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Is there anything that limits which employers are considered "religious"? Obviously, churches, religious schools, etc... fall under that banner, but is there something that prevents a publicly traded company from suddenly deciding they're devoutly Catholic, adding something about it in their employment manual, and then firing all of their female employees who aren't married?
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Jul 8, 2020 19:58
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azflyboy posted:Is there anything that limits which employers are considered "religious"? It would be a large stretch to say your standard line employee at hobby lobby serves a ministerial function in the same way a teacher at a catholic school does. However, if you can think of a way to stretch that definition, courts will be duty bound to accept the religious organization’s definition of a minister.
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Jul 8, 2020 20:11
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Mr. Nice! posted:My statement was not hyperbole. If you work for a religious organization and they claim you have any form of ministerial function in court filings (cause it doesn't seem to matter what your employment contract states), then you have zero federal protections from unlawful discrimination. It was not hyperbole, but the majority opinion doesn’t go quite that far (Thomas’s concurrence would not look behind “good-faith claims that a certain employee’s position is ‘ministerial’.”). Rather, the majority opinion states that “What matters, at bottom, is what an employee does.” And that educating students at a religious school is ministerial. The janitors are probably still ok.
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Jul 8, 2020 20:20
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Does the lower court now have to determine whether or not the teacher is a minister by that church's own standard? I should think an organization receiving preferential payments and tax treatment by the government should not be able to discriminate based on religious doctrine, so can this be used to stop private religious schools receiving public school vouchers if they discriminate in this manner?
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Jul 8, 2020 20:54
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Mizaq posted:Does the lower court now have to determine whether or not the teacher is a minister by that church's own standard? I should think an organization receiving preferential payments and tax treatment by the government should not be able to discriminate based on religious doctrine, so can this be used to stop private religious schools receiving public school vouchers if they discriminate in this manner? No, because that case was decided earlier in this term Edit: This one, Espinoza v Montana: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-1195
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Jul 8, 2020 21:08
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ulmont posted:The janitors are probably still ok. I know we all love edge cases...but really now, what if a hospital or school that is affiliated with some religious organization instructs its janitors to lead students/staff in prayer once a month, requires via its handbook to always avail themselves to pray with students/staff if asked, etc... It just sounds like a pretty low bar has been set to to claim a ministerial role. Are we to start looking at duties performed on a week by week basis? "Mr. Janitor, you just so happened to have led students in prayer on the weeks you also worked overtime, so FLSA protections don't apply to you those week, sorry!" "Sorry to hear about your cancer diagnosis Mr. Janitor, but thank you so much for leading the prayer and bible study this morning. By the way, you're fired!"
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Jul 9, 2020 01:17
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Did Kagan not participate in the Guadalupe case? She's missing form that one.
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Jul 9, 2020 02:47
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Nissin Cup Nudist posted:Did Kagan not participate in the Guadalupe case? She's missing form that one. She joined the majority. quote:ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, BREYER, KAGAN, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined.
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Jul 9, 2020 03:54
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Countdown for Muslim and Church of Satan not being allowed...
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Jul 9, 2020 07:19
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I actually think it's pretty likely Islamic centres would be covered. The religions which get screwed by this will be the non mainstream ones and likely only if they are enforcing some non transferable value. So like a restaurant church firing their security guard for not smoking weed would get slapped down but if they fired their administrator for being gay would probably be fine.
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Jul 9, 2020 07:49
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So technically now jehovah's witnesses could mandate health insurance with no access to blood transfusions?
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Jul 9, 2020 09:16
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Probably if the defence can confusingly argue forcing them to permit that would lead to covering abortions
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Jul 9, 2020 12:18
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vuk83 posted:So technically now jehovah's witnesses could mandate health insurance with no access to blood transfusions? Maybe. The court’s decision related only to HHS rules giving an exemption for contraceptive coverage. You would have to extend that by using the religious freedom restoration act. There were at least 3 votes for that but it’s unclear if there were 5.
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Jul 9, 2020 14:08
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Gorsuch writes for the majority that Oklahoma tribal lands still have the same boundaries as established by treaty in 1866 as those have not been properly altered by congress. Therefore Oklahoma has no authority to prosecute tribe members in said land. Most of Tulsa is on native land, for example.
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Jul 9, 2020 15:11
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Article II and the Supremacy Clause do not categorically preclude, or require a heightened standard for, the issuance of a state criminal subpoena to a sitting President. 7/2 Roberts writing.
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Jul 9, 2020 15:13
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Kavanaugh and Gorsuch in the majority. I sense an impending tweetstorm.
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Jul 9, 2020 15:16
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This means that Mazars is certainly going against Trump as well. e: Vance is 8-1 if you look at it from the standpoint of Trump's claimed absolute immunity as even Thomas says he does not have absolute immunity. Mr. Nice! fucked around with this message at 15:20 on Jul 9, 2020 |
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Jul 9, 2020 15:17
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Meatbag Esq. posted:Article II and the Supremacy Clause do not categorically preclude, or require a heightened standard for, the issuance of a state criminal subpoena to a sitting President. Looking forward to reading Thomas and Alito's reasonings.
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Jul 9, 2020 15:17
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DARPA posted:Looking forward to reading Thomas and Alito's reasonings. Thomas wants a further record developed at the trial court level but also does not believe in absolute immunity. Alito claims that this will forever destroy the presidency.
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Jul 9, 2020 15:21
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They punted in Mazars. The subpoenas might be legal but no court gave enough consideration of the separation of powers issues. Same 7/2 though.
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Jul 9, 2020 15:29
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Meatbag Esq. posted:They punted in Mazars. The subpoenas might be legal but no court gave enough consideration of the separation of powers issues. Same 7/2 though. Yeah. It's very likely he still loses in the lower courts re: Mazars, though, but this means that this portion of the president's tax return battle will likely not be done until sometime next year.
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Jul 9, 2020 15:31
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Mr. Nice! posted:Thomas wants a further record developed at the trial court level but also does not believe in absolute immunity. Thomas agrees the president is not immune, but thinks courts should defer to the president when he says "I'm too busy" to respond and then just let it go?
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Jul 9, 2020 15:36
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Mr. Nice! posted:Thomas wants a further record developed at the trial court level but also does not believe in absolute immunity. Imagine a bridge too far for even Thomas to cross.
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Jul 9, 2020 15:39
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DARPA posted:Thomas agrees the president is not immune, but thinks courts should defer to the president when he says "I'm too busy" to respond and then just let it go? Not necessarily defer to the president, but develop a record as to whether or not it actually interferes with his work. Considering the current president spends the vast majority of his day hatewatching cable news, even if the majority had agreed I doubt a lower court would have ruled in Trump's favor on this ground alone. Sarcastro posted:Imagine a bridge too far for even Thomas to cross. It really is something.
