swampy areas and the opening phases of Barbarossa were fought in woods and hills. Tank battles in the steppe or desert were the exception during the war.
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Dec 3, 2010 18:27
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wins32767 posted:I'm going to call bullshit on that. The blitzkrieg through the Netherlands, Belgium, and France is over the very terrain that you're claiming made armored campaigns irrelevant. The massive armored thrusts into the Balkans near the end of the war were through wooded hills. The combined arms assault into Greece was through mountainous terrain. Hell, Typhoon and Mars were fought in wooded and swampy areas and the opening phases of Barbarossa were fought in woods and hills. Tank battles in the steppe or desert were the exception during the war. I wasn't talking about merely terrain. Had ETO logistics been more up to snuff, both Montgomery and Patton could have sent armored columns deep into Germany in September. The lack of fuel on both sides ensured that armored operations would be limited in scope (the Ardennes, of course, being an exception).
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Dec 3, 2010 20:16
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Bulgaroktonos posted:I wasn't talking about merely terrain. Had ETO logistics been more up to snuff, both Montgomery and Patton could have sent armored columns deep into Germany in September. The lack of fuel on both sides ensured that armored operations would be limited in scope (the Ardennes, of course, being an exception). I would be shocked if Allied logistics in '44 were worse than German ones in late '41. The Germans could move roughly a third as many tons to the front as they needed to fulfil their their baseline supply needs (like, food, daily ammo needs, parts, etc) in the "quiet" period before Typhoon. In other words, they launched a major armored offensive based on a build up period where they couldn't even get enough food to the front to feed their men much less build up ammo and fuel stocks.
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Dec 3, 2010 20:31
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wins32767 posted:I would be shocked if Allied logistics in '44 were worse than German ones in late '41. The Germans could move roughly a third as many tons to the front as they needed to fulfil their their baseline supply needs (like, food, daily ammo needs, parts, etc) in the "quiet" period before Typhoon. In other words, they launched a major armored offensive based on a build up period where they couldn't even get enough food to the front to feed their men much less build up ammo and fuel stocks. Yeah, the Germany logistical situation in 1941 was generally 'solved' by letting infantry divisions rot, which left them very vulnerable to the Soviet counterattacks and increased casualties overall. The German Army could not destroy encircled formations, and often huge amounts of Red Army soldiers could slip back into their own lines because the pockets could not be secured by infantry. The Allied armies of 1944 probably had a far greater logistical need, with all US infantry divisions being larger, and having motorized elements, including TD and armored companies. The various countries' responses to the manpower crunch starting in 1943 might be a good longpost, though.
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Dec 3, 2010 20:41
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Shimrra Jamaane posted:On a different topic, how long is it theorized that the US helped extend the Cold War through its aggressive policy of containment and non-negotiation with the Soviet Union? Kind of a broad question
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Dec 3, 2010 21:25
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Bulgaroktonos posted:That's because Lesley McNair was an artilleryman. One could also argue that you're talking about an outcome that was contingent on the weakness of allied armor and armored doctrine, rather than an essential characteristic of the ETO itself. That is, armor was of secondary importance in the Anglo-American campaign because the Allies had poor armor they didn't know how to use, and the Germans' mobile forces were mostly committed to the eastern front, so it was an infantry war on the basis of what was available rather than what was suitable. As wins32767 pointed out, there's nothing intrinsic to Western Europe that makes it unsuitable for armored warfare. There's nothing saying that a better designed and better led force that relied more heavily on armor could not have fought the war just as (or more) effectively as the historical forces.
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Dec 3, 2010 22:17
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what's a battle?
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Dec 3, 2010 22:23
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wins32767 posted:I would be shocked if Allied logistics in '44 were worse than German ones in late '41. The Germans could move roughly a third as many tons to the front as they needed to fulfil their their baseline supply needs (like, food, daily ammo needs, parts, etc) in the "quiet" period before Typhoon. In other words, they launched a major armored offensive based on a build up period where they couldn't even get enough food to the front to feed their men much less build up ammo and fuel stocks. All the Axis nations took a casual attitude toward logistics. In the campaigns of 39 and 40 that worked fine. Provision up for a few weeks of fighting, achieve your objectives in a few weeks, then start over. The Allies had no hope of overrunning the Germans in Europe so quickly nor such clear supply lines, and thus had an entirely different problem. Bulgaroktonos, I'd argue that the scope of the Ardennes offensive was exactly limited by supplies - many German units advanced until fuel shortages crippled them.
