Middle East Thread of Despair: More Broken Than Syria

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ugh its Troika: May 2, 2009; by FactsAreUseless

Or, rather, the US has moral qualms about how to deal with insurgents and the Syrian military does not. Depopulating an entire area to keep it quiet is certainly effective, if morally repugnant.

# ? Jun 21, 2012 02:05

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# ? Apr 20, 2024 01:46

SexyBlindfold: Apr 24, 2008; i dont care how much probation i get capital letters are for squares hehe im so laid back an nice please read my low effort shitposts about the arab spring

thanxs!!!

-Troika- posted:

Or, rather, the US has moral qualms about how to deal with insurgents and the Syrian military does not. Depopulating an entire area to keep it quiet is certainly effective, if morally repugnant.

i think what he meant is that there are basically two "effective" ways of dealing with insurgents: either you address the issues and demands that cause the population to turn to armed insurgency and work with communities in order to erode their support, or just plain kill everybody. the US was unwilling to fully commit to the first (or uncapable, since one of the core demands was "get out of here", so an invading army will basically always be fighting an unwinnable battle in that aspect), and the second wasn't an option either, be it for "moral qualms" or because it was just not worth doing.

meanwhile Assad's dad pretty much wrote the book on how to destroy modern insurgency through wanton barbarism, so

# ? Jun 21, 2012 02:19

Xandu: Feb 19, 2006; It's hard to be humble when you're as great as I am.

Not sure how effective it's been considering how much the revolution has grown in the last year and how it's become armed, radicalized, and somewhat internationalized.

# ? Jun 21, 2012 02:21

SexyBlindfold: Apr 24, 2008; i dont care how much probation i get capital letters are for squares hehe im so laid back an nice please read my low effort shitposts about the arab spring

thanxs!!!

Xandu posted:

Not sure how effective it's been considering how much the revolution has grown in the last year and how it's become armed, radicalized, and somewhat internationalized.

never said it was working, just that it's an approach that has yielded results in the past.
it does raise the question about what's fundamentally different this time from back in the hama days, though. i don't seem to recall mass defections happening 30 years ago, maybe there's a grain of truth in claiming that ~*~social networks~*~ played a part in triggering a wave of mass resistance? maybe it's just because Syrian society has changed and today it's not just the Muslim Brotherhood that wants/has the means to topple the regime? maybe it's because the Hama uprising didn't have the momentum of a movement sweeping though most of the arab world?
maybe it's just because the gulf coast countries sent a shitton of money. i don't know

# ? Jun 21, 2012 02:30

pantslesswithwolves: Oct 28, 2008; Ba-dam ba-DUMMMMMM

i poo poo trains posted:

Words about COIN

Perhaps it wasn't clear from my post, but when I wrote about the Syrian government trying to minimize casualties, I was referring to their own military casualties, not the civilian populace. I agree with you- to imply that Assad gives a poo poo about civilian casualties in Homs, Hama, Qusayr and elsewhere would be pretty naive.

To me, the similarities between Syrian COIN and the American version stops with both governments using their technological advantages to limit actual close-quarter combat with the enemy.

# ? Jun 21, 2012 03:26

J33uk: Oct 24, 2005

The US and UK are ready to offer Assad clemency and safe passage in exchange for stepping down and talks on transition.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/21/assad-clemency-syria-peace-talks

I'm sure the Syrian people are just thrilled. Kill a few thousand of them? No problem, as long as the unfortunate international political problem goes away. This initiative will never get anywhere but what a loving tragic position to negotiate from. The Yemen model will once again attempt to be used in Syria and will once again fail. Again, I can't imagine a proposal more half assed than this.

# ? Jun 21, 2012 03:33

sum: Nov 15, 2010

suboptimal posted:

Perhaps it wasn't clear from my post, but when I wrote about the Syrian government trying to minimize casualties, I was referring to their own military casualties, not the civilian populace. I agree with you- to imply that Assad gives a poo poo about civilian casualties in Homs, Hama, Qusayr and elsewhere would be pretty naive.

To me, the similarities between Syrian COIN and the American version stops with both governments using their technological advantages to limit actual close-quarter combat with the enemy.