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Jul 9, 2020 15:51
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Mr. Nice! posted:Gorsuch writes for the majority that Oklahoma tribal lands still have the same boundaries as established by treaty in 1866 as those have not been properly altered by congress. Therefore Oklahoma has no authority to prosecute tribe members in said land. Most of Tulsa is on native land, for example. I never expected a ruling that didn't gently caress over native Americans so this is pretty amazing. Meatbag Esq. posted:Article II and the Supremacy Clause do not categorically preclude, or require a heightened standard for, the issuance of a state criminal subpoena to a sitting President. I figured this would be 5-4 for him or 6-3 against but 7-2 was not at all what I expected. Mr. Nice! posted:Yeah. It's very likely he still loses in the lower courts re: Mazars, though, but this means that this portion of the president's tax return battle will likely not be done until sometime next year. Punting it until after the election means they know that they can't side with Trump on the merits alone. Though Is there anything that will stop the NYAG from just giving their copies of Trump's financial records to Congress while Trump tries to run out the clock on Mazars? e: How fast can Congress push for re-hearings on these by the lower courts? I'm sure the SCOTUS won't take up any challenge on separation of powers until post-election but maybe if Congress can get through the court of appeals there won't be 4 justices willing to hear the new case and Congress will get a favorable ruling in September or October? Probably not possible but I dare to dream... Evil Fluffy fucked around with this message at 16:01 on Jul 9, 2020 |
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Jul 9, 2020 15:58
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In essence, both Mazars and Vance are punts. Both will still be tied up in litigation for a while.
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Jul 9, 2020 15:59
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Definitely a middle-of-the-road, closely written opinion in Mazars especially to hold as many justices as possible. There were probably 3-4 votes for immediately ordering the release of all documents to Congress, and there were 2 votes for- effectively- saying the President needs never consider Congressional subpoenas for any reason about anything, with Roberts, Kavanaugh, and Gorsuch in the middle. Roberts' objectives seem to be: -Protect the reputation of the Supreme Court by not being drawn into a partisan political fight, and try to not let the Court be seen as a political thing (it is, but he would very much like to minimize that perception, albeit not the reality) -Clearly state that the President is not above the law. He wrote his opinion to effectively address both- between Mazars and Vance, the message is definitely that the President has no absolute immunity to state or congressional subpoenas while on the other hand, punting both to lower courts keeps the SC insulated from a high voltage political issue in an election year. The rejection of an imperial presidency held the 4 liberal justices, and providing clear and at least hazily constiution-derived tests in Mazars and copious references to the constitution in Vance got Gorsuch onboard. Kavanaugh is a bit more of a mystery- I would have thought he'd have been with Alito on the bitter-end Imperial Presidency side of things. A mixed bag- you could call it a Presidential win, but if so, it's one Trump's really not going to be happy with at *all*.
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Jul 9, 2020 16:00
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After looking at Vance again, Thomas' dissent is only a dissent insomuch that he would vacate and remand for more record before a ruling otherwise he agrees with the majority. On Mazars, though, Thomas says that congress can never use legislative subpoenas for private, nonofficial documents. Such a subpoena would have to be a part of an impeachment investigation.
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Jul 9, 2020 16:14
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The Oklahoma case is kind of blowing my mind with the implications of it, and it seems to stem from a hail mary defense from a convicted child rapist that he couldn't be prosecuted for the child rape he committed because he did it on Native land (Tulsa,OK (which is a matter of fact)) and the courts agreed. Is that all accurate? What a wild ride.
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Jul 9, 2020 16:17
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Mr. Nice! posted:After looking at Vance again, Thomas' dissent is only a dissent insomuch that he would vacate and remand for more record before a ruling otherwise he agrees with the majority. Very logical by Thomas standards. Danger posted:The Oklahoma case is kind of blowing my mind with the implications of it, and it seems to stem from a hail mary defense from a convicted child rapist that he couldn't be prosecuted for the child rape he committed because he did it on Native land (Tulsa,OK (which is a matter of fact)) and the courts agreed. Is that all accurate? What a wild ride. Under state law, this means the tribe or federal government can try him.
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Jul 9, 2020 16:18
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Danger posted:The Oklahoma case is kind of blowing my mind with the implications of it, and it seems to stem from a hail mary defense from a convicted child rapist that he couldn't be prosecuted for the child rape he committed because he did it on Native land (Tulsa,OK (which is a matter of fact)) and the courts agreed. Is that all accurate? What a wild ride. We'd be talking a lot about Oklahoma right now if we didn't have the tax case and a pandemic going on.
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Jul 9, 2020 16:18
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hobbesmaster posted:
Yea, it's unequivocally a good thing for what the US did to Native peoples but drat what a wild ride.
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Jul 9, 2020 16:21
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 Opinions! McGIRT v. OKLAHOMA TLDR: WIthin “the Indian country”, State courts cannot try Indians for crimes; that’s reserved to the federal government under the Major Crimes Act. It turns out that half of Oklahoma remains “Indian country”, at least for these purposes. And so Jimcy McGirt gets a new trial in federal court. Majority Opinion (Gorsuch): On the far end of the Trail of Tears was a promise. Forced to leave their ancestral lands in Georgia and Alabama, the Creek Nation received assurances that their new lands in the West would be secure forever. In exchange for ceding “all their land, East of the Mississippi river,” the U. S. government agreed by treaty that “[t]he Creek country west of the Mississippi shall be solemnly guarantied to the Creek Indians.” Both parties settled on boundary lines for a new and “permanent home to the whole Creek nation,” located in what is now Oklahoma. The government further promised that “[no] State or Territory [shall] ever have a right to pass laws for the government of such Indians, but they shall be allowed to govern themselves.” Today we are asked whether the land these treaties promised remains an Indian reservation for purposes of federal criminal law. Because Congress has not said otherwise, we hold the government to its word. At one level, the question before us concerns Jimcy McGirt. Years ago, an Oklahoma state court convicted him of three serious sexual offenses. Since then, he has argued in post-conviction proceedings that the State lacked jurisdiction to prosecute him because he is an enrolled member of the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma and his crimes took place on the Creek Reservation. … Mr. McGirt’s appeal rests on the federal Major Crimes Act (MCA). The statute provides that, within “the Indian country,” “[a]ny Indian who commits” certain enumerated offenses “against the person or property of another Indian or any other person” “shall be subject to the same law and penalties as all other persons committing any of the above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.”