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sum
Nov 15, 2010


There's no way that Turkey is going to keep tolerating them if all of a sudden the SNC's platform also includes Kurdish activism.

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sum
Nov 15, 2010

That drat Satyr posted:

That being said - I just wanted to ask:
Based on the accusations that the US Government just came out with against Russia, claiming that the attack helicopters were sent to Syria by the Russia military... Does that give grounds for them to place sanctions against Russia? If not, what are the implications of what could come from the allegations, if they are true?
The implications range from either 'nothing' to 'nothing substantial' considering that Russia can maroon the Americans in Afghanistan essentially whenever they want.

Xandu posted:

http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/06/12/the_libyan_rorschach

I haven't finished it, but good piece on Libya so far.
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/jun/21/libya-cracking/?page=1
On the topic of Libya articles, this is a pretty good one that talks about the fraying at the edges (so to speak) of Libya.

sum
Nov 15, 2010

SexyBlindfold posted:

so is libya the only arab-springed country that isn't actively imploding right now?

That depends, do you count stagnating and heading straight down the track to implosion as 'active'?

sum
Nov 15, 2010

suboptimal posted:

Bear in mind that in asymmetric warfare, the insurgent defender usually enjoys more advantages than the anti-insurgent forces. Insurgents have the ability to prepare fighting positions/tank traps/IEDs/etc when they take control over an area, so governments using conventional forces such as infantry units can be expected to incur heavy casualties. Look at how the US has used airpower in Iraq and Afghanistan as a way to inflict casualties on insurgent defenders and only using ground troops when no other options are available or to secure a contested area. The Syrian government's use of artillery and other stand-off weapons is pretty much the flip side of that coin. Additionally, it seems that the Syrian government is using the highly loyal Fourth Division (commanded by Bashar's brother Maher) to actually do the sweeping and clearing operations, as they did with the Baba Amr neighborhood of Homs in late February. Introducing the rest of the army- which is full of poor Sunni conscripts- raises the risk of mass defections to the FSA. While I agree with you that the story as it is presented in the Western media isn't likely to be the whole one, this seems to be the recurring theme of the conflict during the past six months.

Also, the FSA has received more weaponry from Gulf countries as of late, and I wouldn't be surprised if there's a few Saudi or Qatari clandestine guys training the FSA on their usage and combat tactics as well. I also recall seeing reports that Libya was preparing to send some of its former thuwar to act as trainers and combatants, although I don't remember if anything ever came of that.

Using American experience in Iraq and Afghanistan is naive because the Syrians are using actual anti-insurgent tactics (i.e. massacre based) while the Americans are and were using the Vietnam vintage 'CI' nonstrategy. Even if 20 soldiers actually were killed (which is unlikely considering that this is third hand information), likely what will happen is in a couple days the neighborhood is going to be shelled to the ground and a truck full of SAF infantrymen are going to come through and shoot every military aged male they can find. If the FSA begins adopting the blockhouse strategy of merely trying to hold territory while inflicting as many casualties as possible they are very quickly going to find themselves on the losing side of this war.

sum
Nov 15, 2010

suboptimal posted:

Perhaps it wasn't clear from my post, but when I wrote about the Syrian government trying to minimize casualties, I was referring to their own military casualties, not the civilian populace. I agree with you- to imply that Assad gives a poo poo about civilian casualties in Homs, Hama, Qusayr and elsewhere would be pretty naive.

To me, the similarities between Syrian COIN and the American version stops with both governments using their technological advantages to limit actual close-quarter combat with the enemy.

Well, I think from a strategic perspective it is much more in the SAF's interest to initiate as much close combat as possible with the insurgents (as I was gesturing at with my criticism from the FSA's apparent adoption blockhouse tactics), because, unlike other armies where soldiers are more expensive, 20 dead soldiers is an extremely small price for crippling a local insurgency and gaining control of a city, where they would then be able to initiate their brutal mopping-up tactics. You might even be able to argue that a limited number soldier deaths are good for the Syrian state, as they seem ready and willing to use their funerals as opportunities for pro-state rallies and such. I wouldn't be surprised if the official figures of dead soldiers and policemen are actually inflated, considering that they are considerably higher than rebel figures.

sum
Nov 15, 2010

farraday posted:

I disagree. focusing on the cost of a soldier completely ignores the probability of morale loss leading to increased defections and simple desertion. further, the ample evidence of the Syrian Army negotiating to buy back destroyed/damaged tanks highly suggests they are very conscious of material losses which would tend to make close in tactics a bad idea.