Well, I think from a strategic perspective it is much more in the SAF's interest to initiate as much close combat as possible with the insurgents (as I was gesturing at with my criticism from the FSA's apparent adoption blockhouse tactics), because, unlike other armies where soldiers are more expensive, 20 dead soldiers is an extremely small price for crippling a local insurgency and gaining control of a city, where they would then be able to initiate their brutal mopping-up tactics. You might even be able to argue that a limited number soldier deaths are good for the Syrian state, as they seem ready and willing to use their funerals as opportunities for pro-state rallies and such. I wouldn't be surprised if the official figures of dead soldiers and policemen are actually inflated, considering that they are considerably higher than rebel figures.

# ? Jun 21, 2012 03:45

farraday: Jan 10, 2007; Lower those eyebrows, young man. And the other one.

i poo poo trains posted:

Well, I think from a strategic perspective it is much more in the SAF's interest to initiate as much close combat as possible with the insurgents (as I was gesturing at with my criticism from the FSA's apparent adoption blockhouse tactics), because, unlike other armies where soldiers are more expensive, 20 dead soldiers is an extremely small price for crippling a local insurgency and gaining control of a city, where they would then be able to initiate their brutal mopping-up tactics. You might even be able to argue that a limited number soldier deaths are good for the Syrian state, as they seem ready and willing to use their funerals as opportunities for pro-state rallies and such. I wouldn't be surprised if the official figures of dead soldiers and policemen are actually inflated, considering that they are considerably higher than rebel figures.

I disagree. focusing on the cost of a soldier completely ignores the probability of morale loss leading to increased defections and simple desertion. further, the ample evidence of the Syrian Army negotiating to buy back destroyed/damaged tanks highly suggests they are very conscious of material losses which would tend to make close in tactics a bad idea.

# ? Jun 21, 2012 04:12

sum: Nov 15, 2010

farraday posted:

I disagree. focusing on the cost of a soldier completely ignores the probability of morale loss leading to increased defections and simple desertion. further, the ample evidence of the Syrian Army negotiating to buy back destroyed/damaged tanks highly suggests they are very conscious of material losses which would tend to make close in tactics a bad idea.

You have to remember that Syria is in the middle of a weapons embargo, which inflates the price of materiel. Even though a tank might be expensive enough to consider buying back from the FSA, finding Christians/Alawites/Shiites willing to fight and kill for Assad probably isn't nearly as expensive. Besides, if Assad keeps the ethnic antagonization up, there is probably little chance of minority soldiers defecting to the FSA (speaking of which, does anyone have any figures for the ethnic composition of the Syrian Army? I would presume it's mostly Alawite but people keep talking about Sunni conscripts defecting. tia)

# ? Jun 21, 2012 04:51

Xandu: Feb 19, 2006; It's hard to be humble when you're as great as I am.

There's not enough Alawites in the country for them to make up the majority of the army. Dispoportionately represented, sure, especially in the officer corps, but it's still predominantly Sunni.

# ? Jun 21, 2012 04:53

Patter Song: Mar 26, 2010; Hereby it is manifest that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war as is of every man against every man.; Fun Shoe

J33uk posted:

The US and UK are ready to offer Assad clemency and safe passage in exchange for stepping down and talks on transition.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/21/assad-clemency-syria-peace-talks

I'm sure the Syrian people are just thrilled. Kill a few thousand of them? No problem, as long as the unfortunate international political problem goes away. This initiative will never get anywhere but what a loving tragic position to negotiate from. The Yemen model will once again attempt to be used in Syria and will once again fail. Again, I can't imagine a proposal more half assed than this.

The so-called Yemen Solution is a debacle from the word go, and the hosed-up thing is that it's clear that everyone knows it. I mean, it's name is the Yemen Solution, and Yemen's only continued to get closer to outright chaos and all-against-all anarchic war since Saleh left.

# ? Jun 21, 2012 05:45

Mr. Sunshine: May 15, 2008; This is a scrunt that has been in space too long and become a Lunt (Long Scrunt); Fun Shoe

Problem is, what the hell else are they going to do? I mean, you basically have three choices here.
1) You leave Assad in power (The Russian solution).
2) You ask him pretty pretty please to go away (The Yemen solution).
3) You try to remove him by force (The Libya solution).

