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This article somewhat answers the question I had regarding the rare use of infantry squares to fight off cavalry during the 18th century. It seems that armies would often be formed into what was essentially a giant rectangle, with grenadiers filling in the gaps between two main lines of infantry. Grenadiers were also deployed at the flanks of battalions, where they could be relied on to wheel around to better fire on the flanks of an enemy when possible so it seems that they were regarded as more reliable units who could perform more complex roles even though they no longer used grenades or were otherwise equipped differently than line infantry.
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# ? Dec 12, 2020 23:34 |
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# ? Apr 26, 2024 00:40 |
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Argas posted:The tl;dr is that the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not justified, the bombing did play a role in getting Imperial Japan to surrender (Shaun posits that the bombings also gave Imperial Japan a scapegoat to pin blame on rather than their military's performance). Japan would've surrendered without the bombing but it certainly accelerated events. The main thing the video takes time to debunk is that popular sentiment the bombs were justified to save American lives and that Imperial Japan surrendered to save the lives of Japanese people. I'm not gonna watch the video, perhaps this guy does actually mention this, but I really despise how the narrative focusing on saving lives tends (really often) to forget about Imperial Japan's victims when weighing up the calculus. Someone on AskHistorians recently did some napkin math implying something on the order of 250,000 deaths a month as a lowball at this point in the war, i.e. well more than both bombings put together. I understand the fascination around the only military use of nuclear weapons, but the way the bombings have so often framed Imperial Japan as though they were victims is so frustrating.
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# ? Dec 13, 2020 00:48 |
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Koramei posted:I understand the fascination around the only military use of nuclear weapons, but the way the bombings have so often framed Imperial Japan as though they were victims is so frustrating. It's extremely frustrating and is unfortunately the version that's taught in Japan thanks to their own right-wingers setting the standards on what they can teach about World War Two. If you think the version taught in American schools is bad (it is), hoo boy.
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# ? Dec 13, 2020 00:59 |
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I just don't see how the A-bomb conversation is separable from the strategic bombing context. Once you're 5 years deep into a war in which everyone has committed to the idea that aerial bombing of cities is a thing and you are nightly throwing out thousands of aircrew with a 5% attrition rate per mission, I don't think someone responsible for all of that can justify not using the bomb once it's available.
Alchenar fucked around with this message at 01:13 on Dec 13, 2020 |
# ? Dec 13, 2020 01:11 |
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Alchenar posted:I just don't see how the A-bomb conversation is separable from the strategic bombing context. Once you're 5 years deep into a war in which everyone has committed to the idea that aerial bombing of cities is a thing and you are nightly throwing out thousands of aircrew with a 5% attrition rate per mission, I don't think someone responsible for all of that can justify not using the bomb once it's available. Because at the end of the day it's a moral argument, not a military/historical one. The A-Bomb is Bad, therefore it can only have been dropped for illegitimate reasons. It can't simply be a climactic tragedy in a war full of them, we have to convict Truman and the rest of Doing A Bad Thing for Bad Reasons.
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# ? Dec 13, 2020 01:21 |
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If we want to talk about unambiguously amoral, the refusal to provide any sort of substantial medical assistance while allied nations rushed medical researchers to Hiroshima and Nagasaki to watch the survivors die and take notes was pretty unambiguously evil.
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# ? Dec 13, 2020 01:33 |
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If you've decided it's okay to burn hundreds of thousands of people to death does it really matter what type of bomb you use to do it? The US government was trying to wrap up the war before the Soviets could get involved, but at the same time they refused to offer what the Japanese leadership wanted (and that they got in the end anyway) - assurance that they could surrender but keep the emperor. Why did they get so hung up on this? I'm not really convinced by the theory that it was based on popular domestic US opinion. Acebuckeye13 posted:Good and well-researched long-form videos dunking on bad opinions espoused by right-wingers typically, though he also posts his own *terrible* opinions on Twitter I'm curious about these terrible opinions, because I am not aware of any.
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# ? Dec 13, 2020 01:34 |
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GotLag posted:If you've decided it's okay to burn hundreds of thousands of people to death does it really matter what type of bomb you use to do it? Conditional surrender's is how we got WWII in the first place, or at least that was a common view at the time. The US choosing to allow the Emperor to remain is far different then the Japanese negotiating for him to remain.
