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Eh the soviet getting the bomb was a real big deal and their espionage program greatly accelerated that timeline. Curious to see how other events coalescing around that time would have played out in a world where the US retained its sole ownership of atomic weapons.
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Feb 4, 2020 18:07
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Waroduce posted:Eh the soviet getting the bomb was a real big deal and their espionage program greatly accelerated that timeline. Curious to see how other events coalescing around that time would have played out in a world where the US retained its sole ownership of atomic weapons. Korea would have gotten fun
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Feb 4, 2020 18:13
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That Works posted:Korea would have gotten fun It would never of happened then.
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Feb 4, 2020 20:35
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There's more to intelligence work than just stealing technology or finding out their nefarious plans. Beyond all the secret poo poo, there's also a heavy component to just knowing your adversary, knowing what they value, and knowing the personalities working for them. A lot of the work that analysts do id fueled by the raw materials collected by intelligence agencies (in addition to other sources) and when synthesized give policy makers a much better view of what's going on than they would have had otherwise. Having an intelligent answer for when the president turns and asks "so what's this glasnost stuff? Are they serious, is this a real thing, is this some kind of internal consumption only propaganda thing?" is invaluable in and of itself, and getting that answer involves a lot of very mundane, very un-sexy intel work.
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Feb 4, 2020 21:06
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https://twitter.com/oriana0214/status/1224787799980892160?s=21 Interesting proof of concept.
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Feb 4, 2020 21:16
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Cyrano4747 posted:There's more to intelligence work than just stealing technology or finding out their nefarious plans. Beyond all the secret poo poo, there's also a heavy component to just knowing your adversary, knowing what they value, and knowing the personalities working for them. A lot of the work that analysts do id fueled by the raw materials collected by intelligence agencies (in addition to other sources) and when synthesized give policy makers a much better view of what's going on than they would have had otherwise. It's also worth noting that most, if not all countries with a large intelligence network aren't just spying on their enemies - they're also probably spying on their friends (in much more subtle ways) to try to intuit their intents and actions. Five Eyes may not be spying on each other too much (and obviously anyone who knows won't or shouldn't post about it), but for anyone who doesn't remember there was a scandal a few years ago when the Germans figured out the US had been spying on them for years. Statecraft is as much an information war as it is anything else - one that can be twisted to anything a particularly country needs or desires (see: Israel trying to make bedfellows out of everyone, Chinese industrial espionage, etc.)
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Feb 4, 2020 22:04
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bewbies posted:Some espionage efforts span years, with elaborate clandestine plans involving hundreds of people, high tech equipment, and razor-thin timelines. I mean, it sounds like the "secrets" here are just unclassified ITAR information. Obviously, ITAR exists precisely because there are technologies the US doesn't want transferred to places like China, but any "secret" I can freely share with 330 million of my closest friends is not going to withstand much of an effort to get it. There are lots of weird edge cases where there's not much guidance about what really counts as export controlled, which keeps the lawyers busy, but really makes it difficult for smaller companies to know if they are in compliance. I remember at my former government job, there was a Chinese postdoc who was accused by some Congressman of sending secrets to China. He was originally hired, as his boss told me, because they literally could not find an American with expertise in his area willing to take a government salary to do the work after several years of searching. The poor kid panicked and fled back home (his postdoc position was ending soon, anyway), but was arrested at the airport. In the end, they found nothing except some porn on his government computer and deported him for that. For a while, I was worried it might be Wen Ho Lee all over again. A bunch disruptive changes to the process for having visitors and reviewing and disseminating technical data followed; which in my opinion had little effect except to further reduce the productivity of government research. We'd really ought to revisit the export control system; I don't think it buys much in terms of protection, but it does serve as a disincentive for US industry to work in defense-related areas. The classified information system, on the other hand, is quite effective in controlling technical information--but imposes an even higher burden on doing the work in the first place. It would be good to try to find a more effective and less burdensome system to replace the current export control regime, especially now, when frankly, the US is losing its technical edge in many areas.
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Feb 4, 2020 23:21
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The dude they dinged had a secret clearance. Dunno if his laptop had anything but the way he lied about his foreign travel is seriously no bueno in that situation.
