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Because I posted it at the very end of the last thread, I'll link it again. Professor Volokh is using this week to write about the various legal issues implicated in the upcoming Hobby Lobby cases. Apart from knowing a whole bunch about the applicable area of law (First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act statute), I find his writing to be clear, easy to read, and enlightening on a rather dense subject area. If you're interested in reading upon what the Hobby Lobby cases are all about from a legal perspective, I highly recommend following this series. He already has three posts up and will continue to post throughout the week: First Post: Introduction and Run Down of the Week's Analysis Second Post: 1A. What Is the Religious Freedom Restoration Act? Third Post: 1B. Why Have RFRA-Like Religious Exemption Regimes? And, of course, thanks to Warszawa for these threads.
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Dec 2, 2013 20:20
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Ah, timing! The true bugbear of the appeals process -- incredibly important, and yet incredibly boring to research! So I'm not going to do the research, I'm just working off of my memory and general knowledge about the federal rules of appellate procedure! It's been a while since I have looked at the Court's docketing schedule, but I'm fairly certain that the final days for cert to be granted in order for a case to be heard in the upcoming term is near the beginning of Fall -- September or October, maybe? So, in order to be heard in the next 2014 term (Fall 2014-Spring 2015), the cases would need to go trough the entire appellate process at the intermediate appellate level, and then an appeal successfully filed with SCOTUS, within the next 9ish months. I'm not well versed in either the 2nd Circuit's or District of Columbia Circuit's rules of appellate procedure when it comes down to timing (different circuit's local rules can modify the basic federal rules) -- but you can look it up online if you're particularly interested! -- but the whole process requires an initial brief, a response brief, a reply brief, oral argument, and then the opinion/dissent to be written. And then add another month or so for the actual appeal to SCOTUS. So, it's possible, but based on my limited experience with appeals in the federal courts, not likely. In sum: if SCOTUS were to grant cert, it is plausible that we would see the case in the 2014 term, but it would most likely come up in the 2015 term (and therefore an opinion would likely be published in early 2016).
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Dec 28, 2013 17:06
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The Entire Universe posted:Does it broaden the definition of religious group/organization? The Associated Press posted:Sotomayor acted on a request from an organization of Catholic nuns in Denver, the Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged. Also, in accord with Kalman's point, a temporary stay does not actually decide the merits of a party's appeal -- and therefore won't be changing any law. A temporary injunction simply stops enforcement of a law until the merits can be decided.
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Jan 1, 2014 13:41
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The Entire Universe posted:The SCOTUS equivalent of "Presumed Innocent." An example of this was Roberts' opinion on the Obamacare suit. Was that NFIB? The particular quote that FRINGE highlighted is a particular type of canon of statutory instruction whereby a court, when construing a statute, will construe it only in a manner that is constitutional. For example, if a broadly worded statute would appear to apply, on its face, to both Situation A and Situation B, but such an application to Situation B is unconstitutional, a court will simply say "this statute only applies to Situation A."
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Jan 2, 2014 13:43
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KernelSlanders posted:I'm curious to hear people's impression of Navarette v. California. Frankly, I don't think the tip here was sufficient to allow the stop. Not so much because anonymous tips can't give rise to reasonable suspicion (because they can, if there is sufficient indicia of reliability), but because the LEOs in this case followed Navarette for five miles before stopping him (which is valid as not a search or seizure under the 4A), and at no point during that five mile stretch was the tip's assertion of illegality corroborated. The LEOs own observations undercut the reliability of the anonymous tip, and therefore no reasonable suspicion existed. I'm predicting Scalia will be #5 (or #6, depending on how Breyer feels about this particular issue and if the win goes to California, depending on how Kennedy feels about this particular issue if the win goes to Navarette) who writes the opinion, regardless of which way it rolls out. If not Scalia, then Breyer or Kennedy. Also, I own a crystal ball.
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Jan 23, 2014 14:40
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falcon2424 posted:That's what's confusing me about the whole argument. Reckless driving is a visible crime. It's like speeding. How could a car be driving recklessly without breaking any laws, or creating any articulable reason to stop the vehicle? California's position is, and current case law supports, that a LEO need not actually witness the illegality in order to have sufficient suspicion to conduct a limited seizure. Such suspicion can arise from an anonymous tip. The question at issue is whether the anonymous tip in this case provided such sufficient suspicion. Typically, this requires an analysis of whether the anonymous tip is sufficiently reliable and can be corroborated. California's position (basically because that typical analysis sinks their case) is that a court should consider other factors, such as the potential magnitude of harm resulting from the illegality alleged in the anonymous tip. --- Kalman posted:It's not an exigent circumstances case. It's far more analogous to a Terry stop, which only requires reasonable suspicion.
