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Cat Mattress posted:Neither Russia nor Pakistan would go on any military adventure on behalf of Iran. There's no alliance between these countries, and no friendship either. And that sense of extreme isolation in Iran plays a big part in Iranian militarism and the desire for nukes. No one's going to stand up for them, Israel has nukes, and Saudi Arabia could have nukes next week if they want. No one's going to try to restrain Iran's enemies, either. A large part of Iran's political calculus is the knowledge that, thanks to Trump, no one on the international stage is even pretending to like Iran anymore, so Iran's security and defense is on their own heads. That's the kind of situation that makes acquiring nukes not just internally logical but rather urgent. Which of course would only make everyone in the Middle East even more twitchy in general and about Iran specifically. The Security Dilemma in action.
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# ? Jan 30, 2020 19:00 |
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# ? Apr 23, 2024 20:53 |
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Cythereal posted:And that sense of extreme isolation in Iran plays a big part in Iranian militarism and the desire for nukes. No one's going to stand up for them, Israel has nukes, and Saudi Arabia could have nukes next week if they want. No one's going to try to restrain Iran's enemies, either. That political calculus isn't new. A lot of it can be tied to the Iran-Iraq War. This is a pretty good article on it. Also, I think it's important to consider the nonproliferation regime's successes in the context of countries' security concerns, and whether they think their survival can be assured without nuke to back them up. The cases of France, Pakistan, and Israel being some strong examples. (Sagan's full of it on France, fwiw.) Not to be too fatalistic, but if there are pressing security concerns that no other power can address and you have the resources to go nuclear (including black markets), they're going to have to do better than hit you with a sanctions-stick and tell you to cut that poo poo out. And without flattering the regime in Tehran too much, I'd say they have some very legitimate reasons not to trust the US to address any of its security concerns. Karenina fucked around with this message at 20:14 on Jan 30, 2020 |
# ? Jan 30, 2020 20:05 |
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Karenina posted:(Sagan's full of it on France, fwiw.) This guy I suppose. Could you elaborate?
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# ? Jan 30, 2020 20:52 |
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https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2020/01/not-a-straight-shooter-dod-review-cites-fleet-of-faults-in-f-35-program/ F-35 is still a fiasco, according to the DoD.
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# ? Jan 30, 2020 21:16 |
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drgitlin posted:https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2020/01/not-a-straight-shooter-dod-review-cites-fleet-of-faults-in-f-35-program/ quote:One of the major sources of problems with the F-35 program is the Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS)—the software that drives maintenance and logistics for each F-35 aircraft. ALIS is supposed to intelligently drive the flow of maintenance parts, guide support crews in scheduling maintenance, and ensure the right parts get stuck in the right places. Aircraft health and maintenance action information is sent by the ALIS software in each aircraft out to the entire distributed logistical support network. Man, I hope people have at least learned a lesson about concurrent design from all of this. Like, this ALIS thing sounds neat and useful as gently caress. But why develop it as part of this program? It sounds like the sort of neat feature that you could put on the latest block of F18s or whatever and have it as a neat extra on a system that is already known to work. Once the inevitable kinks get worked out then put it in your next gen super fighter.
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# ? Jan 30, 2020 21:20 |
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Cyrano4747 posted:Man, I hope people have at least learned a lesson about concurrent design from all of this. Between the F-35 and the Tesla Model 3 there are many dissertations waiting to be written on just how bad an idea concurrent design really is.
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# ? Jan 30, 2020 21:28 |
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Anyone who's ever designed anything knows it is a bad idea on its face. I want to read the dissertations on how such an obviously foolish approach was taken by companies that should know better
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# ? Jan 30, 2020 22:05 |
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drgitlin posted:Between the F-35 and the Tesla Model 3 there are many dissertations waiting to be written on just how bad an idea concurrent design really is. Don't forget the Fords.
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# ? Jan 30, 2020 22:12 |
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Cyrano4747 posted:Man, I hope people have at least learned a lesson about concurrent design from all of this. As mentioned, the Ford ties up replacement carriers with an unproven catapult design. LCS was kinda dumb also, DDG-1000 is probably one of the biggest military boondoggles ever (edit: on second thought this is massive hyperbole, but its crazy in terms of ambition versus results) - a billion different new design decisions and they would have saved so much money and effort by developing a test ship one-off. I remember the Sea Shadow was one of those last cases where they actually made a prototype to test new technology to be used on future classes, but making one-off testbeds doesn't make Northrop Grumman as much money. Rob Rockley fucked around with this message at 00:49 on Jan 31, 2020 |
# ? Jan 30, 2020 22:22 |
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Splode posted:Anyone who's ever designed anything knows it is a bad idea on its face. I want to read the dissertations on how such an obviously foolish approach was taken by companies that should know better Sounds like a good approach if you have a cost plus contract.