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Feb 4, 2020 23:49
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Tetraptous posted:I mean, it sounds like the "secrets" here are just unclassified ITAR information. Obviously, ITAR exists precisely because there are technologies the US doesn't want transferred to places like China, but any "secret" I can freely share with 330 million of my closest friends is not going to withstand much of an effort to get it. It's good to remember there's a huge gap between "unclassified" and "releasable to the public". Your SSN is unclassified for instance, but government employees can't publish it. Lots of unclassified information from PII to ITAR to proprietary data comes with potential civil and criminal penalties for disclosure. Even if it doesn't it can be a bad idea. Mortabis posted:Can't help but feel that despite the effort involved, the spy game in the Cold War didn't matter. The important piece of intelligence was the realization that Soviet economic figures were bogus, standard of living was regressing, and consequently if we walked away from detente they could never keep up. No theft of secrets could make up the difference. It would have made a massive difference if the Cold War had gone hot, eg, John Anthony Walker's disclosure of naval cryptographic material. It probably also helped prevent the war from going hot by providing some level of tactical warning and protection against technological surprise. The kinds of things you mention are things that intelligence is very bad at. Questions of present physical fact that can be answered by observation, it's great. Grand currents of history, not so much.
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Feb 5, 2020 00:00
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Cyrano4747 posted:The dude they dinged had a secret clearance. Dunno if his laptop had anything but the way he lied about his foreign travel is seriously no bueno in that situation. Not just that, he was specifically warned against taking his company laptop on an overseas, lied about where he was going, then got caught when he decided to resign - ostensibly while still holding onto the laptop. All of this screams data theft, and when Raytheon warned him not to go they probably weren't fully aware of what was (or wasn't) on the laptop.
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Feb 5, 2020 00:08
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Cyrano4747 posted:Having an intelligent answer for when the president turns and asks lol good one It’s all wasted if nobody is home upstairs. This could happen, if, say, the intelligence agencies were “extremely careless in their handling” of domestic politics.
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Feb 5, 2020 00:47
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bewbies posted:Some espionage efforts span years, with elaborate clandestine plans involving hundreds of people, high tech equipment, and razor-thin timelines. From the article. quote:The Chinese-born American citizen had worked for the U.S. defense contractor for more than a decade and had earned secret-level clearance for his work with highly sensitive missile programs developed for the military. At the risk of sounding racist, the first bolded part should have prevented the second bolded part, or at the least required draconian security measures. Edit: how common is it for non-five eyes or Nato nation born-citizens to be given this kind of clearance? Blistex fucked around with this message at 01:12 on Feb 5, 2020 |
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Feb 5, 2020 01:03
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Blistex posted:At the risk of sounding racist, the first bolded part should have prevented the second bolded part, or at the least required draconian security measures. Not how it works. Vetting clearances based on ongoing relationships, status, and social/professional connections is one thing. Discrimination against US citizens based on national origin is another.
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Feb 5, 2020 01:08
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It's a slippery slope, and maybe it's just media over-attention, but it would seem to indicate there being a pattern here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Chinese_spy_cases_in_the_United_States Then again, the list of American born spies is pretty impressive as well. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_American_spies
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Feb 5, 2020 01:18
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mlmp08 posted:Not how it works. Vetting clearances based on ongoing relationships, status, and social/professional connections is one thing. Discrimination against US citizens based on national origin is another. National origin tends to map very closely to the adjudicative guidelines, particularly foreign influence and foreign preference. It is difficult to get a clearance (especially the stricter ones) as a naturalized citizen from a hostile power, and it should be. China in particular leans hard on their very deliberately cultivated efforts to define Chinese ethnicity as synonymous with loyalty to the CCP.
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Feb 5, 2020 01:19
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It’s a lovely, impractical, and un-American practice to barr people from clearances based on national origin of US citizens. For example, a lot of people fled Iran in 1979 who are not fans of the current leadership. Or people growing up in the USSR or Warsaw-pact nations fleeing west. And if someone’s parents deliberately broke ties from a country and brought them to the states at age 2, there may not be strong ties. Someone works for 25 years in an adversary nation, then moves to the US and fast-tracks to citizenship via joining the military or defense industry? Sure, check on that person’s connections. E: it also depends. I knew a guy who had issues with his clearance renewal because of his Iranian-American wife. Because his focus area was Iran. Meanwhile, she ALSO had a clearance but with a different federal agency and focus.
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Feb 5, 2020 01:22
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mlmp08 posted:Someone works for 25 years in an adversary nation, then moves to the US and fast-tracks to citizenship via joining the military or defense industry? Sure, check on that person’s connections. Or, let them run your space program!