You have to remember that Syria is in the middle of a weapons embargo, which inflates the price of materiel. Even though a tank might be expensive enough to consider buying back from the FSA, finding Christians/Alawites/Shiites willing to fight and kill for Assad probably isn't nearly as expensive. Besides, if Assad keeps the ethnic antagonization up, there is probably little chance of minority soldiers defecting to the FSA (speaking of which, does anyone have any figures for the ethnic composition of the Syrian Army? I would presume it's mostly Alawite but people keep talking about Sunni conscripts defecting. tia)

sum
Nov 15, 2010

V. Illych L. posted:

It bears mentioning that massacre-based counterinsurgency tactics have a rather poor history with regards to efficiency as well. The nazis found that out in the Balkans and Russia, and to a lesser degree the Soviets in Afghanistan (these are the most obvious examples I can think of, there are probably more).

I don't think those are as applicable because they were wars of occupation rather than rebellion crushing. Nearly every counter-rebellion that succeeded succeeded because of the use of massacres. Some examples of this would be the War in the Vendée and the Second Chechen War (not to mention the first Syrian uprising from 30 years ago).

sum
Nov 15, 2010

Xandu posted:

It has begun.

I thought that the camps in southern Turkey were old news? I could've sworn I read about it in an Escobar article months ago.

sum
Nov 15, 2010

If your best-case scenario is sending in the CIA you might want to re-evaluate your thinking, really.

sum
Nov 15, 2010

Not Egypt related, but here's an interesting opinion piece in the Asia Times talking about how Russia's reaction to the Syrian situation may have everything to do with internal unrest over Putin. Apparently Putin is trying to improve his domestic popularity by looking powerful on the foreign stage, which necessitates butting heads with the U.S. whenever possible. It also brings up the possibility of Russian intervention, which the Russians themselves look nearly commited to.

sum
Nov 15, 2010

Young Freud posted:

Whelp, we've gone to war over similar casus belli. Don't see why this wouldn't be any different.

I'm fairly certain that NATO's going to back them, anyway, just because of the formal treaty alliance. Maybe not the U.S., because of the election year, but I think we'll officially aid in support flights and other non-combat duties, like in Libya.

Typically when countries go to war over slights such as fighter shootdowns, border guard shootouts or other nonsense like that they usually were looking to go to war anyway and just decided to seize the opportunity. I strongly doubt that Turkey wants or needs a war right now, and at any rate if Erdogan was on the warpath he would have been beating the drums a lot harder and a lot sooner.

sum
Nov 15, 2010

McDowell posted:

Why don't people stand up to these poo poo heads? Are they just well armed and unquestionably savage?

Maybe people on the other side of the world have a different value system than you.

sum
Nov 15, 2010

Xandu posted:

No, some of those shrines stood for nearly 7 centuries and were well integrated into the local cultural landscape. This is a great example of a minority group seeking to impose their own values on everybody else in the area.

Still, wondering why a foreign group of people doesn't rise in rebellion against a group you don't like (which you've also labeled as 'savages' hmm what does this remind me of) because they offended your cultural sensibilities is a very conceited position to have, especially when you ignore pretty much every other dimension in situation.

sum
Nov 15, 2010

Davincie posted:

Didn't SA sent troops into Bahrain to help repress the revolt or did that not end up happening? Either way, IIRC the revolt there got heavily repressed and it is a country that gets weapons from the west so that can't be helping.

Yes. The protests were picking up steam, and since Saudi Arabia is incredibly paranoid of Shiites anywhere gaining power they sent troops in to crush them.

sum
Nov 15, 2010

Golbez posted:

Every time a domino falls, though, it seems to reinflame things. As Egypt wound down, Libya spun up; as Libya wound down, Syria spun up; as Syria winds down, who knows, Bahrain tries again? Yemen?

