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Shimrra Jamaane posted:I don't think there's any doubt about it. Just last week a cop got acquitted for firing over 30 rounds at a car in like something under a minute. That's probably more than most soldiers fire in anger during an entire tour. more friedman units posted:They might have rules about it, but it seems like in practice almost anything justifies escalating to lethal force immediately. Furtive movements, holding an object that could look like a gun if you squint, hands near their waist band... I think you mistaking anecdotes, that we generally hear about *because* they are unusual, for anything close to a representative picture. EDIT: The lesson I tend to draw from recent events is the great leeway the justice system and indeed, the US public as part of any jury, gives to law enforcement in cases where wrongdoing is suspected. Is there disproportionate use of force? Is there increased likelihood of such wrongdoing when a black person is involved? The evidence says yes. But if your average cop *is* actually commonly shooting at the first sign of a furtive movement or hands near their waist band, then we'd be seeing hugely different patterns of events to today. Fangz fucked around with this message at 21:54 on May 31, 2015 |
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May 31, 2015 21:48
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Cyrano4747 posted:No it wasn't. The cav used them but they were still mostly armed with muzzle loading arms and, later, breech loaders. Notably Buford's brigades did have Spencer's at Gettysburg.
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May 31, 2015 21:50
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Fangz posted:I think you mistaking anecdotes, that we generally hear about *because* they are unusual, for anything close to a representative picture. That's fair, although it's understandable why people are angry when even extreme, unusual cases lead to minimal or no punishment of the officers involved. It doesn't say anything good about the culture of American policing.
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May 31, 2015 21:55
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more friedman units posted:That's fair, although it's understandable why people are angry when even extreme, unusual cases lead to minimal or no punishment of the officers involved. It doesn't say anything good about the culture of American policing. I really do think it says more about the broader US culture and its belief in police, that those acquittals happen and are accepted. Recall that, using the recent higher estimate, there's about 1000 police killings per year, and yet there's over 100,000 full-time police. If you widen the criteria you could get up to over a million. On that basis, it seems like the majority of US police never kill anyone - rightly or wrongly - in their entire career. Fangz fucked around with this message at 22:10 on May 31, 2015 |
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May 31, 2015 22:06
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Fangz posted:I really do think it says more about the broader US culture and its belief in police, that those acquittals happen and are accepted. Recall that, using the recent higher estimate, there's about 1000 police killings per year, and yet there's over 100,000 full-time police. If you widen the criteria you could get up to over a million. On that basis, it seems like the majority of US police never kill anyone - rightly or wrongly - in their entire career. On the other hand, the blue wall of silence and racially-charged police violence are real problems in much of the US, and that many incidents are never reported. Still, this is all pretty far afield from military history.
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May 31, 2015 22:26
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Yes, let us re-rail this thread with some cool historical military dudes. Military motorcyles over time have been pretty neat. They've become less and less used over time, but there are still some sweet loving bikes out there. The Kawasaki KLR has been pretty popular with the U.S. and Japanese miltaries for its ruggedness (although most sport riders say the KLR is heavy and handles poorly{and they're right}, its still basically a suitable tool for riding around the woods/desert). Some have even been converted to simplify fuel logistics.  Mmmmm... I would kill a man for that motorcycle. Keldoclock fucked around with this message at 22:34 on May 31, 2015 |
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May 31, 2015 22:31
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Chillyrabbit posted:Is the observer thread suppose to be the german thread? you have the same link posted for both Whoops. Of course, I couldn't exactly click the links to check they were going to the right place... Tomn posted:Speaking of which, is that write-up about how your experiences shaped your research and vice versa going to need to wait until 1916 now? Mostly. I did say "remind me"! There is one thing I will say, though - it becomes a hell of a lot easier to understand why so many generals had a reputation for seeming aloof and callous. If this were anything other than pushing chits round a board I'd have been a complete wreck after five minutes even of planning a defence that will surely kill thousands and maim thousands more. The casualties were truly orders of magnitude bigger than (m)any of them could ever have expected to endure or to inflict, and in that light it's utterly unsurprising that someone like Launcelot Kiggell (Haig's chief of staff and noted dimwit; he's called Launcelot, the "Tarquin" of the late 19th century) would keep himself in Montreuil where the blokes were just icons and the mud was just brown ink on the map. How else does even a highly trained human cope with doing such things? (And, even by this extremely relaxed standard, Hunter-Weston still comes off like a giant raging pile hanging out of the arse of the Army! It's true devotion to the art of being a complete wanker.)
