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wateroverfire
Jul 3, 2010
Moving this derail out of the Libertarian thread.


Helsing posted:

I confess I'm not overly familiar with the internal situation in Chile but it is well documented that the US government immediately terminated most of its foreign aid and Kissinger famously gave the order to "make the Chilean economy scream".

I dunno whether Kissinger ever spoke that line. For the rest we can go to the tape and look at documents archived by the State department.

Editorial note in Doc 148 posted:

In addition to the expropriation by the Government of Peru of the assets of the International Petroleum Company, U.S. officials were faced with the prospect of expropriation of U.S. private copper companies operating in Chile. In a May 4, 1969, letter to President Nixon, President Eduardo Frei of Chile wrote that he would soon present an austere economic program for Chile to try to control inflation and revive a depressed agriculture resulting from a severe drought the previous year. While expressing his desire for continued good relations with the United States, he warned: "To present this plan and to exclude from these sacrifices the copper producing companies is politically and morally impossible." (National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 72 D 320, Chile: Frei to Nixon) President Frei informed the U.S. Ambassador in Santiago, Edward M. Korry, that he had to make changes in two areas of the 1967 agreements which would affect two U.S. companies, Kennecott and Anaconda: link the tax rate to the price of copper instead of a 53-54 percent rate regardless of the price, and "Chileanize" Anaconda, which was still entirely U.S.-owned, either by getting Anaconda to sell some of its stock to Chile or, if necessary, by expropriation. (Memorandum from Kissinger to President Nixon, May 6; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files-Latin America, Chile, Volume I 1969, Box 773) Because Kennecott was already 51 percent-owned by the Government of Chile, it was not a candidate for expropriation.

President Frei informed the American copper companies of his goals on May 9. (Memorandum from Vaky to Kissinger, May 19; ibid.) Intense negotiations began on June 2 and concluded with an agreement with Anaconda on June 26. Although the negotiations were conducted directly between the Chilean Government and the companies, Ambassador Korry played an important role in mediating between the parties. In effect, the parties worked out a formula by which Chile would buy the entire company. The details of the agreement and its implications for future U.S.-Chilean relations as well as for prospects for expropriation initiatives by other countries were spelled out in a memorandum (with enclosures) from Department of State Acting Executive Secretary John P. Walsh to Kissinger, July 1. (Ibid.)

The Chilean elections in September 1970 brought to power the Socialist candidate, Salvador Allende, who had pledged during the campaign to submit legislation to the Chilean Congress covering nationalization of the major copper producers in Chile. In the following months, Nixon administration officials considered a broad range of political, diplomatic, and economic responses to prevent the consolidation of the Allende government, to try to limit its ability to implement policies contrary to U.S. and hemisphere interests, and at the same time to avoid precipitous actions that might allow the Allende government to rally support or blame the United States. The economic pressures against Chile included ending or cutting back further the U.S. Government's bilateral loans, as well as its financial assistance or guarantees for U.S. private investment, and persuading international lending institutions to limit financial assistance. Because copper accounted for about 80 percent of Chile's foreign exchange earnings, measures were also considered that might affect the marketing of Chilean copper. As Allende sought enabling legislation and constitutional amendments from the Chilean legislature to nationalize major industries, especially the American-owned copper mines, Nixon administration officials agreed that if expropriation occurred without just compensation, the United States would use the 6-month waiting period in the Hickenlooper Amendment to explore prospects for working out settlements. When Chile seemed receptive to some kind of pragmatic compromise with the copper companies, the Nixon administration avoided a direct confrontation with the Allende government and approved or deferred some loans and FMS credits instead of cancelling them.

A July 16, 1971, amendment to the Chilean Constitution effectively nationalized the three largest copper companies in Chile (Anaconda, Kennecott, and Cerro), and the Government of Chile announced on October 10, 1971, that there would be no compensation for Anaconda and Kennecott and only $13 million for Cerro. Meanwhile, President Nixon had issued National Security Decision Memorandum 136 on October 8 (Document 169), which set forth the administration's expropriation policy. The Nixon administration intensified its economic pressures on the Allende government: when Chile stopped paying its foreign debts, most of which were owed to U.S. companies or the U.S. Government, and sought multilateral rescheduling of them, the administration took a hard line that would include Chile's prompt and adequate compensation for its expropriation of U.S. properties.

U.S.-Chilean relations were further complicated when Allende announced on April 18, 1972, that he would send legislation to the Chilean legislature requesting the nationalization of the International Telephone and Telecommunications Company (ITT). On the following day a multilateral rescheduling agreement between Chile and its creditors was reached in Paris. As 1972 ended, the Allende government faced serious economic dislocation and political instability. The Nixon administration was still considering whether to sign the rescheduling accord; and its policymakers were engaged in bilateral talks with Chilean representatives, with the U.S. side emphasizing debt repudiation and compensation for expropriated property and the Chilean representatives stressing access to U.S. and U.S.-influenced financing. A national interest waiver announced by Secretary of State Rogers on November 17, 1972, allowed the U.S. Government to remain engaged with the Chileans pending resolution of the issues.

What is well documented is that, in response to the Allende government expropriating American businesses without compensation, the Nixon administration considered a range of measures that would have put pressure on Allende to stop expropriating U.S. businesses or to pay compensation. Ultimately Nixon did not cut off money and the aid situation more or less fell out like this.

Wikipedia: United States intervention in Chile posted:

The U.S. provided humanitarian aid to Chile in addition to forgiving old loans valued at $200 million from 1971-2. The U.S. did not invoke the Hickenlooper Amendment which would have required an immediate cut-off of U.S. aid due to Allende's nationalizations. Allende also received new sources of credit that was valued between $600 million and $950 million in 1972 and $547 million by June 1973. The International Monetary Fund also loaned $100 million to Chile during the Allende years.

Helsing posted:

This was on top of the extensive internal opposition to Allende such as those highly disruptive transportation strikes.

Yes. In response to drivers having their trucks seized and other measures like that.

Helsing posted:

You're accusing other posters of being ignorant or simplistic

Yes.

Helsing posted:

but it seems like you're doing the same thing declaring Allende's policies outright failures.

No.

Helsing posted:

He was only in power for three years, inherited a polarized and unstable country, and faced extensive economic sabatoge from both the world's most powerful country and some of Chile's internal actors.

It's important to know the history, dude. =( Chile was not in a great place when Allende took power but his administration was basically a study in how to knock a country off its rails in the fewest possible steps. The administration didn't need any help from Nixon. I posted a link to an economic reading of Chilean history in the other thread that I'll include here: Economic Reforms in Chile: From Dictatorship to Democracy.

Helsing posted:

Also correct me if I'm wrong but my understanding is that one Allende era reform that Pinochet never reversed was the nationalization of the copper industry - and copper exports were a huge source of national income and government revenue throughout the Pinochet era.

That was one of the better measures, yeah. The nationalization of copper began under Frei, who "negotiated" the government into a bunch of joint ventures giving it about a 50% stake. Allende came to power and basically told the private partners "gently caress you, we're taking it all and we're not paying". I think nationalization was the right call but seizure without compensation wasn't the way to do it. That poo poo more than any influence from Washington made it harder for Chile to get international financing.

Also, I guess this can be the Chile thread? ITT let's talk about Chile and current events in Chile. There's a lot going on. Tax and education reforms are big topics. There's always someone striking somewhere. Lots to gab about.

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wateroverfire
Jul 3, 2010
Reserved.

woke wedding drone
Jun 1, 2003

by exmarx
Fun Shoe
Do you have any contact with people who experienced repression or lost family members under the Pinochet regime?

wateroverfire
Jul 3, 2010

SedanChair posted:

Do you have any contact with people who experienced repression or lost family members under the Pinochet regime?

I'm happy to answer questions about the period or stuff that's going on now or life in general, but I don't want to talk about my personal situation and acquaintances because Internet. Yes, I know people. I would say that's not super common but it's not rare either.

CharlestheHammer
Jun 26, 2011

YOU SAY MY POSTS ARE THE RAVINGS OF THE DUMBEST PERSON ON GOD'S GREEN EARTH BUT YOU YOURSELF ARE READING THEM. CURIOUS!

wateroverfire posted:

Moving this derail out of the Libertarian thread.





