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french lies
Apr 16, 2008
So there’s this place called the People’s Republic of China. You might have heard of it. You may use this thread to talk about things relating to that place. As you may also be aware, the sovereign territory of the People’s Republic of China includes many fine places, such as Taiwan. You may use this thread to talk about this, and other provinces of China.

Index
  • 1.1 The Three Nos: Rules and suggestions
  • 1.2 Sources
  • 1.3 Twitter/Weibo
  • 1.4 Suggested Reading
  • 1.5 Links
  • 2.1 How does China work anyway? by BrotherAdso (Click here)
  • 3.1 Recommended posts (Click here)



To promote scientific and harmonious argument, we insist everyone abide by The Three Nos:

  • No Zhonglish. Don’t write posts in Chinese or in English with Chinese words substituting for English ones. Annotating names is fine, but don’t overdo it. When using characters, stick to simplified script, as that is what most people will be familiar with. The reason for this is that the trademark sprinkling of Chinese characters that ex-pats tend to use closes off the people who can't speak Chinese, and makes the discussion very cliquish.

  • No discussion about Chinese language learning or other practical matters (visa, studies, work, your girlfriend Dongdong). These topics have their own separate threads, found in the ‘Autonomous Regions’ section below. Discussion about topics like language politics is fine.

  • No discussion on hot-button topics without proper naming etiquette, e.g. don’t use the Chinese names of things like: noted dissidents, political prisoners or controversial historical events. Referring to these things by their initials is the best way. Example: LXB is good, Liu Xiaobo is okay, but using his Chinese name is probably not a good idea. This is to avoid the forum getting blacklisted and inaccessible from Mainland China.

Other than that, feel free to discuss anything China-related, be it current events, history or culture. I’ve included two lists below, one of recommended literature and another of sources in English and Chinese. Contributions to these are welcome.

In the second post you’ll find a long article by fellow goon BrotherAdso on the workings of the Chinese government. It’s really good and I recommend you set aside an hour of your time to read it.

On that note, I’ve noticed a lot of goons (including myself) currently live, study or work in China. Some of you even teach Chinese or Chinese-related subjects in university. Effortposts, regardless of topic, will be greatly appreciated by everyone. Those who take the time to write longer contributions will be rewarded with a place in the appendix of the OP, which I’ve reserved for “model posts”.

And of course, if you read Chinese, consider translating interesting articles or blog posts when you come across them. This is a ton of effort, but know that not only are you getting some excellent language practice, you are also contributing in a more abstract sense through making Chinese voices heard. I’ll try to make room for translations in the OP as well.

So without further ado, let’s get on with it!

Autonomous Regions

Ask/Tell Thread about Chinese History
http://forums.somethingawful.com/showthread.php?threadid=3447396&userid=0&perpage=40&pagenumber=1

The China Megathread (Tourism & Travel)
http://forums.somethingawful.com/showthread.php?threadid=3413886

Teaching English in Taiwan (Tourism & Travel)
http://forums.somethingawful.com/showthread.php?threadid=3330057&pagenumber=32&perpage=40#post395784789

Chinese Language Thread (Science, Academics and Languages)
http://forums.somethingawful.com/showthread.php?threadid=2683932&pagenumber=30&perpage=40#post374032197




Most of the reporting done in and on China should be taken with a few grains of salt. Sifting out what’s good from what’s bad, what’s reliable from what’s not et.c. takes time. A good place to start is the China Digital Times, which is a US-funded (and therefore free) news aggregator that picks up most, if not all of the important China stories that run in the English-language media. Or you could check out an independent website like Danwei, which has staff that reads Chinese, and the experience to put events in perspective. The WSJ China Real Time Report is a decent English-language source. Twitter and its Chinese equivalent, Sina Weibo, are also excellent ways of discovering content.

Sources in English

News
  • China Digital Times
    Operated out of Hong Kong and a great aggregator of China news. Picks up reporting and commentary from a wide range of English- and Chinese-language sources. Best of all, it's completely free! That's right, no annoying pay-walls or anything of the sort.

  • Wall Street Journal - China Real Time Report
    The WSJ does some of the better China reporting of the US newspapers, and the RTR has the added benefit of not being stuck behind a paywall like the rest of the paper is. As good a place as any to keep up to date on what’s happening in China.

  • NYT China Page
    The New York Times also has somewhat extensive coverage of China, and they're more generous with the free content, though I often find their reporting is not as good as the WSJ. Also a decent place to keep informed about China news.


Magazines
  • Danwei
    Online magazine featuring book reviews, in-depth articles and news summaries. Run by a handful of experienced China hands, with a very high standard of quality. Unfortunately, they now update very infrequently.

  • China Smack
    Webzine focusing on Chinese internet culture. Tracks memes and online reaction to events in the news, featuring translated comments from Chinese netizens. Also notable for being an independent website in English run almost exclusively by native Chinese.

  • Ministry of Tofu
    China Smack for grown-ups. A great aggregator for trending stories and items on the Chinese internet, with English translations if you don't feel comfortable reading Chinese.

  • China Daily Show
    The Onion, only targeted towards ex-pats and China watchers. Satirical commentary on China news and westerners. Surprisingly funny, even hilarious at its best.

  • Offbeat China
  • China Media Project

Blogs
  • Sinocism
    Current affairs blog by Bill Bishop. Bishop really knows his poo poo, and his command of written Chinese is extremely impressive for a foreigner. Has in common with Danwei’s writers that he is often able to cast a wider net in his articles. Includes a daily list of articles in Chinese and English. A must-have for any serious China RSS feed.

  • Patrick Chovanec
    One of the smartest and most lucid commenters on Chinese politics. Chovanec is extremely knowledgeable, has great access and best of all, he has an amazing ability to condense byzanthine events into very readable and accessible prose. Massive pro-click.

  • Blocked on Weibo
    The author of this blog runs a monthly check on several hundred thousand terms on Weibo to see which ones are banned. He publishes a monthly list, and also analysis of individual words and phrases that are banned. Many bizarre and unexpected phrases are subject to censorship, for reasons we may never know. Fascinating reading.

  • EastSouthWestNorth
    Infrequently updated blog with high-quality translations of blog posts and other items in Chinese.

  • China Financial Blog
  • China Law Blog
  • Blood & Treasure
  • Rectified.Name 正名
  • DigiCha
  • Inside-Out China
  • The China Beat
  • This is China!

Podcasts
  • Sinica
    Fantastic podcast hosted by a who's who of English-speaking China journalists, including Kaiser Kuo, Jeremy Goldkorn, Bill Bishop, Evan Osnos and more. Covers current events, Chinese society and politics.

  • China History Podcast
    Weekly podcast about Chinese history. Run by a cool old guy who is both knowledgeable and able to make otherwise dry topics interesting. I’ve listened to almost all the episodes and really couldn’t recommend it more.

Sources in Chinese

News
  • 21st Century Business Herald (21世纪经济报道)
    PRC equivalent of the Wall Street Journal, read by the political and business elites. Standard of journalism notably higher than pure propaganda outlets like People’s Daily, or hardline party rags like Global Times.

Magazines
  • Caijing Magazine (财经杂志) (iPad edition)
    News mag by and for the elites. They do, or at least used to do, a lot of serious muckracking journalism. Dense, dry and difficult to read. Founded by Hu Shuli, a female journalist, in 1998, who then left the magazine in 2009 under murky circumstances.

  • Caixin Century (新世纪周刊) (iPad edition)
    Counterpoint to Caijing founded by Hu Shuli after her departure from Caijing. Reports on issues not usually tackled at length by the Chinese press, like corruption, women’s rights and the environment.

  • CBN Weekly (第一财经周刊) (iPad edition)
    Trendy business magazine. It’s a lighter read than Caijing and Caixin Century, and does a lot interesting feature articles. If you want to know what issues are on the minds of Chinese professionals in their twenties and thirties, this is the magazine to read.

Podcasts/Youtube
  • (iTunes) Qiang Qiang San Ren Xing (锵锵三人行)
    Daily talk show by the HK-based Mandarin channel Phoenix TV. Always features interesting commentary on the issues of the day, though nothing controversial is likely to pop up.

  • (iTunes) Deutsche Welle Chinese (德国之声中文广播)
    Two daily broadcasts of 30 minutes each. Their budget has been cut pretty badly over the last few years, meaning shorter programs and less original content. Still worth listening to for the odd interview and their listener segments.

  • (Youtube) 2100 Quan Min Kai Jiang (2100全民开讲)
    Crazy, no holds barred political talk show full of unsubstantiated speculation, self-righteous rants and tons of yelling. Probably my favorite TV show in Chinese. Exemplifies both the very best and the very worst of the Taiwanese media.

Sources in Other Languages
  • (Danish) Kinablog
    Blog run by Danish journalist Kim Ratchke. Great resource for Scandinavian goons (I know there are a lot of you). Features in-depth posts and weekly summaries of the news.



Twitter and its Chinese equivalent Weibo are great sources, but can often seem overwhelming if you don’t know who to follow. That’s especially the case with Weibo, what with the added language barrier and all. Below is a list of people you can follow to begin with if you’re interested in China. (some of these were snagged from fellow SA poster SB35)

On Twitter



Interesting links that don’t fit in anywhere else are posted here.




An astonishing number of books have been produced on China. I won’t lay claim to having read more than a paltry number of them. In English, you can find books about virtually any topic from Tang underwear to Mao’s dental hygiene. And of course, even that will pale in comparison to all the material you can access if you read Chinese. For other languages, the selection is smaller but still significant. The list is compiled from my own bookshelf and suggestions from others, and is updated as new suggestions come in.

If you need a starting point, and are interested in Chinese history, I heartily recommend Patricia Ebrey’s book, Cambridge Illustrated History of China. The reason for this is that it is light on specifics and very easy to read. It is commonly used as an introductory textbook in Chinese history courses. Fairbank’s volume is good and widely available, but much denser, to the point where it may very well be unreadable without some foreknowledge. Gernet’s book has similar issues. I have heard good things about Spence’s Search for Modern China, so I am including that as well.