Option 1 is the current status quo, and the west doesn't want that. 3 would be horrendously expensive in both money and lives (and might even be political suicide for whoever initiates it), and no western power wants to risk it. This leaves you with 2. Everyone knows it won't work, but at least it looks like you're doing something.

# ? Jun 21, 2012 07:26

Goatse James Bond: Mar 28, 2010; If you see me posting please remind me that I have Charlie Work in the reports forum to do instead

J33uk posted:

I'm sure the Syrian people are just thrilled. Kill a few thousand of them? No problem, as long as the unfortunate international political problem goes away. This initiative will never get anywhere but what a loving tragic position to negotiate from. The Yemen model will once again attempt to be used in Syria and will once again fail. Again, I can't imagine a proposal more half assed than this.

Beats a vicious civil war with a couple dozen more massacres that it's entirely possible the FSA will lose (with the attendant horrible results).

Unfortunately, precisely BECAUSE it's not a foregone conclusion, there's no drat way Assad accepts terms. He can reasonably still expect to Kill loving Everybody and retain power.

# ? Jun 21, 2012 08:01

Brown Moses: Feb 22, 2002

It appears a MIG-21 flew from Syria and landed in Jordan, with the pilot claiming asylum. Probably not too reassuring for Assad if he can't trust his own airforce.

# ? Jun 21, 2012 11:51

paint dry: Feb 8, 2005

Brown Moses posted:

It appears a MIG-21 flew from Syria and landed in Jordan, with the pilot claiming asylum. Probably not too reassuring for Assad if he can't trust his own airforce.

Shame he didn't fire a missile at the presidential residence first, or something like that.

# ? Jun 21, 2012 11:55

Nenonen: Oct 22, 2009; Mulla on aina kolkyt donaa taskussa

BBC posted:

Syrian state TV earlier announced that contact had been lost with a fighter plane, being flown by an air force colonel, during a training mission.

A Jordanian security source told AFP that the plane had landed at the King Hussein air base in Mafraq.

# ? Jun 21, 2012 12:00

Orange Devil: Oct 1, 2010; Wullie's reign cannae smother the flames o' equality!

According to Dutch media Assad hasn't used the air force against the insurgents thus far. Syrian state TV is saying they've lost contact with a jet which was on a training mission.

# ? Jun 21, 2012 12:01

Brown Moses: Feb 22, 2002

He's certainly used helicopters, not sure about jets though, not seen any evidence of that.

# ? Jun 21, 2012 12:02

Orange Devil: Oct 1, 2010; Wullie's reign cannae smother the flames o' equality!

Brown Moses posted:

He's certainly used helicopters, not sure about jets though, not seen any evidence of that.

Yeah that's my mistranslation. No jets (literally: combat planes) so far according to Dutch media.

# ? Jun 21, 2012 12:02

Brown Moses: Feb 22, 2002

New report from ISW, Syria's Maturing Insurgency

quote:

This report examines the increasing effectiveness of Syria�s armed opposition, explains how responsible provincial-level military structures have emerged, and considers how uncoordinated external support could compound existing fractures within the opposition.

Syria�s maturing insurgency has begun to carve out its own de facto safe zones around Homs city, in northern Hama, and in the Idlib countryside. The Assad regime seized key urban centers in Damascus, Homs, and Idlib during offensives in February and March 2012. However, the rebels successfully withdrew into the countryside, where they operate with impunity. As of June 2012, the opposition controls large swaths of Syria�s northern and central countryside.

The Assad regime does not have the capacity to continue offensive operations while holding the key terrain it cleared in the spring. Currently, the regime is postured to hold Damascus, Homs, and Idlib, but not to defeat the insurgency that prospers in the countryside. In order to direct a new offensive against rebel strongholds outside of Homs city and in the Idlib countryside, the regime will have to consolidate forces for a large operation, which could compromise regime control of the urban areas. Increased direct military assistance from Russia or Iran could substantially mitigate this risk to the regime.