I doubt that the Spring will travel back to the peninsula again. You have to remember that the Syrian uprising (as well as the Egyptians and to a lesser extent the Libyans) has been co-opted by the Sauds, Americans and Qataris, and you'd be a fool to think any of them will tolerate further pro-democracy uprisings on the peninsula. Yemen might get some reform but will likely be tempered by Saudi interference. Bahrain is too small a country to resist Saudi occupation and will likely not go anywhere any time soon. The Berbers might try something, but that's in North Africa and will end badly in the long run anyway. Perhaps when they can no longer can produce significant amounts of oil the area will lose its strategic importance and the Peninsular kings will be unable to keep power, but that won't be for another few decades.

sum
Nov 15, 2010


Took me a couple minutes but I finally found it. It appears that those are AO-1 SCH bomblets (image), perhaps dropped in an RBK 250-275 (image). It seems that they have something of a reputation of ending up as UXO.
e: interestingly enough, it seems that bombs in the RBK family can only be dropped from fixed wing aircraft.

Volkerball posted:

I think the Sudan's are next. Khartoum is an extremely oppressive force in the area, and South Sudan's revolution to escape it has just seen Juba take its place. Something like 98% of South Sudan's assets are under Juba's control. However, the little spending power of the rural areas combined with the LRA's occupation of all the good farming land, plus the small scale civil wars all over, and it's tough to see how a strong movement could get on its feet. North Sudan may have a little more ground to stand on, and they're trying with the #SudanRevolts call to action, but time will tell.
I'd forgotten about Sudan. Considering its precarious internal situation and historic bad reputation with the West I wouldn't be surprised if Bashir is next, but barring foreign finagling in Iran I doubt any more major middle-eastern powers will fall. Is the LRA really that powerful in South Sudan though? I knew that they had a presence but I would be surprised to learn that they control the countryside considering that the Acholi population in South Sudan only numbers around 50,000.

sum fucked around with this message at 01:01 on Jul 11, 2012

sum
Nov 15, 2010

Section 31 posted:

Replace Russia and China with USA, Assad with Netanyahu (or any other Israeli leader), and Syria with Palestine, and you should get some answers.

That's a bad comparison, because at least betting on Assad benefits Russia and China strategically.

sum
Nov 15, 2010

Golbez posted:

You think China would go to war over Syria as a proxy/tryout for the South China Sea and maybe Taiwan?

The Russians were rattling their sabres, sure, but even they can't defend a chemical attack. I think if WMDs start flying around they will cut their losses and get out of Tartus. Because, really, there's only two options right now: Assad stays and Russia keeps Tartus, or Assad leaves and Russia loses Tartus. The second outcome becomes inevitable once he breaks the seal on that gas, so they have zero reason to remain involved at that point.

Basically, once Assad uses gas, he ceases being a strategic partner for Russia. They might grumble, but they won't materially interfere anymore.

You had a good run, tovarasi, but the Mediterranean is lost to you.

What? Sure they could defend a gas attack, it would be very easy in fact. Violating 'international law' is meaningless, especially when you have two superpowers defending you and you've been actively violating many other 'laws' in the past. Assad could massacre Sunnis with poison gas or he could massacre them with bullets and bombs, and neither would change Syria's strategic value to the SCO.

sum
Nov 15, 2010

Rent-A-Cop posted:

Except Bahrain is home to US Naval Forces Central Command and US Fifth Fleet and is essentially America's naval hub in the Middle East. Tartus was a backwater during the Cold War and has been essentially abandoned since. It's value as a strategic asset is nil. It's value as a point of pride for the Kremlin is perhaps significant, but likely not worth any real consequences. Your second point is the more important one. There's an election on and Obama has no interest in another Middle East excursion that will be unpopular and expensive. NATO is incapable of acting without US support so they won't act either.

Syria's importance to the Russians isn't because of its naval base but because it forms the western flank of a crescent of Middle Eastern countries (the others being Iran and Iraq) which have close ties to Russia. Having them as allies is more important than just pride, their geographic positions allow them a very high level of control over land borne trade not just in the region but even between the continents. And don't believe Putin is bluffing when it comes to escalating his position in Syria, there has been a pattern of leaks from the military that intervention is imminent followed by official denials, which suggests that they still haven't made up their minds.

Nenonen posted:

Speculation on the use of chemical weapons is kind of premature. Chemical weapons are not some kind of cheat button that automatically wins the war for you - they certainly didn't solve much in WW1. They're hard to use, and if the insurgents have any source of gasmasks and hazmat suits (and there's little doubt that NATO will supply them if need be) they would do little good. Moving the stockpiles may also be a precaution to retain the WMD deterrent against Turkey/USA and Israel, to retain the WMD deterrent against the insurgents/prevent the insurgents from gaining a similar deterrent against the government, and to avoid giving USA a "reason" for intervention because the WMD stockpiles are falling into Al Qaida's hands.