For history books, you can also check out this expanded reading list by Professor William Rowe from John Hopkins University. (tabris)

The University of Warwick has reading lists for its seminars on Chinese history. Professor Shawn Breslin, also at Warwick, has had the decency to make some of his research papers freely available. (Hong Xiuquan)

History - General Overviews
  • Patricia Ebrey, Cambridge Illustrated History of China (Amazon)
    Probably the best layman’s introduction to Chinese history short of an Idiot’s Guide. Lots of anecdotes, colorful pictures and other elements that help spice up the experience. Used widely as a college textbook, often along with its companion volume, Chinese Civilization: A Sourcebook.

  • Jonathan D. Spence, Search for Modern China (Amazon)
    This is often held up as the definitive English-language introductory volume to Chinese history. Written by a now-retired Yale professor, it explains the major phases of Chinese history in a very accessible style. Comes recommended by a lot of people. Has a great companion volume of translated primary source documents, called The Search for Modern China: Documentary Collection (Hong Xiuquan)

  • John K. Fairbank, China: A New History (Amazon)
    Can be found cheap almost everywhere. Fairbank writes well, but also makes a lot of strange choices: he mostly glosses over imperial history, and devotes a lot of time to parochial topics like Neo-Confucianism and the Ming tax code. Somewhat academic, and requires foreknowledge going in.

  • Jacques Gernet, A History of Chinese Civilization (Amazon)
    This is a translation of Le Monde Chinois written by the famous French sinologist Jacques Gernet. The book is comprehensive but very dense, and requires a dedicated reader.

  • Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, The Rise of Modern China: (Amazon)
    Used to enjoy wide prominence as a standard textbook on Chinese history. Deep (1136 pages, making it the single largest volume on this list) but supremely readable, though it seems to have stopped updating after the 1997 HK handover. (Hong Xiuquan)

Imperial History (221 BC - 1912 AD)
  • Jonathan D. Spence, God’s Chinese Son: The Heavenly Kingdom of Hong Xiuquan (Amazon)
    Tells the story of the Taiping Rebellion, a bloody uprising instigated by a Christian Hakka who believed himself to be the brother of Jesus. Spence recounts the events focusing on the idiosyncratic leader of the movement, Hong Xiuquan. (menino and BrotherAdso)

  • Ray Huang, 1587, A Year of No Significance: The Ming Dynasty in Decline (《万历十五年》) (Amazon)
    Huang examines the corruption and failings of the Ming dynasty, using the reign of the Wanli emperor as his starting point. The system in place during this time was, to put it bluntly, one of the most ridiculous and inefficient ways ever devised to run a country. Considered a classic in English-language literature about Chinese history. Also available in a great Chinese translation done by the author himself.

  • Paul A. Cohen, History in Three Keys (Amazon)
    An account of the anti-foreign Boxer rebellion of 1899-1901. Written by a Wellesley professor of Asian Studies, it’s engagingly written and balances good historical research with an original thesis and analytical approach. (BrotherAdso)

  • Edward Schafer, The Golden Peaches of Samarkand: A Study of T'ang Exotics (Amazon)
    A study of Tang material culture, especially exotics. Great for just skipping around (Ooo, snake bile!), it builds a compelling case of the cosmopolitanism of the dynasty. (Brennanite)

  • Edward Schafer, The Vermilion Bird: T'ang Images of the South (Amazon)
    A history through literature of Southern China and neighboring states. Covers minority peoples, customs, and places. (Brennanite)

  • Charles Holcombe, The Genesis of East Asia, 221 B.C.-A.D. 907 (Asian Interactions and Comparisons) (Amazon)
    Examines the connections between China, Korea, Japan, and Vietnam from the Han to the decline of the Tang empire. A really good book that explores their shared cultural heritage, but also important differences between the countries. (Brennanite)

Modern History (1912 - Present)
  • Jan Wong, Red China Blues: My Long March from Mao to Now (Amazon)
    Memoir written by a Chinese-Canadian woman who went to the PRC in 1972, when the Cultural Revolution was just starting to peter out. She studied at Beijing University and embraced Maoism, living like a common Chinese person, until she was unceremoniously thrown out of the country a few years later. Bittersweet reflection on the period and her own disillusionment with Maoism.

  • Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Amazon)
    Cold War history told from a Chinese perspective. The author essentially argues that Mao was at the heart of the PRC’s foreign entanglements, not only as part of a dick-waving contest with the other communist nations, but also to justify constant revolutions and sweeping political changes at home.

  • Maurice Meisner, Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic (Amazon)
    Written by a recently-deceased professor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Does a good job of explaining the internal contradictions that led to China's current political situation (Mao's utopian voluntarism vs. an entrenched Leninist bureaucracy dedicated to economic development). (Small Talk)

Politics
  • Tony Saich, Governance and Politics of China (Amazon)
    Decent overview of the political system in China, with a slightly partisan bias. Often assigned as a standard textbook on contemporary Chinese politics (and priced accordingly).

  • Richard McGregor, The Party: The Secret World of China’s Communist Rulers (Amazon)
    “Exposé” of the inner life of the CCP, written by a former FT China correspondent. Shows the diffuse nature of the CCP and how it is embedded throughout the layers of government structure. Contains many anecdotes and stories drawn from his time working in China.

  • Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World (Amazon)
    Confronts commonly held biases and assumptions in the West about China’s role in the world now and going forward, chief among these the “necessity” of democracy for a well-functioning economy. Without being alarmist or propagandist, Jacques draws up a scenario for how China will be the world’s leading superpower by 2050.

Religion and Belief Systems
  • Benjamin I. Schwarz, The World of Thought In Ancient China (Amazon)
    Authoritative overview of the Chinese schools of philosophy that arose in ancient China, most notably during the Spring and Autumn Period. Among other topics, Schwarz looks at Confucianism, Legalism, Mohism and, of course, Taoism.

  • Daniel L. Overmyer, Religion in China Today (Amazon)
    A collection of essays about the contemporary practice of religion in China. Covers Qi Gong cults, the syncretic religions practiced in Hong Kong and Taiwan, and the less mainstream practices of Islam and Christianity.

  • David Jordan, Gods, Ghosts & Ancestors: Folk Religion in a Taiwanese Village (Free online version)
    An anthropologist's account of the religious mix of a Taiwanese village and serves as a peek into traditional (diverse) Chinese religious practices. Particularly interesting in the context of some persistent and resurgent mainland beliefs/practices and some of the more interesting stuff happening in Hong Kong. Available for free online. (Hong Xiuquan)

  • John Lagerway and Liu Penglai, Early Chinese Religion (Amazon)
    A two part, four volume set covering religious thought and practice from the Shang through Tang dynasties (1250 BCE to 907 CE). A scholarly work, it is broken into a series of articles for each period. Topics cover ancestor worship, Confucian rites, ritual texts, divination, shamanism, sacred space and time, local and state cults, funerary practices, medicine and a whole lot more--plus all flavors of Buddhism and Daoism and popular religion! All of the articles are written by expert scholars. (Brennanite)

  • Isabelle Robinet, Taoism: Growth of a Religion (Amazon)
    The place to start for anyone looking to understand religious Daoism. Covers its relationship to classical/philosophical Daoism, different schools and subschools, beliefs, practices, and sacred texts. Meant as a introductory text for college religion classes. (Brennanite)

  • Stephen Bokenkamp, Early Daoist Scriptures (Amazon)
    Introduction and translation of major scriptures from the larger schools and categories. Presented chronologically and with context for ease of understanding. You can just read the introductions or skip to a specific example of a text. (Brennanite)

  • Erik Zurcher, The Buddhist Conquest of China (Amazon)
    the granddaddy of all books about the introduction and spread of Buddhism in China. If you only read one book on Chinese religion, read this one. (Brennanite)

  • Kenneth Ch'en, Buddhism in China (Amazon)
    Good overview of the history of Buddhism throughout imperial China. Covers the establishment of different schools, and especially its relationship with the state/emperor. (Brennanite)

  • Stephen Teiser, The Ghost Festival in Medieval China (Amazon)
    Uses the very popular Ghost Festival (yulanpen) to show how Chinese society mixed together elements of Buddhism and folk beliefs. A good discussion of how most Chinese actually engaged in religious practices. (Brennanite)

Biographies
  • Simon Winchester, The Man Who Loved China: The Fantastic Story about the Eccentric Scientist Who Unlocked the Secrets of the Middle Kingdom (Amazon)
    Fascinating biography of Joseph Needham, the principal author of Science and Civilization in China. Needham had a distinguished academic career, which was unfortunately tarnished by his personal idiosyncracies and a blind love of China that clouded his judgment, with disastrous results.

  • Ezra Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (Amazon)
    Great book about one of the most important men of Chinese history. Vogel’s biography is divided into two parts, one tracing Deng’s rise to de facto head of the PRC in the 70s, and the other the sweeping changes enacted after he got into power.

  • Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China (Amazon)
    Sympathetic account of the life of Chiang Kai-shek, leader of the KMT and arch rival of Mao. The book, among other things, argues that the failings of KMT came about in large part due to the unreliable assistance of the Americans (a controversial viewpoint), and that it was Chiang’s vision for China, not Mao’s, that triumphed in the end. (menino)

  • Jonathan Spence, To Change China: Western Advisers in China (Amazon)
    Chronicles the lives and works of sixteen Western advisers working in China, from the Jesuit missionaries during the Qing dynasty to American military advisors assisting the KMT. Long story short; lots of starry-eyed white guys hope to fulfill their dreams of fame/fortune/preaching the good word by selling their technical/medical/organizational skills to the Chinese. Each one leaves just as dejected and cynical as the other. Should be considered a must-read by current and would-be expats.

Business
  • Dan Breznitz, Run of the Red Queen: Government, Innovation, Globalization, and Economic Growth in China (Amazon)
    Interesting book that doesn’t fit into the usual mold of business literature about China. It looks at the development model of China, why it has been successful and how the state, through various methods, has tried to wrangle it into something it’s not.