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Jan 23, 2014 20:36
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SCOTUS will take a case if they think the issue is important enough, regardless of whether the circuit courts agree on the issue. It's just that such a sufficiently important issue is not as common as disagreement between circuits, so most litigants tout the "circuit split" rationale to pique the Court's interest rather than "this is a big loving deal" rationale.
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Feb 14, 2014 13:22
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ThirdPartyView posted:It's not circuit splits, but there are a good number of state supreme court splits on the topic of substantial nexus (as elaborated in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota and mail order/internet sales, yet the Supreme Court has no problem rejecting every appeal since Quill Corp, referring to their suggestion in that decision that Congress do something instead of leaving a non-existant guidance on what the physical presence criteria is, exactly, which has made State and Local Tax practices some of the most lucrative ones (as every state and jurisdiction basically does what they want unless it's clearly in violation of Quill Corp or its predecessor, National Bellas Hess v. Illinois). If so, I would agree with you.
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Feb 17, 2014 18:03
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euphronius posted:If Congress abolished all inferior Federal courts, would the SC be forced to hear all cases of federal jurisdiction? Yes I think. ThirdPartyView posted:Pretty much, yeah - they're pretty content to shoot down state tax cases (particularly nexus issues) while shouting "CONGRESS FIX IT!" despite Congress's last (significant) foray into that field was probably Public Law 86-272 back in 1959, which allows for de facto violations of the dormant commerce clause to run unabated (and therefore makes interstate business in most fields a veritable minefield of potential litigation). May or may not be an actual quote.
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Feb 17, 2014 19:55
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euphronius posted:Couldn't a defendant in state court on a federal question or with diversity motion to move it to the SC though? eviltastic posted:The Supreme Court does not consider itself required to handle even original jurisdiction cases.
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Feb 17, 2014 21:14
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Main Paineframe posted:To come to any different conclusion, the Supreme Court would have to be prepared to overturn not one but two modern Supreme Court decisions which are recent enough that two currently-sitting justices heard the cases (Scalia and Kennedy, both of whom voted with the majority).
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Mar 1, 2014 06:51
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Kalman posted:Yes, but that wasn't a stare decisis argument, it was a "do you really think Kennedy and Scalia have changed their minds about this?" argument. Main Paineframe posted:Yeah, but considering that Kennedy and Scalia both voted with the majority in those cases, they're both going to be actively pushing those cases as a precedent to live by and arguing strongly against any attempt to overturn that precedent. - "Hey, guys, I got more skin in the game because I was part of that particular majority, so now I really meant it that I think we should abide by the precedent!" - "Oh, well, although I would have otherwise overturned that precedent, let's fall in line!" Like, SCOTUS isn't the most acrimonious of appellate courts in the nation, but they don't exactly top the list in not wanting to offend their colleague's jurisprudential sensibilities. It appears that your argument is a sociological one about the behavior of 9 of the most important people in the U.S., and how much they don't want to hurt each other's professional feelings. But I'm not seeing that being a guiding light in how they decide to vote, especially when we know of several examples of them being frenemies.
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Mar 1, 2014 17:42
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Main Paineframe posted:No, I'm just saying that Kennedy and Scalia, unless they've changed their minds, are almost certainly going to rule the way they did back in those cases and are going to argue in favor of upholding those cases a lot harder than they would if they hadn't personally participated in them. I'm not saying the other judges did it as some kind of professional courtesy, I'm suggesting that these two judges pushed those two cases particularly hard because of their participation in those cases (although given how relevant they are, they would have inevitably come up either way) and that judges are occasionally capable of swaying other judges through well-reasoned and logical arguments. quote:Also, and more importantly, the makeup and ideology of the Court usually doesn't change all that much in a mere twenty-five years, so while older cases get more weight in precedent in theory, in practice, the Court's opinion is more likely to have turned against the reasoning of a hundred-year-old case than a ten-year-old case.