Syria�s loyalist security forces will have to balance competing priorities in the summer of 2012. First, they must ensure that fighting does not spread further in northern Aleppo and coastal Latakia provinces. Second, they must regain control of rebel strongholds to the north and south of Homs city. Finally, they must disrupt de facto rebel safe zones in northern Hama and the Idlib countryside.

The insurgency has expanded to an estimated 40,000 men as of late May 2012. New local rebel groups continue to form, which presents a challenge to command and control. However, responsible operational-level structures have emerged in the form of provincial military councils that derive legitimacy from the local rebel groups operating under their command. The provincial military councils operate under the umbrella of the Free Syrian Army (FSA ), but make their own operational decisions.

Viable provincial military councils have formed in Homs, Hama, Idlib, Deraa, and Damascus. Each military council, or majlis askeri, represents a collection of effective, pre-existing FSA battalions. Each military council coordinates with their political opposition counterparts, the provincial revolutionary councils, or majlis thawar. Some powerful and established rebel organizations have not accepted their military council�s leadership, but enough rebel units have backed the councils to give them legitimacy.

The conflict in Syria is approaching a tipping point at which the insurgency will control more territory than the regime. Neither the perpetuation nor the removal of Assad will guarantee Syria�s future stability. In order to prevent Syrian state failure, the insurgency must mature into a professional armed force that can promote and protect a stable political opposition.

Increased external support for Syria�s insurgency has contributed to its success on the battlefield, but the resulting competition for resources has encouraged radicalization and infighting. This ad hoc application of external support has undermined the professionalization of the opposition�s ranks. Carefully managing this support could reinforce responsible organizations and bolster organic structures within the Syrian opposition.

The priority for U.S. policy on Syria should be to encourage the development of opposition structures that could one day establish a monopoly on the use of force. External support must flow into Syria in a way that reinforces the growth of legitimate and stable structures within the Syrian opposition movement. This will mitigate the regional threats of Syrian state failure and prolonged civil war.

# ? Jun 21, 2012 15:15

pantslesswithwolves: Oct 28, 2008; Ba-dam ba-DUMMMMMM

i poo poo trains posted:

Besides, if Assad keeps the ethnic antagonization up, there is probably little chance of minority soldiers defecting to the FSA (speaking of which, does anyone have any figures for the ethnic composition of the Syrian Army? I would presume it's mostly Alawite but people keep talking about Sunni conscripts defecting. tia)

I was looking for similar figures a few months ago, and even BM and Xandu were unable to come up with much. I would assume that the top generals are all Alawi, with lower and mid-ranking officers being Sunni, and a lot of conscripts being Sunni as well. What I'd be really interested in seeing is how the officer corps is broken down- a lot of Arab militaries have bloated officer corps, which means that a Colonel in the Syrian army may have about as much authority as a 2LT in a Western army.

# ? Jun 21, 2012 15:38

V. Illych L.: Apr 11, 2008; ASK ME ABOUT LUMBER

It bears mentioning that massacre-based counterinsurgency tactics have a rather poor history with regards to efficiency as well. The nazis found that out in the Balkans and Russia, and to a lesser degree the Soviets in Afghanistan (these are the most obvious examples I can think of, there are probably more).

# ? Jun 21, 2012 15:45

az jan jananam: Sep 6, 2011; HI, I'M HARDCORE SAX HERE TO DROP A NICE JUICY TURD OF A POST FROM UP ON HIGH

suboptimal posted:

I was looking for similar figures a few months ago, and even BM and Xandu were unable to come up with much. I would assume that the top generals are all Alawi, with lower and mid-ranking officers being Sunni, and a lot of conscripts being Sunni as well. What I'd be really interested in seeing is how the officer corps is broken down- a lot of Arab militaries have bloated officer corps, which means that a Colonel in the Syrian army may have about as much authority as a 2LT in a Western army.

I've talked with friends in Damascus and anecdotally they say similar things to this.

# ? Jun 21, 2012 16:04

az jan jananam: Sep 6, 2011; HI, I'M HARDCORE SAX HERE TO DROP A NICE JUICY TURD OF A POST FROM UP ON HIGH

Brown Moses posted:

Thanks, any details you can pick out from their IDs?