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# ? Dec 13, 2020 01:38 |
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GotLag posted:The US government was trying to wrap up the war before the Soviets could get involved, but at the same time they refused to offer what the Japanese leadership wanted (and that they got in the end anyway) - assurance that they could surrender but keep the emperor. Why did they get so hung up on this? I'm not really convinced by the theory that it was based on popular domestic US opinion. I think popular US opinion was a reason but relying on it too heavily conflicts with the evidence of leaders saying 'if we let the war run on into 46 too late we risk popular opinion turning against the war'. I think 2 other reasons: 1) Because gently caress you that's why. The US had won the war, at huge material and human cost. It was in a position to dictate terms. There's no moral obligation to moderate those terms because the side that had lost and was unquestionably morally responsible for the war needs a few more kicks before it accepts reality. 2) 1918. The Japanese and German regimes in WW2 didn't just need to be defeated, they needed to be utterly discredited and torn apart. No repeat of Versailles, no stab-in-the-back myths, no surviving militarism. It was really important that the losers in WW2 accept that they had totally lost and that everything that happened next was in the gift of the victors to decide. No space allowed for someone to turn around in 10 years time and claim that if only the government had held its nerve and fought harder then Japan could have received better terms.
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# ? Dec 13, 2020 01:44 |
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Argas posted:It's secretly a debunking of the claims popular media and awful shithouses like PragerU often push forth regarding the use of the bombs. Does it seem like the creator is aware of http://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2020/06/09/what-journalists-should-know-about-the-atomic-bombings/ or is it yet another discussion of the non-existent "decision" to drop the bomb. Frankly I basically consider Wellerstein's discussion to be basically the start and the end of the bomb discussion at this point. It's been going around and around pointlessly and fruitlessly for decades now. There's very little new to add to it. Fangz fucked around with this message at 01:48 on Dec 13, 2020 |
# ? Dec 13, 2020 01:44 |
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Koramei posted:I'm not gonna watch the video, perhaps this guy does actually mention this, but I really despise how the narrative focusing on saving lives tends (really often) to forget about Imperial Japan's victims when weighing up the calculus. Someone on AskHistorians recently did some napkin math implying something on the order of 250,000 deaths a month as a lowball at this point in the war, i.e. well more than both bombings put together. Shaun makes a point how the crazy delusional hardliners in Japan were fine with the deaths from Hiroshima and Nagasaki because the whole point of the war after a point was trading lives for war gains. The moderates just didn't think they could get away with keeping the empire and were more worried about getting non-apocalyptic peace terms. Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not an especially large or notable dent in the number of deaths. He also talks about strategic bombing and how it's just not really useful against authoritarian regimes where the people are as much a group to oppress as their enemies. Bombing just made civilians more apathetic, because the military leadership was insulated enough from the effects of it that they could just shrug. Even against democracies its effectiveness is questionable at least in part because "the terror bombing" of Britain just did not involve the sheer scale of Allied bombing but what did happen sure didn't seem like it was going to make the Brits give up. The body of the video's argument hinges on the way the US all but knew (due to various American diplomats/dignitaries who were somewhat familiar with Japan) for certain the sort of terms the Japanese leadership was waiting for, while just refusing to do it. The earlier draft of the Potsdam Declaration was the closest they came to doing it prior to the actual surrender, and in the end they did basically word things so that the guarantee of the survival of the Imperial household was coming from the American side rather than something the Japanese were demanding so it didn't seem like they were giving ground to the enemy. It's hard to say with 100% certainty that America knew how to end the war by guaranteeing the survival of the household but they had more than an inkling and came quite close to doing it earlier, but didn't.
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# ? Dec 13, 2020 01:49 |
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Fangz posted:Does it seem like the creator is aware of http://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2020/06/09/what-journalists-should-know-about-the-atomic-bombings/ or is it yet another discussion of the non-existent "decision" to drop the bomb. That is covered, yes.