Education
  • Andrew Kipnis, Governing Educational Desire: Culture, Politics and Schooling in China (Amazon)
    An academic look at education in China. Kipnis starts at ground level in a small county called Zouping, then zooms further out to look at the country as a whole and how the state is shaping educational desire among the populace. (Curved)

Women and Gender
  • Dorothy Ko, Cinderella’s Sisters: A Revisionist History of Footbinding (Amazon)
    Examines footbinding, women's history, modern China, the influences of western norms upon China, and social constructions of beauty. Tries to show footbinding in a more wide cultural context, rather than dismissing it as just an oppressive tool of the patriarchy. (nerdpony)

  • Dorothy Ko, Teachers of the Inner Chambers: Women and Culture in Seventeenth-Century China (Amazon)
    By the same author as Cinderella’s Sisters. Examines the more general role of women in cultural transmission and domestic management of households. (BrotherAdso)

  • Bret Hinsch, Women in Early Imperial China (Amazon)
    Addresses women's roles in family life/kinship circles, labor, legal rights, education, literature, participation in government and rites, and cosmology (yin-yang). Written for those with little or no background in Chinese studies. (Brennanite)

  • Susan Mann and Yu-yin Cheng, Under Confucian Eyes (Amazon)
    Uses a variety of contemporary sources to examine how gender was written about by the Chinese literati. Some of the sources are written by women. Good for skipping from topic to topic. Covers Tang through Qing (618-1911), but most of the documents are from the Qing (1644-1911). (Brennanite)

  • Nina Wang, Images of Women in Chinese Culture and Thought (Amazon)
    Similar to Under Confucian Eyes, only containing more primary source material. Covers Shang through Song (1600 BCE-1279 CE). The two are good companion pieces. (Brennanite)

  • Wilt Idema and Beata Grant, The Red Brush: Women's Writings in Imperial China (Amazon)
    A monstrous volume (seriously, you could kill with it) of women's writings from the Han to the Qing. Poets are particularly well-represented. Biographical sketches and historical context are included with the literature. (Brennanite)

  • Patricia Ebrey, The Inner Quarters: Marriage and Women's Lives in the Sung Period (Amazon)
    Examines the simultaneous expansion of women's place in society and the restrictions placed upon them by Neo-Confucianists. Haven't read it, but I like her other works on similar topics. (Brennanite)


Multi-volume works
  • Various Authors, The Cambridge History of China
    Expensive as gently caress. Don’t even consider this unless you are literally living on piles of money (or in a university). The Chinese edition is cheaper but extensively censored. Supposed to be good, though I haven’t yet earned the required millions to know.

  • Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China
    Joseph Needham was a genius-level weirdo biologist who caught yellow fever and later in many ways became the prototypical white CCP apologist. He learned Chinese and devoted the rest of his life to the so-called Needham Question, e.g. why China, with its relatively early development of gunpowder and other inventions, was to lag so much behind later on in history. He answered it (partly) by writing this crazy multi-volume monstrosity about the development of science and technology in China.

Books in Chinese
  • Lung Yingtai - Big River, Big Sea: The Untold Stories of 1949 (《大江大海一九四九》) (books.com.tw)
    This book became a big hit in Taiwan, selling over 100,000 copies. Comes recommended by several Chinese friends of mine. The author, who’s a famous writer in Taiwan, looks at the untold stories of the mass migration to Taiwan from Mainland China following the Kuomintang’s defeat in 1949. Banned in the PRC.

  • Fei Xiaotong - From The Soil: The Foundations of Chinese Society (《乡土中国》) (Amazon, English translation)
    A classic in Chinese anthropology. Fei takes a macro view, examining how the countryside has shaped Chinese society over the centuries. He also looks at problems like rural literacy and poverty, and gives suggestions for how to solve them. Available in an English translation by Gary Hamilton.

  • Yang Jisheng - Tombstone: An Account of Chinese Famine in the 1960s (《墓碑:中国六十年代大饥荒的纪实》) (HK Book City)
    Massive work about, you guessed it, Chinese famine in the 1960s following The Great Leap Forward. Compares favorably to the Jung Chang-approved Mao’s Great Famine by Frank Dikötter. Also banned in the PRC, meaning what’s in there is likely to be true.

Books in other languages
  • (German) Helmut Schmidt, Nachbar China (Amazon)
    A short book consisting of conversations between Frank Sieren, a journalist for Die Zeit, and Helmut Schmidt, ex-Chancellor of Germany. I’m a big fan of Schmidt’s, and his insights into China and its position in the world are remarkably astute for someone without a formal China background. Other world leaders would have much to gain from following his example.

Comedy
  • Jung Chang, Mao: The Unknown Story (Amazon)
    Hilarious screed by the West’s favorite defected Red Guard. Fascinating new evidence and witness accounts, all highly unfavorable to Mao, pop up throughout the book. Did you know that the Long March was more like a nice evening stroll, without any fighting whatsoever? You see, we read that in a ‘newly discovered archive’ (we won’t tell you where though).

  • James Mann, The China Fantasy: Why Capitalism Won't Bring Democracy to China (Amazon)
    Short, vacuous polemic which argues confusingly and impotently against a grab bag of straw men. Notable for being pushed by a lot of China watchers, many of whom I suspect are either on drugs or friends with the author.

french lies fucked around with this message at 19:44 on Aug 22, 2013

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french lies
Apr 16, 2008
The following is an excellent write-up about the Chinese government, courtesy of LF superstar BrotherAdso. It should be considered a must-read by everyone. I’ve taken the liberty of correcting a few minor mistakes, mostly typos. Some of the original pics seem to have been lost, so you’ll see some phantom captions pop up here and there.

BrotherAdso posted:

How Does China Work Anyway?

So how the hell does China work? We post post post about it all the drat time.

Well for one thing it is functionally a one party state, but the party and state are not the same thing.


Though they do wear the same drat suits

Huh?

Well, the Communist party doesn’t have the numbers (it has about 78 million members, not all of who are active, and about 40 million cadres), coordination, or expertise to staff every village and township office and every judgeship with its members. Since the 1980s, there has been an ongoing diversification of power expression.

So in China, you have to make two important distinctions: the central government, where Communist Party affiliation and official rank are similar if not identical, and the local and regional governments, where there is divergence of authority.

This bifurcated system is one of the main reasons the PRC’s central government and administration have remained so effective into the 1990s despite the slow erosion of some of the ideological and party elements of power in previous years.



State Central Government
In the central government of the PRC, the highest authority is the National People’s Congress, the 全国人民代表大会. In practice, the Standing Committee of the NPC excercizes a legislative power for most of the year, and consists of a select group of members of the NPC. Though they exercise a lot of constitutional power, they’re typically well-trained Communist party functionaries with a lot of experience in the Politburo or other bodies. Within the Congress, it is the Standing Committee which functionally exercises power — full meetings are rare and mostly symbolic in nature.

Next on the ‘state functions side’ is the State Council (国务院), which replicates the functions of an executive branch and administrative agency. More than the NPC or it’s Standing Committee, the members of the State Council control administrative priorities and decisions on a day-to-day basis. The leaders of the State Council are always members of the Party, and usually of the Central Committee, and its head, the Premiere, is the main domestic authority.

Because the State functions are so heavily interpenetrated with the Party at high levels, the bifurcated model of government is much less powerful and evident than at provincial and especially local levels, which brings us to…

Party Central Government
On the Party side, the Politburo (中国共产党中央政治局) and Central Committee make key decisions – especially high level personnel appointments. They’re self-perpetuating committees with several potential interlocutory agencies that check them (or promise to check them) if they become openly abusive. In particular, the Politburo is constitutionally appointed by the Central Committee, even though this hasn’t been really the case since the 1980s.

The Central Military Commission (中央军事委员会), also on the Party side (but with implications for the pure State side), is a lynchpin because it exists on both sides of the coin. It actually has two different names and administrative functions which are both administered by the same committee.


Now that’s brutalism! Go military commission!

so wait, this is a poo poo-ton of information, why do I care?
Well, because it’s interesting.

But more importantly, because the way the Chinese organize their Party-State relations can give people who actually think about how to build or not build leftist states some important food for thought.

For example, the model of the highest levels of State and Party – bifurcated but interlaced – provides a leadership which can make effective decisions, but which spreads out authority enough to ensure that unstable or ineffective individuals are less able to set bad priorities or cripple the system. In addition, the consultative model inherent in the central committees creates an effective way to share the expertise and perspective of good leaders while make sure ideas can cross-pollinate across branches and individuals.


Illustration of the relationship between party and state in China. Click here for a clearer version.

so what else does the Central Party do then?
The central party also runs a couple of other very important institutions. The first is the Central School (共中央党校), whose purpose and goal is to educate and train future party leaders, not just in ideological modes and doctrines, but in cooperative techniques, geopolitics, administration, anti-corruption, and so on. The establishment of the school also creates a place for connections to be made among each group and generation of Party leadership, and a way to retrain or utilize party members not currently in rotation on one of the main power committees. For example, the incumbent President after Wen Jiabao, Xi Jinping, is the current head of the Central Party School.


Congratulating graduates of this august institution…wearing totally western-style graduation regalia. Huh.

The other is the Discipline and Inspection Committee (中国共产党中央纪律检查委员), which is actually remarkably similar to the role of the office of the Imperial Censorate and other associated offices in the late Imperial era. The Committee is huge – employing at least 2,000 people centrally in Beijng and many thousands more in the provinces, and many more indirectly. Its counterpart on the State side (since the CDIC is technically Party-internal) is the Ministry of Supervision (中华人民共和国监察部). Together, they exercise a lot of authority to bring cases, indict individuals, and move the levers of power on the state and party apparatuses to enforce their decisions (even though their own real power is very poorly defined).

What about local governance?
Just like the Central Government technically has divisions between Government office and Party office at most levels, all the localities are also governed in a two-half system, from province to township.

So let’s take Liaoning Province as an example. Liaoning has a Governor, at the moment Chen Zhenggao (陈政高), who has extensive experience in the Party and is a party member, but at the moment isn’t sitting on any major Party committees. His counterpart is the CPC Committee Secretary, currently Zhang Wenyue (張文岳), who is politically extremely reliable but less well connected in the region than Chen Zhenggao. The Governor has some autonomous power over the police and everyday administration of the region, but Zhang, as the CPC secretary, has much more final executive control and fewer symbolic duties of state.