WMDs are about as close as there is to a 'win' button against an insurgency. Remember Mao: insurgents rely on civilians like fish rely on water. Even if they were somehow able to get hazmat suits (unlikely), they would be without a civilian base either because they have become refugees or because they are dead. Both situations would make an insurgent army extremely easy pickings for a military of any quality.

sum fucked around with this message at 04:00 on Jul 15, 2012

sum
Nov 15, 2010

Rent-A-Cop posted:

How would Russia even transport troops to Syria? Overland isn't happening. By air means overflying either Iraq or Turkey. Turkey certainly isn't going to agree, and I don't know if Iraqi sovereignty really extends to doing things against US interests in the region. By sea means either through the Bosporus or the Mediterranean and either of those options is going to antagonize the hell out of NATO. I just don't know if Syria is important enough to Russia for them to risk what certainly won't be a cheap foray into Middle Eastern insurgency warfare.

Turkey can't close their straits to Russian warships without violating the Montreux Convention, but if they wanted to avoid the straits, they could go for a roundabout course starting from Murmansk. At any rate, antagonizing NATO would be a bonus, not a cost of intervention. Also, Iraq today cannot even be counted as an ally of the US, much less a puppet; discounting the larger-than-the-Vatican Embassy the US no longer even operates military bases in Iraq.

Whether Russia intervenes at this point is still something of a toss-up. You have to consider which direction the civil war will go (either way, really) and, if things do go badly for Assad, the sort of political math Putin would think the potential costs of intervening vs. looking weak domestically is. Defying the West is practically guaranteed to make him like better.

sum
Nov 15, 2010

Brown Moses posted:

Anyway, to avoid a derail I've come across another unique and exciting video from Syria, this time the first time a tank has been recorded being used by the FSA in Syria.

This is from a page back, but this is a bit of a distressing development. Willingness to use a tank in a guerrilla war seems to indicate that whoever is in charge of the FSA forces in Rastan is trying to form a jacquerie, which will certainly end badly. It makes you wonder what their long term plan is.

sum
Nov 15, 2010

hepatizon posted:

I looked up that word but I still don't understand what you're saying. It's already a civil war.

I was using in the sense of a standing irregular army (as opposed to a traditional insurgency). Google says that that's a more obscure use of the term though, I probably should've been more specific about it.

sum
Nov 15, 2010

truth masseuse posted:

Yes, you should have. You need not impress us with your perspicacity. :eng101: How does one even qualify a traditional v. non-traditional insurgency? I dunno. It's all semantics. It's a loving war, plain and simple.
A traditional insurgency doesn't drive around in tanks and pretend it's a field army. The concerning thing about having a tonka truck tank corps isn't an ethical problem but rather the fact that operating them requires a level of organization that, while probably technically feasible considering the resources the FSA has, is strategically disastrous. By forming a standing army they put too many eggs in a too large and too fragile a basket. An insurgency wins by preserving themselves until the other army can't or won't keep fighting. They don't win by destroying the enemy army. If they think they can approach this Libya-style by forming an army and marching on Damascus they will be crushed.

So yes, semantics, but very important semantics.

sum
Nov 15, 2010

CoderCat posted:

Give me a video, not a blog post. There are thousands upon thousands of protest videos. Surely you'll find one with this chant if it's popular.

Why are you so incredulous to the notion that a members of a belligerent party to an extremely sectarian conflict may harbor sectarian views?

sum
Nov 15, 2010

MothraAttack posted:

edit: And this video, which is mostly a lovely night vision of the Damascus skyline taken early in this morning, is particularly interesting because around the :26 mark you see what appears to be a few bursts of AA fire into the night sky followed by a notable explosion on the ground around :40. While the AA could be video artifacts (although it seems pretty linear), it seems to suggest that someone in the city is putting up AA resistance against aircraft that might be conducting bombings. I suppose it could also be illumination flares, but the trajectory seems to place doubt on that.