Sorry for the late reply, it's hard for me to make out any details even in hi-res but they're not military IDs. One of them is their passport and the other one is from an Iranian environemental/occupational health organization (Markez-e-Salamat-e-Muheit-o-Kar), they seem like driving IDs of some sort but I'm not sure.

az jan jananam fucked around with this message at 16:19 on Jun 21, 2012

# ? Jun 21, 2012 16:09

Sivias: Dec 12, 2006; I think we can just sit around and just talk about our feelings.

az jan jananam posted:

Sorry for the late reply, it's hard for me to make out any details even in hi-res but they're not military IDs. One of them is their passport and the other one is from the Iranian occupational health authority (Markez-e-Salomat-e-Muheit-o-Kar), they seem like driving IDs of some sort but I'm not sure.

Is it possible that knowing the chance their militants being caught in Syria exists, mocking up non-military IDs and distributing them to combatants/telling them not to bring any identification linking them to the Iranian military? Seems silly to me if you are sending in supposedly covert soldiers into a foreign combat zone not to at least try to hide the fact that you're sending soldiers into a foreign combat zone.

Perhaps I'm thinking too much like a spy novel.

(*edit for clarity)

Sivias fucked around with this message at 16:39 on Jun 21, 2012

# ? Jun 21, 2012 16:22

midnightclimax: Dec 3, 2011; by XyloJW

What would be a good central hub for all things FSA? Basically some kind of intelligence report, that lists their political agenda (if there is a unified one) and their financial backers. (Sorry Brown Moses if I overlooked that on your blog)

EDIT: Err okay found that link to ISW a couple of posts above. That pdf looks promising. Thanks.

midnightclimax fucked around with this message at 19:26 on Jun 21, 2012

# ? Jun 21, 2012 18:30

Brown Moses: Feb 22, 2002

They also did a report on Syria in March that's even longer, really good stuff:
http://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Syrias_Armed_Opposition.pdf

# ? Jun 21, 2012 20:17

Brown Moses: Feb 22, 2002

Updated my post about the weapons used by the FSA, and their DIY weapons, which now includes DIY explosives launched by oversized slingshots, quite the David and Goliath metaphor:
http://brown-moses.blogspot.com/2012/06/increasingly-well-armed-fsa-and-other.html

# ? Jun 21, 2012 20:54

Xandu: Feb 19, 2006; It's hard to be humble when you're as great as I am.

It has begun.

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/21/world/middleeast/cia-said-to-aid-in-steering-arms-to-syrian-rebels.html?_r=2&pagewanted=1&partner=rss&emc=rss posted:

A small number of C.I.A. officers are operating secretly in southern Turkey, helping allies decide which Syrian opposition fighters across the border will receive arms to fight the Syrian government, according to American officials and Arab intelligence officers.

The weapons, including automatic rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, ammunition and some antitank weapons, are being funneled mostly across the Turkish border by way of a shadowy network of intermediaries including Syria�s Muslim Brotherhood and paid for by Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the officials said.

The C.I.A. officers have been in southern Turkey for several weeks, in part to help keep weapons out of the hands of fighters allied with Al Qaeda or other terrorist groups, one senior American official said. The Obama administration has said it is not providing arms to the rebels, but it has also acknowledged that Syria�s neighbors would do so.

The clandestine intelligence-gathering effort is the most detailed known instance of the limited American support for the military campaign against the Syrian government. It is also part of Washington�s attempt to increase the pressure on President Bashar al-Assad of Syria, who has recently escalated his government�s deadly crackdown on civilians and the militias battling his rule. With Russia blocking more aggressive steps against the Assad government, the United States and its allies have instead turned to diplomacy and aiding allied efforts to arm the rebels to force Mr. Assad from power.

By helping to vet rebel groups, American intelligence operatives in Turkey hope to learn more about a growing, changing opposition network inside of Syria and to establish new ties. �C.I.A. officers are there and they are trying to make new sources and recruit people,� said one Arab intelligence official who is briefed regularly by American counterparts.

