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feedmegin posted:Shanks Mare What's this?
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# ? Jan 13, 2021 12:21 |
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# ? Apr 19, 2024 12:19 |
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walking
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# ? Jan 13, 2021 13:03 |
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feedmegin posted:Dragoons (og definition). Lightly armed infantry with a means faster than Shanks Mare to get to vital places on the battlefield quickly and then defend them on foot. Dragoons were used as doctrinally intended, though. I think the distinction with modern paratroopers is that they really never get used in combat drops. It would be like if dragoons never actually rode their horses. Pre-WWI French cuirassiers, maybe? Expensive equipment, nominally elite, with a vestigial specialization that wasn't useful, employed exactly the same way as all other cavalry in the end. However, I don't think they were trained all that differently from other French cavalry.
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# ? Jan 13, 2021 13:40 |
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bewbies posted:what's the best historical analogue to modern paratroopers A small group sent in an extremely risky attack that will probably take extremely high casualties but might get an advantageous position that subverts an enemy's plans? How about a "Forlorn Hope?" Cessna fucked around with this message at 17:11 on Jan 13, 2021 |
# ? Jan 13, 2021 16:06 |
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bewbies posted:what's the best historical analogue to modern paratroopers War elephants? Edit: theoretically useful but expensive and able to be effectively countered GotLag fucked around with this message at 17:11 on Jan 13, 2021 |
# ? Jan 13, 2021 17:07 |
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Cessna posted:A small group sent in an extremely risky attack that will probably take extremely high casualties but might get an advantageous position that subverts an enemy's plans? How about a "Forlorn Hope?" It doesn't meet the specialized training, equipment, or doctrine requirements, though. I think that part is the funny part about paras.
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# ? Jan 13, 2021 17:26 |
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KYOON GRIFFEY JR posted:It doesn't meet the specialized training, equipment, or doctrine requirements, though. I think that part is the funny part about paras. True, fair point - I was thinking more in term of mission.
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# ? Jan 13, 2021 17:30 |
What about recon and force recon units? I assume everything they would be designed to do is supplanted by long loiter time UAVs and other remote assets.
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# ? Jan 13, 2021 17:50 |
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TK-42-1 posted:What about recon and force recon units? I assume everything they would be designed to do is supplanted by long loiter time UAVs and other remote assets.
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# ? Jan 13, 2021 19:36 |
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Reconnaissance is a fundamental task any infantry unit could be called upon to perform; no amount of overhead assets is going to change that. Even with the existence of ground based remote collection assets, like sensors and cameras, that have existed for years there will still be a desire for ground reconnaissance, to include deep in the battle space
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# ? Jan 13, 2021 19:52 |
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Eventually there will be UAVS that shoot down other UAVs on the cheap, and the world will need a sneaky guy with binoculars and talent for CQC again
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# ? Jan 13, 2021 20:57 |
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Any recommendations for books about Horatio Nelson? Just listened to the Age of Napoleon episodes about him and would like to learn more.
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# ? Jan 13, 2021 21:14 |
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Multiple sources of Intel are huge as well. Show me a uav pic of a tank and I’ll think it could possibly be a tank. Show me a pic and have a guy on the ground say he sees it, I’ll think it’s probably a tank. Give them thermal optics and the ability to detect communications signals and ill think it’s likely a tank.
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# ? Jan 13, 2021 21:19 |
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interesting stuff!
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# ? Jan 13, 2021 22:16 |
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FastestGunAlive posted:Reconnaissance is a fundamental task any infantry unit could be called upon to perform; no amount of overhead assets is going to change that. Even with the existence of ground based remote collection assets, like sensors and cameras, that have existed for years there will still be a desire for ground reconnaissance, to include deep in the battle space It is definitely not a fundamental task, reconnaissance is performed by dedicated reconnaissance units with their own training pipelines and schooling. However, I do agree with your overall point that there will always be a need for soldiers on the ground conducting reconnaissance. More likely is a reconnaissance unit being given an infantry mission, something they're not organized or trained to do. There's obviously some cross over in skills but each type of unit is obviously better at performing tasks they're actually organized and trained to perform. Just to be clear, I'm talking about conventional military reconnaissance.