...State courts generally have no jurisdiction to try Indians for conduct committed in “Indian country.” The key question Mr. McGirt faces concerns that last qualification: Did he commit his crimes in Indian country? A neighboring provision of the MCA defines the term to include, among other things, “all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation.” §1151(a). Mr. McGirt submits he can satisfy this condition because he committed his crimes on land reserved for the Creek since the 19th century. The Creek Nation has joined Mr. McGirt as amicus curiae...in seeking to defend the state-court judgment below, Oklahoma has put aside whatever procedural defenses it might have and asked us to confirm that the land once given to the Creeks is no longer a reservation today...The scope of their dispute is limited; nothing we might say today could unsettle Oklahoma’s authority to try non-Indians for crimes against non-Indians on the lands in question. Still, the stakes are not insignificant. If Mr. McGirt and the Tribe are right, the State has no right to prosecute Indians for crimes committed in a portion of Northeastern Oklahoma that includes most of the city of Tulsa. Responsibility to try these matters would fall instead to the federal government and Tribe. … While there can be no question that Congress established a reservation for the Creek Nation, it’s equally clear that Congress has since broken more than a few of its promises to the Tribe. Not least, the land described in the parties’ treaties, once undivided and held by the Tribe, is now fractured into pieces. While these pieces were initially distributed to Tribe members, many were sold and now belong to persons unaffiliated with the Nation. So in what sense, if any, can we say that the Creek Reservation persists today? … History shows that Congress knows how to withdraw a reservation when it can muster the will. Sometimes, legislation has provided an “[e]xplicit reference to cession” or an “unconditional commitment . . . to compensate the Indian tribe for its opened land.” Other times, Congress has directed that tribal lands shall be “‘restored to the public domain.’” Likewise, Congress might speak of a reservation as being “‘discontinued,’” “‘abolished,’” or “‘vacated.’” Disestablishment has “never required any particular form of words,” But it does require that Congress clearly express its intent to do so, “[c]ommon[ly with an] ‘[e]xplicit reference to cession or other language evidencing the present and total surrender of all tribal interests.’ ” … Without doubt, in 1832 the Creek “cede[d]” their original homelands east of the Mississippi for a reservation promised in what is now Oklahoma. And in 1866, they “cede[d] and convey[ed]” a portion of that reservation to the United States. But because there exists no equivalent law terminating what remained, the Creek Reservation survived allotment. In saying this we say nothing new. For years, States have sought to suggest that allotments automatically ended reservations, and for years courts have rejected the argument. … whatever the confluence of reasons, in all this history there simply arrived no moment when any Act of Congress dissolved the Creek Tribe or disestablished its reservation. In the end, Congress moved in the opposite direction. Ultimately, Oklahoma is left to pursue a very different sort of argument. Now, the State points to historical practices and demographics, both around the time of and long after the enactment of all the relevant legislation. These facts, the State submits, are enough by themselves to prove disestablishment. … To avoid further confusion, we restate the point. There is no need to consult extratextual sources when the meaning of a statute’s terms is clear. Nor may extratextual sources overcome those terms. The only role such materials can properly play is to help “clear up . . . not create” ambiguity about a statute’s original meaning. And, as we have said time and again, once a reservation is established, it retains that status “until Congress explicitly indicates otherwise.” … In the end, Oklahoma abandons any pretense of law and speaks openly about the potentially “transform[ative]” effects of a loss today...If we dared to recognize that the Creek Reservation was never disestablished, Oklahoma and dissent warn, our holding might be used by other tribes to vindicate similar treaty promises. Ultimately, Oklahoma fears that perhaps as much as half its land and roughly 1.8 million of its residents could wind up within Indian country. It’s hard to know what to make of this self-defeating argument. Each tribe’s treaties must be considered on their own terms, and the only question before us concerns the Creek. Of course, the Creek Reservation alone is hardly insignificant, taking in most of Tulsa and certain neighboring communities in Northeastern Oklahoma. But neither is it unheard of for significant non-Indian populations to live successfully in or near reservations today. Oklahoma replies that its situation is different because the affected population here is large and many of its residents will be surprised to find out they have been living in Indian country this whole time. But we imagine some members of the 1832 Creek Tribe would be just as surprised to find them there. What are the consequences the State and dissent worry might follow from an adverse ruling anyway? Primarily, they argue that recognizing the continued existence of the Creek Reservation could unsettle an untold number of convictions and frustrate the State’s ability to prosecute crimes in the future. But the MCA applies only to certain crimes committed in Indian country by Indian defendants. A neighboring statute provides that federal law applies to a broader range of crimes by or against Indians in Indian country. States are otherwise free to apply their criminal laws in cases of non-Indian victims and defendants, including within Indian country. And Oklahoma tells us that somewhere between 10% and 15% of its citizens identify as Native American. Given all this, even Oklahoma admits that the vast majority of its prosecutions will be unaffected whatever we decide today. … The federal government promised the Creek a reservation in perpetuity. Over time, Congress has diminished that reservation. It has sometimes restricted and other times expanded the Tribe’s authority. But Congress has never withdrawn the promised reservation. As a result, many of the arguments before us today follow a sadly familiar pattern. Yes, promises were made, but the price of keeping them has become too great, so now we should just cast a blind eye. We reject that thinking. If Congress wishes to withdraw its promises, it must say so. Unlawful acts, performed long enough and with sufficient vigor, are never enough to amend the law. To hold otherwise would be to elevate the most brazen and longstanding injustices over the law, both rewarding wrong and failing those in the right. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma is Reversed. Lineup: Gorsuch, joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Dissent by Roberts, joined by Alito and Kavanaugh, and by Thomas (other than footnote 9). Dissent by Thomas. Dissent (Roberts, joined by Alito and Kavanaugh, and by Thomas (other than footnote 9, which suggests that a state habeus claim might be made by Oklahoma Indian prisoners following this decision)): In 1997, the State of Oklahoma convicted petitioner Jimcy McGirt of molesting, raping, and forcibly sodomizing a four-year-old girl, his wife’s granddaughter [you always see the lurid details in a dissent against an opinion giving a win to a convict]. McGirt was sentenced to 1,000 years plus life in prison. Today, the Court holds that Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction to prosecute McGirt—on the improbable ground that, unbeknownst to anyone for the past century, a huge swathe of Oklahoma is actually a Creek Indian reservation, on which the State may not prosecute serious crimes committed by Indians like McGirt. Not only does the Court discover a Creek reservation that spans three million acres and includes most of the city of Tulsa, but the Court’s reasoning portends that there are four more such reservations in Oklahoma. The rediscovered reservations encompass the entire eastern half of the State—19 million acres that are home to 1.8 million people, only 10%–15% of whom are Indians. Across this vast area, the State’s ability to prosecute serious crimes will be hobbled and decades of past convictions could well be thrown out. On top of that, the Court has profoundly destabilized the governance of eastern Oklahoma. The decision today creates significant uncertainty for the State’s continuing authority over any area that touches Indian affairs, ranging from zoning and taxation to family and environmental law. None of this is warranted. What has gone unquestioned for a century remains true today: A huge portion of Oklahoma is not a Creek Indian reservation. Congress disestablished any reservation in a series of statutes leading up to Oklahoma statehood at the turn of the 19th century. The Court reaches the opposite conclusion only by disregarding the “well settled” approach required by our precedents. Under those precedents, we determine whether Congress intended to disestablish a reservation by examining the relevant Acts of Congress and “all the [surrounding] circumstances,” including the “contemporaneous and subsequent understanding of the status of the reservation.” Yet the Court declines to consider such understandings here, preferring to examine only individual