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# ? Jan 30, 2020 22:41 |
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I dunno they sound badass to me https://twitter.com/ddale8/status/1222994454648434706
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# ? Jan 30, 2020 22:50 |
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Minor story but thread relevant, retirement of cold war relics: The B-52 Will No Longer Carry Nuclear Gravity Bombs I imagine there's basically no place that we could nuke with gravity bombs on a B-52 as the B-52 would be shot down long before they got where they wanted to go. Also from the article: quote:B-52, known as the Big Ugly Fat Fellow What a good attempt at re-branding, AF.
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# ? Jan 30, 2020 23:28 |
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It’s an old euphemism, not really a rebranding. They needed something to tell kids at airshows in the 70s when they asked about the BUFF name.
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# ? Jan 30, 2020 23:32 |
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See also: "Situation Normal, All Fouled Up"
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# ? Jan 30, 2020 23:33 |
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Cat Mattress posted:This guy I suppose. Could you elaborate? Sure thing. This might get long-winded. Back in 1996 or so, he had an article in International Security called "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb." Sagan lists three theoretical frameworks, or models, for why states go nuclear. You have the security model, according to which states build nukes to better secure themselves against threats to their national security--say, another state with a nuke. The next is the domestic politics model, where nukes are essentially political tools for domestic actors to further their own parochial and bureaucratic interests. Last is the norms model, where a state seeks or dismantles nukes based on the symbolic, normative power of that decision. As in, it's the 1950s and I want some sexy modernity and prestige. What's more modern than a nuke? Sagan recognizes that states aren't driven by just one of these models, and that security concerns tend to be overriding in the majority of the states that ultimately went nuclear. My problem is with how he characterizes the French program. He frames it as based on the symbolic power of nuclear weapons. The bomb is a "dramatic symbol of French independence" necessary for "France to continue to be seen, by itself and others, as a great power." This argument is way too simplistic, and it leaves out some important details. Bruno Tertrais has an article called "Déstruction assurée" that gives a more comprehensive picture (and critiques Sagan a bit). Sagan notes that Mendes-France’s decision to start a nuclear weapons program came in December 1954, two years before the Suez Crisis. Based on that, he says, Suez couldn't have put France on the nuclear path. There definitely weren't any similar instances of the US not coming to help France keep its colonial empire afloat. Definitely not in 1954. Anyway, Sagan doesn't even mention Dien Bien Phu, even though that partly precipitated the founding of Atomic Energy Commission. He essentially dismisses WWII as a factor in US credibility by saying that the US sided with France and ultimately liberated it. But from another vantage point, the US only entered the war when its own interests were at stake. Would the same happen in another war, say, one where US interests weren't at stake? Could the French expect a country all the way across the Atlantic to meet its security concerns, especially ones that the US didn't share? And then comes Sputnik. So you have a) the experience of World War II, b) the US not helping them at Dien Bien Phu, c) the US not siding with them over the Suez Crisis, d) the US' special nuclear relationship with the Brits, and e) Sputnik all compounding on each other. From the perspective of a guy like de Gaulle--and others in the French government, for that matter--the US security guarantee looks pretty unreliable. The fact that France had become an empire in decline didn't mean that all of its key political and military players would just give up on those long-standing global interests. Empires aren't usually inclined to give everything up without a fuss. None of this is to sympathize with French imperialism or to say the US should have, say, intervened at Dien Bien Phu and Suez on their behalf. My point is that that these events and anxieties have unavoidable consequences beyond symbols and ego. Framing the decision to go nuclear in terms of prestige is also pretty dismissive, I think, because both the French and the British recognized the nuclear deterrent as a powerful bargaining chip. Getting the bomb gave them more weight to throw around. Anyway, while symbolism and prestige are obviously at play here, dissociating those from the security concerns is both inaccurate and unproductive. Which is essentially what Sagan does.