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May 31, 2015 23:12
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Trin Tragula posted:Launcelot Kiggell
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May 31, 2015 23:15
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It's a damned close-run thing! They're all so evocative, aren't they? If I had to pick an All-Name British Army Polo Team (1914-1918), then it'd be The Honourable Charles Granville Fortescue; Sir Torquhil George Matheson, 5th Baronet; Sir William Pulteney Pulteney (not a typo); Sir George Kenneth Scott-Moncrieff, and Sir Launcelot Edward Kiggell as substitute. Yes, he was literally Sir Launcelot. (The "B" team would be Sir Sydney Turing Barlow Lawford, Sir Hugh Sandham Jeudwine, Sir Frederic Manley Glubb, and Sir Horace Lockwood Smith-Dorrien, with Sir Ian Monteith Standish Hamilton on the bench.) Trin Tragula fucked around with this message at 23:52 on May 31, 2015 |
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May 31, 2015 23:44
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found a dude named Stacht Cracken once. It's short for Eustacius.
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May 31, 2015 23:57
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HEY GAL posted:found a dude named Stacht Cracken once. It's short for Eustacius. I'm pretty sure this is literally a star wars character
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Jun 1, 2015 05:06
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StashAugustine posted:I'm pretty sure this is literally a star wars character Almost! http://starwars.wikia.com/wiki/Pash_Cracken Trin Tragula posted:Sir Ian Monteith Standish Hamilton Standish sounds like some sort of upper-class slang adjective. "He's a mightily standish fellow, isn't he, wot wot?"
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Jun 1, 2015 06:21
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Hey Trin and other WW1 historians, how long did people serve during the war? Did they have a system like "tours", as seen in modern militaries, or something else? If they were expected to be there the whole time, did anybody actually live through the whole war? I'm also interested in the expected serving time for the corresponding air forces, considering that being a pilot in WW1 seems like a pretty good way to die fast. Did the aces get cycled out and put in training roles, or did they fly until they got unlucky?
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Jun 1, 2015 07:04
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Splode posted:Hey Trin and other WW1 historians, how long did people serve during the war? Did they have a system like "tours", as seen in modern militaries, or something else? If they were expected to be there the whole time, did anybody actually live through the whole war? I think that the British signed up for 3 years with the condition that they would be discharged if the war ended before that.
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Jun 1, 2015 08:34
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Splode posted:I'm also interested in the expected serving time for the corresponding air forces, considering that being a pilot in WW1 seems like a pretty good way to die fast. Did the aces get cycled out and put in training roles, or did they fly until they got unlucky? IIRC the Allies put their skilled pilots in training roles, whereas the Axis left them in place. This is why the top Axis aces had so many kills compared to the top Allied aces - they kept flying until they died, instead of spending a relatively limited time.
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Jun 1, 2015 09:25
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The Lone Badger posted:IIRC the Allies put their skilled pilots in training roles, whereas the Axis left them in place. This is why the top Axis aces had so many kills compared to the top Allied aces - they kept flying until they died, instead of spending a relatively limited time. But that's the second world war, not the first. From fiction about the Great War, I've kind of gathered that they all just tended to keep their pilots flying until they died. No idea if that's correct. The Japanese certainly started the WWII with excellent pilots, but lost most of them at Midway and never could train enough to make up for it, even without all the pilot trainees they threw away with the Kamikaze program.
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Jun 1, 2015 09:32
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Is this the same ideology and thought process that led to Tiger and Maus boondoggles? Fascist aestheticism demands heroes, so the heroes will be kept in positions where they can keep achieving heroic feats until they are finally fall heroically in battle, whereas a sensible person would put them in a position where they can achieve maximum strategic outcomes (aka training the next generation of rookies that can roll over the other side's rookies).
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Jun 1, 2015 10:14
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Phobophilia posted:Is this the same ideology and thought process that led to Tiger and Maus boondoggles? Fascist aestheticism demands heroes, so the heroes will be kept in positions where they can keep achieving heroic feats until they are finally fall heroically in battle, whereas a sensible person would put them in a position where they can achieve maximum strategic outcomes (aka training the next generation of rookies that can roll over the other side's rookies). It's hard for me to say if that's about fascist aesthetics or just pure incompetence to be honest.