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# ? Dec 13, 2020 01:49 |
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quote:The body of the video's argument hinges on the way the US all but knew (due to various American diplomats/dignitaries who were somewhat familiar with Japan) for certain the sort of terms the Japanese leadership was waiting for, while just refusing to do it. That "all but" seems to be doing a lot of work there. There's people who got it right but there's always people who got it right with the benefit of hindsight. This does not equal "well they knew", not when there's major figures that disagreed with that assessment, and pre-war diplomats thoroughly discredited themselves (fairly or unfairly) by being blindsided by the war declaration. It certainly doesn't equate to the US *knowing* that they knew. Fangz fucked around with this message at 01:55 on Dec 13, 2020 |
# ? Dec 13, 2020 01:52 |
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Koramei posted:I understand the fascination around the only military use of nuclear weapons, but the way the bombings have so often framed Imperial Japan as though they were victims is so frustrating. Alchenar posted:I just don't see how the A-bomb conversation is separable from the strategic bombing context. Once you're 5 years deep into a war in which everyone has committed to the idea that aerial bombing of cities is a thing and you are nightly throwing out thousands of aircrew with a 5% attrition rate per mission, I don't think someone responsible for all of that can justify not using the bomb once it's available.
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# ? Dec 13, 2020 01:53 |
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If we hadn't dropped the atomic bombs on those cities, they would have just been firebombed to ash instead. And if Japan hadn't surrendered by around the end of November, the bloodiest invasion in the history of the world would have occurred. And if the war hadn't started years earlier... moral arguments about any of it seem like a waste of time.
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# ? Dec 13, 2020 01:54 |
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Here's Henry Stimson's diary from August 10, 1945:quote:There I read the messages. Japan accepted the Potsdam list of terms put out by the President 'with the understanding that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of his majesty as a sovereign ruler'. It is curious that this was the very single point that I feared would make trouble. When the Potsdam conditions were drawn and left my office where they originated, they contained a provision which permitted the continuance of the dynasty with certain conditions. The President and [Sec. of State] Byrnes struck that out. They were not obdurate on it but thought they could arrange it in the necessary secret negotiations which would take place after any armistice. There has been a good deal of uninformed agitation against the Emperor in this country mostly by people who know no more about Japan than has been given them by Gilbert and Sullivan's 'Mikado', and I found today that curiously enough it had gotten deeply embedded in the minds of influential people in the State Department. Harry Hopkins [special advisor to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman] is a strong anti-Emperor man in spite of his usual good sense and so are Archibald MacLeish [Assistant Sec. of State for Public and Cultural Relations] and Dean Acheson [Assistant Sec. of State for Congressional Relations] - three very extraordinary men to take such a position.
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# ? Dec 13, 2020 01:57 |
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Argas posted:The body of the video's argument hinges on the way the US all but knew (due to various American diplomats/dignitaries who were somewhat familiar with Japan) for certain the sort of terms the Japanese leadership was waiting for, while just refusing to do it. The earlier draft of the Potsdam Declaration was the closest they came to doing it prior to the actual surrender, and in the end they did basically word things so that the guarantee of the survival of the Imperial household was coming from the American side rather than something the Japanese were demanding so it didn't seem like they were giving ground to the enemy. It's hard to say with 100% certainty that America knew how to end the war by guaranteeing the survival of the household but they had more than an inkling and came quite close to doing it earlier, but didn't.
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# ? Dec 13, 2020 01:58 |
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Fangz posted:That "all but" seems to be doing a lot of work there. There's people who got it right but there's always people who got it right with the benefit of hindsight. This does not equal "well they knew", not when there's major figures that disagreed with that assessment. It certainly doesn't equate to the US *knowing* that they knew. I mean, yeah. The US didn't know know but they had more than a vague idea with what they knew. It's just kind of one of those grim humorous moments how a few small changes might've brought the war to an end sooner. Obviously it's not as simple as it's made out to be but the video does highlight that the change in the Potsdam Declaration could've saved everyone a ton of trouble. And that the concern over lives lost in the invasion was not really the major one that it's often made out to be. Terrible Opinions posted:Well even with those terms it would still take the Emperor himself to break the deadlock, and he was unwilling to exercise that power until after Russia declared war. Which was something that wasn't going to happen until Stalin got big attack on Manchuria geared up. The "aha, this will break the deadlock" followed by "and then they were deadlocked" is pretty much a comedy routine by the end of the video.
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# ? Dec 13, 2020 02:00 |
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Terrible Opinions posted:He specifically makes a note of Imperial Japan not caring about it's civilian population and that they were at fault for the whole thing in the first place. I meant victims as in the 250,000/monthly dead in mainland Asia and the Philippines, not Japan; the ones that (like these past few posts) get constantly forgotten about. My stance on the bombings is, frankly, we should stop caring. There are vastly more important and far more tragic things that happened in the Pacific theater, and the atomic bombs have had a damagingly oversized presence in the narrative.