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Feb 5, 2020 01:25
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We should be more like the British, who during the Cold War made sure that all their highest-level intelligence positions were filled by white Britons with impeccable backgrounds and who had attended all the best schools and could vouch for each other. I understand that worked out extremely well for the UK and its intelligence services.
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Feb 5, 2020 01:27
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Yes, all that's true, which is why it's not and shouldn't be a blanket ban. But it does require extra scrutiny and that's ok, especially from say China as opposed to allies like South Korea or Japan.
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Feb 5, 2020 01:36
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More on the cold self interest side there's also the effect of denying yourself of talent. What is the worth of contributions by Chinese born people with security clearances? I bet it's not insignificant. I like to think that attracting global talent is one of the big advantages of open societies. Maybe that's a Stephen Ambrose level of wishful thinking but Germany chasing off all the Jewish scientists did not seem to do their Japanese allies any favors. Related, we don't have any nuke smilies? That seems a defect.
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Feb 5, 2020 01:38
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I think the best part of Raytheon man in China story is most likely he didn’t actively work with the Chinese government or else he would’ve never came back, but the Chinese likely copied his hard drive in his hotel room or at the airport anyway.
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Feb 5, 2020 01:40
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Blistex posted:Edit: how common is it for non-five eyes or Nato nation born-citizens to be given this kind of clearance? Fun anecdote: my clearance investigator was himself a naturalized citizen. As I am also a naturalized citizen, this helped put my mind at ease about a part of the process that my recruiters had absolutely no clue about.
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Feb 5, 2020 01:52
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Mazz posted:I think the best part of Raytheon man in China story is most likely he didn’t actively work with the Chinese government or else he would’ve never came back, but the Chinese likely copied his hard drive in his hotel room or at the airport anyway. Maybe he thought he got away with it and was getting ready for round two?
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Feb 5, 2020 01:53
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I’ve known more than a few TS/SCI folks from middle eastern and former soviet countries. I don’t know the demographics (or if they make those remotely public), but it’s neither mega-common not uncommon? Also plenty of naturalized Mexican-Americans with TS clearances just by nature of a fair number of naturalized Mexican-Americans seeking military or other government jobs. One of my childhood friends became an intel officer for the Air Force, and he was a naturalized Vietnamese citizen.
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Feb 5, 2020 01:57
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mlmp08 posted:
Unless he was North Vietnamese that's not an apples to apples comparison.
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Feb 5, 2020 02:14
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A.o.D. posted:Unless he was North Vietnamese that's not an apples to apples comparison. It is also not apples to apples to compare every naturalized Chinese-American citizen to every known foreign spy who was a Chinese-American citizen. That includes people who came to America from China as a result of luck of immigration while leaving communist China or fleeing/seeking out-of-China residency in the aftermath of Tienanmen square. quote:Prior to the Chinese Student Protection Act of 1992 (CSPA), President George H.W Bush issued Executive Order 12711 in 1990. This policy implementation was solidified by the actual Act in 1992. The Act's main sponsors were Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) for the House of Representatives and Senator Slade Gorton (R-WA) for the Senate. The Chinese Student Protection Act of 1992 was passed on May 21, 1992 by the Senate, and passed by the House of Representatives on August 10, 1992. President George H. W. Bush signed it into law on October 9, 1992. The Chinese Student Protection Act became Public Law 102-404, 106 Stat. 1969. Also when he came over, there was no North or South Vietnam. There was just Vietnam, because Saigon had been overrun and the South had already surrendered.
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Feb 5, 2020 02:28
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Was there not a brilliant physicist on the Manhattan Project who was Chinese-American, and in the 1950s paranoia he was pushed out of his position, so he goes to China and essentially becomes the godfather of their nuclear program?
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Feb 5, 2020 02:32
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Nebakenezzer posted:Was there not a brilliant physicist on the Manhattan Project who was Chinese-American, and in the 1950s paranoia he was pushed out of his position, so he goes to China and essentially becomes the godfather of their nuclear program? That just proves they weren’t paranoid.  A red‐blooded American would have gotten work as a janitor before betraying America like that.