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Jun 1, 2015 11:07
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Splode posted:Hey Trin and other WW1 historians, how long did people serve during the war? Did they have a system like "tours", as seen in modern militaries, or something else? If they were expected to be there the whole time, did anybody actually live through the whole war? Period joke: "How long are you in for?" "Seven years, or Duration [of the war]." "You're lucky! I'm Duration!" The thing about modern wars (from the perspective of a large NATO country) is that they're small enough not to require the participation of the entire army at the same time. The Falklands, for instance, was fought by (very roughly) about 10-15% of the British army's total strength. Therefore, you have the modern tour system where units go out to a long war and then come back from it after doing their time. Also consider how much easier it is to move large groups of people and their poo poo around with modern aircraft. (I've just tried to imagine a company trying to pack itself into a Sopwith Camel, it's quite funny.) So everyone who was in it, was in it until the war ended, or they became unfit for further service. (Not many people survived from August 1914 to November 1918 at the front, but more did than you might think, and still more might have done but got promoted or sent to training roles to pass on their experience.) The basic expectation for an average unit was that it would go out to a theatre of war, stay there until the theatre was won or lost, and then go to another one. The only way it might expect to return home as a unit was if it were going to be sent to another theatre, although of course individual men received home leave from time to time. That of course didn't mean that they lived like Blackadder in the same trench for three years, and here's where we find practices that you might, if you pummel them a bit, see them as roughly equivalent to the tour system. as we've seen, Louis Barthas's life is full of the regular rhythm of going into and out of reserve, and then when out of reserve (or "up the line" in British parlance) going into the trenches and back out of them again. German units tended to stay in the same positions for a long period of time, six months or more; Entente units were moved around more frequently (in part to stop them getting overly familiar with their billets, and the enemy soldiers across the way). This willingness to shift people around is going to become vital when we get to Verdun and Petain's noria ("water-wheel") system of rotating almost the entire army through the battle for short periods and thereby keeping the men at the front as fresh as possible. The sheer amount of movement there was back and forth, even within a trench system, is something I'm trying to build up a picture of through the personal accounts. Louis Barthas goes up the line and into close reserve in a village like Annequin for four days. Then he goes forward again and his time will be split something like one day in the front line, two days in the second line, one day in the third line, and then out again to Annequin for four days. He's done that for a couple of months and then in theory was sent to the rear for a month or two of rest and training, but it's been decided that his unit is needed for Second Artois, so no rest for you, matey. Only about 5-15% of the time he spent not participating in a major offensive would have been served in the first line, and roughly half his time in the war would have been spent up the line. (And then a significant proportion of that time would have been served in quiet sectors where not much happened. Annequin/Vermelles was quite quiet, but he'll get to quieter places.) quote:I'm also interested in the expected serving time for the corresponding air forces, considering that being a pilot in WW1 seems like a pretty good way to die fast. Did the aces get cycled out and put in training roles, or did they fly until they got unlucky? Here's what we have to remember about pilot rotation. In the Second World War, air combat was a known quantity; they had plenty of theory to teach new pilots how to do their jobs, so it made sense to pull your aces and get them training aces of the future. Meanwhile, in WWI, we still haven't had the first kill from a synchronising-gear-equipped fighter aircraft yet. Nobody knows how to do air combat. The only way you learn how to do air combat is by doing air combat and seeing what works. And the best people to learn, refine your initial ideas, and develop new ones, are your best pilots. If you take them away after 5 kills, or 10 kills, all you're going to do is train cadres of pilots whose training will be obsolete in three months when the enemy introduces a new plane with an extra 5,000 feet of service ceiling (or whatever), or figures out that flying at you from out of the sun is a jolly wizzo scheme. That's not to say that they didn't recognise the value of having experienced pilots do training (IIRC a significant part of the Flying Circus was trained by the Red Baron), but it was usually outweighed by the need to keep their best pilots in the air so they could keep innovating.