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# ? Dec 13, 2020 02:01 |
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GotLag posted:Here's Henry Stimson's diary from August 10, 1945: I don't see how that contradicts what I said. Argas posted:I mean, yeah. The US didn't know know but they had more than a vague idea with what they knew. It's just kind of one of those grim humorous moments how a few small changes might've brought the war to an end sooner. Obviously it's not as simple as it's made out to be but the video does highlight that the change in the Potsdam Declaration could've saved everyone a ton of trouble. And that the concern over lives lost in the invasion was not really the major one that it's often made out to be. There's a difference between "well things could have easily turned out differently" and waggling ones fingers and going "the US KNEW that this one little thing WOULD END THE WAR but THEY CHOSE NOT TO FOR MYSTERIOUS EVIL REASONS". EDIT: The goal posts here seem to have shifted from "all but knew for certain" to "more than a vague idea". Well frankly if you look at the totality of US actions, putting aside the opinions of individuals who might have been correct, the US institutionally as a whole had rather less than a vague idea what it would take to end the war. That's why they were planning a shitload more nukes, for example. EDIT2: Frankly my take home message from the whole situation is really the need for better foreign human intelligence. Does any one have any info on US human intelligence efforts vs Japan - was there even any? Fangz fucked around with this message at 02:18 on Dec 13, 2020 |
# ? Dec 13, 2020 02:01 |
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Isn't there still a sort of need to maintain the uniquely impressive scale of the nuclear bombs for the sake of averting their usage in modern war? And if nukes weren't dropped on Japan, would we have ended up dropping them during the Korean war?
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# ? Dec 13, 2020 02:17 |
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Fangz posted:I don't see how that contradicts what I said. You're the one who's injecting the attribution to EVIL and not a poor decision made for uncertain but probably stupid reasons Shift the goal post out of your rear end.
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# ? Dec 13, 2020 02:18 |
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SlothfulCobra posted:Isn't there still a sort of need to maintain the uniquely impressive scale of the nuclear bombs for the sake of averting their usage in modern war? There absolutely is, but there's ways to do that without distorting historical facts.
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# ? Dec 13, 2020 02:19 |
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SlothfulCobra posted:Isn't there still a sort of need to maintain the uniquely impressive scale of the nuclear bombs for the sake of averting their usage in modern war? Wellerstein argues that Truman essentially constructed this idea of the unique nature of atomic bombs (and thus the need for unitary presidential authority over them) out of whole cloth following Nagasaki. So yeah, if you buy that argument, and I find it quite compelling, the thought that MacArthur would have gotten his nukes to use if not for Nagasaki seems quite realistic.
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# ? Dec 13, 2020 02:20 |
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Koramei posted:I meant victims as in the 250,000/monthly dead in mainland Asia and the Philippines, not Japan; the ones that (like these past few posts) get constantly forgotten about.
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# ? Dec 13, 2020 02:21 |
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Out of curiosity, has anybody relitigating the morality of the strategic bombing campaign looked into the expected collateral damage of invasion or even blockade? Because a campaign to render Japan militarily incapable of resistance sounds fun and good until you realize that it's a country with highly regional food production, massive cities and a dependency on trade. Let's say the US tries to blockade Imperial Japan. First off, their armies in China are foraging, which is a cute euphemism for something hideous, but even if you decide that the poor put upon population of a fascist power are the only people who get to count as victims in this war, it's worse. The merchant ships that are being used until the end of the war are needed for civilian trade, the ports that the navy is operating out of until the end of the war that were mined and would be mined further in any blockade provided needed trade, and the same railways that would be used to ferry reinforcements to any invasion are necessary to ship food inside the country to prevent localized shortages that would have killed millions. The people in power in Imperial Japan are the people who needed to decide to surrender, and they are the people who needed to clearly communicate and negotiate rather than play 20 questions while running their nation as an ongoing humanitarian disaster in an attempt to continue vicious wars of aggression. I mean, there's a reason blockades are frequently called strangulation.