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# ? Jan 30, 2020 23:51 |
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Thanks. I'm not surprised at Sagan's take, seems quite stereotypical of how American political thinkers view French defense and foreign policy. I'd add that the French nuclear weapon program actually started before WW2, but was interrupted by it. All research notes and reserves of material were sent to the UK for safekeeping when Germany invaded, and the UK in turn handed them to the US. I don't think Dien Bien Phu was a factor, though. What was a factor was: 1914: the Great War begins, Germany invades north-eastern France through Belgium 1917: after three years of bloody stalemates completely ravaging the French countryside, the USA decide to enter the battle 1939: World War 2 begins, Germany invades France through Belgium again, this time doesn't get stalemated but instead inflict a humiliating defeat 1944: after four years of Nazi occupation, the USA decide to enter the battle 19XY: the Soviet Union starts WW3, invading France through Germany and then Belgium 19XZ: after X years of ruthless soviet occupation and bloody slaughters, the USA decide perhaps to enter the battle It's not the colonies that were at stake, it was the mainland. (Nukes wouldn't have helped at Dien Bien Phu.) I don't think any American politician could grasp the trauma caused by having your country serve as the battleground to two world wars in 30 years but there was a "never again" factor. Another interesting thing to point out is what happened between both world wars. And notably, the story of Clemenceau and the Versailles Treaty. quote:When Clemenceau returned to the Council of Ten on 1 March he found that little had changed. One issue that had not changed at all was a dispute over France's long-running eastern frontier and control of the German Rhineland. Clemenceau believed that Germany's possession of this territory left France without a natural frontier in the East and thus simplified invasion into France for an attacking army. The British ambassador reported in December 1918 on Clemenceau's views on the future of the Rhineland: "He said that the Rhine was a natural boundary of Gaul and Germany and that it ought to be made the German boundary now, the territory between the Rhine and the French frontier being made into an Independent State whose neutrality should be guaranteed by the great powers".[31] When the USSR developed its own atom bomb, and the logic of MAD entered the political equation, there was a simple calculus to make: if the Warsaw Pact invades Europe but without attacking the USA, why would America commit nuclear suicide? If European countries don't have their own deterrent, they'll just serve as battlefields (again) for the two superpowers, so that they can have a "safe" conventional proxy war.
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# ? Jan 31, 2020 01:14 |
Cat Mattress posted:Thanks. I'm not surprised at Sagan's take, seems quite stereotypical of how American political thinkers view French defense and foreign policy. This was a nice post, thanks
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# ? Jan 31, 2020 01:17 |
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To add, for a while, both the US and the Soviet Union went hard on the idea of mid-range nukes and tactical nukes and collectively Europe realized that the Soviets and Americans could conceivably write off Europe as a nuclear combat hellzone if it meant avoiding strategic nukes being dropped on the two great powers’ homelands. MAD was preferable for nations potentially caught in the middle.
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# ? Jan 31, 2020 01:25 |
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Cat Mattress posted:Thanks. I'm not surprised at Sagan's take, seems quite stereotypical of how American political thinkers view French defense and foreign policy. Right. Sagan's a fairly well-respected scholar on nuclear safety and the like, but he's parroting a very superficial interpretation devoid of sympathy for the other country's experience. You see similarly dismissive and (imo) clueless rhetoric on the French withdrawal from NATO's integrated command. I knew about the major contributions the French had made to nuclear research, but I wasn't aware of what had happened with the notes and reserves. Really adding insult to injury on the US-UK nuclear relationship. quote:I don't think Dien Bien Phu was a factor, though. What was a factor was: Looking back at my earlier post, I think I worded it rather badly and made it sound like I was overstating the colonies as a factor while understating the trauma of WWII. Sorry about that. My point is less that nukes would have somehow helped at Dien Bien Phu and more that these colonial losses fed into an existing sense of vulnerability and dangerous dependency on an unreliable security guarantor. They were factors, but not decisive or independent of existing factors like WWII and the possibility of WWIII.
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# ? Jan 31, 2020 02:59 |
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Cat Mattress posted:We know what happened then: the US Senate refused to ratify the treaty, so Wilson's guarantee was voided Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose.