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Jun 1, 2015 12:14
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Trin Tragula posted:There is one thing I will say, though - it becomes a hell of a lot easier to understand why so many generals had a reputation for seeming aloof and callous. If this were anything other than pushing chits round a board I'd have been a complete wreck after five minutes even of planning a defence that will surely kill thousands and maim thousands more. The casualties were truly orders of magnitude bigger than (m)any of them could ever have expected to endure or to inflict, and in that light it's utterly unsurprising that someone like Launcelot Kiggell (Haig's chief of staff and noted dimwit; he's called Launcelot, the "Tarquin" of the late 19th century) would keep himself in Montreuil where the blokes were just icons and the mud was just brown ink on the map. How else does even a highly trained human cope with doing such things? Yeah, I'm noticing a pretty strong theme of "Well, look, we're going to have to accept quite a lot of casualties no matter what we do if we want to get anything at all done, and if we're not willing to do that we may as well ask for terms of peace and have done with it." Which, given that asking for peace was politically unacceptable most of the time in real life and that the generals had trained quite a long time to actually WIN a war, would seem to incline people to start revising the idea of "acceptable casualties" ever further upwards in the interests of not letting the whole thing have been a bloody pointless waste and in the hopes of actually accomplishing something worth doing at some point.
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Jun 1, 2015 12:54
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Grand Prize Winner posted:The Japanese certainly started the WWII with excellent pilots, but lost most of them at Midway This is a popular myth but isn't true. The Japanese did lose quite a few pilots at Midway, but not enough to put a substantial dent in the overall quality of Japanese aviation. That came mainly from the Solomon Islands campaign with its long aerial war of attrition which ground down the Japanese elite pilot corps.
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Jun 1, 2015 13:51
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Cythereal posted:This is a popular myth but isn't true. The Japanese did lose quite a few pilots at Midway, but not enough to put a substantial dent in the overall quality of Japanese aviation. That came mainly from the Solomon Islands campaign with its long aerial war of attrition which ground down the Japanese elite pilot corps. In terms of planes and pilots lost wasn't Midway actually proportionately more devastating to the US carriers than to the Japanese? They lost virtually all of their striking power either shot down or just flown into the sea.
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Jun 1, 2015 14:21
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Phobophilia posted:Is this the same ideology and thought process that led to Tiger and Maus boondoggles? Fascist aestheticism demands heroes, so the heroes will be kept in positions where they can keep achieving heroic feats until they are finally fall heroically in battle, whereas a sensible person would put them in a position where they can achieve maximum strategic outcomes (aka training the next generation of rookies that can roll over the other side's rookies). We're still talking about WW1 pilot rotation? It would be rather hard for fascist ideology to shape aircrew rotation policies in WW1.
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Jun 1, 2015 14:22
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Cythereal posted:This is a popular myth but isn't true. The Japanese did lose quite a few pilots at Midway, but not enough to put a substantial dent in the overall quality of Japanese aviation. That came mainly from the Solomon Islands campaign with its long aerial war of attrition which ground down the Japanese elite pilot corps. Hmm, is there a good book about that?
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Jun 1, 2015 14:25
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Splode posted:I'm also interested in the expected serving time for the corresponding air forces, considering that being a pilot in WW1 seems like a pretty good way to die fast. Did the aces get cycled out and put in training roles, or did they fly until they got unlucky? Fighter pilot training in WWI was essentially an apprenticeship/OJT operation for all sides. Institutional training was limited not only by a lack of training aircraft and qualified instructors, but also by the extreme attrition of the process: something like one in 20 trainees were killed in accidents. The more hours you spent puttering around in rickety trainers in the rear, the greater your chances of something catastrophic happening. So, they'd get their ground school and a basic overview of how to take off and land a plane and then it was off to your squadron. When you got there you were given some hours on your type of aircraft and then thrown into things usually as the wingman of a more experienced pilot. It didn't really make a whole lot of sense to take guys out of operational squadrons to teach new pilots: the air war changed wildly week-to-week and any knowledge a pilot had was extremely perishable.
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Jun 1, 2015 14:48
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Fangz posted:Hmm, is there a good book about that? Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway Fantastic book.
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Jun 1, 2015 14:49
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Fangz posted:Hmm, is there a good book about that? Not sure about the overall losses including the fighting from land bases, but Shattered Sword makes a point of mentioning that of Coral Sea, Midway, Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz, midway was pretty middle of the pack for Japanese losses, with Santa Cruz being the worst.
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Jun 1, 2015 14:50
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this "shatter sword" good book is?