It's important to know the history, dude. =( Chile was not in a great place when Allende took power but his administration was basically a study in how to knock a country off its rails in the fewest possible steps. The administration didn't need any help from Nixon. I posted a link to an economic reading of Chilean history in the other thread that I'll include here: Economic Reforms in Chile: From Dictatorship to Democracy.




From the Excerpt you posted (I only saw the one) it doesn't really detail what exactly he did wrong, and seems to be more about external factors that undermined him pretty hard. I mean he was accused of being a "dictator" but none of that is substantiated in the excerpt posted.

Anyway, since he was only in power for three years its really impossbile to judge Allende's policies. Its just to short of a window for anything to really happen. Not to mention most of it undone by his successor.

If you really want a to compare him to big P, well you can't. He nationalized the copper mines, and Big P murdered a poo poo ton of people. There is no way Big P comes out even close.

CharlestheHammer fucked around with this message at 00:25 on Jul 25, 2014

Baronjutter
Dec 31, 2007

"Tiny Trains"

This is going to be a poo poo show, but I'm excited to learn more about how Pinochet was simply a product of his times and Allende was a horrible illegal socialist who doomed the country.

SirKibbles
Feb 27, 2011

I didn't like your old red text so here's some dancing cash. :10bux:
Ok I've got an honest question with you being kind of center-right what do you think is wrong with Chile at the moment and how would you fix it?

King Metal
Jun 15, 2001
rear end in a top hat anarchists have been blowing up bombs here the past week

Job Truniht
Nov 7, 2012

MY POSTS ARE REAL RETARDED, SIR
I don't see how Pinochet Chile would be the exception rather than the rule for corrupt banana republics and lovely South/Latin American CIA honeypots, nor should anyone seriously expect anyone believe that Pinochet was anyway directly responsible for anything other than the disappearance of some 30,000 people and a sharp drop in literacy rates due to voucher reforms.

Absurd Alhazred
Mar 27, 2010

by Athanatos
This whole topic really makes me want to re-read all my Project Cybersyn stuff, particularly~Cybernetic Revolutionaries, although it is somewhat didactic. I believe I first heard about it on these forums.

It was misunderstood as a way of centrally managing the economy from Santiago, but really the purpose was to facilitate better working of the economy in a kind of biological structure, where the head office would only deal with emergencies that can't be handled at lower levels. Unfortunately, its implementation was doomed because for it to work you had to have buy-in all the way from the factory worker up to senior management, and class antagonism even between workers and the engineers training them in the factory-level equipment was just too large.

The one real achievement (at least as far as the Allende administration is concerned) of the program was the use of Telex machines to alleviate the effects of the 1972 transport strike. (The wikipedia description fails to mention these facts, but they do appear in Cybernetic Revolutionaries, and I think in Beer's account in his Brain of the Firm, one of the main books in which he proposed his Viable System Model for business/government/social distributed regulation and control.)

The story of Project Cybersyn is very interesting in how it interacts with what the UP were trying to do, and how the failure reflects problems with implementing computational solutions to social problems. A book about a similar attempt in the Soviet Union under Khruschev is From Newspeak to Cyberspeak, again, recommended on these forums. A more whimsical account can be found in Red Plenty, a fairy tale with citations and notes of more or less the same era.

wateroverfire
Jul 3, 2010

SirKibbles posted:

Ok I've got an honest question with you being kind of center-right what do you think is wrong with Chile at the moment and how would you fix it?

That's a really broad question. Chile has a lot of challenges to overcome and they're related.

Probably the biggest thing is that the economy depends heavily on exporting copper and other minerals. To give you some idea, Chile's GDP in dollars in 2013 was around 300 billion. Exports were about 80 billion and copper was half of that. Mining directly employs only like 70,000 people but indirectly a great many jobs in Chile depend on the flow of money and economic activity it generates, and the health of the mining sector is one of the big variables that determines the peso / dollar exchange rate (the others are the prime interest rate in Chile, the prime interest rate in the U.S., and on some level what's going on in Chilean politics at the moment). Over the long run that's an unstable situation because a shift in trade patterns or a prolonged global slump will spike unemployment, send the exchange rate through the roof, spur inflation (because so much is imported, and the peso will be weaker) and depress government revenue. Basically what I'm saying is that without strong mining performance there is no money.

The solution to that is to open up new export markets, probably in services and finance, leveraging Chile's relatively stable and well functioning (by Latin American standards anyway) business environment. Also developing the internal economy, though as a country of just 17 million people there is limited potential in that. That means educating a bunch of bright young people who can go out and build those things, which would be great except...

Chile's education system is pretty bad.

In the OECD's program for international student assessment 2009 Chile ranked 44th in reading, 49th in math, and 44th in science. That's in terms of higher education outcomes.

This article describes the structure of the Chilean education system.

In practice there are a few good universities (by Chilean standards. Some are private and some are public. There are a lot of additional private institutions that sprung up quickly to serve poorer and lesser achieving students that are "accredited" but are basically degree mills that grant worthless credentials while saddling students with debt. Students would like to go to the good universities, however admission is competitive and also very classist and there are nowhere near enough slots at those institutions for everyone who wants to go. Nor do many Chileans get primary and secondary education adequate to make use of those opportunities even if they were there. If I knew how to fix this I would probably be Education minister. =(

Education reform is probably the biggest challenge and public preoccupation facing Chile today*, and is a catalyst for a lot of public dialogue and civil unrest. There have been several waves of protests and school occupations by students. Again, here's an article with some background. English language reporting about this is almost universally awful.

Sorry for a bunch of wikipedia links. It's hard to find english language sources covering Chilean affairs in a neutral way.

edit:

*Unless you're a Mapuche. Then you're probably more worried about getting strung up by nervous farmers because your bros have been attacking land owners.

wateroverfire fucked around with this message at 16:04 on Jul 25, 2014

wateroverfire
Jul 3, 2010

Absurd Alhazred posted:

This whole topic really makes me want to re-read all my Project Cybersyn stuff, particularly~Cybernetic Revolutionaries, although it is somewhat didactic. I believe I first heard about it on these forums.

It was misunderstood as a way of centrally managing the economy from Santiago, but really the purpose was to facilitate better working of the economy in a kind of biological structure, where the head office would only deal with emergencies that can't be handled at lower levels. Unfortunately, its implementation was doomed because for it to work you had to have buy-in all the way from the factory worker up to senior management, and class antagonism even between workers and the engineers training them in the factory-level equipment was just too large.

The one real achievement (at least as far as the Allende administration is concerned) of the program was the use of Telex machines to alleviate the effects of the 1972 transport strike. (The wikipedia description fails to mention these facts, but they do appear in Cybernetic Revolutionaries, and I think in Beer's account in his Brain of the Firm, one of the main books in which he proposed his Viable System Model for business/government/social distributed regulation and control.)

The story of Project Cybersyn is very interesting in how it interacts with what the UP were trying to do, and how the failure reflects problems with implementing computational solutions to social problems. A book about a similar attempt in the Soviet Union under Khruschev is From Newspeak to Cyberspeak, again, recommended on these forums. A more whimsical account can be found in Red Plenty, a fairy tale with citations and notes of more or less the same era.

Cybersyn was doomed because in order to be embraced by the Chilean bureaucracy every step of every calculation would have to be printed out in triplicate, taken by hand to the ministry to be stamped/validated, then returned by hand to the appropriate official's desk where it would sit for weeks before being punted to the next official in the process. =(

wateroverfire
Jul 3, 2010

King Metal posted:

rear end in a top hat anarchists have been blowing up bombs here the past week

Nobody taking credit so far. Kind of amateur hour for political violence. If no one knows who you are what's the point?