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# ? Dec 13, 2020 02:27 |
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If a nuke is just a really big, really expensive bomb that's never been tested in combat and isn't perceived by the world at large as being a war-ender, does anyone go to the trouble and expense of building a lot of them, especially after the big war has just finished?
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# ? Dec 13, 2020 02:30 |
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This week's article is one of mine and is a pretty specialist topic: Sherman tank mobility in mud Queue: M4A3E2 Jumbo Sherman, M4A2 Sherman in the Red Army, T-54, T-44 prototypes, T-44 prototypes second round, T-44 production, Soviet HEAT anti-tank grenades, T-34-85M, Myths of Soviet tank building: interbellum tanks, Light Tank M24, German anti-tank rifles, PT-76 modernizations, ISU-122 front line impressions, German additional tank protection (zimmerit, schurzen, track links), Winter and swamp tracks, Paper light tank destroyers, Allied intel on the Maus , Summary of French interbellum tank development, Medium Tank T20, Medium Tank T23, Myths of Soviet tank building, GMC M10, Tiger II predecessors, Pz.Kpfw.IV Ausf.H-J,IS-6, SU-101/SU-102/Uralmash-1, Centurion Mk.I, SU-100 front line impressions, IS-2 front line impressions, Myths of Soviet tank building: early Great Patriotic War, Influence of the T-34 on German tank building, Medium Tank T25, Heavy Tank T26/T26E1/T26E3, Career of Harry Knox, GMC M36, Geschützwagen Tiger für 17cm K72 (Sf), Early Early Soviet tank development (MS-1, AN Teplokhod), Career of Semyon Aleksandrovich Ginzburg, AT-1, Object 140, SU-76 frontline impressions, Creation of the IS-3, IS-6, SU-5, Myths of Soviet tank building: 1943-44, IS-2 post-war modifications, Myths of Soviet tank building: end of the Great Patriotic War, Medium Tank T6, RPG-1, Lahti L-39, T-80 T-62 T-64 T-72A comparative trials, American tank building plans post-war, German tanks for 1946, HMC M7 Priest, GMC M12, GMC M40/M43, ISU-152, AMR 35 ZT, Soviet post-war tank building plans, T-100Y and SU-14-1, Object 430, Pz.Kpfw.35(t), T-60 tanks in combat, SU-76M modernizations, Panhard 178 Available for request (others' articles): Shashmurin's career BT-7M/A-8 trials Voroshilovets tractor trials T-55 underwater driving equipment NEW Light Tank T37 Light Tank T41 Medium Tank M46 Modernization of the M48 to the M60 standard Pre-war and early war British tank building NEW 15 cm sFH 13/1 (Sf) Oerlikon and Solothurn anti-tank rifles German tank building trends at the end of WW2 Pz.Kpfw.III/IV Evolution of German tank observation devices 43M Zrínyi NEW
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# ? Dec 13, 2020 02:32 |
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GotLag posted:If a nuke is just a really big, really expensive bomb that's never been tested in combat and isn't perceived by the world at large as being a war-ender, does anyone go to the trouble and expense of building a lot of them, especially after the big war has just finished? It's only expensive to make the first one. Once you have the pipeline in place remaining bombs can be made very affordably. If it's not a war-ender it's still a very cost effective army/fleet-killer. Fangz fucked around with this message at 02:43 on Dec 13, 2020 |
# ? Dec 13, 2020 02:35 |
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GotLag posted:If a nuke is just a really big, really expensive bomb that's never been tested in combat and isn't perceived by the world at large as being a war-ender, does anyone go to the trouble and expense of building a lot of them, especially after the big war has just finished? The tank wasn't a WWI ender either, and tanks went from being unwieldy hand-assembled things into streamlined war machines produced by the thousand during peace time. There is no guarantee that nuclear weapons would have quietly died after WWII if they weren't used on Japan.
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# ? Dec 13, 2020 02:36 |
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GotLag posted:If a nuke is just a really big, really expensive bomb that's never been tested in combat and isn't perceived by the world at large as being a war-ender, does anyone go to the trouble and expense of building a lot of them, especially after the big war has just finished? The US developed, tested, and built an unknown (but greater than 0) number of purely conventional MOABs, so probably.