statutes in isolation. Applying the broader inquiry our precedents require, a reservation did not exist when McGirt committed his crimes, so Oklahoma had jurisdiction to prosecute him. I respectfully dissent. … What Congress actually did here was enact a series of statutes beginning in 1890 and culminating with Oklahoma statehood that (1) established a uniform legal system for Indians and non-Indians alike; (2) dismantled the Creek government; (3) extinguished the Creek Nation’s title to the lands at issue; and (4) incorporated the Creek members into a new political community—the State of Oklahoma. These statutes evince Congress’s intent to terminate the reservation and create a new State in its place. … In sum, in statute after statute, Congress made abundantly clear its intent to disestablish the Creek territory. The Court, for purposes of the disestablishment question before us, defines the Creek territory as “lands that would lie outside both the legal jurisdiction and geographic boundaries of any State” and on which a tribe was “assured a right to self-government.” That territory was eliminated. By establishing uniform laws for Indians and non-Indians alike in the new State of Oklahoma, Congress brought Creek members and the land on which they resided under state jurisdiction. By stripping the Creek Nation of its courts, lawmaking authority, and taxing power, Congress dismantled the tribal government. By extinguishing the Nation’s title, Congress erased the geographic boundaries that once defined Creek territory. And, by conferring citizenship on tribe members and giving them a vote in the formation of the State, Congress incorporated them into a new political community. “Under any definition,” that was disestablishment. … Under our precedents, we next consider the contemporaneous understanding of the statutes enacted by Congress and the subsequent treatment of the lands at issue. The Court, however, declines to consider such evidence because, in the Court’s view, the statutes clearly do not disestablish any reservation, and there is no “ambiguity” to “clear up.” That is not the approach demanded by our precedent, and, in any event, the Court’s argument fails on its own terms here. I find it hard to see how anyone can come away from the statutory texts detailed above with certainty that Congress had no intent to disestablish the territorial reservation. At the very least, the statutes leave some ambiguity, and thus “extratextual sources” ought to be consulted. … As the Creek, the State of Oklahoma, the United States, and our judicial predecessors have long agreed, Congress disestablished any Creek reservation more than 100 years ago. Oklahoma therefore had jurisdiction to prosecute McGirt. I respectfully dissent. Dissent (Thomas): I write separately to note an additional defect in the Court’s decision: It reverses a statecourt judgment that it has no jurisdiction to review. “[W]e have long recognized that ‘where the judgment of a state court rests upon two grounds, one of which is federal and the other non-federal in character, our jurisdiction fails if the non-federal ground is independent of the federal ground and adequate to support the judgment.’” Under this well-settled rule, we lack jurisdiction to review the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision, because it rests on an adequate and independent state ground. In his application for state postconviction relief, petitioner claimed that Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction to prosecute him because his crime was committed on Creek Nation land and thus was subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Government under the Major Crimes Act, 18 U. S. C. §1153. In support of his argument, petitioner cited the Tenth’s Circuit’s decision in Murphy v. Royal, 875 F. 3d 896 (2017). The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that petitioner’s claim was procedurally barred under state law because it was “not raised previously on direct appeal” and thus was “waived for further review.” The court found no grounds for excusing this default, explaining that “[p]etitioner [had] not established any sufficient reason why his current grounds for relief were not previously raised.” This state procedural bar was applied independent of any federal law, and it is adequate to support the decision below. We therefore lack jurisdiction to disturb the state court’s judgment. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/18-9526_9okb.pdf TOMMY SHARP, INTERIM WARDEN, PETITIONER v. PATRICK DWAYNE MURPHY Opinion of the Court (Per Curiam): The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit is affirmed for the reasons stated in McGirt v. Oklahoma, ante, p. ___. It is so ordered. JUSTICE GORSUCH took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. JUSTICE THOMAS and JUSTICE ALITO dissent. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/17-1107_o759.pdf
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Jul 9, 2020 16:22
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TRUMP v. VANCE, DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF NEW YORK, ET AL. TLDR: There’s no magic protection categorically shielding a sitting President from a state criminal subpoena. The President may of course challenge the subpoena on any grounds permitted by state law (bad faith, undue burden, etc.), and a court should give respect to the office of the Chief Executive. Plus there might also be a challenge as an attempt to influence official duties or on other constitutional grounds. But fight those separately from “you can’t subpoena the President.” More litigation needed. Majority Opinion (Roberts) In our judicial system, “the public has a right to every man’s evidence.” Since the earliest days of the Republic, “every man” has included the President of the United States. Beginning with Jefferson and carrying on through Clinton, Presidents have uniformly testified or produced documents in criminal proceedings when called upon by federal courts. This case involves—so far as we and the parties can tell—the first state criminal subpoena directed to a President. The President contends that the subpoena is unenforceable. We granted certiorari to decide whether Article II and the Supremacy Clause categorically preclude, or require a heightened standard for, the issuance of a state criminal subpoena to a sitting President. [New York County DA subpoenaed Trump’s accountants, Trump intervened in his personal capacity, ultimately the Second Circuit rejected a heightened test or a bar, now on to SCOTUS.] In the lead-up to trial [for plotting to take over the Louisiana Territory], [Aaron] Burr, taking aim at his accusers, moved for a subpoena duces tecum directed at Jefferson. The draft subpoena required the President to produce an October 21, 1806 letter from Wilkinson and accompanying documents, which Jefferson had referenced in his message to Congress. The prosecution opposed the request, arguing that a President could not be subjected to such a subpoena and that the letter might contain state secrets. Following four days of argument, Marshall announced his ruling to a packed chamber. The President, Marshall declared, does not “stand exempt from the general provisions of the constitution” or, in particular, the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee that those accused have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses for their defense. At common law the “single reservation” to the duty to testify in response to a subpoena was “the case of the king,” whose “dignity” was seen as “incompatible” with appearing “under the process of the court.” But, as Marshall explained, a king is born to power and can “do no wrong.” The President, by contrast, is “of the people” and subject to the law. According to Marshall, the sole argument for exempting the President from testimonial obligations was that his “duties as chief magistrate demand his whole time for national objects.” But, in Marshall’s assessment, those demands were “not unremitting.” And should the President’s duties preclude his attendance at a particular time and place, a court could work that out upon return of the subpoena. … In the two centuries since the Burr trial, successive Presidents have accepted Marshall’s ruling that the Chief Executive is subject to subpoena. … Following Monroe’s lead, his successors have uniformly agreed to testify when called in criminal proceedings, provided they could do so at a time and place of their choosing. In 1875, President Grant submitted to a three-hour deposition in the criminal prosecution of a political appointee embroiled in a network of tax-evading whiskey distillers….President Carter testified via [videotaped deposition] in the trial of two local officials who, while Carter was Governor of Georgia, had offered to contribute to his campaign in exchange for advance warning of any state gambling raids. The history surveyed above all involved federal criminal proceedings. Here we are confronted for the first time with a subpoena issued to the President by a local grand jury operating under the supervision of a state court. In the President’s view, that distinction makes all the difference. He argues that the Supremacy Clause gives a sitting President absolute immunity from state criminal subpoenas because compliance with those subpoenas would categorically impair a President’s performance of his Article II functions. … We begin with the question of absolute immunity. No one doubts that Article II guarantees the independence of the Executive Branch. As the head of that branch, the President “occupies a unique position in the constitutional scheme.”