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Dec 3, 2010 22:26
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Zorak of Michigan posted:All the Axis nations took a casual attitude toward logistics. Prussia (the state that became Germany) literally invented the General Staff. This is the country that had time tables for when each battalion could march through a given crossroads in Belgium less than 30 years previous. You want to back that incredible assertion up with facts?
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Dec 3, 2010 22:33
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Panzeh posted:The German Army could not destroy encircled formations, and often huge amounts of Red Army soldiers could slip back into their own lines because the pockets could not be secured by infantry.
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Dec 3, 2010 22:34
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wins32767 posted:Prussia (the state that became Germany) literally invented the General Staff. This is the country that had time tables for when each battalion could march through a given crossroads in Belgium less than 30 years previous. You want to back that incredible assertion up with facts? They were great guns for marching soldiers, exactly as if they were most interested in the operational aspect of maneuver warfare than the tedious questions of supplying it. They knew perfectly well that they couldn't properly supply the troops during the invasion of Russia due to the difference in rail gauge, but they invaded anyway and figured that if they killed or captured enough Russians, everything would work out. If that's not a casual attitude toward logistics, what is?
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Dec 3, 2010 23:00
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Red posted:Exactly why is Rommel (his book, strategies) still taught in officers' school in the U.S.? Not sure but I have read a bit of "Attacks". Rommel is still relevant because his book talks about basic tactics at the platoon/company level that haven't really changed much over the course of almost 100 years. "Attacks" is a pretty educational read because Rommel first gives a narrative about an action and then he sums it up at the end of the chapter with lessons learned or theory verified under fire. The whole book is structured like this. Rommel fought in WWI from beginning to end. I'm impressed he lived through the whole thing.
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Dec 4, 2010 02:48
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DarkCrawler posted:In the same vein though, how many times did Soviet Union/U.S. troops exhange direct fire during the Cold War? Did they ever? Puukko naamassa posted:At least in the Korean war, Soviet pilots flew MiG-15's that had North Korean or Chinese markings and frequently engaged US aircraft, and During the Vietnam war, Soviet crews operated some of the SAM batteries in North Vietnam that shot down B-52's. This was of course all very hush-hush. US personnel were in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation, training the muhajadeen. I don't know, however, if they were actually involved in any of the fighting.
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Dec 4, 2010 03:12
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How did the US get troops/vehicles into Afghanistan? They would have had to pass through some other country to get there, I imagine. Talkin bout War on Terror, not training Mujahideen.
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Dec 4, 2010 03:27
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PlasticPaddy posted:what's a battle? A mediocre wide receiver http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-C3XP4CVixc
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Dec 4, 2010 04:35
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AgentF posted:How did the US get troops/vehicles into Afghanistan? They would have had to pass through some other country to get there, I imagine. Russia has recently been allowing transport of non military equipment. There is a base in Kyrgyzstan as well. Pakistan I think as well, not sure.
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Dec 4, 2010 04:36
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AgentF posted:How did the US get troops/vehicles into Afghanistan? They would have had to pass through some other country to get there, I imagine. They could go right in to Pakistan, then insert over the border from Pakistani safe areas into battle zones in Afghanistan, as the Taliban do now. For more info watch Rambo 3
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Dec 4, 2010 06:08
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AgentF posted:How did the US get troops/vehicles into Afghanistan? They would have had to pass through some other country to get there, I imagine. There are these great metal birds in the sky these days, you may have seen them yourself. People climb on the back of them (I think?? Someone help me out here) and if you feed them the right food they can take you great distances.
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Dec 4, 2010 06:17
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Rodrigo Diaz posted:There are these great metal birds in the sky these days, you may have seen them yourself. People climb on the back of them (I think?? Someone help me out here) and if you feed them the right food they can take you great distances. Supplying an entire military operation the size of the coalition forces in Afghanistan entirely by air is extremely expensive. I don't think we have enough cargo planes for an operation of that scale. They drive it across the borders from friendly countries, that's part of the reason why we are so worried about angering Pakistan, since it is the only way to get things there by sea without going through clearly hostile nations (Iran) or thousands of miles through Russia and central Asia. Edit: Some quick googling and math shows that coalition troops eat about 655,000 pounds of food every day. The cost of flying all of that in adds up very quickly, even if we could do that. Konstantin fucked around with this message at 08:52 on Dec 4, 2010 |
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Dec 4, 2010 08:17
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never mind. My reading comprehension sucks.