Absurd Alhazred
Mar 27, 2010

by Athanatos

wateroverfire posted:

Cybersyn was doomed because in order to be embraced by the Chilean bureaucracy every step of every calculation would have to be printed out in triplicate, taken by hand to the ministry to be stamped/validated, then returned by hand to the appropriate official's desk where it would sit for weeks before being punted to the next official in the process. =(
Those don't seem to be the obstacles that the project actually encountered, at least according to Beer himself or to Medina in her research on the topic. The project had a lot of official support going quite a ways through the government, being backed by Allende himself and by CORFO. Do you have any evidence to the contrary? Medina in particular seemed to have gotten information from a large variety of sources, including Fernando Flores, who is more of a centrist business-type Senator now, if I'm not mistaken.

SALT CURES HAM
Jan 4, 2011
I guess this is the appropriate thread to ask in, does anyone have any context for that Latuff cartoon about the president of Chile getting hosed in the rear end by Goku? It's absolutely hilarious, don't get me wrong, but I have no clue what it's referring to and it bugs me.

wateroverfire
Jul 3, 2010

Absurd Alhazred posted:

Those don't seem to be the obstacles that the project actually encountered, at least according to Beer himself or to Medina in her research on the topic. The project had a lot of official support going quite a ways through the government, being backed by Allende himself and by CORFO. Do you have any evidence to the contrary? Medina in particular seemed to have gotten information from a large variety of sources, including Fernando Flores, who is more of a centrist business-type Senator now, if I'm not mistaken.

It was just a cynical comment based on my frustration dealing with Chilean bureaucracy. =)

More seriously, I think you would have a hard time implementing a Cybrsyn-like system in Chile even today. It's hard enough to find workers who have had exposure to and feel comfortable using database products like simple ERP systems. I can't imagine what it would have been like in the early 70's. That's separate from the mathematical intractability of the modeling problems. This came up a couple of times, I think, in the Marxism thread when some of the economists who post occasionally in D&D got involved.

Absurd Alhazred
Mar 27, 2010

by Athanatos

wateroverfire posted:

It was just a cynical comment based on my frustration dealing with Chilean bureaucracy. =)
Wait, so you're saying that this is post-Pinochet bureaucracy?

quote:

More seriously, I think you would have a hard time implementing a Cybrsyn-like system in Chile even today. It's hard enough to find workers who have had exposure to and feel comfortable using database products like simple ERP systems. I can't imagine what it would have been like in the early 70's. That's separate from the mathematical intractability of the modeling problems. This came up a couple of times, I think, in the Marxism thread when some of the economists who post occasionally in D&D got involved.

Well, the idea was that workers wouldn't need to learn anything complicated. I think it came down to basically "upvoting" or "downvoting" how they were doing, dealing with whatever they could themselves, and it only involving people higher in the hierarchy if things went horribly wrong; and each level at the hierarchy had a mostly tractable problem at their scale. It was tractable because the effort was distributed and recursive, and the idea wasn't to be optimal, just to respond better than without the right communications. On some level, he was trying to simply mirror and improve existing hierarchical structure that he'd found in the British military, and a variety of businesses as an operations researcher.

I'm not going to lie, while cybernetics is really interesting for me, and I've read a lot about its history, and while I do have a background in computer science, I have not really researched this topic enough, other than to know that the whole "perfect market" thing is rubbish. But approximating NP-hard problems with polynomial-complexity algorithms is a an active field of research, and you don't really need to have an exact solution to have something that works better than the status quo. Beer's specific solution may or may not have worked; but with all of these issues, it seems to me that questions of politics, power, and cultural inertia come in much earlier than any kind of computational limit.

Anyway, beyond my particular fixation, you mentioned repeatedly that there is a dearth of good coverage in English. If you are up to it, I would personally appreciate rough translations if you think they would enlighten us. I can probably give rough translations of short pieces in French, if there is any such you could recommend, but I imagine Spanish-literate posters would be more relevant generally.

wateroverfire
Jul 3, 2010

SALT CURES HAM posted:

I guess this is the appropriate thread to ask in, does anyone have any context for that Latuff cartoon about the president of Chile getting hosed in the rear end by Goku? It's absolutely hilarious, don't get me wrong, but I have no clue what it's referring to and it bugs me.

Here's the image for anyone who hasn't seen it.



Here's what Latuf said about it here (translation by Andrés Chandía).

quote:

I spent the last 3 weeks in Chile participating of protests against building of a dam in Patagonia by Hidroaysén, students for public education, against anti-terror laws applied to Mapuche. During these demonstrations, it was pretty common to see protesters on the streets chanting "Goku Goku, Super Sayayin, culeate a Piñera por el chiquitin!", something like "Goku Goku, Super Sayayin (Famous Japanese comics character), go gently caress Piñera (Chile's president) in the rear end". Based upon this chant, here's Goku and Piñera, together, in a cartoon. Reproduction is free for everyone! :)

...That doesn't answer the obvious follow-up but there it is!


Absurd Alhazred posted:

Wait, so you're saying that this is post-Pinochet bureaucracy?

Oh my, yes. Chile is a very bureaucratic place and that expresses itself in some ridiculous ways sometimes. For instance, the following happened to someone I know:

=) I'm applying for my driver's license. Here's my paperwork!
:j: Por supuesto señor, I just need the diploma that shows you graduated 8th grade.
=) My country doesn't give 8th grade diplomas but there's my university degree so now that's settled we
:j: I need the 8th grade diploma.
:( But..
:spergin:
:doh:

A driver's license was not gotten that day.

Absurd Alhazred posted:

Anyway, beyond my particular fixation, you mentioned repeatedly that there is a dearth of good coverage in English. If you are up to it, I would personally appreciate rough translations if you think they would enlighten us. I can probably give rough translations of short pieces in French, if there is any such you could recommend, but I imagine Spanish-literate posters would be more relevant generally.

I don't know good french sources. When I come across interesting spanish sources I can link them and do some translating or at least paraphrasing. Are there topics you're in particular interested in?

Baronjutter
Dec 31, 2007

"Tiny Trains"

drat now I want to read about "cybernetics". I heard references to cybernetics reading about the soviet union but I was always like "they wanted to make cyborg super-soldier bureaucrats to run things????"

Absurd Alhazred
Mar 27, 2010

by Athanatos

wateroverfire posted:

Oh my, yes. Chile is a very bureaucratic place and that expresses itself in some ridiculous ways sometimes. For instance, the following happened to someone I know:

=) I'm applying for my driver's license. Here's my paperwork!
:j: Por supuesto señor, I just need the diploma that shows you graduated 8th grade.
=) My country doesn't give 8th grade diplomas but there's my university degree so now that's settled we
:j: I need the 8th grade diploma.
:( But..
:spergin:
:doh:

A driver's license was not gotten that day.
Thing is, it's hard to fault Allende's administration for something that may not have been around back then. :v:


quote:

I don't know good french sources. When I come across interesting spanish sources I can link them and do some translating or at least paraphrasing. Are there topics you're in particular interested in?

What do you think about Michelle Bachelet? Any good critiques of her current plans?


Baronjutter posted:

drat now I want to read about "cybernetics". I heard references to cybernetics reading about the soviet union but I was always like "they wanted to make cyborg super-soldier bureaucrats to run things????"

It's been a while since I read it, but the ideas went like this: we want a planned economy, so we should use computer science/cybernetics/algorithms to plan it, hey hold on if we use linear optimization we find that we get "prices" like in capitalism, meaning it doesn't have to be centralized after all, then people get spooked, especially after Khrushchev gets deposed, and to it in a centralized manner anyway, but with paperwork and getting nowhere. Did that make sense? Probably better for another thread and for someone more knowledgeable than me, frankly. Anyway, it's the history of those kinds of plans which make me so wary of Marblebux, and other Eripsa software solutions to human problems.

Absurd Alhazred fucked around with this message at 21:37 on Jul 25, 2014

Badger of Basra
Jul 26, 2007

Absurd Alhazred posted:

What do you think about Michelle Bachelet? Any good critiques of her current plans?

She's doing a lot to make the system more equal (raising taxes, education reform, indigenous rights), but many of those who voted for her are saying she needs to move faster. The big deal right now is making education free at all levels and reforming the constitution (or just straight up rewriting it). A lot of my Chilean friends thought she wouldn't have the balls to call a Constitutional Assembly, so we'll see if that happens.