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# ? Jan 13, 2021 23:08 |
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Mustang posted:It is definitely not a fundamental task, reconnaissance is performed by dedicated reconnaissance units with their own training pipelines and schooling. However, I do agree with your overall point that there will always be a need for soldiers on the ground conducting reconnaissance.
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# ? Jan 13, 2021 23:24 |
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"Go take that hill" "Bring me more ammo" "tell me what's over there" Sounds simple when reduced down to one sentence but none the less each has numerous manuals telling you how to do it and soldiers that train specifically in those tasks. Not to mention the unique equipment each unit is fielded with to help them perform those tasks. Just with the recon example, the infantry lack the fancy long range optics that are fielded in large numbers across reconnaissance formations.
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# ? Jan 13, 2021 23:45 |
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KYOON GRIFFEY JR posted:Dragoons were used as doctrinally intended, though. I think the distinction with modern paratroopers is that they really never get used in combat drops. It would be like if dragoons never actually rode their horses. Stephen Badsey has this gimmick where he likens the intended role of WWI-era cavalry to very, very short-range paratroopers; you drop into the enemy's rear somewhere inconvenient, get off the
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# ? Jan 13, 2021 23:55 |
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Alchenar posted:High readiness, high mobility light infantry absolutely have a place in a military that wants to be able to react globally to a crisis within days, but if they had a place in modern high intensity conventional warfare then you would have seen some use of them in either Iraq war. What I'd actually argue about is the utility of Airborne forces as a high readiness, high mobility force. Desert Shield dropped an airborne division into the Saudi Desert to square off against the Iraqi tanks. The bluff worked, but if the Iraqis had just gone hell for leather they could have minced the Airborne with their armoured battlegroups. The strategic mobility of these forces is high but their tactical mobility is Remain In Place and their firepower turns it into Die In Place against any competent opponent.
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# ? Jan 13, 2021 23:57 |
FrangibleCover posted:The US did a brigade strength drop into Northern Iraq in 2003. Minimal resistance, all objectives achieved. Doesn't really prove anything except that they had a load of spare aircraft. I suppose making the enemy make that choice is part of it tho, isnt it?
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# ? Jan 14, 2021 00:04 |
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FrangibleCover posted:The US did a brigade strength drop into Northern Iraq in 2003. Minimal resistance, all objectives achieved. Doesn't really prove anything except that they had a load of spare aircraft. There's any number of circumstances where you might want to put a brigade of infantry in 48 hours where they won't have to fight an armoured division. Or where the sudden presence of those troops forestalls any risk of conflict. The ability to suddenly be somewhere and then work out tomorrow what your sustained lines of supply are creates enormous freedom of action in a crisis that you just don't get outside of the Tier 1 and 2 military powers.
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# ? Jan 14, 2021 00:11 |
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Would they actually parachute, or would they be delivered by helicopter?
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# ? Jan 14, 2021 00:14 |
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Alchenar posted:The ability to suddenly be somewhere and then work out tomorrow what your sustained lines of supply are creates enormous freedom of action in a crisis that you just don't get outside of the Tier 1 and 2 military powers. It only works against third world countries that don't have any air defense though. But that point you got such over match why bother?
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# ? Jan 14, 2021 00:16 |
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PeterCat posted:It only works against third world countries that don't have any air defense though. Because you want to be there in 24 hours from now, not in the 8 weeks it's going to take to get a heavy brigade onto ships from wherever it is stationed, sail it to wherever you need to go, and now you actually have to fight to establish a SPOD because you gave enough notice that even a third world country can prepare to put on a best possible fight, oh and also you have to bring the large and expensive logistical baggage you need in order to get the thing to actually do anything. Speed matters.
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# ? Jan 14, 2021 00:21 |
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Trin Tragula posted:Stephen Badsey has this gimmick where he likens the intended role of WWI-era cavalry to very, very short-range paratroopers; you drop into the enemy's rear somewhere inconvenient, get off the I can dig it.