This bifurcation continues down the scale, until at the local level you see power balance much more evenly between the local party and the local government, resulting in competition for bribe money etc.

OK, now this is a bunch of names and poo poo – what’s the upshot?
The dual-official system at the lower level creates an effective interlocking beaurocracy. At the highest levels of the government, where CPC rank and effective state authority are closely associated, but serve to spread out power among a larger number of high party officials. However, at the lower levels, it is not so likely that all people in the State side of the apparatus will be Party members at all, much less high ranking ones (note: this isn’t true of Province-level positions and most of the Autonomous Regions). This means there can be effective rivalries for power and dialogues between different wings of the apparatus. In addition, the State side can encourage inspection of the Party side, and Party officials can rotate into and out of State side positions. This is an effective way for the Party to educate or shake up positions and prevent too much local-institutional corruption.

The Chinese have also studied closely models of local and institutional governance in other countries, particularly Latin America and Singapore, and are trying to implement some of the corporatist models of countries like Chile. This model allows the state to actively intervene and place Communist and State officials in positions of power in powerful commercial and NGO groups. These models add a third leg to the stool of the State-Party model. In addition, they strengthen civil outlets outside the party, which has a relatively small membership.

Yeah, but what about all those propaganda campaigns that Maggotmaster so loved?
Well, the ‘golden age’ of silly propaganda is certainly over. But there are two remaining slogans it is still vitally important to understand and engage with. The first is the Scientific Development Concept campaign.
Scientific Development, pushed by Hu Jintao and members of his political clique into being included in the Chinese official party constitution and statements in 2007, makes it clear that an emphasis will be put on three things:

1) Equalizing economic gain and opportunity across the country
2) Creating intra-party democratic checking mechanisms.
3) Creating extra-party democratic and activist organizations that share membership with the party, to solve environmental problems.

Two of the most interesting examples of how these are working: masses accusation centers, which are anonymised phone lines, tip boxes, emails, and physical locations where citizens have direct access to the party-side disciplinary and inspection committees, and can bypass other party-side institutions to bring allegations of abuse and corruption to light. Second is approval period and party elections – most villiage and sub province level party branches and state organs have begun conducting elections among intra-party candidates for the office, and, once a candidate is elected or appointed, there is a ‘lag time’ of several weeks or a month where individuals can lodge complaints or worries about the individual who is going to occupy the post – and possibly halt their investiture.

This is further developed by the Harmonious Society Program, a subset of the Scientific Development campaign. The Harmonious Society program aims specifically to involve different sectors of society in government initiatives to create greater citizen investment in local offices – for example, environmental cleanups or ‘patriotic initiatives’ like community classes. This also includes a promotion of economic development of inland, western provinces at the expense of large technologically cutting-edge projects in Eastern cities – an approach which has proven very controversial.

The second is the Three Represents.



Jiang Zemin introduced the Three Represents in 2000, intending it as his standing contribution to Chinese ideology and to reflect the problems he saw as emerging in the increasingly powerful economy his policies had allowed to grow. The Three Represents aimed to include new groups of people in the ranks of the party – particularly young high-achievers and intellectuals, and entrepeneurs and business-owners. The Three Represents took (and takes) a variety of approaches to this – perhaps the most interesting is A ‘decoupling’ of State enterprises. Many state-run factories and shops were separated from the funding and supervision of central planners, but retained the same staff, function (and many times, the same mission and limitations). The managers and owners of these enterprises were suddenly ‘independent entrepreneurs’, but also long-time party members. Voila! A more representative party.



Of course, there are advantages that emerged in the late-1990s and early-2000s that drew some members of the commercial class – for example, the higher level leadership of most of China’s main lending banks is subject to Party approval, and contain party representation in decision making at many levels. Thus, businesses with party members in their leadership are more likely to get good commercial loans and development funding.

Whew!

Sorry for the lack of picures, it’s not really a topic which is real picture-friendly. Thanks for reading if you did, I can try to answer questions too. The Special Autonomous Regions, the Inter-Party Relations Committee, and the Eight Democratic Parties are all interesting and not touched on here.

Part Two: Special Administration

Autonomous Regions in China



So the second part of this post will examine how China uses political and economic compromises to create expansion and stability without disturbing the solidity of the party system as it exists in most of the country.
There are three large ‘types’ of special administrative divisions in the PRC. The first are Special Autonomous Regions (usually but not always ethnic in nature), the second are Special Administrative Regions (political and economic in nature) and Special Economic Regions/Zones (soely economic in nature). Municipalities, while important, don’t deviate too significantly from the standard party/state structure detailed above, and also I don’t know much about them (it’s a hole).

So yeah. First off, Special Autonomous Regions.

Well, the need for Special Autonomous Regions comes from the fact that China is 92% Han (汉人), where its significant that the demonym (Hanren) in Mandarin is the same as the characters for the historical Han Dynasty and the Han river in Northern China. And in a country with such an overwhelming majority with an extremely powerful sense of identity, ethnic minorities (of which the PRC recognizes fifty-odd), will be in serious trouble.

China loves to make a big deal out of how inclusive they are, down to having special ethnicity zoos

So the CCP’s solution has been to create Special Autonomous Regions.
Special Autonomous Regions are governed via the same divided state-party system outlined above, but have special processes for appointment of certain officials, especially the Governor and members of the financial boards and bodies.

Special Autonomous Regions are allowed use of ethnic languages and scripts – which, when you consider China has recently gone so far as banning use of English words in popular press and on television, even to refer to global trends and such, is a pretty big deal. In theory, they have a lot of economic planning leeway, but in reality they are fairly tightly controlled except in their own special economic zones, especially Guangxi and Xinjiang (because the first is host to drug trafficking and the second is exceptionally rich in natural resources).

Unlike those places, Mongolia (ironically enough) is one of the safer, more placed SARs

Just like the primary divisions of China, the Special Autonomous Regions have rotating boards of officials on the State and Party side, but tend to have stronger ties to the local governments on the township and village level – which can be both a good and a bad thing, depending on levels of corruption or ethnic antagonism. It’s important to note that, though some high-level officials in the Autonomous Regions are (as they are supposed to be) appointed from the minorities in the region, the majority will often be Han Chinese officials on rotation from other provinces. This is particularly true in troublesome areas, where the local minorities simply aren’t trusted by the central government and sometimes by their own Autonomous Region government.

So does it work?


Anti-land reclaimation riots in Guangxi

No.


Riots in Urumqi

Or less well than the system for standard provinces, it seems. This might just be a function of poverty – the Special Autonomous Regions tend to be poorer and more rural as well as ethnically different – but the State-Party division of power, which tends to provide some checking and internal revision in the standard provinces, seems to break down when faced with an ethnic element. It doesn’t end well.

Guangxi, Tibet, and Xinjiang are three of the most troubled areas of China despite the presence and fairly effective management of the autonomy system.

So wait, there are two kinds of Special Autonomy though, right?
Yes – we were just talking about ethnically based special autonomous zones, which have been around more or less as long as the PRC has, and have special consideration in the constitution, etc. There are also political special zones, which don’t have a significant ethnic component, and have different political management systems altogether from the bifurcated state-party system in the provinces and ethnic regions.

There are only two politically unique administrative regions, and, like any good leftist, I bet you can guess why these areas are so different?

Whats that?


You guessed right!

Yessir, these were two of the most important bases of Western colonization of China: Hong Kong and Macau (Shanghai was, too, but Shanghai’s industrial, national, and financial importance was such that it became and important symbol in the civil war and couldn’t receive the same political exemptions). The framework for their exceptional system is as old as the Deng administration, which talked about the return of Hong Kong and Macau (and indeed Taiwan) as being feasible under “One nation, two systems” (一国两制)

Hong Kong is the more important of the two, so we’ll talk about it rather than Macau.

Hong Kong has some oversight from Beijing – the winner of their elections is appointed by the Beijing government to be Chief Executive once it is clear that he or she has won fairly – thus far, Beijing hasn’t shown any desire to interfere because of disapproval of a candidate, and has given most people their stamp of approval. These elections, and the fact that elected officials are able to appoint other administrators with a great deal of leeway (again, compared to the party-state relationship, rotational system, retraining, masses-approval and other systems on the mainland), make the Hong Kong political system remarkably free from direct control.

The economic system in Hong Kong has none of the barriers of entry or state control of financial capital you find on the mainland, either – it is more open than even the Special Economic Zones, though it has its own versions of mainland-style corruption.


Beautiful Hong Kong?

It’s worth noting, though, that Hong Kong isn’t exactly an open society – which is rather the way Beijing wants and needs it to be. For example, Falun Gong (established in a court case as legal and protected) has been repeatedly repressed on flimsy grounds, anti-PRC radio stations have been shut down, and street demonstrations are subject to pretty tremendous police brutality and very very strong regulation and prior approval.



Hong Kong is, according to the Communist Party itself, a testing ground for a Singaporean style of governance in China, and many people in openness-leaning cliques look to Hong Kong for ‘best practices’ and guidance for implementing certain accountability and openness reforms in the PRC itself without causing too many problems.

Alright, the last kind of special zone is the solely economic one: the Special Economic Zone. Interestingly, the biggest and most important Special Economic zones roughly coincide to the treaty ports China was forced to open to western occupation during the 19th century, but, y’know, that couldn’t possibly be of symbolic or real importance. Nope.

The biggest Special Economic Zone is probably Shenzhen, but the growth and creation of Shenzhen is closely intertwined with the special political and economic nature of Hong Kong, so there are more typical and useful cases to look at farther North.

Xiamen and Dalian are both excellent examples. Xiamen is one of the older SEZs, and was originally chosen because of its proximity to Taiwan, Macau, and Hong Kong back in 1979-1980. What makes the SEZs so special?
Well, first is availability of capital. In most of the provinces and areas, the Chinese system of government-party connected banking controls capital more closely, but there are tremendous incentives to invest in the SEZs – these take the form of both tax breaks and lower rates of interest or ease of getting loans. In addition, Chinese firms are free to seek partnerships with and capital from foreign firms when they are operating in a SEZ, which they typically cannot do elsewhere.

Banking: key to controlled and created capital movement?