Here's an article in English on her first 100 days and here's one about education reform. She says her goal is free education for all by 2020.

joepinetree
Apr 5, 2012

wateroverfire posted:

Moving this derail out of the Libertarian thread.


I dunno whether Kissinger ever spoke that line. For the rest we can go to the tape and look at documents archived by the State department.

It was Nixon who spoke that line:

http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/nsaebb8i.htm



quote:


What is well documented is that, in response to the Allende government expropriating American businesses without compensation, the Nixon administration considered a range of measures that would have put pressure on Allende to stop expropriating U.S. businesses or to pay compensation. Ultimately Nixon did not cut off money and the aid situation more or less fell out like this.


The idea that intervention came as a response to Allende expropriating American businesses is bullshit, and disproved so conclusively that I cannot really understand how anyone would still say that crap today in good faith.

Let's go step by step:

intervention started in 1962 with a group dedicated to helping ensure that Frei would win the 1964 elections:

https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/chile/#4

Note that it is from CIA's own website.

Then, in the elections that Allende eventually won, the US spent more money to defeat him on per capita terms than both US candidates combined in the 1968 US elections.

After Allende won, the US ambassador to Chile started plotting ways to block Allende from taking power:

http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/docs/doc18.pdf

The make the economy scream line came from a September 15th, 1970 meeting:

http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/docs/doc26.pdf

Where the US decided how they were going to essentially disrupt the Chilean economy in every way possible. It also shows the US plotting a coup that early.

Then, as early as October 18th, 1970 the US started planning a way to fake a coup attempt by Allende so that their own coup would be justified:

http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/docs/doc27.pdf

And then as early as December 4th, 1970, with Allende in power for a month, the US had a de facto economic blockade against Chile:

http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/docs/doc20.pdf



quote:


Yes. In response to drivers having their trucks seized and other measures like that.

This is, again, not true. Originally the strike was about freight rates and difficulties in obtaining parts. As a result of the strikes the government seized some trucks. As with most other economic phenomenon, it later came out that the trucking strike was financed by the CIA:

http://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v21/pdf/frus1969-76v21.pdf
(page 867, for example)



quote:


It's important to know the history, dude. =( Chile was not in a great place when Allende took power but his administration was basically a study in how to knock a country off its rails in the fewest possible steps. The administration didn't need any help from Nixon. I posted a link to an economic reading of Chilean history in the other thread that I'll include here: Economic Reforms in Chile: From Dictatorship to Democracy.

The idea that it "didn't need any help from Nixon" is false. As seen above, with evidence only from declassified US documents.


quote:

That was one of the better measures, yeah. The nationalization of copper began under Frei, who "negotiated" the government into a bunch of joint ventures giving it about a 50% stake. Allende came to power and basically told the private partners "gently caress you, we're taking it all and we're not paying". I think nationalization was the right call but seizure without compensation wasn't the way to do it. That poo poo more than any influence from Washington made it harder for Chile to get international financing.

Also, I guess this can be the Chile thread? ITT let's talk about Chile and current events in Chile. There's a lot going on. Tax and education reforms are big topics. There's always someone striking somewhere. Lots to gab about.

Once again, not true.
First, the third stage of the nationalization of the copper industry passed congress by a unanimous vote, so it is misleading to say it was Allende who did anything.
Second, Allende's government did pay for some of the copper companies that were nationalized. The reason most were not compensated and others received less compensation than they wanted was because the UP's government decided to deduct stuff like machinery that was turned over defectively, book value of unexplored mineral deposits that was included in the company's valuations, debts to the state, and previous payments by the state to the company:
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1985&context=vlr
(see top of page 34 of pdf)

Not to mention that as controversial as you may feel those nationalizations were, not even Pinochet reversed them or changed anything related to compensation.


Now, as far as original contributions go, here's one thing that generally doesn't get the attention it should:

La Cuestion del Plebiscito

Even with all the evidence above you will still hear the eventual person defending Pinochet and the coup because "communism!" The part that is not told is about the plebiscite Allende was about to call.

http://books.google.com/books?id=cB...%201973&f=false

Allende had a speech set for September 10th, 1973 where he would have called a plebiscite on whether he should remain president because he saw the risk of a coup and wanted to avoid a bloodbath. He delayed the speech because they were in talks with the PDC to see if they would accept the plebiscite as a solution. Then Allende was extra naive and alerted the military commanders that he would announce the plebiscite on September 11th at noon. So the military commanders pushed up the coup to September 11th, 6 am. In other words, the coup was pushed up because Allende was about to announce that the population would get to vote on whether he would finish his term. And that wasn't even done in the hopes that he would win the plebiscite. But the coup was pushed up because even if Allende had lost, Unidad Popular would still have a significant presence in both houses of parliament (UP actually won seats in the 1973 election in comparison to 1969).

Cool Bear
Sep 2, 2012

joepinetree posted:

The idea that intervention came as a response to Allende expropriating American businesses is bullshit, and disproved so conclusively that I cannot really understand how anyone would still say that crap today in good faith.

Wait wait slow down, as a highly educated american socialist sympathizer, I want to say that expropriating american businesses in Chile kicks rear end, is awesome and that is what I want Allende to do.

edit: Let's tweet him and see what he says, is he still around? What happened to him or other leaders who used similar rhetoric and policies around the world during the few decades of the cold war?

Cool Bear fucked around with this message at 08:29 on Jul 26, 2014

Filippo Corridoni
Jun 12, 2014

I'm the fuckin' man
You don't get it, do ya?

wateroverfire posted:

What would you know about conditions in Chile at the time? Or now, for that matter?

Chile was desperately poor and unequal when Allende was elected. Inflation and shortages due to mismanagement pretty well ensured that the poor were going to stay hosed.

You guys are the most absurd caricatures of clueless privileged leftists. You know nothing about the actual history of Chile or the conditions in Chile but gently caress it who cares because Communists Are Never Wrong and gently caress Capitalism Anyway and I Took a Lat Am Marxist Studies Internet Course Once.

clueless privileged leftist posted:

Pinochet was the figure-head of a military coup in 1973 against the democratically elected left-wing government, a coup which the CIA helped organise. Thousands of people were murdered by the forces of "law and order" during the coup and Pinochet's forces "are conservatively estimated to have killed over 11 000 people in his first year in power." [P. Gunson, A. Thompson, G. Chamberlain, The Dictionary of Contemporary Politics of South America, Routledge, 1989, p. 228]
The installed police state's record on human rights was denounced as barbaric across the world. However, we will ignore the obvious contradiction in this "economic miracle", i.e. why it almost always takes authoritarian/fascistic states to introduce "economic liberty," and concentrate on the economic facts of the free-market capitalism imposed on the Chilean people.

Working on a belief in the efficiency and fairness of the free market, Pinochet desired to put the laws of supply and demand back to work, and set out to reduce the role of the state and also cut back inflation. He, and "the Chicago Boys" -- a group of free- market economists -- thought what had restricted Chile's growth was government intervention in the economy -- which reduced competition, artificially increased wages, and led to inflation. The ultimate goal, Pinochet once said, was to make Chile "a nation of entrepreneurs."
The role of the Chicago Boys cannot be understated. They had a close relationship with the military from 1972, and according to one expert had a key role in the coup:
"In August of 1972 a group of ten economists under the leadership of de Castro began to work on the formulation of an economic programme that would replace [Allende's one]. . . In fact, the existence of the plan was essential to any attempt on the part of the armed forces to overthrow Allende as the Chilean armed forced did not have any economic plan of their own." [Silvia Bortzutzky, "The Chicago Boys, social security and welfare in Chile", The Radical Right and the Welfare State, Howard Glennerster and James Midgley (eds.), p. 88]
It is also interesting to note that "[a]ccording to the report of the United States Senate on covert actions in Chile, the activities of these economists were financed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)" [Bortzutzky, Op. Cit., p. 89]
Obviously some forms of state intervention were more acceptable than others.
The actual results of the free market policies introduced by the dictatorship were far less than the "miracle" claimed by Friedman and a host of other "Libertarians."