American officials and retired C.I.A. officials said the administration was also weighing additional assistance to rebels, like providing satellite imagery and other detailed intelligence on Syrian troop locations and movements. The administration is also considering whether to help the opposition set up a rudimentary intelligence service. But no decisions have been made on those measures or even more aggressive steps, like sending C.I.A. officers into Syria itself, they said.

The struggle inside Syria has the potential to intensify significantly in coming months as powerful new weapons are flowing to both the Syrian government and opposition fighters. President Obama and his top aides are seeking to pressure Russia to curb arms shipments like attack helicopters to Syria, its main ally in the Middle East.

�We�d like to see arms sales to the Assad regime come to an end, because we believe they�ve demonstrated that they will only use their military against their own civilian population,� Benjamin J. Rhodes, deputy national security adviser for strategic communications, said after Mr. Obama and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir V. Putin, met in Mexico on Monday.

Spokesmen for the White House, State Department and C.I.A. would not comment on any intelligence operations supporting the Syrian rebels, some details of which were reported last week by The Wall Street Journal.

Until now, the public face of the administration�s Syria policy has largely been diplomacy and humanitarian aid.

The State Department said Wednesday that Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton would meet with her Russian counterpart, Sergey V. Lavrov, on the sidelines of a meeting of Asia-Pacific foreign ministers in St. Petersburg, Russia, next Thursday. The private talks are likely to focus, at least in part, on the crisis in Syria.

The State Department has authorized $15 million in nonlethal aid, like medical supplies and communications equipment, to civilian opposition groups in Syria.

The Pentagon continues to fine-tune a range of military options, after a request from Mr. Obama in early March for such contingency planning. Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told senators at that time that the options under review included humanitarian airlifts, aerial surveillance of the Syrian military, and the establishment of a no-fly zone.

The military has also drawn up plans for how coalition troops would secure Syria�s sizable stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons if an all-out civil war threatened their security.

But senior administration officials have underscored in recent days that they are not actively considering military options. �Anything at this point vis-�-vis Syria would be hypothetical in the extreme,� General Dempsey told reporters this month.

What has changed since March is an influx of weapons and ammunition to the rebels. The increasingly fierce air and artillery assaults by the government are intended to counter improved coordination, tactics and weaponry among the opposition forces, according to members of the Syrian National Council and other activists.

Last month, these activists said, Turkish Army vehicles delivered antitank weaponry to the border, where it was then smuggled into Syria. Turkey has repeatedly denied it was extending anything other than humanitarian aid to the opposition, mostly via refugee camps near the border. The United States, these activists said, was consulted about these weapons transfers.

American military analysts offered mixed opinions on whether these arms have offset the advantages held by the militarily superior Syrian Army. �The rebels are starting to crack the code on how to take out tanks,� said Joseph Holliday, a former United States Army intelligence officer in Afghanistan who is now a researcher tracking the Free Syrian Army for the Institute for the Study of War in Washington.

But a senior American officer who receives classified intelligence reports from the region, compared the rebels� arms to �peashooters� against the government�s heavy weaponry and attack helicopters.

The Syrian National Council, the main opposition group in exile, has recently begun trying to organize the scattered, localized units that all fight under the name of the Free Syrian Army into a more cohesive force.

About 10 military coordinating councils in provinces across the country are now sharing tactics and other information. The city of Homs is the notable exception. It lacks such a council because the three main military groups in the city do not get along, national council officials said.

Jeffrey White, a defense analyst at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy who tracks videos and announcements from self-described rebel battalions, said there were now about 100 rebel formations, up from roughly 70 two months ago, ranging in size from a handful of fighters to a couple of hundred combatants.

�When the regime wants to go someplace and puts the right package of forces together, it can do it,� Mr. White said. �But the opposition is raising the cost of those kinds of operations.�

# ? Jun 21, 2012 21:01

Chronojam: Feb 20, 2006; This is me on vacation in Amsterdam
Never be afraid of being yourself!

That's actually quite interesting. What's the confidence on no actual material support, and it actually just being a glorified management job? That might be a new way to operate that's more favorable than paying to deliver US-made equipment to these locations.