While the actual format of provincial administration and registry for the population and so on is the same as in the rest of China, the governments of the SEZs get special considerations, just like the firms that operate there. They aren’t usually part of large scale initiatives and projects that come from the central province administration, they have their own financial structures and goals partly separate from the province, and have their own looser and central-local cooperative regulations on import, export, and other trade activities.



The final catch, though, is that they must be export-focused, capital-focused enterprises. The regulation of this is tough, of course – it is done on an industry by industry basis by special boards maintained within the SEZs.

So if you look at Xiamen and Dalian, you have two different models. Xiamen, like Shenzhen, was in many ways a “labor camp” – access to shipping and migrant labor from interior Fujian and Guangdong combined with the strictures above to create a place where industrial manufacturing could absolutely explode – including food processing and export and light manufacturing. In the past five or ten years, a second stage of development has built on the first, and the Party has taken a very strong interest in the relationship of the second stage to the first. Second only to Shanghai and Hong King, Xiamen has become a finances and communications service city, because of the relaxation of the import/export and capital-intense regulations in their SEZ (and the relative wealth and infrastructure built up from 1980-1996 or 2000). Dalian, on the other hand, embraced the basic strictures of SEZ development and has become a petrochemical, electronics, shipbuilding, and trade processing center – high capital, high investment industries which require relatively little labor force, but still propel the economy forwards in ways which would’t be possible without the SEZ policies.



So how on earth does all this dynamism coexist with a political structure that’s fundamentally the same as the one in the first part of this post? It’s an interesting question – the other two experiments (different political structure without different economic structure, radically different political and economic structure) are both problematic and hard to evaluate or manage effectively for the CPC, but the SEZs (despite some of the local unrest over state evictions and the nascent labor movement) have proven to be much more of a benefit than a cost.

So there you have it – a broad outline of the current Chinese political system and some of its exceptions.

The United Front and the Eight Democratic Parties
Well, so far we’ve covered the structure of the Chinese government, the way that interacts with specialized structures for ethnically or economically distinctive regions, and seen current event (the White Paper On Corruption) come into the narrative.

The last part of this post is about China’s nods to representation and the “alternative parties” in the Chinese system.
First off, you have to understand the origin of the CCP’s relationship with the ‘Eight Democratic Parties’.


The Second United Front: Getting Along with Whitey

Back during the Civil War and the post- Sun Yat-Sen/孫中山 reorganization of power by imperial interests, Communist parties were shattered or simply ill-funded and organized. There was a huge multiplicity of political factions in China, which ranged from monarchist to fascist to center-democratic. In order to get political bargaining power during truce periods, the CCP cultivated an early and close relationship with certain leftist elements of the main factions, especially the China Democratic League and the Zhi Gong Party.

Most of these parties were founded formally in the mid-1930s, and did not find themselves in formal alliance with the CCP until near the end of the civil war. Initially, many of them found a very functional role in the new Chinese state, since the CCP didn’t have the resources to totally consolidate political and economic power until the mid-to-late 1950s, especially in complex urban areas like Shanghai, Wuhan, and Nanjing.


Survivors during the Civil War in Shanghai, living in a very different world than 90% of the rest of China

So, that’s why they exist in one sense – as a historical legacy.

The most important historical-legacy parties are the

China Zhi Gong Party
This party is the legacy of the political and economic influence of Chinese expats in Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines, and the United States – hell, it was founded in San Francisco, not Sanxing. So what value does such a puppet of capitalist interests have, you ask?


The Early congress of the Zhi Gong party, which threw its lot in with the CPC

Well, initially, it acted as a counterweight to the China Lobby in the US Government in the 1930s and 1940s, which was badly dominated by Chiang Kai-shek’s partisans, and as a bulwark in the CCP’s finances (though the majority were still supplied by the International). It had a lot of political clout because of its age and its closeness to Sun Yat-Sen’s already just about sacred memory. In addition, it was a powerful force for aid in the fight against the Japanese, though it has been accused of being too cozyed up to the British after they moved their headquarters to Hong Kong.

But when the Japanese took Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia, the overseas Chinese communities there took a big chunk of the occupation’s brutality, and both the financing and membership of the Zhi Gong Party evaporated.

Hong Kong, and much of the network of overseas Chinese, burns.

So the CCP invited the Zhi Gong to return to formal coalition after the party, a shattered shell of itself, abandoned Chiang Kai-shek in 1947 to strike out on its own. The party came along, and as soon as the People’s Republic was inaugurated, it had a significant number of reserved seats in the NPCC (which is symbolic but ineffective – see the very first post), and, more importantly, seats in county and city government and on specific boards and initiatives.

Today, the Zhi Gong, which was very badly damaged during the Hundred Flowers and especially during the Cultural revolution, is undergoing a rapid increase of relevance. The modern CCP uses the Zhi Gong as an intermediary with Hong Kong democrats, international organizations and other countries, and to keep the wealthy and influential Chinese communities overseas in the orbit of Beijing and inclined to lobby for pro-Chinese trade parties. Numberically, it’s one of the larger parties, with a little over 150,000 registered members, but that is little clue as to their real influence as a favored tool of the CCP itself during a period of internationalization.

The head of the Zhi Gong party at the moment, Li Peng, is the former Chairman of the NPCC standing commission, and was treated as both a senior diplomat and legislative authority for many years. He had tremendous influence in the 1990s and he, along with other secondary party officials, make state visits to conferences and so on.

The Zhi Gong taking part in negotiations about trade and technology

The other highly influential and important secondary party is the China Democratic Leaguge. Just like the Zhi Gong party, the CDL was tremendously influential during the Second Sino-Japanese War and World War II – in fact, probably more so. Why? Because far from simply being a second voice outside of the GMD/China Lobby, the US State Department saw the CDL as a viable third power group in China, without the corruption of Jiang’s GMD or the unacceptable Communism of Mao.


The original CDL

Today, the CDL serve the same purpose internally that the Zhi Gong party does with regards to overseas Chinese. It’s actually pretty damned influential for a small party – its leader gets to be on the Standing Committee, which means he can influence appointments and legislation.

The modern CDL has almost 200,000 members – again not something which should be taken too strongly as a measurement of its power and influence. For example, the current head of the CDL is also a world-famous physicist, Jiang Shusheng, and he represents the highly elite scientific and intellectual membership of the CDL quite well.

The CDL routinely does “wonky” stuff on food security, infrastructure, and education, and serves a great political purpose by redirecting some of the reforming energy of the university-educated elite into an acceptable, controlled, and vetted “fourth party”.


Guo Quan, who was the model CDL member until recently — now in jail for ten yeas.

The third important party is the Revolutionary Committee Of the GMD.

Huh? I thought, you say, that the GMD was in Taiwan/the hated enemy of the people. How do they have a revolutionary committee? What kind of revisionist poo poo is this?

What are these fuckers doing here?

Well, the GMD split (like many other parties) in 1949-1950, as the war was lost and the exodus to Taiwan began. The RCGMD went through a really pronounced period of recession in the 1950-1980 period. However, it has always maintained a large number of seats and a relatively large numbers of members, sometimes people who were ‘quarantined’ from the regular political system because of ties to Taiwan and the GMD. Today, the GMD has a very important role as the symbolic ‘reform party’ of the post-1990 Chinese government. The GMD, many of whose membership are government-side bureaucratic insiders, have taken a strong role in proposing internal legal reforms to create anti-corruption oversight and increase the interaction of the government-side appointment process and the people.



The other minor parties are much smaller, typically with less than 100,000 members. Each one is analogous to the GMD – for example, the Chinese National Democratic Construction League plays a strong role in the proposition of policy with regards to industrial development, tax policy, and industrial-applied scientific research.

So what’s the goddamned point of all these tiny 100-200,000 person parties?

Well, for the CCP, they provide extremely useful tools for a number of situations.

First, they neatly segregate interest groups which could be troublesome and put a closer track on them.

Second, they provide a slightly outside-the-box viewpoint on problems, since their well-educated members don’t have the same worries about internal party advancement as regular members of the Central Committee but have more standing than many NPCC members.

Third, they provide a method of outsider interaction for both diplomatic and political purposes. China can claim a much stronger image of democracy as long as it keeps these parties active, and can use them to relate to countries and factions that reject the central CCP.

Fourth, as the CCP moves, as per the recent White Paper, to increase certain kinds of controlled internal democracy and anti-corruption, pro-press campaigns, the infrastructure and known-quantity high level members of the Eight Democratic Parties will provide a controlled alternative and set of personnel to implement those policies.
So in the next decade, you’ll be seeing more of the past and future members of the United Front – remember where they fit into the larger structure of the Chinese Government.

french lies fucked around with this message at 09:41 on Feb 16, 2012

french lies
Apr 16, 2008


Part of my intention while making this thread was to draw out more of the expertise on SA that you’ll sometimes catch glimpses of here and there: In case you haven’t noticed, goons know poo poo. So far I’ve been amazed at the depth and breadth of knowledge you guys possess about China, and I hope the trend of longer and more in-depth posts continues throughout the thread. Now, I know it takes time and effort to write those, so to make sure they’re appreciated (and to keep the same questions from popping up over and over again), I’ve created this section for model posts. Those who write a lot of these will be rewarded with “model worker” status”.

Model posts as of 13.08.2012

french lies fucked around with this message at 12:26 on Jan 2, 2013

Typo
Aug 19, 2009

Chernigov Military Aviation Lyceum
The Fighting Slowpokes
I'm literally going to Shanghai tomorrow, anyone know of any good way to bypass the famed great firewall? I'm planning on using my own proxy server but backups would be appreciated.

John_Anon_Smith
Nov 26, 2007
:smug:
Thanks for this incredibly informative post. As someone who is second-gen and half-Chinese, most of my knowledge of China comes from my interactions and involvement with Chinese expats (mostly from Hong Kong).

I had heard from relatives that there can be a bit of a political struggle over the use of Cantonese and that some feel as if the Beijing are trying to "wipe them out". Would it be possible to outline the political struggle surrounding the use of Cantonese and put any illusions I have about what is happening to rest?