The initial effects of introducing free market policies in 1975 was a shock-induced depression which resulted in national output falling buy 15 percent, wages sliding to one-third below their 1970 level and unemployment rising to 20 percent. [Elton Rayack, Not so Free to Choose, p. 57] This meant that, in per capita terms, Chile's GDP only increased by 1.5% per year between 1974-80. This was considerably less than the 2.3% achieved in the 1960's. The average growth in GDP was 1.5% per year between 1974 and 1982, which was lower than the average Latin American growth rate of 4.3% and lower than the 4.5% of Chile in the 1960's. Between 1970 and 1980, per capita GDP grew by only 8%, while for Latin America as a whole, it increased by 40%. Between the years 1980 and 1982 during which all of Latin America was adversely affected by depression conditions, per capita GDP fell by 12.9 percent, compared to a fall of 4.3 percent for Latin America as a whole. [Elton Rayack, Op. Cit., p. 64]
In 1982, after 7 years of free market capitalism, Chile faced yet another economic crisis which, in terms of unemployment and falling GDP was even greater than that experienced during the terrible shock treatment of 1975. Real wages dropped sharply, falling in 1983 to 14 percent below what they had been in 1970. Bankruptcies skyrocketed, as did foreign debt. [Elton Rayack, Op. Cit., p. 69] By the end of 1986 Gross Domestic Product per capita barely equaled that of 1970 [Thomas Skidmore and Peter Smith, "The Pinochet Regime", pp. 137-138, Modern Latin America, Second Edition, Oxford University Press, 1989].

The Pinochet regime did reduce inflation, from around 500% at the time of the CIA-backed coup, to 10% by 1982. From 1983 to 87, it fluctuated between 20 and 31%. The advent of the "free market" led to reduced barriers to imports "on the ground the quotas and tariffs protected inefficient industries and kept prices artificially high. The result was that many local firms lost out to multinational corporations. The Chilean business community, which strongly supported the coup in 1973, was badly affected." [Skidmore and Smith, Op. Cit.]

However, by far the hardest group hit was the working class, particularly the urban working class. By 1976, the third year of Junta rule, real wages had fallen to 35% below their 1970 level. It was only by 1981 that they has risen to 97.3% of the 1970 level, only to fall again to 86.7% by 1983. Unemployment, excluding those on state make-work programmes, was 14.8% in 1976, falling to 11.8% by 1980 (this is still double the average 1960's level) only to rise to 20.3% by 1982. [Rayack, Op. Cit., p. 65]. Unemployment (including those on government make-work programmes) had risen to a third of the labour force by mid-1983. By 1986, per capita consumption was actually 11% lower than the 1970 level. [Skidmore and Smith, Op. Cit.] Between 1980 and 1988, the real value of wages grew only 1.2 percent while the real value of the minimum wage declined by 28.5 percent. During this period, urban unemployment averaged 15.3 percent per year. [Silvia Bortzutzky, Op. Cit., p. 96] In other words, after nearly 15 years of free market capitalism, real wages had still not exceeded their 1970 levels.

The decline of domestic industry had cost thousands of better-paying jobs. The ready police repression made strikes and other forms of protest both impractical and dangerous. According to a report by the Roman Catholic Church 113 protesters had been killed during social protest against the economic crisis of the early 1980s, with several thousand detained for political activity and protests between May 1983 and mid-1984. Thousands of strikers were also fired and union leaders jailed. [Rayack, Op. Cit., p. 70] The law was also changed to reflect the power property owners have over their wage slaves and the "total overhaul of the labour law system [which] took place between 1979 and 1981. . . aimed at creating a perfect labour market, eliminating collective bargaining, allowing massive dismissal of workers, increasing the daily working hours up to twelve hours and eliminating the labour courts." [Silvia Borzutzky, Op. Cit., p. 91] Little wonder, then, that this favourable climate for business operations resulted in generous lending by international finance institutions.

One consequence of Pinochet's neo-classical monetarist policies "was a contraction of demand, since workers and their families could afford to purchase fewer goods. The reduction in the market further threatened the business community, which started producing more goods for export and less for local consumption. This posed yet another obstacle to economic growth and led to increased concentration of income and wealth in the hands of a small elite." [Skidmore and Smith, Op. Cit.]

It is the increased wealth of the elite that we see the true "miracle" of Chile. According to one expert in the Latin American neo-liberal revolutions, the elite "had become massively wealthy under Pinochet" and when the leader of the Christian Democratic Party returned from exile in 1989 he said that economic growth that benefited the top 10 per cent of the population had been achieved (Pinochet's official institutions agreed). [Duncan Green, The Silent Revolution, p. 216, Noam Chomsky, Deterring Democracy, p. 231] Thus the wealth created by the relatively high economic growth Chile experienced in the mid to late 1980s did not "trickle down" to the working class (as claimed would happen by "free market" capitalist dogma) but instead accumulated in the hands of the rich.

For example, in the last years of Pinochet's dictatorship, the richest 10 percent of the rural population saw their income rise by 90 per cent between 1987 and 1990. The share of the poorest 25 per cent fell from 11 per cent to 7 per cent. [Duncan Green, Op. Cit., p. 108] The legacy of Pinochet's social inequality could still be found in 1993, with a two-tier health care system within which infant mortality is 7 per 1000 births for the richest fifth of the population and 40 per 1000 for the poorest 20 per cent. [Ibid., p. 101]
Per capita consumption fell by 23% from 1972-87. The proportion of the population below the poverty line (the minimum income required for basic food and housing) increased from 20% to 44.4% from 1970 to 1987. Per capita health care spending was more than halved from 1973 to 1985, setting off explosive growth in poverty-related diseases such as typhoid, diabetes and viral hepatitis. On the other hand, while consumption for the poorest 20% of the population of Santiago dropped by 30%, it rose by 15% for the richest 20%. [Noam Chomsky, Year 501, pp. 190-191]

The impact on individuals extended beyond purely financial considerations, with the Chilean labour force "once accustomed to secure, unionised jobs [before Pinochet] . . . [being turned] into a nation of anxious individualists . . . [with] over half of all visits to Chile's public health system involv[ing] psychological ailments, mainly depression. 'The repression isn't physical any more, it's economic - feeding your family, educating your child,' says Maria Pena, who works in a fishmeal factory in Concepcion. 'I feel real anxiety about the future', she adds, 'They can chuck us out at any time. You can't think five years ahead. If you've got money you can get an education and health care; money is everything here now.'" [Duncan Green, Op. Cit., p. 96]

Little wonder, then, that "adjustment has created an atomised society, where increased stress and individualism have damaged its traditionally strong and caring community life. . . suicides have increased threefold between 1970 and 1991 and the number of alcoholics has quadrupled in the last 30 years . . . [and] family breakdowns are increasing, while opinion polls show the current crime wave to be the most widely condemned aspect of life in the new Chile. 'Relationships are changing,' says Betty Bizamar, a 26-year-old trade union leader. 'People use each other, spend less time with their family. All they talk about is money, things. True friendship is difficult now.'"[Ibid., p. 166]
The experiment with free market capitalism also had serious impacts for Chile's environment. The capital city of Santiago became one of "the most polluted cities in the world" due the free reign of market forces. [Nathanial Nash, cited by Noam Chomsky, Year 501, p. 190] With no environmental regulation there is general environmental ruin and water supplies have severe pollution problems. [Noam Chomsky, Ibid.]

Since Chile has become a democracy (with the armed forces still holding considerable influence) some movement towards economic reforms have begun and been very successful. Increased social spending on health, education and poverty relief has lifted over a million Chileans out of poverty between 1987 and 1992. In even the neo-liberal tiger has had to move away from free market policies and the Chilean government has had to intervene into the economy in order to start putting back together the society ripped apart by market forces and authoritarian government.

So, for all but the tiny elite at the top, the Pinochet regime of "economic liberty" was a nightmare. Economic "liberty" only seemed to benefit one group in society, an obvious "miracle." For the vast majority, the "miracle" of economic "liberty" resulted, as it usually does, in increased poverty, pollution, crime and social alienation. The irony is that many right-wing "libertarians" point to it as a model of the benefits of the free market.