# ? Jun 21, 2012 21:32

Nenonen: Oct 22, 2009; Mulla on aina kolkyt donaa taskussa

V. Illych L. posted:

It bears mentioning that massacre-based counterinsurgency tactics have a rather poor history with regards to efficiency as well. The nazis found that out in the Balkans and Russia, and to a lesser degree the Soviets in Afghanistan (these are the most obvious examples I can think of, there are probably more).

OTOH Soviet Union and Yugoslavia were the only two countries where partisans stood a chance at being of any military use. German brutality was really effective at deterring active resistance everywhere else - France, Greece, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Poland etc. to the point where western Allies instructed resistance groups to avoid attacking Axis soldiers because the retribution against local civilians would be so out of proportion.

Modern history of Middle-East has certainly shown that a ruthless dictator very often can extinguish the flame of rebellion with the blood of the people. Ba'athist governments in particular have been very successful in this regard.

# ? Jun 21, 2012 21:34

Brown Moses: Feb 22, 2002

The first half of this IED video from Syria demonstrates an increasingly common and annoying feature of a lot of these videos, over long introductions for short videos
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jwDDOCxu3T8

# ? Jun 21, 2012 22:09

Xandu: Feb 19, 2006; It's hard to be humble when you're as great as I am.

Jihadists

# ? Jun 21, 2012 22:13

Brown Moses: Feb 22, 2002

This video shows two generals and two colonels who have just defected
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H_8hYCA0ET0

# ? Jun 21, 2012 22:19

Patter Song: Mar 26, 2010; Hereby it is manifest that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war as is of every man against every man.; Fun Shoe

V. Illych L. posted:

It bears mentioning that massacre-based counterinsurgency tactics have a rather poor history with regards to efficiency as well. The nazis found that out in the Balkans and Russia, and to a lesser degree the Soviets in Afghanistan (these are the most obvious examples I can think of, there are probably more).

The Nazi example actually shows its success in areas, at least areas where there was enough carrot-and-stick that "The Nazis are going to kill you whether you resist or not" became a reality. A good example is Lidice. A man from Lidice assassinated Heydrich, the Nazis respond by killing every adult man in the village of Lidice and deporting the women and most of the children to a concentration camp, there's pretty much no resistance among the Czechs for the rest of the war because everyone's frightened their village would be the next Lidice if they did anything.

# ? Jun 21, 2012 22:52

sum: Nov 15, 2010

V. Illych L. posted:

It bears mentioning that massacre-based counterinsurgency tactics have a rather poor history with regards to efficiency as well. The nazis found that out in the Balkans and Russia, and to a lesser degree the Soviets in Afghanistan (these are the most obvious examples I can think of, there are probably more).

I don't think those are as applicable because they were wars of occupation rather than rebellion crushing. Nearly every counter-rebellion that succeeded succeeded because of the use of massacres. Some examples of this would be the War in the Vend�e and the Second Chechen War (not to mention the first Syrian uprising from 30 years ago).

# ? Jun 21, 2012 22:58

New Division: Jun 23, 2004; I beg to present to you as a Christmas gift, Mr. Lombardi, the city of Detroit.

V. Illych L. posted:

It bears mentioning that massacre-based counterinsurgency tactics have a rather poor history with regards to efficiency as well. The nazis found that out in the Balkans and Russia, and to a lesser degree the Soviets in Afghanistan (these are the most obvious examples I can think of, there are probably more).

The Germans might have succeeding in depopulating Russia and the Balkans if the Red Army hadn't hung in there and made the comeback of the century.

# ? Jun 21, 2012 23:47

V. Illych L.: Apr 11, 2008; ASK ME ABOUT LUMBER

^^^^Right, I'm not by any means an expert on WWII so I can't really comment on it, but I thought that Greece and France both had active and fighting resistance movements despite it all?

Also for a counterexample to the Second Chechen War, the First Chechen War (yes, it's a somewhat different beast, but I'd argue that it's still applicable).

My point is, brutality is not a sure-fire way of repressing a revolt - revolts are legitimately hard to deal with once they gain momentum (Hama, back in the day, was a successful effort to stop the revolt from gaining momentum), and after that brutality mostly serves to polarise the conflict. Not saying that Assad is definitely doomed, but his methods are just as fallible as those of any other occupant/dictator.

# ? Jun 22, 2012 00:06