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Mar 2, 2014 17:21
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Kalman posted:He basically said that the states witnesses had no credibility, which is a core function for trial judges and harder to overturn on appeal. I am not privy to the Sixth Circuit's particular standard of review regarding what degree of deference is given to the finder of fact regarding factual findings. But I assume that there is some amount of deference given for factual findings. In other cases, arguments supporting SSM bans have been voiced by the litigants themselves. On appeal, I presume a circuit court would review such arguments de novo, as they are essentially legal arguments going to an issue of law. But in this case, the district court sat as fact finder, attributed the anti-SSM arguments to particular witnesses, and then found those witnesses not credible. As you point out, the purpose of this tactic is clear: the court is trying to make it as difficult as possible to overturn his decision on appeal. I just wonder how successful he will be in manipulating the standard of review. That is, although determining witness credibility is clearly within the province of the fact finder, I wonder how the Sixth Circuit will characterize the anti-SSM arguments: will it review them de novo, because they go to the ultimate legal issue, or will it review them with deference to the trial court, because it's an issue of witness credibility?
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Mar 22, 2014 04:42
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twodot posted:I don't think this addresses what I said at all. I don't think the judge said their facts were wrong, just that their facts weren't a rational justification of the ban, and even if that were the case, appellate courts don't need to consider the arguments presented in lower courts when deciding rational basis, so even if the arguments you are talking about here are completely dead, higher courts can still ask other people to present similar arguments. I think this is ultimately correct, insofar that the Sixth Circuit will probably qualify the witness testimony re: anti-SSM arguments as legal arguments rather than factual statements. Thus, the Sixth Circuit won't be hampered in invoking a plenary review of whether these arguments are sufficient to satisfy the rational basis standard. However, there is clearly room for the Sixth Circuit to conduct its review differently. I mean, the parties' arguments are essentially arguments about the "facts" of the consequences of SSM. It's not like these arguments are clear cut legal arguments, particularly considering the fact that the particular arguments the district court evaluated were those voiced by witnesses during a trial. Although an appellate court will apply law to facts de novo -- so, for example, the Sixth Circuit would assess whether rational basis is or is not satisfied depending upon the "fact" anti-SSM arguments -- deference is given to the fact finder about what those facts are. So much so, that the circuit court will not disturb the fact finder's factual findings on appeal unless there was clear error in making those factual determinations (thanks Warszawa). If the Sixth Circuit takes this direction, because the fact finder in this case determined the anti-SSM arguments to not have credibility, unless the Sixth Circuit finds clear error in that credibility determination, then the Sixth Circuit should not actually weigh these arguments when applying law to fact: that is, when determining if rationale basis is satisfied. That is to say, if this route is taken, there will be no credible anti-SSM facts to which the Sixth Circuit could apply its rationale basis review. The court would not evaluate the anti-SSM arguments under the rationale basis rubric. It would simply discard them as incredible. Essentially, then, the anti-SSM law would automatically fail because the state would be unable to provide any anti-SSM arguments that the Sixth Circuit could review. --- Edit: Also, in response to another comment of yours, appellate courts frequently do not allow litigants to assert arguments for the first time on appeal. Once again, I'm not well versed in how the Sixth Circuit handles that situation. But just because a litigant *could* articulate new arguments on appeal that favors their position does not mean that an appellate court will actually let them do so. Green Crayons fucked around with this message at 13:31 on Mar 22, 2014 |
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Mar 22, 2014 13:28
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Discendo Vox posted:I've studied and written a bit about the general issue of science in the courtroom in my work and career. Even before you get to the (massive) problems of judicial and legal scientific illiteracy and dueling experts, scientific information in the courtroom is inherently fraught. I would imagine the latter situation involving fact finders being required to choose the "true" scientific assertion so that they can decide what "actually" happened (for the purposes of litigation) is an inescapable problem.
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Mar 25, 2014 14:34
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mcmagic posted:This is Scalia from the Smith case dealing with right of Native American people to smoke Peyote as part of their religion: Two totally different things.
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Mar 25, 2014 15:06
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SCOTUSBlog posted:Justice Scalia told him that the RFRA law makes no mention of third party interests. Crain posted:Seems somewhat predictable. Kennedy is the key vote, it'll be split 5-4, Scalia is a oval office.