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# ? Dec 13, 2020 02:49 |
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Wasn't the Japanese request to keep the Emperor a lot more than merely keeping the Emperor, but also wanted the Emperor to retain veto over occupation policy? That feels like an important detail. Does Shaun make any reference to McNamara and Fog of War? I always found that segment to be hugely compelling when contextualizing WW2. As an aside, there's an interesting parallel I feel between what it must be like to be an official in WW2 Japan and modern politics today; and despite knowing better and what needs to happen you're probably like, shrugging your shoulders about how it can't be helped. The people with the power are going to do what they're going to do and there's nothing you can do and the people who could do something are either deadlocked or disinterested. All the while a cataclysmic, overwhelmingly powerful enemy is bearing down on you and if you wanted to avoid that onslaught should have made better decisions over a decade ago.
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# ? Dec 13, 2020 02:52 |
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xthetenth posted:Out of curiosity, has anybody relitigating the morality of the strategic bombing campaign looked into the expected collateral damage of invasion or even blockade? Because a campaign to render Japan militarily incapable of resistance sounds fun and good until you realize that it's a country with highly regional food production, massive cities and a dependency on trade. Let's say the US tries to blockade Imperial Japan. First off, their armies in China are foraging, which is a cute euphemism for something hideous, but even if you decide that the poor put upon population of a fascist power are the only people who get to count as victims in this war, it's worse. The merchant ships that are being used until the end of the war are needed for civilian trade, the ports that the navy is operating out of until the end of the war that were mined and would be mined further in any blockade provided needed trade, and the same railways that would be used to ferry reinforcements to any invasion are necessary to ship food inside the country to prevent localized shortages that would have killed millions. I have, its Infact i linked to my post about this from milhist thread 3 a few pages ago now i think about it. For those of you without archives. Headline figures, of the likely cost of an invasion of Japan with accompanying blockade. (low end of the estimates) 400k US military dead, 900k wounded. (US estimates) Around 5 million Japanese military casualties. (US estimates) 10 million japanese civillian dead due to starvation. (Japanese government figures) Polyakov fucked around with this message at 03:21 on Dec 13, 2020 |
# ? Dec 13, 2020 03:11 |
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Japanese, chinese, Korean, and any other civilians caught up in the whole thing. If the bombings sped up the end of the war by even a day it saved untold thousands of lives, once the US could start getting food to those peoples.
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# ? Dec 13, 2020 03:15 |
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N1B71d-9j9k&t=398s Some incredible footage here I've never stumbled across before from the landing deck camera of a carrier in the pacific
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# ? Dec 13, 2020 03:36 |
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That entire British Pathé Channel is an absolute treasure trove of cool old film. I'm particularly fond of the ones showing the operations of the automat.
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# ? Dec 13, 2020 03:40 |
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Hey I know it's 2 hours and 20 minutes, so I understand not wanting to watch it, but it's a nuanced take and full of citations so maybe just assuming it's all just saying "bomb = bad" isn't good conversation? He could totally be wrong but he is going through primary documents to make his argument and it's more complicated than that. Plus I naturally rankle at people who go, "I'm not reading/watching that but here are my rebuttals on what I assume they say." His fundamental argument is that trying to boil it down to "bombs made war go away yay" is an over-simplification and then he explains that premise in depth forever. Watch it or don't but you can't just decide what his argument is cause you had a vaguely similar argument with someone 6 years ago. (I saw the video and specifically didn't post it cause I worried it'd cause this.)
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# ? Dec 13, 2020 04:17 |
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I don't go looking at YouTube political commentators for history takes, sorry. Even if I end up agreeing with them I find them supremely annoying. If he has any particularly novel arguments they can be presented here and talked about. I think if the core of what you want to debate, though, is "is this YouTuber virtuous or not", then I don't see that as an useful use of most people's time. Fangz fucked around with this message at 04:50 on Dec 13, 2020 |
# ? Dec 13, 2020 04:45 |
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War itself is inherently evil and despite any lip service to morality it all goes out the window when it comes down to it.
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# ? Dec 13, 2020 04:52 |
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# ? Apr 26, 2024 00:40 |
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That's totally fair and a pretty good viewpoint. I specifically wasn't asking anyone to watch the video, just that if we're going to have a giant derail people should watch it and talk about his points instead of points they made up. I do not want another giant derail about Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but if I must read one I'd like it to even kind of vaguely function as a conversation rather than being the same old points.
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# ? Dec 13, 2020 04:52 |