To me it looks it might be a ricochet. If they were truly trying to put fire on an aircraft they probably would've shot at it for an extended period.

sum
Nov 15, 2010

J33uk posted:

The responsibility to protect is pretty much dead
The 'responsibility to protect' was a political invention and if you think that it was an honest change in humanitarian doctrine I don't know what to tell you.

sum
Nov 15, 2010

zero alpha posted:

Is Kurd-talk OK in this thread? If so, is there any reason why Kurds are not morally entitled to a country of their own, in accordance with principals of self-determination? I'm pretty sure they've been there forever, and are mentioned in some ancient Greek documents from >2000 years ago.

Whether they're morally entitled to a country is irrelevant (they certainly strongly believe in their own nation), the real question is whether they're capable of declaring and keeping their independence, which right now looks like a 'no' and will be that way for the foreseeable future. They're a weak, landlocked nation stuck between 4 regional powers who would all very much dislike giving even an acre to an independent Kurdish state, and I'm afraid there is no realistic scenario for Kurdish independence that would not end in anguish and defeat.

sum
Nov 15, 2010

ChaosSamusX posted:

If that was their exact wording, then does this mean that there are probably some cooler heads on top of the chain of command that might rein in any sectarian violence that happens after the regime collapses?

The FSA has no chain of command much in the same way that the FSA is not a single entity. Not much is known about the exact composition and command of the various brigades, but it's safe to say that some are conservative Islamists, some are secular and more progressive, some are sectarian others aren't etc. Undoubtedly they will have different ideas of how to run the country and what to do about the Shiites, Christians and Alawis (if anything) if and when the current government falls, and I'd say at this stage it's not safe to speculate about through what means they will push their agendas and how successful they will be.

sum
Nov 15, 2010

Xandu posted:

Once the rebels started organizing, they started having obligations under international law to avoid civilian causalties, even if that would mean fleeing.

The issue can be complicated than it might appear though. If the FSA abandons a civilian area and then those residents suffer heavy reprisals and massacres from the government, with no one to defend them, what are the rebels supposed to do? Baba Amr and Houla seem like examples of that.

What immediately comes to mind is that a month after the PLO left Beirut in 1982, thousands of Palestinians were massacred in the Sabra and Shatila camps.
One of the secrets of running a successful insurgency is that goading the occupying army into killing limited amounts of civilians is actually a smart move, because it unifies them in support of your cause. It's grisly mathematics, but so is everything else about an insurgency. At any rate, fleeing isn't an option because it leaves them high and dry out in the field where they'll simply be destroyed. The smartest option I suppose would be burying the weapons in the yard (so to speak) and popping out again when the only thing left is a garrison, but that implies a large amount of civilian deaths. There isn't really an option that doesn't leave a bunch of civilians dead but, again, that's true about anything in an insurgency.

sum
Nov 15, 2010

Here's an interesting roundtable discussion over Syria that I think brought up some interesting points: http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3189/the-call-for-july-22-2012-russian-ambitions-in
Some of the things mentioned:
  • Russia is becoming less interested in intervention but is primarily concerned about the Islamization of the Middle East
  • Turkey backs the rebels so as to secure its position as the overland natural gas route to Europe
  • The Sauds and Qataris are trying to export revolution in an attempt to turn Iraq and Lebanon into Sunni-governed states
  • Assad might be planning to create an Alawi rump state north-west Syria backed with chemical WMDs, leaving the rest of Syria in anarchy.
Definitely worth a read.

sum
Nov 15, 2010

Xandu posted:

:rolleyes:

Even Landis thinks this is unlikely. Also the weirdly pejorative use of tribal here bothers me.

edit: to elaborate, the various tribal leaders are one of the more stabilizing forces. They've been careful not to put their lot against Assad until their hands were forced and have often acted as a mediating element. Hassan Hassan talks about the role of tribal forces in Syria a lot in his columns in The National.

http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/a-damascus-loyalist-defects-as-violence-affects-the-tribes

http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/tribal-bonds-strengthen-the-gulfs-hand-in-a-new-syria

To describe the heavily Sunni areas of Syria as a "chaotic tribal region" is problematic in many ways.
If the state suddenly withdrew from 'Sunni Syria' leaving only the militias it wouldn't exactly be unrealistic that the various clans and brigades wouldn't make a peaceful transition to a government they all have consensus in. Much to the opposite it would probably be cut up largely along tribal/family/clan/whatever you want to call it lines as in Somalia.