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Mar 25, 2014 19:36
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Crain posted:What "what?"? Moreover, even if you want to adopt this position of context-less vitriol, it's directed at the wrong Justice. Alito is probably the worst right-wing stooge on the Court. Like, take everything you could possibly disagree with, shove it into a corner, and you will find Alito there pumping the keg with a party hat strapped on his head giving you the thumb's up. There are no "happy incidents" or "even a blind squirrel finds a nut" events with Alito. Add that little nugget of horribleness with the fact that he's actually a good writer (and therefore can convey ideas in a simplistic and easy to digest manner, thereby making those ideas appear more tolerable), along with the fact that he's going to outlive Scalia (and at least Thomas, Breyer, and Ginsburg), and you have yourself the real Most Evil Justice Of Our Time. Yes, I will blow the horn of "Alito is the worst Justice ever in terms of policy preferences" until he perishes and is no longer on the Supreme Court. No, you cannot make me shut up about it.
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Mar 26, 2014 03:41
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Grapplejack posted:So, thread regulars, what are the expected cases to be opinioned Wednesday? I'm hoping for the Hobby Lobby case (I have a bet riding on the outcome) but I'm sure it isn't going to happen. I assume that we're going to see the NLRB case, if anything. You have 100% lost your bet.
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Apr 1, 2014 14:47
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Oh, I see.
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Apr 1, 2014 15:27
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Huge Liability posted:There has been a lot of discussion about the Hobby Lobby case here lately. Is the ruling on this case expected to come soon, or is it more likely that they'll 'run out the clock' and wait until June, as they did for the same-sex marriage ruling last year? So, yes, the safe bet is that the Hobby Lobby opinions will be out in June, but that's because they are big cases that were argued just last week rather than some sort of strategy move on the Court's part.
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Apr 2, 2014 21:02
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Badger of Basra posted:I have a sort of court history/conlaw question that I thought I would put here. I was reading up on the CRA of 1964 and the court case that said it was constitutional for Congress to ban racial discrimination (Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States). The case was decided on interstate commerce grounds, saying that since the motel had a lot of out-of-state customers and was near two interstates, that interstate commerce was relevant. The United States Congress isn't like a state legislature, which can pass laws restricting private behavior however it wants (so long as such legislation does not affirmatively offend that state's constitution or the federal Constitution). In contrast, the federal government is a government of limited powers, and in the legislative realm that means that Congress can only pass laws that arise from its specifically enumerated powers in the Constitution (found at Article 1, Section 8). The only enumerated power that is recognized as supporting Congress's ability to pass a law banning private discrimination is the Commerce Clause. Whether that is a valid understanding of the Commerce Clause, and the exact scope of that Commerce Clause power, is up to debate and there's not a definitely right answer (which is what I think you're looking for?). Also, the Fourteenth Amendment does permit Congress to enact legislation to enforce that Amendment's substantive provisions, but as ulmont alluded to, the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive provisions prohibit state discrimination, and not private discrimination.
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Apr 14, 2014 15:38
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mdemone posted:Are they allowed to mention that it is dead, for example, in a majority opinion for another case altogether? Would that erase the precedent, or does that kind of reference not bear the weight of law? So it can be pretty difficult to get a majority of Justices to sign onto a segment of an opinion that is clearly dicta. And I would imagine it might be 99.9% impossible to get 5 of the current Justices to sign onto such dicta that holds a whole line of jurisprudence, or even just a single but well-known case (e.g., Korematsu), as overruled.
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Apr 14, 2014 18:43
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Xandu posted:
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Apr 21, 2014 23:29
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Breyer continues to be bad at the 4th Amendment.
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Apr 22, 2014 15:34
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Existing 4A Case Law: anonymous tips can provide sufficient "reasonable suspicion" for a LEO to pull over a car, so long as there is sufficient indicia of reliability as to that anonymous tip. Sufficient indicia of reliability typically requires particularized knowledge that is not attributable to the general population (e.g., someone who has knowledge about the suspect, giving details about the suspect's activities that the general public could not glean simply from observing the suspect). This Case: anonymous tips can provide sufficient "reasonable suspicion" for a LEO to pull over a car. Sufficient indicia of reliability exists because of the mere fact that the anonymous tip was made over the 911 system by a person who claimed to have seen the suspect in person.  Even better: an anonymous tip of a single instance of bad driving provides sufficient reasonable suspicion of drunk driving even after LEOs themselves observe the suspect's completely traffic-violation free driving for five minutes.