Still haven't even tried to critique this. You just spergily asked for citations when the citations were right there.

Just admit that you're a neoliberal.

CharlestheHammer
Jun 26, 2011

YOU SAY MY POSTS ARE THE RAVINGS OF THE DUMBEST PERSON ON GOD'S GREEN EARTH BUT YOU YOURSELF ARE READING THEM. CURIOUS!

Filippo Corridoni posted:



Just admit that you're a neoliberal.
To be fair, I don't think water has ever denied that.

Or at least something similar to a neoliberal.

Eswin
Feb 21, 2009
oh look a pinochet apologist

Absurd Alhazred
Mar 27, 2010

by Athanatos

joepinetree posted:

It was Nixon who spoke that line:

http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/nsaebb8i.htm


The idea that intervention came as a response to Allende expropriating American businesses is bullshit, and disproved so conclusively that I cannot really understand how anyone would still say that crap today in good faith.

Let's go step by step:

intervention started in 1962 with a group dedicated to helping ensure that Frei would win the 1964 elections:

https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/chile/#4

Note that it is from CIA's own website.

Then, in the elections that Allende eventually won, the US spent more money to defeat him on per capita terms than both US candidates combined in the 1968 US elections.

After Allende won, the US ambassador to Chile started plotting ways to block Allende from taking power:

http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/docs/doc18.pdf

The make the economy scream line came from a September 15th, 1970 meeting:

http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/docs/doc26.pdf

Where the US decided how they were going to essentially disrupt the Chilean economy in every way possible. It also shows the US plotting a coup that early.

Then, as early as October 18th, 1970 the US started planning a way to fake a coup attempt by Allende so that their own coup would be justified:

http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/docs/doc27.pdf

And then as early as December 4th, 1970, with Allende in power for a month, the US had a de facto economic blockade against Chile:

http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/docs/doc20.pdf


This is, again, not true. Originally the strike was about freight rates and difficulties in obtaining parts. As a result of the strikes the government seized some trucks. As with most other economic phenomenon, it later came out that the trucking strike was financed by the CIA:

http://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v21/pdf/frus1969-76v21.pdf
(page 867, for example)


The idea that it "didn't need any help from Nixon" is false. As seen above, with evidence only from declassified US documents.


Once again, not true.
First, the third stage of the nationalization of the copper industry passed congress by a unanimous vote, so it is misleading to say it was Allende who did anything.
Second, Allende's government did pay for some of the copper companies that were nationalized. The reason most were not compensated and others received less compensation than they wanted was because the UP's government decided to deduct stuff like machinery that was turned over defectively, book value of unexplored mineral deposits that was included in the company's valuations, debts to the state, and previous payments by the state to the company:
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1985&context=vlr
(see top of page 34 of pdf)

Not to mention that as controversial as you may feel those nationalizations were, not even Pinochet reversed them or changed anything related to compensation.

Ah, modern bureaucracies. The most despicable things are documented in triplicates. :allears:

quote:

Now, as far as original contributions go, here's one thing that generally doesn't get the attention it should:

La Cuestion del Plebiscito

Even with all the evidence above you will still hear the eventual person defending Pinochet and the coup because "communism!" The part that is not told is about the plebiscite Allende was about to call.

http://books.google.com/books?id=cB...%201973&f=false

Allende had a speech set for September 10th, 1973 where he would have called a plebiscite on whether he should remain president because he saw the risk of a coup and wanted to avoid a bloodbath. He delayed the speech because they were in talks with the PDC to see if they would accept the plebiscite as a solution. Then Allende was extra naive and alerted the military commanders that he would announce the plebiscite on September 11th at noon. So the military commanders pushed up the coup to September 11th, 6 am. In other words, the coup was pushed up because Allende was about to announce that the population would get to vote on whether he would finish his term. And that wasn't even done in the hopes that he would win the plebiscite. But the coup was pushed up because even if Allende had lost, Unidad Popular would still have a significant presence in both houses of parliament (UP actually won seats in the 1973 election in comparison to 1969).

I don't think I knew about this at all! In case someone takes issue with Haslam, I found another source for this:
The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of Chile, 1964-1976, by Paul E. Sigmund. It seems that this was a point of contention within UP, but that Allende's pro-plebiscite opinion prevailed shortly before the coup. Is this commonly known, at least in Chile?

joepinetree
Apr 5, 2012

Absurd Alhazred posted:

Ah, modern bureaucracies. The most despicable things are documented in triplicates. :allears:


I don't think I knew about this at all! In case someone takes issue with Haslam, I found another source for this:
The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of Chile, 1964-1976, by Paul E. Sigmund. It seems that this was a point of contention within UP, but that Allende's pro-plebiscite opinion prevailed shortly before the coup. Is this commonly known, at least in Chile?

I used Haslam because it was the easiest English source you can find. But the note he quotes there, for example, comes from Jose Toribio Merino Castro's own memoir. Merino was one of the leaders of the coup, for the record.

Absurd Alhazred
Mar 27, 2010

by Athanatos

joepinetree posted:

I used Haslam because it was the easiest English source you can find. But the note he quotes there, for example, comes from Jose Toribio Merino Castro's own memoir. Merino was one of the leaders of the coup, for the record.

Oh, that is damning.

joepinetree
Apr 5, 2012

wateroverfire posted:



What is well documented is that, in response to the Allende government expropriating American businesses without compensation, the Nixon administration considered a range of measures that would have put pressure on Allende to stop expropriating U.S. businesses or to pay compensation. Ultimately Nixon did not cut off money and the aid situation more or less fell out like this.



Just saw something in this passage that I missed the first time around: did you really describe money spent on covert activities to depose Allende as "aid?" You do realize that the article you link to is not talking about money sent to Chile as "aid," but to finance covert activities, which included everything from financing the PN election campaign to paying organizations to protest and go on strike against Allende?

I mean, in order to support your argument that Nixon sent economic aid to Chile, you just linked to a section about the covert money spent trying to overthrow Allende...

wateroverfire
Jul 3, 2010

joepinetree posted:

The idea that intervention came as a response to Allende expropriating American businesses is bullshit

So, let's avoid being a typical D&D thread and make sure we're always talking directly at each other. In the post that spawned this derail, and that I quoted in the OP, Helsing said Nixon immediately terminated most of its foreign aid after Allende took power. I posted documents to flesh out the financing situation and show that no, that was not true, instead withdrawal of aid was threatened as a response to illegal (from the POV of most of the world) expropriation of American companies. For sure, the CIA (and the Russians, too, but there we have less information) had been meddling in Chile for awhile. Intervention in that sense had absolutely been going on before the expropriation.


joepinetree posted:

This is, again, not true. Originally the strike was about freight rates and difficulties in obtaining parts. As a result of the strikes the government seized some trucks. As with most other economic phenomenon, it later came out that the trucking strike was financed by the CIA:

http://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v21/pdf/frus1969-76v21.pdf
(page 867, for example)

I stand corrected! But does striking over price controls and shortages of parts (among other things) make things different?

Document 311, page 867 of the original report but 824 of the PDF posted:

Truckers’ grievances with the Allende government (over such issues as freight rates and the scarcity of spare parts) formed the ostensible basis of the trucking strike which began last week in southern Chile and has spread to the more populous central zone.2 Government moves to counteract the strike by jailing key union leaders, impounding trucks and declaring zones of emergency appeared to stiffen resistance and gain sympathy from other groups. Shopkeepers and small businesses joined the strike with at least 65 percent effectiveness, and some other professional groups (including engineers and doctors)have publicly indicated they might follow suit. The opposition political parties have announced their support of the strike. While Allende has called for moderation, he has also extended the
zones of emergency, which inter alia place the military in charge of law enforcement, to seventeen of Chile’s twenty-five provinces including
almost three-quarters of the national population.