On a further note, do you have information that relates to Mao on a particular point? There was an argument I heard recently that part of the reason for Mao and the CCP's failure to properly institute a "properly" communist system was because they failed to keep control of officials in rural and poverty-stricken areas. So instead of instituting the regime's changes, these officials used local superstition and pre-existing social mores to establish their corruption and solidify power. The CCP, eager to create a new China, forgot that they were building on top of old China and not simply sweeping it away with their reforms. What would your opinion be on this subject and where could I learn more?

BrotherAdso
May 22, 2008

stat rosa pristina nomine
nomina nuda tenemus

John_Anon_Smith posted:

Thanks for this incredibly informative post. As someone who is second-gen and half-Chinese, most of my knowledge of China comes from my interactions and involvement with Chinese expats (mostly from Hong Kong).

I had heard from relatives that there can be a bit of a political struggle over the use of Cantonese and that some feel as if the Beijing are trying to "wipe them out". Would it be possible to outline the political struggle surrounding the use of Cantonese and put any illusions I have about what is happening to rest?

All people are required to learn and use standard mandarin, so even the big dialects (Cantonese, Hunanese, Shanghainese Fujianese) are officially verbooten in most public documents. In parts of Guangdong and Guangxi especially though, this shift is still slowly occurring, even in government offices and other official capacities.

This mostly becomes important when you realize that there is very little private broadcasting in China, and what there is undergoes strict regulation. Except in Hong Kong, dialect based programming is largely prohibited or minimized, and in movies, regional dialects are rarely if ever heard.

There are no "language police" who abduct 45 year olds or 60 year olds for never learning Mandarin, but there is a campaign to minimize the dialects and increase the common cultural identity felt by citizens across the PRC wherever possible, very similar to the slow eradication of traditional character writing.

John_Anon_Smith posted:

On a further note, do you have information that relates to Mao on a particular point? There was an argument I heard recently that part of the reason for Mao and the CCP's failure to properly institute a "properly" communist system was because they failed to keep control of officials in rural and poverty-stricken areas. So instead of instituting the regime's changes, these officials used local superstition and pre-existing social mores to establish their corruption and solidify power. The CCP, eager to create a new China, forgot that they were building on top of old China and not simply sweeping it away with their reforms. What would your opinion be on this subject and where could I learn more?

This is only kind of true. Read The Spiral Road and Fanshen for two detailed and fairly thorough accounts of early and late Communist rule in agricultural villages and the problems that establishing and maintaining a rural commune or semi-commune system posed.

BrotherAdso fucked around with this message at 18:20 on Feb 14, 2012

BrotherAdso
May 22, 2008

stat rosa pristina nomine
nomina nuda tenemus

Typo posted:

I'm literally going to Shanghai tomorrow, anyone know of any good way to bypass the famed great firewall? I'm planning on using my own proxy server but backups would be appreciated.

VPN. Honestly, if you'll only be there a few days or weeks it won't be too bad - I lived there for a year and wasn't starved even though I had only very occasional access to Facebook and such. If your Chinese is good, you can even learn to use Weibo and Tudou, which I regret never exploring in depth.

edit: Ah, I hadn't had time to read through he extensive OP carefully, and skipped to the questions. I'll keep an eye on the three Nos henceforth.

BrotherAdso fucked around with this message at 20:18 on Feb 14, 2012

french lies
Apr 16, 2008

Typo posted:

I'm literally going to Shanghai tomorrow, anyone know of any good way to bypass the famed great firewall? I'm planning on using my own proxy server but backups would be appreciated.
There's a China thread in the Tourism & Travel sub-forum which has a lot of information on this. You might have noticed it, it's right there in the OP:
http://forums.somethingawful.com/showthread.php?threadid=3413886

Edit: Literally two posts later and we have our first violation of The Three Nos! This doesn't bode well...

Cefte
Sep 18, 2004

tranquil consciousness
Does't noes take an e?

What's your read on the Wang Li-Jun embassy business?

How's real-name registration going to work for foreigners and their Sina weaboos?

enigma74
Aug 5, 2005
a lean lobster who probably doesn't even taste good.
Great OP, it's nice to know about the mechanism of China's government.

sbaldrick
Jul 19, 2006
Driven by Hate
How involved is the PLA in the day to day running of the country. I've read a few articles that stat that Jiang Zemin kept control of PLA after leaving the Presidency as kind of a back door to power (which he later gave up)?

DarkCrawler
Apr 6, 2009

by vyelkin
Awesome OP.

If this wasn't there yet, you should put it in there, family portraits of all 56 ethnic groups of China:
http://www.chinahush.com/2009/12/06/family-portraits-of-all-56-ethnic-groups-in-china/

OXBALLS DOT COM
Sep 11, 2005

by FactsAreUseless
Young Orc

sbaldrick posted:

How involved is the PLA in the day to day running of the country. I've read a few articles that stat that Jiang Zemin kept control of PLA after leaving the Presidency as kind of a back door to power (which he later gave up)?

I think the biggest change in the role of the PLA in China was the movement in the 90s to divest the PLA of its enormous commercial and real-estate interests. Before, there was a literal "military-industrial complex" where the PLA directly ran the businesses that supplied it, from military goods to food. It also owned plenty of unrelated real estate and businesses as well. The idea was originally that the PLA would be a somewhat self-funded organization.

Of course, in the 90s, people in government and also the military leadership started realizing that this not only bred tons of corruption but was actually kind of scary because it meant that the PLA was becoming a power group highly independent from the Party and from central control, since with independent funding it was a lot harder to twist arms with threats of funding cuts. So they started spinning off lots of these enterprises, usually just having the existing PLA managers "retire" from the military but keeping their positions in the company. Nowadays, the PLA is more or less separated from these businesses, although naturally there are very very strong existing connections because the spin-offs are all run by the same former PLA officers.

This old "budget" approach to government, where government organs were expected to self-fund much of their operating costs instead of relying entirely on state funding, is definitely becoming a major problem and is arguably a big part of why the central government is struggling so much with local corruption.

OXBALLS DOT COM fucked around with this message at 21:38 on Feb 14, 2012

french lies
Apr 16, 2008

Cefte posted:

Does't noes take an e?
Both are fine. :eng101:

quote:

What's your read on the Wang Li-Jun embassy business?
I agree with Xujun Eberlein's assertion that Wang wasn't seeking asylum, but likely using the Consulate as a place to take refuge until forces from Beijing arrived (meaning Bo's own men couldn't take him in). Eberlein also speculates that this is part of a deal between Wang and certain people in Beijing, trading sensitive information about Bo, most likely corruption charges, for more lenient handling of a case he's implied in. I haven't kept up to date on this over the last two days though.

Any way you look at it, Bo is probably hosed as far as his political future is concerned.

One interesting aside is how the FLG has reacted to this. Wang Lijun and Bo Xilai were two of the main guys involved in the 1999 crackdown on the FLG, so the Epoch Times and NTDTV are going crazy right now. Two days ago, one of their commentators even speculated that Wang Lijun was directly involved in organ harvesting operations, and that he had leaked details of an ongoing harvesting scheme lead by him and Bo Xilai to the US Government. Needless to say, anything the FLG says can be safely disregarded.

quote:

How's real-name registration going to work for foreigners and their Sina weaboos?
China Daily found out that they essentially have no policy in place for foreigners. You can bypass the requirements altogether by registering your account as "overseas".

french lies fucked around with this message at 23:13 on Feb 14, 2012

BrotherAdso
May 22, 2008

stat rosa pristina nomine
nomina nuda tenemus

Cream_Filling posted:

I think the biggest change in the role of the PLA in China was the movement in the 90s to divest the PLA of its enormous commercial and real-estate interests. Before, there was a literal "military-industrial complex" where the PLA directly ran the businesses that supplied it, from military goods to food. It also owned plenty of unrelated real estate and businesses as well. The idea was originally that the PLA would be a somewhat self-funded organization.

Of course, in the 90s, people in government and also the military leadership started realizing that this not only bred tons of corruption but was actually kind of scary because it meant that the PLA was becoming a power group highly independent from the Party and from central control, since with independent funding it was a lot harder to twist arms with threats of funding cuts. So they started spinning off lots of these enterprises, usually just having the existing PLA managers "retire" from the military but keeping their positions in the company. Nowadays, the PLA is more or less separated from these businesses, although naturally there are very very strong existing connections because the spin-offs are all run by the same former PLA officers.

This old "budget" approach to government, where government organs were expected to self-fund much of their operating costs instead of relying entirely on state funding, is definitely becoming a major problem and is arguably a big part of why the central government is struggling so much with local corruption.

Three more notes:

1) the PLA and military police are becoming increasingly important as class and social tensions continue to rise in cities and villages. This means that the social and political opinions and origins of high ranking officers in the PLA become increasingly important for analysis by party leaders, making the Army more overtly political.

2) As high-tech and high-profile defense policies and aquisitions increase with the modernization of the Air Force and the PLN, the role of the military establishment in the economy is likely to continue to alter, shift, and expand. There are few projects more expensive and expansive than a Navy, and fewer still that require as many special facilities, capital, and workers.

3) The convoluted relationship between the State CMC, the Party CMC, the National Defense Commission, the ex-PLA physical infrastructure and industries, and the state supply and manufacture infrastructure for the military leaves huge gray areas. As a result, the PLA retains huge amounts of power and influence from agriculture policy to commercial lending, but it goes through research, personnel, capital allocations, and shared-title ownership and so on. They're particularly important in the business patterns of some of the stuff the ICBC and especially the CDBC gets up to in terms of projects, assets, and lending.

One thing I'd be very interested in is the relationship between the PLA and their financial assets and the Chinese stimulus infrastructure package, and how they interact with the building boom in coastal China. I don't have the research chops to do that, but I'd suspect that they are firmly on one side or another in the dance of disaster surrounding urban housing values and taxes. Can anyone else pick it up?

BrotherAdso fucked around with this message at 23:56 on Feb 14, 2012

Grotz
Apr 29, 2009

Cream_Filling posted:

I think the biggest change in the role of the PLA in China was the movement in the 90s to divest the PLA of its enormous commercial and real-estate interests. Before, there was a literal "military-industrial complex" where the PLA directly ran the businesses that supplied it, from military goods to food. It also owned plenty of unrelated real estate and businesses as well. The idea was originally that the PLA would be a somewhat self-funded organization.