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Dec 4, 2010 09:09
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Red posted:Exactly why is Rommel (his book, strategies) still taught in officers' school in the U.S.? I went through officer education and now teach officers and Rommel is not a part of any curriculum I'm aware of. It might be on reading lists or something, I dunno. It obviously isn't terribly relevant anymore except for general ideas. Konstantin posted:Supplying an entire military operation the size of the coalition forces in Afghanistan entirely by air is extremely expensive. I don't think we have enough cargo planes for an operation of that scale. They drive it across the borders from friendly countries, that's part of the reason why we are so worried about angering Pakistan, since it is the only way to get things there by sea without going through clearly hostile nations (Iran) or thousands of miles through Russia and central Asia. Funny you ask, there was recently a huge change to this. We used to fly through Germany and then across central Asia but the land of Borat and Russia just opened an air corridor that will allow flights straight from Alaska to Afghanistan. It is a pretty big deal logistically speaking, it allows polar overflights now and allows the planes to fly each leg without refueling. That said, most of the poo poo still has to come in by land, and most of this comes through the Khyber Pass, which you might have heard of as it is a big deal. This is mainly stuff landed at Karachi in Pakistan and then trucked through the mountains. I don't know how accurate it is today but something like half of the shooting engagements in theater a few years ago were here for obvious reasons. This obviously isn't an idea position, so the coalition is trying to open some new supply lines. One is from the Baltic Sea to Riga, then by rail through Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan and then trucked into Afghanistan, the other through the Dardanelles/Black Sea, Tbilisi, through Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, shipped across the Caspian Sea to Kazakhstan, loaded onto rail again through Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, then trucked into Afghanistan.
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Dec 4, 2010 15:35
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what would the reprisals against rebels be if the brittish had defeated the americans in the revolution? The ringleaders hanged drawn and quartered and mass executions of continental soldiers?
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Dec 4, 2010 17:31
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How would a modern infantry battalion fare in WWII? Say a US Ranger battallion (no Bradleys). Like literally teleported in, with no modern air support or GPS (no satellites).
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Dec 4, 2010 18:16
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Julio Lopez posted:How would a modern infantry battalion fare in WWII? Say a US Ranger battallion (no Bradleys). Like literally teleported in, with no modern air support or GPS (no satellites). They'd have a bit more firepower and the body armor and night vision would be nice additions, but the really decisive differences between now and then is C4I and fires, which I'm guessing isn't present in your hypothetical.
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Dec 4, 2010 19:06
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bewbies posted:They'd have a bit more firepower and the body armor and night vision would be nice additions, but the really decisive differences between now and then is C4I and fires, which I'm guessing isn't present in your hypothetical. They'd basically be a couple of notches up from a WWII infantry battalion, but not a real game changer.
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Dec 4, 2010 19:13
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The Rangers would have a handful of Javelin launchers. Given how few tanks the Germans really had, that would probably let them take out an entire panzer regiment... once. If they were used as a strategic asset, making a night attack to counter an enemy advance, they could impact the war on a strategic level. It was rough enough on the Germans that the US Army was able to slow down their armored spearhead in the Adrennes; having their most successful unit shredded the second night of the attack would permanently blunt it. Still, every 21st century weapon or device would require batteries, ammo, or parts not available during WWII. After a couple of heavy fights they'd all be carrying Garands or consulting for the War Department. "General McNair, I'm just a lieutenant, but I can loving assure you that in the judgement of history,your ideas about armored tactics are goddamn bullshit."
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Dec 4, 2010 20:40
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Julio Lopez posted:Thanks. I googled what C4I is, but what do you mean by "fires"? Well, I don't think a battalion sized element would ever be strategically decisive unless it was a battalion of jedis or something. Maybe a whole BCT with reasonable logistical support in the perfect situation (Stalingrad?). edit - "fires" means fire support bewbies fucked around with this message at 20:59 on Dec 4, 2010 |
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Dec 4, 2010 20:48
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It just occurred to me that at Guadalcanal, putting a squad of Rangers with NVGs in with every Marine company could have solved the entire problem of night infiltration attacks. Once they got integrated into the fire control system and the Navy was back on station, they might have also done amazing service as nighttime infiltrators themselves. Logistics would still dictate the pace of strategy but those Marines would have felt an order of magnitude better and taken fewer casualties.
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Dec 4, 2010 22:56
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wins32767 posted:I thought Glanz had disproven this thesis? I haven't read Glantz's latest stuff but he definitely backs the assertion in "When Titans Clashed"
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Dec 5, 2010 17:10
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In my International Politics and Intelligence classes I often bump into this argument that the German War Machine put very little emphasis on Logistics and Intelligence, mainly because of the interest Hitler had in high tech machines such as the V-1 and the Tiger and Maus tanks. I'm very much aware of the autocratic nature intrinsic to Hitlers rule, especially in foreign and domestic policy, but did his micro-managing interfer with actual war machine to such a degree as that? There surely must of been other facts as well as Hitlers personal distaste for Intelligence and Logistics that led to them having such a small part in German Doctrine?