Of course that is a big 'if' for Assad as it would mean losing control over large swaths of territory and most of the population while still having to maintain a military that poses a credible threat, the rebels would probably have to seize and hold Damascus and Aleppo for Assad to become that desperate.


Valley Troll posted:

As far as I'm aware, the Gatestone Institute is a crazy right wing "media" outlet a la MEMRI that usually focuses on churning out articles about how muslim extremists are planning to personally assassinate every christian in the world.

their most viewed stories:


including the now-debunked 'sodomy for islam' story where idiot rightwingers ran with a story that was originally essentially a chain letter joke on arabic language forums: http://electronicintifada.net/blogs/benjamin-doherty/israel-intel-linked-memri-perpetuates-sodomy-jihad-hoax
:ughh:

This is extremely embarrassing. I'd made a cursory review of the front page and saw a lot of things contributed by writers I at least view as credible discussing sane topics. For the record I was linked there from one of Escobar's articles.

sum
Nov 15, 2010

McDowell posted:

Don't apologize, no one knows what is going on, and in this subject any information is useful, it's just good to acknowledge bias and how it affects speculation (which is a good 50% of the media).

I decided to do some research on the actual contributors to that article, and I was able to find this:

The contributors for that particular article were Escobar and Goldman ('Spengler'), both columnists for the Asia Times with a liberal/left bent, Jim Davis who as far as I can tell is a guy who wrote fairly anodyne articles about Russia in 2005 and once donated $250 to the RNC, Tony Badran who is a fellow at a pro-Israel pro-West 'non-partisan' think tank with connections to such savory figures as Joe Lieberman, Bill Kristol and Newt Gingrich, and finaly David Samuels, Generic American Liberal. So, was this an actual roundtable, Zionist scaremongering (:tinfoil:) or a mix? Can't say, really.

sum
Nov 15, 2010

Brown Moses posted:

Here's a new aircraft video
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8kvr9O5zmPk
Is it me or is it not even armed?

Doesn't look armed just from the profile view, but it's impossible to say considering the quality and shakiness of the video. It's possible that they're using the L-39 as a cheap recce vehicle to spot FSA vehicles and emplacements.

sum
Nov 15, 2010

McDowell posted:

Persecuted minorities should get their own country if they are ready to fight for it - I can think of a good mideast example for US Foreign Policy.

They were ready to fight for their own state 90 years ago (coincidentally during the same period where Wilson was championing the 'rights' of small nations) and they were crushed by the Turks, and they will be crushed by the Turks again whether they tried it tomorrow or in 90 years or in 900 years.

sum
Nov 15, 2010

Corny posted:

And popular opinion was that the nascent state of Israel would be destroyed or fought into a stalemate by the Holy War army and the Arab Liberation Army, that Mubarak would transfer power to his son, Gadhafi would rule in Libya for the rest of time. Never say "never" in the Middle-East because poo poo could very easily change quite dramatically, especially when no one thinks that it will ever happen.

Most of the cases you mentioned have to do with political rule over an entire, largely ethnically homogenous nation. There's a few extremely simple reasons why the Kurds will never, ever have independence: they're small, they're weak, they're poor, they're landlocked, they're extremely divided (important) and Kurdish independence means that Turkey no longer has a border with Iraq and Iran. Losing Kurdistan is not an option for Turkey if it wants to become a regional power, which is why it won't budge an inch on Kurdish independence. Conceivably they might end up creating a 'semi-autonomous' polity, but by it's nature it would have to be a sham managed by a family of strongmen who ultimately answer to Ankara.

sum
Nov 15, 2010

-Troika- posted:

Isn't the Kurdish peshmerga force better trained and equipped than the Iraqis right now? I know they took over a very large portion of the previous government's armored vehicles.

(granted they're mostly PT-76es, but that's better than nothing)

Wikipedia claims that Iraq only had 100 PT-76s in 1990 and that they were 'destroyed or scrapped'. It's certainly possible that some Kurdish faction got there hands on a couple dozen, but maintaining an armor corps implies a fairly sophisticated logistical system, which, even if they have one, is certainly no match for Iraq's professional armor divisions, which include some 300 Abrams tanks.