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Feb 5, 2020 02:53
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Captain von Trapp posted:It's good to remember there's a huge gap between "unclassified" and "releasable to the public". Your SSN is unclassified for instance, but government employees can't publish it. Lots of unclassified information from PII to ITAR to proprietary data comes with potential civil and criminal penalties for disclosure. Even if it doesn't it can be a bad idea. Yes and that’s why the lowest level is a public trust clearance. Even I had one of those, and I’m a dirty foreigner. I only had to give all *my* PII to China in return. gently caress you, OPM.
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Feb 5, 2020 02:57
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FMguru posted:We should be more like the British, who during the Cold War made sure that all their highest-level intelligence positions were filled by white Britons with impeccable backgrounds and who had attended all the best schools and could vouch for each other. I understand that worked out extremely well for the UK and its intelligence services. It certainly fooled the head of counterespionage for the CIA for decades, didn’t it?
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Feb 5, 2020 03:00
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drgitlin posted:Yes and that’s why the lowest level is a public trust clearance. Even I had one of those, and I’m a dirty foreigner. I only had to give all *my* PII to China in return. They got my PII, twice.
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Feb 5, 2020 03:10
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Banged in the Butt by the Notion that OPM Wouldn't Lose my SF-86. fake edit: closest I could find not really that terribly NWS, but still unparsed: https://images-na.ssl-images-amazon.com/images/I/51kWBAZDWLL.jpg
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Feb 5, 2020 03:17
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A.o.D. posted:They got my PII, twice. That we know of.
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Feb 5, 2020 03:24
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Mortabis posted:Can't help but feel that despite the effort involved, the spy game in the Cold War didn't matter. The important piece of intelligence was the realization that Soviet economic figures were bogus, standard of living was regressing, and consequently if we walked away from detente they could never keep up. No theft of secrets could make up the difference. This only works if you assume the USSR was destined to fall.
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Feb 5, 2020 05:55
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The other thing to keep in mind with espionage and foreign influences is that the top predictors for someone doing bad poo poo are financial stress and major life problems (infidelity, drug problems, etc) , in that order. If someone’s going bankrupt they’re a huge goddamn risk and if they have ugly poo poo going on that they don’t want their wife knowing about they’re susceptible to blackmail. The two can overlap as well, as once someone does something a little bad (say PII) that can be leveraged for worse stuff (actual classified documents) via blackmail. Thats way, way more common than the ideological true believers. Some of it is incredibly petty too. I recall one example where a dude was busted selling a flash drive to undercover FBI agents full of SSNs he got from having access to unclassified but sensitive stuff. He was going to get something really dumb like $500. Iirc he thought he was selling to credit card scammers.
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Feb 5, 2020 06:59
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Nebakenezzer posted:Was there not a brilliant physicist on the Manhattan Project who was Chinese-American, and in the 1950s paranoia he was pushed out of his position, so he goes to China and essentially becomes the godfather of their nuclear program? Sorta. This guy. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qian_Xuesen Reminds me of that scene from Charlie Wilson's War where Gust goes "Did he not think it was a good idea to have spies who could speak the same loving language as the guys theyre spying upon?"
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Feb 5, 2020 07:58
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Cyrano4747 posted:The other thing to keep in mind with espionage and foreign influences is that the top predictors for someone doing bad poo poo are financial stress and major life problems (infidelity, drug problems, etc) , in that order. If someone’s going bankrupt they’re a huge goddamn risk and if they have ugly poo poo going on that they don’t want their wife knowing about they’re susceptible to blackmail. The two can overlap as well, as once someone does something a little bad (say PII) that can be leveraged for worse stuff (actual classified documents) via blackmail. Wasn't there at least one person that handed over documents to the Soviets basically out of boredom? I can't recall who, but they'd been passed over for promotion a few times and felt they should be more respected/have more responsibility/whatever. Asked for a pittance in return, just to feel like he was doing it for profit and not because he was betraying other Americans.
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Feb 5, 2020 08:36
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See also: Benedict Arnold. One of the most competent American commanders in the Revolution but he turned traitor because he kept getting passed over for commands/promotions that should have gone to him but went to other, less competent commanders due to politics and egos.
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Feb 5, 2020 09:26
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Arnold was also heavily in debt and asked the British for a lot of money.
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Feb 5, 2020 09:33
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The big public leaks with ideological motivations (Snowden, Manning) get all the press. But when you actually count up spies and their motivations though, it's overwhelmingly money, followed by ego.
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Feb 5, 2020 12:38
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