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# ? Jan 31, 2020 03:42 |
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mlmp08 posted:To add, for a while, both the US and the Soviet Union went hard on the idea of mid-range nukes and tactical nukes and collectively Europe realized that the Soviets and Americans could conceivably write off Europe as a nuclear combat hellzone if it meant avoiding strategic nukes being dropped on the two great powers’ homelands. Man that is like a razor thin line, hoping to stop at tactical nukes. I get Europe's perspective obviously but more broadly I don’t see how a war like that ends before escalating to total exchange
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# ? Jan 31, 2020 05:32 |
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European independent nuclear capabilities were part-meant to be a guarantor of total escalation I guess.
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# ? Jan 31, 2020 08:38 |
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Koesj posted:European independent nuclear capabilities were part-meant to be a guarantor of total escalation I guess. That's a very clear sighted guess
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# ? Jan 31, 2020 11:28 |
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Koesj posted:European independent nuclear capabilities were part-meant to be a guarantor of total escalation I guess. For sure, I just mean if Soviet/US warplanners thought they were going to be able to contain a limited nuclear engagement, that's dumb as hell
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# ? Jan 31, 2020 15:23 |
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zoux posted:For sure, I just mean if Soviet/US warplanners thought they were going to be able to contain a limited nuclear engagement, that's dumb as hell “The nuclear arms race is like two sworn enemies standing waist deep in gasoline, one with three matches, the other with five...one lights a match, setting themselves ablaze, and both men conclude...."
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# ? Jan 31, 2020 19:22 |
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Hard to reconcile that a TV movie may have been instrumental to detente but old Ronnie liked his stories.
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# ? Jan 31, 2020 19:33 |
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Defense reporters getting pissed that a more mainstream site got traffic with a clickbaity old news headline are amusing, even though I’m sure I’d be frustrated if I were them. https://twitter.com/aviation_intel/status/1222940756538613760?s=21
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# ? Jan 31, 2020 20:55 |
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Those articles are annoying for the pile on it inspires from folks completely ignorant of the actual specifics but then that’s clickbait I guess..
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# ? Jan 31, 2020 21:01 |
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Some first renders for the B-21 came out today.
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# ? Jan 31, 2020 22:24 |
more like B-2:2
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# ? Jan 31, 2020 22:40 |
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Dante80 posted:
no engine at all, a bold choice air force
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# ? Jan 31, 2020 22:54 |
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Edit: gently caress it, it’s not important.
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# ? Jan 31, 2020 23:00 |
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Is that not an inlet just starboard (for you landlubbers: starboard means west) of the cockpit?
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# ? Jan 31, 2020 23:03 |
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Cat Mattress posted:19XY: the Soviet Union starts WW3, invading France through Germany and then Belgium
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# ? Jan 31, 2020 23:21 |
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evil_bunnY posted:This is what started the "force de frappe" initiative and literally what the french nukeboyz will tell you if you'd bothered listening to them. The name of the game is "stay the gently caress out of our house, or we glass yer poo poo" Which is why using my Cold War blender always makes me chuckle.
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# ? Jan 31, 2020 23:37 |
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joat mon posted:Which is why using my Cold War blender always makes me chuckle. Incredible flex but I want that blender
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# ? Jan 31, 2020 23:54 |
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joat mon posted:Which is why using my Cold War blender always makes me chuckle. We had one of these when I was growing up.
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# ? Feb 1, 2020 00:14 |
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evil_bunnY posted:This is what started the "force de frappe" initiative and literally what the french nukeboyz will tell you if you'd bothered listening to them. The name of the game is "stay the gently caress out of our house, or we glass yer poo poo" I remember when they did testing in '96, my economics teacher told us "they got torn to pieces and burned to the ground twice in the first half of this century, they want to make sure that if anyone tries it again, the consequences are clearly on display"
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# ? Feb 1, 2020 02:00 |
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https://youtu.be/1B1EAeh6H_I Imagine hearing this with no warning
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# ? Feb 1, 2020 02:19 |
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# ? Apr 23, 2024 20:53 |
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The Captian and First Officer of HMCS Calgary have been removed. The issue:quote:The second-in-command was relieved of this duties after he was found guilty of misconduct for his actions in disabling the smoke and heat detectors in the ship’s wardroom so he could smoke. The disabling of those safety systems took place less than two weeks after a fire had broken out in the engine room of HMCS Calgary. quote:isabling a smoke detector is seen as a significant safety issue since fires on ships have the potential to cause extensive damage. Just 12 days before, a fire broke out in the engine room of HMCS Calgary. The fire was quickly extinguished and crew members were treated for minor injuries and placed under observation for smoke exposure.
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# ? Feb 1, 2020 02:57 |