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Jun 1, 2015 14:55
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yes
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Jun 1, 2015 15:00
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Phobophilia posted:Is this the same ideology and thought process that led to Tiger and Maus boondoggles? Fascist aestheticism demands heroes, so the heroes will be kept in positions where they can keep achieving heroic feats until they are finally fall heroically in battle, whereas a sensible person would put them in a position where they can achieve maximum strategic outcomes (aka training the next generation of rookies that can roll over the other side's rookies). Nah, it's mostly a combination of the pre-fascistish lessons learned from Tsukishima* and partly based on what's actually a very level headed reading of Japan's position militarily. See, Japan was never going to win a big all out attritional war. Maybe they could have done a better job at loosing slower, but instead they opted for the Decisive Battle Doctrine, the idea being to knock around the American fleet and so thoroughly kick the poo poo out of them that they'd accept Japanese gains as fait accompli before the war machine spooled up and America bridged the Pacific by simply parking spare flattops from Seattle to Tokyo. Obviously it didn't work out. I'd also argue that the infamous recalcitrance of the Japanese, once their navy was on the back foot and the US was driving up the islands and firebombing the home islands, isn't really all about fanaticism death cults etc. etc., any more than the VC dying by the droves or North Vietnam holding out despite regular plastering from the air. There were obvious differences ('gently caress you this is our country' vs. 'gently caress you we want to keep some of our empire') but militarily the strategy was the same; trade blood and willpower for blood and willpower no matter the exchange rate and hope your deeper reserves of will holds out. The Japanese just badly misjudged how pissed the Americans were about the whole 'surprise attack' thing. I think there's a fundamental misunderstanding, on some level, of how the American's approached wars (e.g., always a crusade of some sort or another, even our clearly stupid imperialistic ones) vs. most of the rest of the world at the time (keep down continental rivals, acquire key ports/resources, quick punitive actions in colonial regions,** in other words, wars as tools of foreign policy subject to rational things like 'cost/benefit' breakdowns and poo poo.) *Because the next war is always going to be like the last one, right? **We was getting in on this too, but somehow didn't get around to calling them wars like the Opium Wars and the like.
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Jun 1, 2015 15:05
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Alchenar posted:In terms of planes and pilots lost wasn't Midway actually proportionately more devastating to the US carriers than to the Japanese? They lost virtually all of their striking power either shot down or just flown into the sea. USS Enterprise, for example, had replenished her aircraft and crews within a month of Midway to participate in the Solomon campaign. "We won based on K/D ratio" looks good in the newspaper, and can be an important piece of information, but usually isn't the main determinate for deciding who got more advantage out of the battle. Cythereal posted:This is a popular myth but isn't true. The Japanese did lose quite a few pilots at Midway, but not enough to put a substantial dent in the overall quality of Japanese aviation. That came mainly from the Solomon Islands campaign with its long aerial war of attrition which ground down the Japanese elite pilot corps. In counter to what I said above, attrition has to start somewhere. As it turns out history is pretty clear that even the losses at Midway were irreplaceable even if they didn't have an immediate impact on the quality of the carrier based flight crews. Japan had somewhere around 1800-1900 trained carrier pilots in 1941, so to lose around 15% of them in one battle only seven months into the war was pretty painful. I think I recall that Japanese carrier flight training was a two year evolution and they simply didn't act fast enough to get new pilots into the line once big losses started occurring. When people say, 'trained flight crews' they don't mean that they were just capable of flying off a ship and landing. The mean additionally that they were able to fight as part of a team with overlapping responsibilities and expected levels of performance. Your wing man didn't just follow you around, he was expected to participate fully in an engagement using advanced tactics to force the fight into your favor and allow you both to complete successful attacks. Bringing veteran pilots back to the rear for training cycles (and also to positions in command, production and R&D) really allowed the US to speed up the entrance of new, high quality, pilots (and planes) into the fleet. This really shows up later on as new Japanese pilots did pretty much show up just knowing how to take off and land and were of very little value in offensive operations. e: Does anyone know if the Japanese did anything to the equivalent of the US of putting veteran officers in observation/consultation of production lines? Murgos fucked around with this message at 15:28 on Jun 1, 2015 |
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Jun 1, 2015 15:22
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bewbies posted:this "shatter sword" good book is? Yup. Picked it up from a library to use as a source for a staff paper, ended up buying it and reading it for fun.