One interesting spin-off of this was that the PLA began using their production facilities to make non-military goods, such as clothes and consumer articles (the example that came up most was washing machines for some reason). As you pointed out, this was originally allowed in order to secure more funding for the military.

But it did lead to yet another reason why it was eventually banned, because it created the possibility that the PLA would be a military financially invested in peace. A PLA officer couldn't make much money if his factory was making machine guns. But if he could switch production over to washing machines, he stood to make personal gain.

Part of me regrets that China discontinued this experiment. It might have led to an interesting case where a military would be the opposite of hawkish.

"Declare war on Vietnam? Are you crazy? Do you have any idea what that would do to our third quarter figures?!?"

Typo
Aug 19, 2009

Chernigov Military Aviation Lyceum
The Fighting Slowpokes

Grotz posted:

One interesting spin-off of this was that the PLA began using their production facilities to make non-military goods, such as clothes and consumer articles (the example that came up most was washing machines for some reason). As you pointed out, this was originally allowed in order to secure more funding for the military.

But it did lead to yet another reason why it was eventually banned, because it created the possibility that the PLA would be a military financially invested in peace. A PLA officer couldn't make much money if his factory was making machine guns. But if he could switch production over to washing machines, he stood to make personal gain.
Isn't this model exactly what is done in Egypt even now?

sitchensis
Mar 4, 2009

Can you speak to what China has been doing in terms of its environment? Every month it seems that I read an article on how it is supposed to turn into a desert wasteland. That said, sometimes I feel a spark of hope whenever I read about aggressive new Chinese investment in alternative energy and solutions to climate change. I can imagine the two issues are related.

iSuck
Jul 22, 2005

by T. Mascis
How liberal is the drug law in practice?

Donraj
May 7, 2007

by Ralp
I've always heard that heroin and other opium-based drugs were especially illegal in China for historical reasons. I've never found someone who could really confirm or deny that.

Riptor
Apr 13, 2003

here's to feelin' good all the time
On a real, real basic level, what are the arguments against the PRC and ROC just giving up on their claims on one another?

I imagine from the PRC's side it boils down to this:

-It would set a precedent and would likely inspire other autonomous regions to try to secede
-Keeping the claim standing lets you save face and not appear weak
-It's a good kind of rallying cry to rabble-rouse all your citizens into nationalism and such

But from the ROC's side all I really get is

-They feel that they are the legitimate government and were historically so.

But no one in Taiwan actually thinks they'll someday reclaim the whole of the PRC, will they? Why wouldn't it be better to just say "nope, we're totally just Taiwan now and you know what? We're fine with that"

Similarly, wouldn't the PRC relinquishing its claim to Taiwan be something they could spin as them being magnanimous and such? Or, they could just say "gently caress off we don't need you".

I dont know, these might be really dumb questions. It just seems to me that the tension that these claims both cause aren't worth it

shots shots shots
Sep 6, 2011

by Y Kant Ozma Post

Riptor posted:

But no one in Taiwan actually thinks they'll someday reclaim the whole of the PRC, will they? Why wouldn't it be better to just say "nope, we're totally just Taiwan now and you know what? We're fine with that"

No one in Taiwan realistically thinks they will get the mainland back, but the decision to keep/relinquish claims on the mainland has a lot to do with north/south Taiwan tensions and the idea of ethnic Han nationalism. Taipei is all about the mandarin and Chinese culture, but as you go south and hear more Taiwanese and affirmation of Taiwanese culture.

Riptor
Apr 13, 2003

here's to feelin' good all the time

shots shots shots posted:

No one in Taiwan realistically thinks they will get the mainland back, but the decision to keep/relinquish claims on the mainland has a lot to do with north/south Taiwan tensions and the idea of ethnic Han nationalism. Taipei is all about the mandarin and Chinese culture, but as you go south and hear more Taiwanese and affirmation of Taiwanese culture.

Hm, could you explain more? If there's tensions within the country how wouldn't it benefit them to possibly mollify them by relinquishing the claims and work on a unified Taiwanese nationalism?

skysedge
May 26, 2006

Riptor posted:

But from the ROC's side all I really get is

-They feel that they are the legitimate government and were historically so.

But no one in Taiwan actually thinks they'll someday reclaim the whole of the PRC, will they? Why wouldn't it be better to just say "nope, we're totally just Taiwan now and you know what? We're fine with that"


Well, aside from a few diehards, most people in Taiwan have no illusions over controlling/wanting to control the mainland. Back in the early 90s then President Lee already stated that the ROC had no intention of contesting PRC rule anywhere except "the Free Area of the ROC".

Today even the mainstream KMT has more or less tacitly adopted the ROC=Taiwan position. A few days ago, when a controversial retired ROC general schmoozing in Xian made some statements about the PLA and ROC Armed Forces both being "China's Army", the condemnation was pretty much bipartisan in Taipei.

The main issue with formalizing this position is that by formally rescinding claims over mainland China as codified in the 1947 ROC Constitution, you more or less end up with One China One Taiwan (de jure independence for Taiwan), or Two Chinas. The PRC has vehemently opposed both positions (see the PRC's reaction to then President Lee's "Special State to State Relations" in 1999), but conventional wisdom says that Beijing would rather see the continuation of the (now extensively amended, except for national territory) 1947 Constitution, since it establishes some type of bond between Taiwan and mainland China (while also making Taipei's position look absurd).

So in practice, the modern day ROC conveniently ignores the mainland claims, and most Taiwanese (north or south), generally identify with Taiwan first and foremost with "reconquer the Mainland" being a relic of the past.

Edit: ROC Constitution was ratified in 1947, not 1949.

skysedge fucked around with this message at 18:31 on Feb 15, 2012

Riptor
Apr 13, 2003

here's to feelin' good all the time
Cool, thanks.

This is a Good Thread. Thanks OP

shots shots shots
Sep 6, 2011

by Y Kant Ozma Post

Riptor posted:

Hm, could you explain more? If there's tensions within the country how wouldn't it benefit them to possibly mollify them by relinquishing the claims and work on a unified Taiwanese nationalism?

Hard green (Taiwanese) areas/people often speak Taiwanese instead of Mandarin and don't consider themselves Chinese at all, whereas the blue KMT areas/people identify strongly with Chinese culture and the idea of an ethnic Chinese state. Many of these people are descended from 外生人 (waishengren, people who fled the communists), but are not limited to those people. You'll often hear really racist stuff from KMT supporters, including statements like the recent "Chinese shouldn't interbreed with aboriginals and dilute pure Chinese blood" from a KMT politician.

Tl;dr, it's a cultural and economic gap between the rich north of Taiwan and the poor south that is also very tied up in ethnicity/language.

DarkCrawler
Apr 6, 2009

by vyelkin
I've just never understood why the PRC has such a problem with independent Taiwan, as in the state being called "Taiwan" without "China" written anywhere in the laws or the constitution or the declaration of independence or whatever. If they have a hard-on for "One China", then let them have exactly that? I just find it ridicolous that we have this developed, populated and rich first world state that nobody recognizes officially.

skysedge
May 26, 2006

shots shots shots posted:

Hard green (Taiwanese) areas/people often speak Taiwanese instead of Mandarin and don't consider themselves Chinese at all, whereas the blue KMT areas/people identify strongly with Chinese culture and the idea of an ethnic Chinese state. Many of these people are descended from 外生人 (waishengren, people who fled the communists), but are not limited to those people. You'll often hear really racist stuff from KMT supporters, including statements like the recent "Chinese shouldn't interbreed with aboriginals and dilute pure Chinese blood" from a KMT politician.

Tl;dr, it's a cultural and economic gap between the rich north of Taiwan and the poor south that is also very tied up in ethnicity/language.

Well partially, albeit its more complicated then that. If you've watched KMT political campaigns since at least 2008 (if not earlier), you'll find that they go to extraordinary lengths trying to convince voters that they "love Taiwan" and pursue "Taiwan first"-policies. Public opinion increasingly reflects that more and more people self-identify as Taiwanese rather than Chinese. Running for office on a platform of Chinese unification in Taiwan is tantamount to electoral suicide. Rather, closer relations with the PRC as promoted by the current KMT administration are usually crouched in economic terms: "Since Beijing objects to de jure independence, stick to de facto independence so we can try to make money off them." The whole thing is usually summed up as "No unification, no independence, no war".

National Chengchi University polling data on Taiwanese self-identity from 1992 - 2011
Green = "Taiwanese only", blue = "Chinese only", pink = "Both", and black = "No response".

skysedge fucked around with this message at 17:36 on Feb 15, 2012

Nomenklatura
Dec 4, 2002

If Canada is to survive, it can only survive in mutual respect and in love for one another.
Good LORD lookit that OP. I've seen textbooks that do a worse job. Kudos.

The only thing that I'd like to see is some sort of visual representation of that dual-track party/state system, since it's still a bit difficult to follow exactly what's going on simply by reading text. But that's honestly a minor quibble.

BrotherAdso
May 22, 2008

stat rosa pristina nomine
nomina nuda tenemus

Nomenklatura posted:

Good LORD lookit that OP. I've seen textbooks that do a worse job. Kudos.

The only thing that I'd like to see is some sort of visual representation of that dual-track party/state system, since it's still a bit difficult to follow exactly what's going on simply by reading text. But that's honestly a minor quibble.

Thanks. French Lies did a fabulous job formatting and bringing in the great book list -- I did that post on the govt long ago now.

I've also got one I did on Confucianism -- would that fit into the thread well, you or French Lies? It doesn't look like it made it into the LF Effortposts wordpress.

I have a visual representation of the party/state relationships, let me dig it up.

BrotherAdso fucked around with this message at 20:39 on Feb 15, 2012

Hungry Gerbil
Jun 6, 2009

by angerbot
I would love to see a post about Confucianism and it's role in Chinese society and politics.

sbaldrick
Jul 19, 2006
Driven by Hate
The most interesting thing about Confucianism I've recently found out is his decedents are still tracked in hereditary fashion, have been treated well by every ruler in Chinese history and are still involved in the government of the ROC :psyduck:

That's some crazy trivia there.