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Apr 22, 2014 15:48
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Only now they can pull you over even when you obey all the laws -- based on an "anonymous tip" that you were driving in the area and committed a traffic violation -- and then can claim to smell weed.
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Apr 22, 2014 15:52
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ComradeCosmobot posted:Affirmative action is dead if states want it to be.All hail our post-racial reality! I think Scalia's concurring opinion was right on one point: "I find the question presented <in this case> only slightly less strange: Does the Equal Protection Clause forbid a State from banning a practice that the Clause barely—and only provisionally—permits?" Assuming the EPC permits affirmative action (A Good Thing, I agree), I'm not as comfortable with the result that the EPC requires affirmative action. Holding otherwise would invert the typical affirmative action analysis: the judiciary would not be evaluating whether an affirmative action program goes too far in distinguishing between races, but the judiciary would now be required to evaluate whether a school's affirmative action program fails to go far enough in distinguishing between races. Edit: My problem with that scenario is that the judiciary would basically be making school policy as to what constitutes sufficient procedures designed to achieve racial integration as a constitutional matter, whereas now the Court simply does a thumbs up/thumbs down on whether any particular school policy goes too far in trying to achieve such equality. hobbesmaster posted:Thomas points out that the call wasn't made anonymously, the call was recorded along with the caller id and the caller freely gave their name but the prosecution in the case proceeded as if it was an anonymous call because they didn't want to subpoena the 911 operator and the caller for a suppression hearing. Scalia obsesses over the fact that the tip was anonymous and nobody would anonymously report being in a traffic accident. I mean, the majority opinion even accepts this premise: "Even assuming for present purposes that the 911 call was anonymous, see n. 1, supra, we conclude that the call bore adequate indicia of reliability for the officer to credit the caller’s account." Edit: In other words, everyone is treating the call as anonymous, and this opinion is predicated on that factual premise Green Crayons fucked around with this message at 16:28 on Apr 22, 2014 |
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Apr 22, 2014 16:22
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hobbesmaster posted:Was the call itself part of evidence? Scalia was saying it wasn't credible because someone that wished to remain an anonymous victim of a crime isn't trustworthy. The caller didn't wish to be anonymous, that call was made by the police which breaks that part down. quote:1 At the suppression hearing, counsel for petitioners did not dispute that the reporting party identified herself by name in the 911 call recording. Because neither the caller nor the Humboldt County dispatcher who received the call was present at the hearing, however, the prosecution did not introduce the recording into evidence. The prosecution proceeded to treat the tip as anonymous, and the lower courts followed suit. See 2012 WL 4842651, *6 (Cal. Ct. App., Oct. 12, 2012). It doesn't matter what the caller did or didn't want in actuality, because what the record shows is what matters for purposes of an appellate decision. And the record shows that the call was treated as anonymous. So, if the parties treated the call as anonymous in the trial court, and if the majority is basing its ruling off of the premise that the call was anonymous, the dissent is free to attack the trustworthiness of a call as if that call was anonymous because everyone is treating that call as anonymous. Kro-Bar posted:This isn't much different from the way it works now, where they just lie about you breaking a minor traffic law to justify pulling you over.
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Apr 22, 2014 16:42
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KernelSlanders posted:How is that possible? Also, it suggests a meta strategy for the university defendants.
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Apr 23, 2014 15:13
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If the cases are being resolved prior to trial (no trial testimony) and prior to summary judgment (no deposition testimony) -- so, say, on a 12(b)(6) motion, I guess? -- then I can see how a plaintiff would not be required to testify. (I don't know how at what stage in the litigation process these cases are being resolved.)
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Apr 23, 2014 15:42
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Allaniis posted:The other one dealt with compensation to a victim of child pornography from viewers of said child pornography. The answer is yes, the victim can receive some compensation. How much? The Court gives very little guidance. A very wide range of opinions. I'm still working through them. That said, I'm certainly not disappointed with the majority's opinion from a results point of view.