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# ? Jan 14, 2021 00:26 |
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Alchenar posted:Because you want to be there in 24 hours from now, not in the 8 weeks it's going to take to get a heavy brigade onto ships from wherever it is stationed, sail it to wherever you need to go, and now you actually have to fight to establish a SPOD because you gave enough notice that even a third world country can prepare to put on a best possible fight, oh and also you have to bring the large and expensive logistical baggage you need in order to get the thing to actually do anything. Speed matters. Not sure if there great results for light infantry forces deployed 8 weeks ahead of resupply or reinforcement. Not really sure what kind of objective requires a whole airborne unit to land somewhere but not any other part of an army
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# ? Jan 14, 2021 00:29 |
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Mustang posted:It is definitely not a fundamental task, reconnaissance is performed by dedicated reconnaissance units with their own training pipelines and schooling. However, I do agree with your overall point that there will always be a need for soldiers on the ground conducting reconnaissance. From the marine corps perspective I disagree and the training&readiness manual directly speaks to the expectation that line infantry regiments and below be prepared to conduct reconnaissance, for reasons that include to inform their own commander and higher commanders. I agree that specialized reconnaissance units are more better at doing it but an infantry battalion has a platoon of scout snipers specifically trained in this, it’s not until you get to the division level that the marine corps has light armored reconnaissance and reconnaissance battalions. A platoon of scout snipers isn’t going to always cut it so the line companies need to be prepared to also conduct recon. I would hope a battalion commander would not lead with his face going into an attack and would instead conduct reconnaissance before hand. This could include his organic assets, like small uas, scout snipers, and/or a simple recon patrol by an infantry squad, in addition to assets from higher such as better uas, signals intelligence, and reporting from reconnaissance units. FastestGunAlive fucked around with this message at 00:56 on Jan 14, 2021 |
# ? Jan 14, 2021 00:53 |
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Slim Jim Pickens posted:Not sure if there great results for light infantry forces deployed 8 weeks ahead of resupply or reinforcement. Not really sure what kind of objective requires a whole airborne unit to land somewhere but not any other part of an army The initial precursor to Desert Storm. The 82nd arrived in the KSA within 48 hours of kuwait getting invaded. This served several quite useful purposes. 1: It steadied Saudi Arabia and had the good optice for them and for the mission as a whole of the US turning up in significant force. 2: It put a significant block on the table for Saddam deciding to gently caress around and find out, you can convince yourself that the US wont go to war if there are no troops there, or a few hundred, but when there are multiple thousands there you have to know if you fight them you are going to war. 3: It let certain logistical and local communications and relations issues be encountered on a smaller scale and start to be resolved before the heavy forces started arriving and a snarl up would cost much more time. Everyone knew that the Iraqis could roll over them if they wanted to, but that wasnt really their point. To take a non US centric example, mountain fighting in the Himalayas between China and India are excellent places where having light infantry that can be supplied by air and are good at it is very suited to the terrain.
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# ? Jan 14, 2021 00:56 |
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^^^^ Even taking the US 82nd in Saudi Arabia in 1991 as an example, dropping them near a flashpoint forces the decision. Do you want to start that fight too? Probably not really. Iraq running over them means that the next portion of the hypothetical war looks a lot more like 2003 than it ended up actually being in 1991. Mustang posted:"Go take that hill" As was pointed out: FastestGunAlive posted:a simple recon patrol by an infantry squad Arquinsiel fucked around with this message at 01:08 on Jan 14, 2021 |
# ? Jan 14, 2021 01:06 |
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Alchenar posted:Because you want to be there in 24 hours from now, not in the 8 weeks it's going to take to get a heavy brigade onto ships from wherever it is stationed, sail it to wherever you need to go, and now you actually have to fight to establish a SPOD because you gave enough notice that even a third world country can prepare to put on a best possible fight, oh and also you have to bring the large and expensive logistical baggage you need in order to get the thing to actually do anything. Speed matters. This is why you have a MEU. Also, the 82nd didn't jump into the KSA.