I doubt the Kurds will ever put up a serious fight for independence at any rate, as that would mean that they would have to stand unified behind a single leader, which they have never, ever been able to do. Especially not considering that the current president of Iraq, Talabani, controls the PUK and by extension half of Kurdistan.

sum
Nov 15, 2010

Do the sanctions effect food imports? Couldn't they just import food if need be? I would imagine local shortages would be because of a disruption in the transport system, not an actual lack of food.

sum
Nov 15, 2010

Nenonen posted:

Unless... unless it's all a big deception, like the Patton's ghost army and the hints that the invasion would target Calais rather than Normandy :tinfoil:

*goes to tweet "Asma al-Assad going to defect next week"*

Those types of deceptions don't end in a soundproofed basement with a couple of angry men from the interior ministry with hacksaws and ball-peen hammers.

e: actual content from the Angry Arab Blog:

"Here, the New York Times tell you that Al-Qa`idah in Syria is more moderate, unlike Al-Qa`idah in Iraq posted:

It is getting comical in this piece by Neil MacFarquhar: "Abu al-Khatab, in his late 20s, said he was a former fighter for Al Qaeda in Iraq before he joined Ahrar al-Sham. “I agree with Al Qaeda on certain things and disagree on others,” he said. “Suicide bombings should only be against the security forces, not civilians, for example.”" So let me get this straight: Al-Qa`idah is good if it fights against enemies of the US, and it is bad if it fights against US and its clients in the region? Is that the real criterion here? With Neil MacFarquhar, I expect to read this one day: Abu Al-Khattab, although active in Al-Qa`idah, is a secular feminist who enjoys his single-malt whiskey. (Comrade Joseph once explained to me what single-malt whiskey is but I don't remember).

sum fucked around with this message at 21:44 on Jul 30, 2012

sum
Nov 15, 2010

Killer robot posted:

Congratulations on the article, Brown Moses, and lots of good information.

The part on Syria having 5000 tanks, and a little extra research into what they are, makes me curious about how significant that breakdown is from rebel perspective. I know that if you're an unarmed civilian or a guy with a rifle it doesn't really matter if it's a T-55 or a T-72 headed at you, and I know that if you're in a tank yourself it's a pretty huge difference, but how much do the generations of armor matter when it comes to RPGs and other countermeasures rebels can offer? I mean, is it a case where the more modern armor is a lot more significant of an obstacle for rebels, or where that ends up secondary to just the location and amount of infantry support the armor has?

Main battle tanks (which the Syrian Army's stock is almost entirely comprised of) were developed primarily as a sort of modern-aged cavalry, designed to poke holes in front lines and then use their mobility to gently caress up the enemy's rear and force them either into an encirclement or into giving large amounts of ground. The primary difference between the different eras of tanks essentially has to do with their capability to do this, which of course goes down to things like the optics, engine, gun caliber, etc. When they're employed against what are essentially militias any sort of tank can be murderously lethal and those details don't really matter as much. Sure you could make the argument that reactive armor, better optics etc. etc. give certain models advantages, but, really there isn't a significant difference.

In other news, looking at that BBC special report + other articles around the internet it's looking like the FSA in Aleppo is increasingly likely to do something Really Dumb. The news about the siege and food shortages combined with the fact that it appears all the civilians are fleeing while the men are staying to fight is eerily reminiscent of the lead up to the Hama massacre. I honestly hope that the FSA doesn't try to do some last-stand pitched battle nonsense.

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sum
Nov 15, 2010

AllanGordon posted:

I was under the impression that there has been significantly more defections in Syria among the armed forces than there were in Libya. There is also the fact that for the most part the Libyan army was poorly trained with a few elite units dedicated to keeping the regime in power while in Syria they have a much more traditional military structure.

Obviously the Assad regime is far from collapsing, but I wouldn't say that such a thing is too outlandish. As the repression continues there will only be more defections. The rebels only need to fight a war of attrition and the regime cannot remain in power.

This is too optimistic I think. So far the only major defections have been Tlass and al-Fares, and considering the fact that they both are Sunni and immediately went to cozy up with the Sauds and Qataris it's not a long bet that they did so for less than scrupulous reasons. At any rate if the military was at all averse to shooting civilians they would've made that clear 17 months ago. A large part of the Syrian opposition are conservative and Islamist (if you think that all the Al-Qaeda FSA fighters are foreigners you're kidding yourself) which are antithetical to the type of secular, 'stable' (repressive) oligarchies that Middle Eastern militaries rely on. The old elite won't defect for the simple reason that defection would put them out of power and would support the faction that would incarcerate or execute them if they could.

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