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Apr 24, 2014 13:18
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VitalSigns posted:Unless actuarial tables take into account the chances of someone discovering a phylactery and learning the arcane rituals to destroy it, they won't be much use in estimating Scalia's life expectancy. Plenty of rich people do just fine into their early 80s, so I'm betting both Scalia and Kennedy will hold on through the 2016 winner until at least 2020. And by "hold on," I mean grip tightly to their seat of power through sheer force of will -- despite any medical woes -- because I would imagine that for any Justice, ego, party politics, and identity/self-worth is wrapped up into their job. Snoggle posted:Yeah, but she likes the Yankees.
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Apr 25, 2014 14:31
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evilweasel posted:Scalia is absolutely the best person to have replaced by a Democrat: Kennedy leans conservative, but he's not a sure conservative vote. Scalia is. You get much more milage out of replacing Scalia: you have a solid 6-3 majority for abortion rights and gay rights, for example. - A 5-4 win on gay rights (status quo) - Probably a stronger/more consistent 5-4 win on abortion rights (Kennedy is a milquetoast supporter whose support has only gotten weaker over time, so this result would be consistent with replacing either Kennedy or Scalia) - Something replacing Scalia doesn't: flipping the conservative majority on 4th Amendment rights to a 5-4 win (Kennedy replacement, Scalia, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan). I don't see the benefit of keeping Kennedy over Scalia from a strategy standpoint.
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Apr 25, 2014 17:02
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As a fan of Citizen's United, I can confidently say that McCutchen was bullshit.
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Apr 27, 2014 16:27
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Omerta posted:Can you elaborate? Do you mean the holding was bullshit, the dicta was bullshit, or both? McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1450-51 (2014) posted:Moreover, while preventing corruption or its appearance is a legitimate objective, Congress may target only a specific type of corruption—“quid pro quo” corruption. As Buckley explained, Congress may permissibly seek to rein in “large contributions [that] are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders.” 424 U.S., at 26, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659. In addition to “actual quid pro quo arrangements,” Congress may permissibly limit “the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions” to particular candidates. Id., at 27, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659; see also Citizens United, 558 U.S., at 359, 130 S. Ct. 876, 175 L. Ed. 2d 753 (“When Buckley identified a sufficiently important governmental interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, that interest was limited to quid pro quo corruption”).
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Apr 29, 2014 21:54
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StarMagician posted:Can someone put together an effortpost explaining how these sorts of cases make it to the Supreme Court? I'm assuming that there's a legal organization somewhere that wanted more power for the District Courts, and it's one that has no opinion on and no interest in the merits of various health food companies. I would also be surprised if Octane Fitness were looking to spend years and hundreds of thousands of dollars trying to go all the way to the Supreme Court with whatever dispute it was. The correct standard of review upon appeal (Highmark) comes up in every single appellate case. It was only a matter of time for the Federal Circuit to get it wrong, and for SCOTUS to take the appeal as an easy case for error correction. Indeed, the petitioner/appellant had won in the District Court, and the Federal Circuit's de novo review reversed (in part) that win -- so there was a strong impetus to spend the money on appeal and get the Federal Circuit's own opinion reversed, because there would be a net financial gain if they won. And this is the typical calculus most clients have on appeal, I might add. Similarly, attorneys frequently ask for attorney's fees (Octane Fitness). It was only a matter of time for that minor, but important, issue to work its way up the system. It probably helped that the Court decided to also grant Highmark, as the two cases go hand in hand.
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Apr 30, 2014 13:31
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N00ba the Hutt posted:Transferring anything at sea is inherently hazardous, so even getting someone to board and inspect is a bit of an adventure. The Warszawa posted:"Firsts" are kind of easy to pick out simply because so much of the judiciary is made up of white dudes - Sotomayor was pickable because there was a sentiment that it was about drat time there was a Latino/a Justice (not counting Cardozo), and that was the same "foresight" that made Miguel Estrada so controversial. For the most part, I tend to think that nominees who "everyone" talks about being obvious choices are usually nominees with friends who are reporters or are listened to by reporters (for example, Kagan and Toobin are close, apparently, and I recall that Greenwald was pretty heavy into Diane Wood when the Souter vacancy was up). That's also why Goodwin Liu got blocked for the 9th Circuit.
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May 1, 2014 12:26
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Any thoughts on whether the fact that he's currently serving on California's supreme court is providing him the experience he needs to be a credible nominee?
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May 1, 2014 13:22
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