BrotherAdso
May 22, 2008

stat rosa pristina nomine
nomina nuda tenemus

sbaldrick posted:

The most interesting thing about Confucianism I've recently found out is his decedents are still tracked in hereditary fashion, have been treated well by every ruler in Chinese history and are still involved in the government of the ROC :psyduck:

That's some crazy trivia there.

Oh, yeah, it's a big deal. His hometown is a relatively large tourist draw (Qufu) and so is the mountain he was born on (Mt. Ni). Heck, his temples and stuff were so beloved they survived every damned purge and civil war campaign intact, unlike so many of China's ancient sites in that region, and are now some of the biggest UNESCO sites in China.

Electro-Boogie Jack
Nov 22, 2006
bagger mcguirk sent me.

DarkCrawler posted:

I've just never understood why the PRC has such a problem with independent Taiwan, as in the state being called "Taiwan" without "China" written anywhere in the laws or the constitution or the declaration of independence or whatever. If they have a hard-on for "One China", then let them have exactly that? I just find it ridicolous that we have this developed, populated and rich first world state that nobody recognizes officially.

Part of the problem is that the Communist Party has staked a lot of its legitimacy on 'reunifying the motherland' and bringing 'China' back together, and Taiwan is the last major bit that they haven't fulfilled. Note that they still maintain claims to areas like NEFA in India that have never been administered directly by Beijing, just because of claims based on Qing-era treaties between China and its suzerain states.

There's also a lot of value to be had in keeping Taiwan as something to rile up mainlanders. Given that they can blame Taiwans current status on both of the usual suspects- Japan and the USA- while gradually deemphasizing the role of the KMT, it works as one huge thing to unite all the things that get people riled up and nationalistic.

Of course, theres definitely a bit of blowback now, because decades of using Taiwan to get people riled up has produced a populace that is easily riled up in regards to Taiwan, and might get legitimately pissed if Beijing did the reasonable thing and took steps to deescalate the situation and maybe bring about peace between China and Taiwan.

french lies
Apr 16, 2008

BrotherAdso posted:

Thanks. French Lies did a fabulous job formatting and bringing in the great book list -- I did that post on the govt long ago now.

I've also got one I did on Confucianism -- would that fit into the thread well, you or French Lies? It doesn't look like it made it into the LF Effortposts wordpress.

I have a visual representation of the party/state relationships, let me dig it up.
I should put your post in quotes, actually: a lot of people seem to assume I wrote it myself.

Also. the Confucianism effortpost definitely deserves a place in the thread, and the OP for that matter. Send it to me via PM and I'll put it in the third post.

karthun
Nov 16, 2006

I forgot to post my food for USPOL Thanksgiving but that's okay too!

How serious is the 4:2:1 problem in China?

Cefte
Sep 18, 2004

tranquil consciousness

sbaldrick posted:

The most interesting thing about Confucianism I've recently found out is his decedents are still tracked in hereditary fashion, have been treated well by every ruler in Chinese history and are still involved in the government of the ROC :psyduck:

That's some crazy trivia there.
No discussion of the Kong family is complete without Kong Qing-Dong.

BrotherAdso
May 22, 2008

stat rosa pristina nomine
nomina nuda tenemus

karthun posted:

How serious is the 4:2:1 problem in China?

Depends. The one child policy was poorly and unevenly enforced, and had a variety of legal exemptions and loopholes to boot. Plus, the big exception was to let only children who married have 2-3 children themselves, reducing the problem.

China does still face a huge population disparity, though, one which will cause a significant retirement insurance and health care problem in the next few decades. Because of all the exemptions, though, the average rate is more like 2 or 2.5 children per person in many geographic areas now and has been since the early 2000s, taking the worst edge off the problem.

Adar
Jul 27, 2001

french lies posted:

Yessir, these were two of the most important bases of Western colonization of China: Hong Kong and Macau (Shanghai was, too, but Shanghai’s industrial, national, and financial importance was such that it became and important symbol in the civil war and couldn’t receive the same political exemptions). The framework for their exceptional system is as old as the Deng administration, which talked about the return of Hong Kong and Macau (and indeed Taiwan) as being feasible under “One nation, two systems” (一国两制)

Hong Kong is the more important of the two, so we’ll talk about it rather than Macau.

I'm not an expert about China proper, but as the resident professional gambler, here are some words about Macau:

The rest of the OP is great, but what I quoted just now is wrong; despite its size, Macau may well be more important to China than Hong Kong will ever be. The reason, of course, is gaming and the impact it has on the mainland.

Gambling has been allowed in Macau roughly forever, but starting in the mid 20th century, the only group allowed to operate was a state monopoly. This enterprise was successful but had marked limits on what it was allowed to do; the Portuguese government viewed the issue as sensitive and didn't particularly welcome a huge amount of Chinese gamblers. What it did do, and what we'll come back to shortly, was start running ferries to Hong Kong, which was not Chinese enough at the time for anyone to care. These boats were soon carrying millions of people a year and turned the monopoly a very nice (staggering) amount of money.

When Macau was handed over to the Chinese in 1999, the smell of gold was in the air from day one. Now theoretically subordinate to China proper and thus freed from the shackles of actually having to tread lightly around issues of international diplomacy, the government liberalized the industry as fast as they possibly could. Because gambling is outlawed (and occasionally punished by prison sentences) in the rest of China, Macau became the only easily accessible outlet for over a billion people. By 2006, Macau casinos took in more money than those in Vegas; today, the take is 5 times that (to be fair, these days, both sets of properties are largely owned by the same corporate chains). There are currently 33 different mega-casinos running in an area of 11 square miles and over 50% of Macau's economy comes directly from gambling. In 2011, these casinos took in over $35 billion USD.

What makes Macau very different from Vegas, though, is that I just lied; the part about the income coming from 'gambling' is not actually true. Over two thirds of this gigantic number actually comes from *one game*: high stakes VIP baccarat. Here's a random post from another forum:

quote:

There's a high limit $10k minimum bet baccarat table on the 1st floor next to the escalator in {Gran Lisboa, a major casino} in open public area. Everyday, around the clock, 80% of the time there would be someone driving the action by betting $100,000 to $500,000 per hand. Around him there would be a crowd of 10-20 degens betting smaller amounts.

If we take the average rake for baccarat as 1%, and we assume the average wager on the table to be $300,000. Rake paid to the house would be $3,000 per hand.

No matter the time you're reading this, someone in Macau is currently betting a million dollars a minute and losing about $10,000 a minute (with huge variance, of course) on baccarat. Fortunately for them, strictly speaking, they're not actually losing 'their' money. You see, what's actually happening is this:

quote:

But it is not just a passion for cards that brought more than 13.2m mainlanders to Macau in the first ten months of this year. Many come to elude China’s strict limits on the amount of yuan people can take out of the country. A government official who has embezzled state funds, for example, may arrange to gamble in Macau through a junket. When he arrives, his chips are waiting for him. When he cashes out, his winnings are paid in Hong Kong dollars, which he can stash in a bank in Hong Kong or take farther afield.

“There are many ways to launder money, more than we can think of,” says Davis Fong, an associate business professor at the University of Macau. Some bypass junkets and instead use pawnshops and other stores, where they buy an item with yuan and promptly sell it back for Macanese pataca or Hong Kong dollars—less, of course, a generous cut for the shopkeeper. No one can quantify how much money is laundered in Macau, but it’s “such an obscene amount of money you would die”, one resident avows.

Macau is the biggest money laundering town in the world. The laundering business is so large it has spawned a recently fully legitimized cottage industry of 'junkets', a description combines the Las Vegas VIP host (person that will get you everything you could possibly want, occasionally including but not limited to hookers and blow, as long as you drop large amounts of theoretical money) with the now run out of town 1960's Las Vegas loanshark slash collection agent. Here's some more on junkets:

quote:

- The VIP junket operators have a network of agents, known as sub-junkets whose job it is to select VIP patrons to gamble. Sub-junkets, or agents, are usually localized groups around China and familiar with the credit history of their clients. The sub-junkets receive commission from the VIP junket operators for giving credit to gamblers and are responsible for collecting debts.

- Junket agents in Macau usually operate on a two-week debt-collection cycle, so a rise in bad gaming debts would likely be quickly offset by a pullback in new credit issuance.

- Macau has two types of remuneration models for paying VIP junket operators. The commission model is a fixed rate of 1.25 percent of VIP rolling chip turnover and the casinos remain responsible for gaming taxes. The win rate model is when VIP junket operators split the gross gaming win with the casino and also share the downside risk.

Some of these junkets are much more legitimate than others, but basically all of them live and die by wealthy Chinese smuggling their money out and whitewashing it via baccarat rake. That's not to say there are no legitimate degenerates in China - God knows there are probably more of them there per capita than anywhere else in the world - but many if not most of them only drop money that cannot otherwise be converted from RMB in any other way, to the tune of a very large fraction of $35 billion a year. Of course, baccarat being what it is, many of these people do wind up losing 100% of what they embezzled, which is where the loan shark part of the junket enterprise comes in; the Hong Kong triads have been all over Macau since its inception and take the ferries just like everybody else.

The Chinese government, of course, knows all about this and occasionally cracks down on visas from the mainland (yes, Macau requires visas); most recently, the province nearest the peninsula has seen visa issuance restricted to a massive barrier of once every three months. Even this, of course, stops absolutely no one of any real significance because the various Hong Kong boats go back and forth 24/7 and the people involved have long since bribed far more important individuals than border guards. It's widely predicted that over the next few years, China will lose patience and come down once and for all...but those predictions have been around since the initial legalization while gaming revenue rose tenfold.

This has really been a rather too snarky post about a territory that's much more developed than it sounds like so far; the place has 500,000 residents with an unemployment rate of 3%, the second longest life expectancy in the world and isn't nearly as much of a tax haven as it used to be. But 20 of its 22 million visitors every year are from China or Hong Kong, and although its economy is a tenth of Hong Kong's, it may siphon out close to as much black market money out as HK does.

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hitension
Feb 14, 2005


Hey guys, I learned Chinese so that I can write shame in another language
I don't have much more to add right now, but this is an excellent thread! Nice work french lies and BrotherAdso.

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