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# ? Jan 14, 2021 01:30 |
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Polyakov posted:The initial precursor to Desert Storm. The 82nd arrived in the KSA within 48 hours of kuwait getting invaded. Of all places in the worlds, a high-altitude plateau filled with escarpments seems like one of the worst to conduct a paradrop operation
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# ? Jan 14, 2021 01:58 |
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FastestGunAlive posted:From the marine corps perspective I disagree and the training&readiness manual directly speaks to the expectation that line infantry regiments and below be prepared to conduct reconnaissance, for reasons that include to inform their own commander and higher commanders. I'm coming at it from an Army perspective, where each brigade has it's own reconnaissance squadron. Each infantry battalion also has it's own scout platoon but like you said, they're manned by guys with specialized training(and equipment). Reconnaissance is also just getting more specialized in the Army. All conventional reconnaissance units are now manned by 19D cavalry scouts, including the scout platoons in the infantry battalions. An infantry scout would eventually end up back on the line, a cavalry scout is always a scout. This also sort of ties into the paratroopers question in that all of the airborne LRS units no longer exist in the conventional Army. Arquinsiel posted:As was pointed out: Sure I guess basic security patrols are fundamental in the sense that it's also fundamental for an infantry platoon to conduct resupply and casualty evacuation but I wouldn't mistake that for a dedicated combat support or medical unit. In a peer or near peer threat, a simple recon patrol by ye olde infantry squad is absolutely not going to cut it. Most skirmishing by modern reconnaissance units is happening outside of the range of small arms weapons and involves long range optics and indirect fire.
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# ? Jan 14, 2021 02:02 |
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Mustang posted:In a peer or near peer threat, a simple recon patrol by ye olde infantry squad is absolutely not going to cut it. Most skirmishing by modern reconnaissance units is happening outside of the range of small arms weapons and involves long range optics and indirect fire. Agree to disagree I guess. Reconnaissance occurs at many distances, to include within a battalion’s battle space, where it will not necessarily have these specialized units. Technology will continue to improve and the modern battlefield will become more complex but there will also continue to be value in “simple” methods, in my opinion.
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# ? Jan 14, 2021 02:08 |
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Slim Jim Pickens posted:Of all places in the worlds, a high-altitude plateau filled with escarpments seems like one of the worst to conduct a paradrop operation This is why helimobile light infantry is popular.
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# ? Jan 14, 2021 03:27 |
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Helicopters won't operate at too high of altitudes though. I guess you could use them in the lower parts of the himalayas. Or just don't fight a war on a mountain
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# ? Jan 14, 2021 03:41 |
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Big Dick Cheney posted:Any recommendations for books about Horatio Nelson? Just listened to the Age of Napoleon episodes about him and would like to learn more. I enjoyed The Line Upon the Wind by Mostert and as I recall alot of it is about Nelson.
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# ? Jan 14, 2021 04:36 |
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Gaius Marius posted:Helicopters won't operate at too high of altitudes though. I guess you could use them in the lower parts of the himalayas. Or just don't fight a war on a mountain what if the mountains supply the water for over 3 billion people.
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# ? Jan 14, 2021 04:49 |
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Stairmaster posted:what if the mountains supply the water for over 3 billion people. Pump CO2 into the atmosphere until they stop
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# ? Jan 14, 2021 07:00 |
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FrangibleCover posted:The US did a brigade strength drop into Northern Iraq in 2003. Minimal resistance, all objectives achieved. Doesn't really prove anything except that they had a load of spare aircraft. Airborne forces being lightly equipped and therefore not suited for much of anything you'd want to deploy them for is a persistent problem (that kind of plagues all light infantry) but how does your conclusion square with the existence of mechanized airborne forces like the VDV, who seem to be trying to solve the problem by constantly adjusting upwards the limit for what can be dropped out of a plane. They have a lot more organic firepower and mobility than most airborne forces! (Bring back 91st Motorized Infantry High Tech Test Bed!) This is an open question to the room, by the way.
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# ? Jan 14, 2021 08:23 |
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# ? Apr 19, 2024 12:19 |
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Just do like the British and deploy 60 of the Special Boat Squadron to the Mosul area from helicopters in Pinkies and ATV quads, then drive around firing wildly until you have an entire Corps and a bunch of Fedayeen chasing you because someone was 100% sure they were ready to surrender for "reasons". Of course that corps is also now not moving south to deal with either the main or secondary lines of advance, so... mission accomplished? The 5th Corps did eventually surrender too, just six years later! Then tell nobody about it, let the public be all "why did you send boats to Iraq?", and Damien Lewis gets to write about it in a slightly less racist tone than he normally manages and all the conservative papers love it.
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# ? Jan 14, 2021 09:00 |