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Dec 5, 2010 17:45
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d3c0y2 posted:In my International Politics and Intelligence classes I often bump into this argument that the German War Machine put very little emphasis on Logistics and Intelligence, mainly because of the interest Hitler had in high tech machines such as the V-1 and the Tiger and Maus tanks. I'm simplifying it a bit, but Germany didn't have as many resources as their enemies. And he didn't expect Stalin to pull another army out of his rear end.
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Dec 5, 2010 18:13
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d3c0y2 posted:In my International Politics and Intelligence classes I often bump into this argument that the German War Machine put very little emphasis on Logistics and Intelligence, mainly because of the interest Hitler had in high tech machines such as the V-1 and the Tiger and Maus tanks. I just finished Citino's The German Way of War and Death of the Wehrmacht, and he argues that the disdain for all such things goes all the way back to the Great Elector. Prussia could never hope to match the resources of the various enemies surrounding it, so it evolved a military doctrine based on rapid victory and subsequent redeployment of troops to meet the next threat. Logistics did not require so much attention for short campaigns close to home. Prussian military culture grew to venerate men who took bold gambles and attacked whenever possible, trusting to the superior competence of their troops and the shock effect of their aggression to overwhelm superior numbers. They trusted the rest to work out, and in most cases before the 20th century, it had.
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Dec 5, 2010 18:53
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Zorak of Michigan posted:They were great guns for marching soldiers, exactly as if they were most interested in the operational aspect of maneuver warfare than the tedious questions of supplying it. They knew perfectly well that they couldn't properly supply the troops during the invasion of Russia due to the difference in rail gauge, but they invaded anyway and figured that if they killed or captured enough Russians, everything would work out. If that's not a casual attitude toward logistics, what is? bewbies posted:They'd have a bit more firepower and the body armor and night vision would be nice additions, but the really decisive differences between now and then is C4I and fires, which I'm guessing isn't present in your hypothetical. But artillery would still be almost as deadly as ever, and a single infantry battalion wouldn't stay combat effective for long in a battle like Kursk. The body armor would save lives, but heavy artillery drumfire would still cause losses. Nenonen fucked around with this message at 22:01 on Dec 5, 2010 |
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Dec 5, 2010 21:45
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Nenonen posted:Or maybe they expected that the enemy would suffer just as greatly, so it wouldn't be that much of an issue? I doubt it was a casual attitude, rather it was just miscalculations/misestimations/misinformation. Inability to predict the results of the campaign don't equal not giving a poo poo, all armies had logistical SNAFUs, including the Allied armies. As for other Axis nations, Italy I can accept, much of the time they seemed to sport a rather naive attitude to logistics from top to lower ranks. But Japan seemed to pay a great deal of attention to logistics, they just couldn't foresee nor help the problems that enemy activities would cause to their supply shippings. The biggest problem for the Germans in the East was the difference in railway gauge, which meant that no German equipment could be used in conquered territory. Obviously that problem would not exist for the enemy. You also don't need to be trained in the German staff school to realize that a defender generally falls back closer to his base of supply, while the attacker extends his own. I mean, their own "plans" included the idea that the panzer and panzergrenadier divisions would be supplied by horse-drawn carts in some situations. The sheer implausibility of supplying mechanized war with panje carts certainly occurred to some of them, but they figured the German army always figured out a way to win. That may make for nice aggressive tactics but you can't supply a million men and vehicles on the basis of "find a way." The Japanese lack of logistical understanding can been seen most clearly in their decision to prioritize American warships instead of supply ships as targets for I-boats. The problems for their supply lines caused by American subs and mines could have been foreseen - all they had to do was study the WWI battle of the Atlantic. However, their planners substituted faith in the Emperor and contempt for American fighting spirit for the German military tradition and arrived at the same conclusion: attack, mess the enemy up a lot, and trust that things will work out. In a prior era that might have worked, but modern war requires a different set of priorities.
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Dec 6, 2010 04:08
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Nenonen posted:WW2 tanks would stand no chance. With 21st century Fire and Forget missiles hitting them, the tankers would start sacrificing virgins to appease the angry gods. Yes but how many missiles will they have? Now what if we dropped a SAS troop into Berlin and have them capture Hitler instead?
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Dec 6, 2010 05:18
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What is your opinion on the M16 and it's variants (M4, XM177, M110 SASS, etc.) vs the AK-47 and its variants (AKM, AK-74, -74u, PSL, Zastava M76, etc.)? (Bias is ever so welcome  )
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Dec 6, 2010 08:57
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