It's important to differentiate "CIA spent some money to support a thing" from "A thing happened because the CIA spent money on it." Especially in Chilean politics. The grievances behind the initial strike were real and the heavy handed government response escalated the matter into a general strike against the UP.
How much was the CIA involved? This is how the footnote of the same document describes CIA involvement.

quote:

A nationwide truckers’ strike began on October 10 and grew into a protest against the UP government. According to the report of the Senate Select Committee to Study Govern-ment Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (Church Committee), “antigovernment strikers were actively supported by several of the private sector groups which received CIA funds.” When the CIA learned that one private sector group had broken the Agency’s ground rules and passed $2,800 directly to the strikers, the Agency protested, but continued passing money to the group. (Covert Action in Chile, p. 31)

So, private groups the CIA gave money to also gave some money to the strikers, over objections (probably tepid) by the agency. Anyone want to hunt up Covert Action in Chile, if it's available? Maybe it identifies which groups and how much.


joepinetree posted:

First, the third stage of the nationalization of the copper industry passed congress by a unanimous vote, so it is misleading to say it was Allende who did anything.
Second, Allende's government did pay for some of the copper companies that were nationalized. The reason most were not compensated and others received less compensation than they wanted was because the UP's government decided to deduct stuff like machinery that was turned over defectively, book value of unexplored mineral deposits that was included in the company's valuations, debts to the state, and previous payments by the state to the company:
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1985&context=vlr
(see top of page 34 of pdf)

That is a really awesome source and I would encourage everyone to read the whole thing. It's really interesting.

joepinetree posted:

Not to mention that as controversial as you may feel those nationalizations were, not even Pinochet reversed them or changed anything related to compensation.

:devil: Possession is 9/10ths of the law and all that!

Nationalization of copper was extremely popular in Chile, and eventual full nationalization was the goal of the Frei administration in the late 60's. IMO that was ultimately a good thing. However, Allende's confiscatory approach was extremely controversial and caused a lot of unnecessary turmoil. There was certainly some normal commercial dickering over the value of the assets, but the two largest categories of deductions were for "excess profits" and "loans the government deemed had not been invested usefully", which were criteria related to social justice rather than business or the economics of the mines. And when taken in total the scheme was highly questionable.

From the same document you linked:

Fleming: The Nationalization of Chile's Large Copper Companies in Contempo, p.638-639 posted:

Thus, it is obvious that Chile's deductions of damages from the compensation awards provided for the mining enterprises are not entirely unprecedented in interstate practice. In fact, the concept of retribution for alleged injustices, in and of itself, might be viewed as quite justifiable. However, in the Chilean case, this issue becomes considerably more debatable since, when these deductions for fiscal and social misfeasance are combined with the other deductions discussed, the total of the deductions greatly exceeds the original base book values of several of the mining enteprises.252 In effect, com-pensation to three of the five nationalized mines was wholly eliminated by the State's deductions. Of the three North American firms affected by the reforms, only the Cerro Company was not charged with owing the Chilean state millions of dollars. The book value of Cerro's Rio Blanco (Andina) mine was listed at $20,145,469.44. This valuation was reduced by only $1,875,768.09 following deductions for the mineral deposits themselves and the minor deductions for assets received in defective condition.2

In the case of the Anaconda Company, total deductions from its Chuquicamata and El Salvador properties exceeded the combined book value of these mines by $78,078,570.65. 254 However, Anaconda's third holding in Chile, the Ex6tica mine, was to receive $10,010,445.11 in compensation after minor deductions for mineral deposits and assets received in defective condition had been subtracted from its estimated base book value of $14,815,052.52.255

The Kennecott Corporation's El Teniente mine accrued by far the largest net deficit of any of the three mining enterprises, primarily due to the enormous reduction in compensation for excessive profits. Deductions totaling $629,227,615.98 were subtracted from a book value of $318,801,198.77, leaving Kennecott with a negative balance of $310,426,417.21.2 "

Graciously, the Chilean government declined to go after Kennecott for 310 million dollars. :a2m: Chile's takings fell well outside of international norms and, understandably, the international community and the companies involved had a problem with that. Pages 53-55 of the PDF talk about some of the consequences.

quote:

However, the United States has not confined its condemnations of Chile's acts to mere diplomatic rhetoric. Largely as a consequence of Chile's treatment of the American-owned mines, financial aid from most private and public sources in the Western world has virtually been halted. Lines of short-term credit have fallen from $220 million in August 1970, to $32 million in June 1972.277 There have been no new loans to Chile from the World Bank during the last 22 months, for instance, although Chile has claimed to have met all the necessary technical requirements for such loans.178 This stifled flow of funds from the World Bank is generally attributed to United States opposition, on the ground that the Chileans are no longer credit-worthy.

...

During conferences with its creditor nations in Paris this past year, Chile won agreement in principle for renegotiation of its foreign debt, about half of which is owed to the United States. 281' However, the agreement stated that details must be ironed out bilaterally between Chile and each of its creditors, and the
United States has thus far refused to consider bilateral talks until "just compensation" is awarded to the nationalized mining firms.

The Kennecott Corporation is responsible for the most serious reprisals yet to be taken against the Chilean government. Claiming that the copper produced by El Teniente has been wrongly confiscated, the multinational corporation has attempted to interfere with the international marketing of the Chilean copper. Through court actions, Kennecott is trying to impound or attach all monies paid for Chilean copper in international sales. Recently, French authorities, on its motion attached payments for 1250 tons of Chilean copper being shipped to France. The West German cargo vessel carrying this copper diverted its course to the Netherlands, only to be confronted with a Dutch attachment order. 55 Similarly, informed sources in Stockholm warned that a $1.5 million shipment of copper from El Teniente's mines being shipped to Sweden on a Russian ship might be sequestered on arrival in Sweden." If these court orders are sustained in France, the Netherlands, Sweden,
Germany, and in other nations, Chile may be forced to seek new markets for its principal export product.

Mentioned as a footnote (because the document is about copper nationalization, nationalization of other businesses was going on at the time.

Footnote 55 on page 10 of the PDF posted:

To date, Allende's socialization efforts have resulted in the nationalization or negotiated sale of large sectors of the foreign-owned business community. In addition to the five mining enterprises of the Gran Mineria and Andina, the affected foreign concerns include: Alimentos Purina (a subsidiary of Ralston Purina), Anglo- Lautaro (a nitrate industry with a 51 per cent ownership interest held by the Chilean government), Bethlehem-Chile Iron Mines Co. (a wholly-owned subsidiary of Bethlehem Steel), Chitelco (Chile's telephone company of which 70 per cent is owned by ITT), Ford Motor Co. of Chile, Industrias Nibco (50 per cent ownership held by Northern Indiana Brass Co. and 25 per cent held by European investors), RCAChile, and South American Power-Chilectra (70 per cent ownership interest held by the Boise-Cascade Co.). Furthermore, the new administration has nationalized a large portion of the banking industry in Chile, including Banco de Brasil, Banco Frances e Italiano, Bank of London and South America, First National City Bank, and the Bank of America.

The combined effect of all of this was to push international business out of Chile and make it much harder to get international financing or capital, for understandable reasons. Since Chile's economy depended on trade that meant the Chilean economy and Chilean people were absolutely screwed. Frei's more moderate approach of negotiated nationalization would have avoided much of that at the expense of slowing down the process and I guess causing revolutionary socialists to pop less wood.


joepinetree posted:

Now, as far as original contributions go, here's one thing that generally doesn't get the attention it should:

La Cuestion del Plebiscito

Even with all the evidence above you will still hear the eventual person defending Pinochet and the coup because "communism!" The part that is not told is about the plebiscite Allende was about to call.

http://books.google.com/books?id=cB...%201973&f=false

Allende had a speech set for September 10th, 1973 where he would have called a plebiscite on whether he should remain president because he saw the risk of a coup and wanted to avoid a bloodbath. He delayed the speech because they were in talks with the PDC to see if they would accept the plebiscite as a solution. Then Allende was extra naive and alerted the military commanders that he would announce the plebiscite on September 11th at noon. So the military commanders pushed up the coup to September 11th, 6 am. In other words, the coup was pushed up because Allende was about to announce that the population would get to vote on whether he would finish his term. And that wasn't even done in the hopes that he would win the plebiscite. But the coup was pushed up because even if Allende had lost, Unidad Popular would still have a significant presence in both houses of parliament (UP actually won seats in the 1973 election in comparison to 1969).