...In addition, the Constitution guarantees “the entire independence of the General Government from any control by the respective States.” As we have often repeated, “States have no power . . . to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress.” It follows that States also lack the power to impede the President’s execution of those laws. … To be clear, the President does not contend here that this subpoena, in particular, is impermissibly burdensome. Instead he makes a categorical argument about the burdens generally associated with state criminal subpoenas, focusing on three: diversion, stigma, and harassment. We address each in turn. The President’s primary contention, which the Solicitor General supports, is that complying with state criminal subpoenas would necessarily divert the Chief Executive from his duties….we expressly rejected immunity based on distraction alone 15 years later in Clinton v. Jones. There, President Clinton argued that the risk of being “distracted by the need to participate in litigation” entitled a sitting President to absolute immunity from civil liability, not just for official acts, as in Fitzgerald, but for private conduct as well. We disagreed with that rationale, explaining that the “dominant concern” in Fitzgerald was not mere distraction but the distortion of the Executive’s “decisionmaking process” with respect to official acts that would stem from “worry as to the possibility of damages.”...“[w]hile such distractions may be vexing to those subjected to them, they do not ordinarily implicate constitutional . . . concerns.”The same is true of criminal subpoenas. Just as a “properly managed” civil suit is generally “unlikely to occupy any substantial amount of ” a President’s time or attention, two centuries of experience confirm that a properly tailored criminal subpoena will not normally hamper the performance of the President’s constitutional duties. If anything, we expect that in the mine run of cases, where a President is subpoenaed during a proceeding targeting someone else, as Jefferson was, the burden on a President will ordinarily be lighter than the burden of defending against a civil suit. ... The President next claims that the stigma of being subpoenaed will undermine his leadership at home and abroad. Notably, the Solicitor General does not endorse this argument, perhaps because we have twice denied absolute immunity claims by Presidents in cases involving allegations of serious misconduct. But even if a tarnished reputation were a cognizable impairment, there is nothing inherently stigmatizing about a President performing “the citizen’s normal duty of . . . furnishing information relevant” to a criminal investigation. Nor can we accept that the risk of association with persons or activities under criminal investigation can absolve a President of such an important public duty. Prior Presidents have weathered these associations in federal cases, and there is no reason to think any attendant notoriety is necessarily greater in state court proceedings. To be sure, the consequences for a President’s public standing will likely increase if he is the one under investigation. But, again, the President concedes that such investigations are permitted under Article II and the Supremacy Clause, and receipt of a subpoena would not seem to categorically magnify the harm to the President’s reputation. … Finally, the President and the Solicitor General warn that subjecting Presidents to state criminal subpoenas will make them “easily identifiable target[s]” for harassment. But we rejected a nearly identical argument in Clinton, where then-President Clinton argued that permitting civil liability for unofficial acts would “generate a large volume of politically motivated harassing and frivolous litigation.” The President and the Solicitor General nevertheless argue that state criminal subpoenas pose a heightened risk and could undermine the President’s ability to “deal fearlessly and impartially” with the States….Any effort to manipulate a President’s policy decisions or to “retaliat[e]” against a President for official acts through issuance of a subpoena, would thus be an unconstitutional attempt to “influence” a superior sovereign “exempt” from such obstacles. We generally “assume[] that state courts and prosecutors will observe constitutional limitations.” Failing that, federal law allows a President to challenge any allegedly unconstitutional influence in a federal forum, as the President has done here. Given these safeguards and the Court’s precedents, we cannot conclude that absolute immunity is necessary or appropriate under Article II or the Supremacy Clause. Our dissenting colleagues agree. JUSTICE THOMAS reaches the same conclusion based on the original understanding of the Constitution reflected in Marshall’s decision in Burr. And JUSTICE ALITO, also persuaded by Burr, “agree[s]” that “not all” state criminal subpoenas for a President’s records “should be barred.” On that point the Court is unanimous. We next consider whether a state grand jury subpoena seeking a President’s private papers must satisfy a heightened need standard. … We disagree, for three reasons. First, such a heightened standard would extend protection designed for official documents to the President’s private papers. … Second, neither the Solicitor General nor JUSTICE ALITO has established that heightened protection against state subpoenas is necessary for the Executive to fulfill his Article II functions. … Finally, in the absence of a need to protect the Executive, the public interest in fair and effective law enforcement cuts in favor of comprehensive access to evidence. … Rejecting a heightened need standard does not leave Presidents with “no real protection.”To start, a President may avail himself of the same protections available to every other citizen. These include the right to challenge the subpoena on any grounds permitted by state law, which usually include bad faith and undue burden or breadth. And, as in federal court, “[t]he high respect that is owed to the office of the Chief Executive . . . should inform the conduct of the entire proceeding, including the timing and scope of discovery.” Furthermore, although the Constitution does not entitle the Executive to absolute immunity or a heightened standard, he is not “relegate[d]” only to the challenges available to private citizens. A President can raise subpoena-specific constitutional challenges, in either a state or federal forum. As previously noted, he can challenge the subpoena as an attempt to influence the performance of his official duties, in violation of the Supremacy Clause. his avenue protects against local political machinations “interposed as an obstacle to the effective operation of a federal constitutional power.” In addition, the Executive can—as the district attorney concedes—argue that compliance with a particular subpoena would impede his constitutional duties. … The arguments presented here and in the Court of Appeals were limited to absolute immunity and heightened need. The Court of Appeals, however, has directed that the case be returned to the District Court, where the President may raise further arguments as appropriate. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Lineup: Roberts, joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Concurrence in the Judgment by Kavanaugh, joined by Gorsuch. Dissent by Thomas. Dissent by Alito. Concurrence in the Judgment (Kavanaugh, joined by Gorsuch): The Court today unanimously concludes that a President does not possess absolute immunity from a state criminal subpoena, but also unanimously agrees that this case should be remanded to the District Court, where the President may raise constitutional and legal objections to the subpoena as appropriate. I agree with those two conclusions. The dispute over this grand jury subpoena reflects a conflict between a State’s interest in criminal investigation and a President’s Article II interest in performing his or her duties without undue interference. Although this case involves personal information of the President and is therefore not an executive privilege case, the majority opinion correctly concludes based on precedent that Article II and the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution supply some protection for the Presidency against state criminal subpoenas of this sort. … Because this case again entails a clash between the interests of the criminal process and the Article II interests of the Presidency, I would apply the longstanding Nixon “demonstrated, specific need” standard to this case. The majority opinion does not apply the Nixon standard in this distinct Article II context, as I would have done. That said, the majority opinion appropriately takes account of some important concerns that also animate Nixon and the Constitution’s balance of powers. The majority opinion explains that a state prosecutor may not issue a subpoena for a President’s personal information out of bad faith, malice, or an intent to harass a President, ante, at 16; as a result of prosecutorial impropriety, ibid.; to seek information that is not relevant to an investigation, ante, at 16, 19–20; that is overly broad or unduly burdensome, ante, at 19–20; to manipulate, influence, or retaliate against a President’s official acts or policy decisions, ante, at 17, 20; or in a way that would impede, conflict with, or interfere with a President’s official duties, ante, at 20–21. All nine Members of the Court agree, moreover, that a President may raise objections to a state criminal subpoena not just in state court but also in federal court. And the majority opinion indicates that, in light of the “high respect that is owed to the office of the Chief Executive,” courts “should be particularly meticulous” in assessing a subpoena for a President’s personal records. In the end, much may depend on how the majority opinion’s various standards are applied in future years and decades. It will take future cases to determine precisely how much difference exists between (i) the various standards articulated by the majority opinion, (ii) the overarching Nixon “demonstrated, specific need” standard that I would adopt, and (iii) JUSTICE THOMAS’s and JUSTICE ALITO’s other proposed standards. In any event, in my view, lower courts in cases of this sort involving a President will almost invariably have to begin by delving into why the State wants the information; why and how much the State needs the information, including whether the State could obtain the information elsewhere; and whether compliance with the subpoena would unduly burden or interfere with a President’s official duties. Dissent (Thomas): Respondent Cyrus Vance, Jr., the district attorney for the County of New York, served a grand jury subpoena on the President’s personal accounting firm. The subpoena, which is nearly identical to a subpoena issued by a congressional Committee, requests nearly 10 years of the President’s personal financial records. In response to this troublingly broad request, the President, in his personal capacity, sought a declaration in federal court “‘that the subpoena is invalid and unenforceable’” and an injunction preventing respondent “‘from taking any action to enforce the subpoena.’” The District Court denied the President’s motion for a preliminary injunction, and the Second Circuit affirmed in relevant part. The President argues that he is absolutely immune from the issuance of any subpoena, but that if the Court disagrees, we should remand so that the District Court can develop a record about this particular subpoena. I agree with the majority that the President is not entitled to absolute immunity from issuance of the subpoena. But he may be entitled to relief against its enforcement. I therefore agree with the President that the proper course is to vacate and remand. If the President can show that “his duties as chief magistrate demand his whole time for national objects,” he is entitled to relief from enforcement of the subpoena. The President first argues that he has absolute immunity from the issuance of grand jury subpoenas during his term in office. This Court has recognized absolute immunity for the President from “damages liability predicated on his official acts.” But we have rejected absolute immunity from damages actions for a President’s nonofficial conduct, and we have never addressed the question of immunity from a grand jury subpoena. I agree with the majority that the President does not have absolute immunity from the issuance of a grand jury subpoena. Unlike the majority, however, I do not reach this conclusion based on a primarily functionalist analysis. Instead, I reach it based on the text of the Constitution, which, as understood by the ratifying public and incorporated into an early circuit opinion by Chief Justice Marshall, does not support the President’s claim of absolute immunity. … I agree with the majority that the President has no absolute immunity from the issuance of this subpoena. The President also sought relief from enforcement of the subpoena, however, and he asked this Court to allow further proceedings on that question if we rejected his claim of absolute immunity. The Court inexplicably fails to address this request, although its decision leaves the President free to renew his request for an injunction against enforcement immediately on remand. I would vacate and remand to allow the District Court to determine whether enforcement of this subpoena should be enjoined because the President’s “duties as chief magistrate demand his whole time for national objects.” Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. Dissent (Alito): This case is almost certain to be portrayed as a case about the current President and the current political situation, but the case has a much deeper significance. While the decision will of course have a direct effect on President Trump, what the Court holds today will also affect all future Presidents—which is to say, it will affect the Presidency, and that is a matter of great and lasting importance to the Nation. The event that precipitated this case is unprecedented. Respondent Vance, an elected state prosecutor, launched a criminal investigation of a sitting President and obtained a grand jury subpoena for his records. The specific question before us—whether the subpoena may be enforced—cannot be answered adequately without considering the broader question that frames it: whether the Constitution imposes restrictions on a State’s deployment of its criminal law enforcement powers against a sitting President. If the Constitution sets no such limits, then a local prosecutor may prosecute a sitting President. And if that is allowed, it follows a fortiori that the subpoena at issue can be enforced. On the other hand, if the Constitution does not permit a State to prosecute a sitting President, the next logical question is whether the Constitution restrains any other prosecutorial or investigative weapons. … a subpoena like the one now before us should not be enforced unless it meets a test that takes into account the need to prevent interference with a President’s discharge of the responsibilities of the office. I agree with the Court that not all such subpoenas should be barred. There may be situations in which there is an urgent and critical need for the subpoenaed information. The situation in the Burr trial, where the documents at issue were sought by a criminal defendant to defend against a charge of treason, is a good example. But in a case like the one at hand, a subpoena should not be allowed unless a heightened standard is met. Prior cases involving Presidential subpoenas have always applied special, heightened standards. In the Burr trial, Chief Justice Marshall was careful to note that “in no case of this kind would a court be required to proceed against the president as against an ordinary individual,” and he held that the subpoena to President Jefferson was permissible only because the prosecutor had shown that the materials sought were “essential to the justice of the [pending criminal] case.” … The Presidency deserves greater protection. Thus, in a case like this one, a prosecutor should be required (1) to provide at least a general description of the possible offenses that are under investigation, (2) to outline how the subpoenaed records relate to those offenses, and (3) to explain why it is important that the records be produced and why it is necessary for production to occur while the President is still in office. In the present case, the district attorney made a brief proffer, but important questions were left hanging. It would not be unduly burdensome to insist on answers before enforcing the subpoena. One obvious question concerns the scope of the subpoena. The subpoena issued by the grand jury is largely a copy of the subpoenas issued by Committees of the House of Representatives, and it would be quite a coincidence if the records relevant to an investigation of possible violations of New York criminal law just so happened to be almost identical to the records thought by congressional Committees to be useful in considering federal legislation. It is therefore appropriate to ask the district attorney to explain the need for the various items that the subpoena covers. The district attorney should also explain why it is important that the information in question be obtained from the President’s records rather than another source. } And the district attorney should set out why he finds it necessary that the records be produced now as opposed to when the President leaves office. At argument, respondent’s counsel told us that his office’s concern is the expiration of the statute of limitations, but there are potential solutions to that problem. Even if New York law does not automatically suspend the statute of limitations for prosecuting a President until he leaves office, it may be possible to eliminate the problem by waiver. And if the prosecutor’s statute-of-limitations concerns relate to parties other than the President, he should be required to spell that out. … The subpoena at issue here is unprecedented. Never before has a local prosecutor subpoenaed the records of a sitting President. The Court’s decision threatens to impair the functioning of the Presidency and provides no real protection against the use of the subpoena power by the Nation’s 2,300+ local prosecutors. Respect for the structure of Government created by the Constitution demands greater protection for an institution that is vital to the Nation’s safety and well-being. I therefore respectfully dissent. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/19-635_o7jq.pdf TRUMP ET AL. v. MAZARS USA, LLP, ET AL TLDR: Congressional subpoenas directed at the President’s personal information must be carefully reviewed by the Courts. More litigation needed. Majority Opinion (Roberts): Over the course of five days in April 2019, three committees of the U. S. House of Representatives issued four subpoenas seeking information about the finances of President Donald J. Trump, his children, and affiliated businesses. We have held that the House has authority under the Constitution to issue subpoenas to assist it in carrying out its legislative responsibilities. The House asserts that the financial information sought here—encompassing a decade’s worth of transactions by the President and his family—will help guide legislative reform in areas ranging from money laundering and terrorism to foreign involvement in U. S. elections. The President contends that the House lacked a valid legislative aim and instead sought these records to harass him, expose personal matters, and conduct law enforcement activities beyond its authority. The question presented is whether the subpoenas exceed the authority of the House under the Constitution. We have never addressed a congressional subpoena for the President’s information….Here the President’s information is sought not by prosecutors or private parties in connection with a particular judicial proceeding, but by committees of Congress that have set forth broad legislative objectives. Congress and the President—the two political branches established by the Constitution—have an ongoing relationship that the Framers intended to feature both rivalry and reciprocity. That distinctive aspect necessarily informs our analysis of the question before us. [Lots of subpoenas, Trump files suit.] Although the parties agree that this particular controversy is justiciable, we recognize that it is the first of its kind to reach this Court; that disputes of this sort can raise important issues concerning relations between the branches; that related disputes involving congressional efforts to seek official Executive Branch information recur on a regular basis, including in the context of deeply partisan controversy; and that Congress and the Executive have nonetheless managed for over two centuries to resolve such disputes among themselves without the benefit of guidance from us. Such longstanding practice “ ‘is a consideration of great weight’” in cases concerning “the allocation of power between [the] two elected branches of Government,” and it imposes on us a duty of care to ensure that we not needlessly disturb “the compromises and working arrangements that [those] branches . . . themselves have reached.” With that in mind, we turn to the question presented. Congress has no enumerated constitutional power to conduct investigations or issue subpoenas, but we have held that each House has power “to secure needed information” in order to legislate. … Because this power is “justified solely as an adjunct to the legislative process,” it is subject to several limitations. Most importantly, a congressional subpoena is valid only if it is “related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress.” … Furthermore, Congress may not issue a subpoena for the purpose of “law enforcement,” because “those powers are assigned under our Constitution to the Executive and the Judiciary.” … Finally, recipients of legislative subpoenas retain their constitutional rights throughout the course of an investigation. And recipients have long been understood to retain common law and constitutional privileges with respect to certain materials, such as attorney-client communications and governmental communications protected by executive privilege. … The President contends, as does the Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the United States, that the usual rules for congressional subpoenas do not govern here because the President’s papers are at issue. They argue for a more demanding standard based in large part on cases involving the Nixon tapes. … We disagree that these demanding standards apply here. Unlike the cases before us, Nixon and Senate Select Committee involved Oval Office communications over which the President asserted executive privilege. That privilege safeguards the public interest in candid, confidential deliberations within the Executive Branch; it is “fundamental to the operation of Government.” As a result, information subject to executive privilege deserves “the greatest protection consistent with the fair administration of justice.” We decline to transplant that protection root and branch to cases involving nonprivileged, private information, which by definition does not implicate sensitive Executive Branch deliberations. … The House meanwhile would have us ignore that these suits involve the President. Invoking our precedents concerning investigations that did not target the President’s papers, the House urges us to uphold its subpoenas because they “relate[] to a valid legislative purpose” or “concern[] a subject on which legislation could be had.”...The House’s approach fails to take adequate account of the significant separation of powers issues raised by congressional subpoenas for the President’s information. Congress and the President have an ongoing institutional relationship as the “opposite and rival” political branches established by the Constitution. As a result, congressional subpoenas directed at the President differ markedly from congressional subpoenas we have previously reviewed, and they bear little resemblance to criminal subpoenas issued to the President in the course of a specific investigation. … We[] conclude that, in assessing whether a subpoena directed at the President’s personal information is “related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress,” courts must perform a careful analysis that takes adequate account of the separation of powers principles at stake, including both the significant legislative interests of Congress and the “unique position” of the President. Several special considerations inform this analysis. … First, courts should carefully assess whether the asserted legislative purpose warrants the significant step of involving the President and his papers. ... Second, to narrow the scope of possible conflict between the branches, courts should insist on a subpoena no broader than reasonably necessary to support Congress’s legislative objective. … Third, courts should be attentive to the nature of the evidence offered by Congress to establish that a subpoena advances a valid legislative purpose. … Fourth, courts should be careful to assess the burdens imposed on the President by a subpoena. … Other considerations may be pertinent as well; one case every two centuries does not afford enough experience for an exhaustive list. When Congress seeks information “needed for intelligent legislative action,” it “unquestionably” remains “the duty of all citizens to cooperate.” Congressional subpoenas for information from the President, however, implicate special concerns regarding the separation of powers. The courts below did not take adequate account of those concerns. The judgments of the Courts of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit and the Second Circuit are vacated, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Lineup: Roberts, joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Dissent by Thomas. Dissent by Alito. Concurrence in the Judgment (Thomas): Three Committees of the U. S. House of Representatives issued subpoenas to several accounting and financial firms to obtain the personal financial records of the President, his family, and several of his business entities. The Committees do not argue that these subpoenas were issued pursuant to the House’s impeachment power. Instead, they argue that the subpoenas are a valid exercise of their legislative powers. Petitioners challenge the validity of these subpoenas. In doing so, they call into question our precedents to the extent that they allow Congress to issue legislative subpoenas for the President’s private, nonofficial documents. I would hold that Congress has no power to issue a legislative subpoena for private, nonofficial documents—whether they belong to the President or not. Congress may be able to obtain these documents as part of an investigation of the President, but to do so, it must proceed under the impeachment power. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgments of the Courts of Appeals. Concurrence in the Judgment (Alito): JUSTICE THOMAS makes a valuable argument about the constitutionality of congressional subpoenas for a President’s personal documents. In these cases, however, I would assume for the sake of argument that such subpoenas are not categorically barred. Nevertheless, legislative subpoenas for a President’s personal documents are inherently suspicious. Such documents are seldom of any special value in considering potential legislation, and subpoenas for such documents can easily be used for improper non-legislative purposes. Accordingly, courts must be very sensitive to separation of powers issues when they are asked to approve the enforcement of such subpoenas. In many cases, disputes about subpoenas for Presidential documents are fought without judicial involvement. If Congress attempts to obtain such documents by subpoenaing a President directly, those two heavyweight institutions can use their considerable weapons to settle the matter. But when Congress issues such a subpoena to a third party, Congress must surely appreciate that the Judiciary may be pulled into the dispute, and Congress should not expect that the courts will allow the subpoena to be enforced without seriously examining its legitimacy. Whenever such a subpoena comes before a court, Congress should be required to make more than a perfunctory showing that it is seeking the documents for a legitimate legislative purpose and not for the purpose of exposing supposed Presidential wrongdoing. The House can inquire about possible Presidential wrongdoing pursuant to its impeachment power, but the Committees do not defend these subpoenas as ancillary to that power. Instead, they claim that the subpoenas were issued to gather information that is relevant to legislative issues, but there is disturbing evidence of an improper law enforcement purpose. In addition, the sheer volume of documents sought calls out for explanation. The Court recognizes that the decisions below did not give adequate consideration to separation of powers concerns. Therefore, after setting out a non-exhaustive list of considerations for the lower courts to take into account, the Court vacates the judgments of the Courts of Appeals and sends the cases back for reconsideration. I agree that the lower courts erred and that these cases must be remanded, but I do not think that the considerations outlined by the Court can be properly satisfied unless the House is required to show more than it has put forward to date. Specifically, the House should provide a description of the type of legislation being considered, and while great specificity is not necessary, the description should be sufficient to permit a court to assess whether the particular records sought are of any special importance. The House should also spell out its constitutional authority to enact the type of legislation that it is contemplating, and it should justify the scope of the subpoenas in relation to the articulated legislative needs. In addition, it should explain why the subpoenaed information, as opposed to information available from other sources, is needed. Unless the House is required to make a showing along these lines, I would hold that enforcement of the subpoenas cannot be ordered. Because I find the terms of the Court’s remand inadequate, I must respectfully dissent. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/19-715_febh.pdf
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Jul 9, 2020 16:22
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hobbesmaster posted:Very logical by Thomas standards. Yup. This is entirely just a way of saying that Oklahoma itself has no jurisdiction over tribal members on tribal lands, which is entirely consistent with precedent. The sweeping part is the ruling that this map is still the boundaries of tribal land: https://www.loc.gov/resource/g4021e.ct003199/?r=0.124,0.082,0.815,0.42,0
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Jul 9, 2020 16:28
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Mr. Nice! posted:Yup. This is entirely just a way of saying that Oklahoma itself has no jurisdiction over tribal members on tribal lands, which is entirely consistent with precedent. The sweeping part is the ruling that this map is still the boundaries of tribal land: https://www.loc.gov/resource/g4021e.ct003199/?r=0.124,0.082,0.815,0.42,0 its darkly hilarious that this decision explicitly rests on "well, congress broke promises left, right, and center to the creek nation...but forgot to get around to breaking this one" and then goes on to mention "gee, when it comes to consequences, maybe we should have broken less promises to the native americans" quote:Oklahoma replies that its situation is different because the affected population here is large and many of its residents will be surprised to find out they have been living in Indian country this whole time. But we imagine some members of the 1832 Creek Tribe would be just as surprised to find them there.
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Jul 9, 2020 16:31
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Mr. Nice! posted:After looking at Vance again, Thomas' dissent is only a dissent insomuch that he would vacate and remand for more record before a ruling otherwise he agrees with the majority. This sounds like Thomas trying to protect himself as much as Trump since, iirc, his own tax information contains outright falsehoods like claiming zero spousal income despite his wife's very political work that he doesn't even recuse himself from when it hits the SCOTUS. Danger posted:The Oklahoma case is kind of blowing my mind with the implications of it, and it seems to stem from a hail mary defense from a convicted child rapist that he couldn't be prosecuted for the child rape he committed because he did it on Native land (Tulsa,OK (which is a matter of fact)) and the courts agreed. Is that all accurate? What a wild ride. Especially since he'll get re-tried in Tribal and/or Federal court and likely end up back in prison anyways.
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Jul 9, 2020 16:41
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Gorsuch seems sympathetic to native causes and is actually following "well the text says this" which is a crazy good combo for the rights of natives because theres several hundred years of laws and treaties out there that "everyone knows" to just ignore.
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Jul 9, 2020 16:42
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hobbesmaster posted:Gorsuch seems sympathetic to native causes and is actually following "well the text says this" which is a crazy good combo for the rights of natives because theres several hundred years of laws and treaties out there that "everyone knows" to just ignore. yeah and his decision is very, very much "perhaps you shouldn't have ignored those laws and treaties, so don't come crying to us when that had consequences"
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Jul 9, 2020 16:45
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Evil Fluffy posted:This sounds like Thomas trying to protect himself as much as Trump since, iirc, his own tax information contains outright falsehoods like claiming zero spousal income despite his wife's very political work that he doesn't even recuse himself from when it hits the SCOTUS. Then there's this paragraph which can be read as "even originalism says you suck", amongst other things: quote:I agree with the majority that the President does not have absolute immunity from the issuance of a grand jury subpoena. Unlike the majority, however, I do not reach this conclusion based on a primarily functionalist analysis. Instead, I reach it based on the text of the Constitution, which, as understood by the ratifying public and incorporated into an early circuit opinion by Chief Justice Marshall, does not support the President’s claim of absolute immunity.
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Jul 9, 2020 17:02
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