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Jun 1, 2015 15:28
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The US losses at Midway were disproportionately focused on the torpedo bombers, which were already obsolete. Would that have made a difference in how quickly they could be replaced? By that I mean were there already squadrons equipped with TBFs worked up and ready?
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Jun 1, 2015 15:35
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xthetenth posted:The US losses at Midway were disproportionately focused on the torpedo bombers, which were already obsolete. Would that have made a difference in how quickly they could be replaced? By that I mean were there already squadrons equipped with TBFs worked up and ready? TBFs participated in Midway. It should be noted that they suffered absolutely horrific casualties as well. As for replacing losses, it is always much easier to replace an airplane than it is to replace trained cew. Even in the crappiest of industries the rate of training aircrews is much slower than the rate of manufacturing aircraft.
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Jun 1, 2015 15:39
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Tomn posted:Yeah, I'm noticing a pretty strong theme of "Well, look, we're going to have to accept quite a lot of casualties no matter what we do if we want to get anything at all done, and if we're not willing to do that we may as well ask for terms of peace and have done with it." Which, given that asking for peace was politically unacceptable most of the time in real life and that the generals had trained quite a long time to actually WIN a war, would seem to incline people to start revising the idea of "acceptable casualties" ever further upwards in the interests of not letting the whole thing have been a bloody pointless waste and in the hopes of actually accomplishing something worth doing at some point. "I know we're not sure if this bus is coming, but we can't stop waiting for it and just walk/call a cab, we've been standing here waiting for it forever."
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Jun 1, 2015 15:43
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Tomn posted:Yeah, I'm noticing a pretty strong theme of "Well, look, we're going to have to accept quite a lot of casualties no matter what we do if we want to get anything at all done, and if we're not willing to do that we may as well ask for terms of peace and have done with it." Which, given that asking for peace was politically unacceptable most of the time in real life and that the generals had trained quite a long time to actually WIN a war, would seem to incline people to start revising the idea of "acceptable casualties" ever further upwards in the interests of not letting the whole thing have been a bloody pointless waste and in the hopes of actually accomplishing something worth doing at some point. The biggest eye opener for me is just having to deal with the fog of war in a setting where I can't easily change my orders if my info proves to be wrong. Yes, my men are going to get slaughtered horribly, and there's nothing I can do about it. And if I think about it too much, I'll gently caress up again instead of learning from my mistakes.
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Jun 1, 2015 15:48
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HEY GAL posted:found a dude named Stacht Cracken once. It's short for Eustacius. Yeah, but how are they for nick names? Everyone knows a general is only as good as his nickname. Hancock "The Superb" "Granny" or "King of Spades" Lee "Unconditional Surrender" Grant "Fighting Joe" Hooker "Commissary" Banks "Spoons" Bulter "Stonewall" Jackson "Bad Hand" MacKenzie "Bad Old Man" or "Wooden Man" Early "Bloody Bill" Anderson "Old Baldy" Ewelle "Old Wooden Head" Hood "That Devil" Forrest And of course, SideBurns etc...
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Jun 1, 2015 16:13
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I like Charles "The Hammer" Martel and Turner Ashby, the Black Knight of the Confederacy. HM: Saburo "The Sky Samurai" Sakai and of course Stormin' Norman
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Jun 1, 2015 16:24
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Murgos posted:Yeah, but how are they for nick names? Everyone knows a general is only as good as his nickname. Tilly: "Father Tilly" or "The monk in armor" Wallenstein: "The Hanging Duke"/"Der Henkerherzog" Christian of Halberstadt: "The Mad Halberstadter" Gustavus Adolphus: "Lion of the North" or "King of Midnight" The Elector Palatine: "The Winter King" Gallas: "Destroyer of Armies"/"Der Herrverderber" Merode supposedly gave rise to the word "marauder;" this isn't the case but the pun was a thing at the time Dam Vizthum von Eickstaedt's first name is short for Damian, but apparently Dodo zu Innhausen und Knyphausen's name was his given one; he had a brother named Enno, also a professional soldier. They were East Frisians, I wonder if that was it. HEY GUNS fucked around with this message at 16:29 on Jun 1, 2015 |
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Jun 1, 2015 16:25
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HEY GAL posted:Superb. For an extra fun time, try to guess which of these are supposed to be complimentary and which are supposed to be insults.
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Jun 1, 2015 16:28
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