I've heard that story a couple of ways. In one the president confided in Pinochet that he was going to announce a plebiscite and the general replied something like "Very wise, Mr. President, but if you want my advice wait three days". The account above is probably an accurate one.


joepinetree posted:

Just saw something in this passage that I missed the first time around: did you really describe money spent on covert activities to depose Allende as "aid?" You do realize that the article you link to is not talking about money sent to Chile as "aid," but to finance covert activities, which included everything from financing the PN election campaign to paying organizations to protest and go on strike against Allende?

Again, let's not be D&D ok? The quote below the link contains the info I linked to the article for and it's talking about aid money (in response to Helsing's assertion that Nixon cut off all financing).

Quote refresh posted:

The U.S. provided humanitarian aid to Chile in addition to forgiving old loans valued at $200 million from 1971-2. The U.S. did not invoke the Hickenlooper Amendment which would have required an immediate cut-off of U.S. aid due to Allende's nationalizations. Allende also received new sources of credit that was valued between $600 million and $950 million in 1972 and $547 million by June 1973. The International Monetary Fund also loaned $100 million to Chile during the Allende years.

wateroverfire
Jul 3, 2010

Filippo Corridoni posted:

Still haven't even tried to critique this. You just spergily asked for citations when the citations were right there.

Just admit that you're a neoliberal.

First, that's a repost of the poo poo you originally posted without any cites at all. Second, what do you want me to say about it? I do not want to spend time or energy defending Pinochet. I find that loving distasteful, and the point of starting this conversation wasn't to argue for how great the dictatorship was (it wasn't). Rather, it was to educate people about what was going down during and prior to the Allende administration so that people had some context and could come to appreciate why, in Chile, this is a much more nuanced topic than it seems to be for the neck bearded internet leftists here.

wateroverfire
Jul 3, 2010

Absurd Alhazred posted:

What do you think about Michelle Bachelet? Any good critiques of her current plans?

Working on this. Don't have a ton of time.

The TLDR -

Bachelet is making a lot of (business) people nervous.

She proposed a tax reform that would have eliminated the corporate veil WRT taxation and passed retained earnings (money taxed at the corporate rate but left in the company) through to the owners as personal income. This would have raised the corporate rate, effectively, from 20% to 35% and utterly hosed the shareholders of public companies with detrimental effects in Chile's stock market, for pension funds, etc. That did not happen, thankfully, and the compromise that seems set to pass raises the corporate rate from 20% to 27% among a bunch of other more technical things.

She is committed to education reforms that, partly because of the tax compromise and partly because the original tax proposal was total fantasy anyway, there is no way to pay for. Free higher education for all Chilean students would cost approximately 9 billion dollars, or about 3% of Chilean GDP. Her education minister had talked about buying all the hybrid public-private institutions and making them fully public. Depending on whose estimates you take on the value of those concerns the cost could be 5 billion or 17 billion. Either way the money isn't there. Education is a big sexy issue competing right now with issues like public health spending (very underfunded) and Chile's growing energy needs.

*Axes Hydro Aysen. Declares victory for SOCIAL JUSTICE. Pays highest rates for energy in Latin America and wonders why poo poo is so expensive to make here*

And in general there's a populist vibe that reminds many people uncomfortably of the bad old days.

That said, Bachelet enjoys wide support in general despite approval having come down from the stratospheric heights it attained during the primaries.

Absurd Alhazred
Mar 27, 2010

by Athanatos

wateroverfire posted:

Working on this. Don't have a ton of time.
No rush, Chile will still be around next week!

quote:

[Bachelet] is committed to education reforms that, partly because of the tax compromise and partly because the original tax proposal was total fantasy anyway, there is no way to pay for. Free higher education for all Chilean students would cost approximately 9 billion dollars, or about 3% of Chilean GDP. Her education minister had talked about buying all the hybrid public-private institutions and making them fully public. Depending on whose estimates you take on the value of those concerns the cost could be 5 billion or 17 billion. Either way the money isn't there. Education is a big sexy issue competing right now with issues like public health spending (very underfunded) and Chile's growing energy needs.

When you get to the bigger piece, I would be interested in what competing proposals there are for education reform; and, well, to start with, what is perceived as being deficient in the status quo.

Bulky Brute
Aug 23, 2004
I'm a horrible extreme leftist moron who developed my political opinions through a long and trying process of smelling my own farts until my brain died. Please ignore all my stupid posts---------->

wateroverfire posted:

And in general there's a populist vibe that reminds many people uncomfortably of the bad old days.
Ah yes, those terrifying Allende years where the chilean petite bourgeoisie lived under economic and political uncertainty i.e. what workers live through every single day of their lives.

Badger of Basra
Jul 26, 2007

wateroverfire posted:

Working on this. Don't have a ton of time.

The TLDR -

Bachelet is making a lot of (business) people nervous.

She proposed a tax reform that would have eliminated the corporate veil WRT taxation and passed retained earnings (money taxed at the corporate rate but left in the company) through to the owners as personal income. This would have raised the corporate rate, effectively, from 20% to 35% and utterly hosed the shareholders of public companies with detrimental effects in Chile's stock market, for pension funds, etc. That did not happen, thankfully, and the compromise that seems set to pass raises the corporate rate from 20% to 27% among a bunch of other more technical things.

She is committed to education reforms that, partly because of the tax compromise and partly because the original tax proposal was total fantasy anyway, there is no way to pay for. Free higher education for all Chilean students would cost approximately 9 billion dollars, or about 3% of Chilean GDP. Her education minister had talked about buying all the hybrid public-private institutions and making them fully public. Depending on whose estimates you take on the value of those concerns the cost could be 5 billion or 17 billion. Either way the money isn't there. Education is a big sexy issue competing right now with issues like public health spending (very underfunded) and Chile's growing energy needs.

*Axes Hydro Aysen. Declares victory for SOCIAL JUSTICE. Pays highest rates for energy in Latin America and wonders why poo poo is so expensive to make here*

And in general there's a populist vibe that reminds many people uncomfortably of the bad old days.

That said, Bachelet enjoys wide support in general despite approval having come down from the stratospheric heights it attained during the primaries.

How does it feel to be a Matthei voter?

wateroverfire
Jul 3, 2010

Badger of Basra posted:

How does it feel to be a Matthei voter?

A little dirty TBH. I would have voted for Velasco but nobody from the center left was going to win vs. Bachelet.

CharlestheHammer
Jun 26, 2011

YOU SAY MY POSTS ARE THE RAVINGS OF THE DUMBEST PERSON ON GOD'S GREEN EARTH BUT YOU YOURSELF ARE READING THEM. CURIOUS!

Bulky Brute posted:

Ah yes, those terrifying Allende years where the chilean petite bourgeoisie lived under economic and political uncertainty i.e. what workers live through every single day of their lives.

To be fair, those where bad old days.

They just have literally nothing to do with Allende.

Bachelet sounds cool though.

edit: Though it is funny that the businesses aren't learning their lessons. If populism is making you fearful, don't fight back, it will only make it worse.

CharlestheHammer fucked around with this message at 19:35 on Jul 28, 2014

joepinetree
Apr 5, 2012

wateroverfire posted:

So, let's avoid being a typical D&D thread and make sure we're always talking directly at each other. In the post that spawned this derail, and that I quoted in the OP, Helsing said Nixon immediately terminated most of its foreign aid after Allende took power. I posted documents to flesh out the financing situation and show that no, that was not true, instead withdrawal of aid was threatened as a response to illegal (from the POV of most of the world) expropriation of American companies. For sure, the CIA (and the Russians, too, but there we have less information) had been meddling in Chile for awhile. Intervention in that sense had absolutely been going on before the expropriation.

How about we also avoid that "typical D&D thread" part where people who get contradicted immediately go "D&D amirite?" This thread is all in one page, we don't really need to argue over what you or someone else really said. Of course, the bit he said about terminating "most" of the aid is correct, as evidence is once again clear as day that aid was cut prior and increased after the coup. Of course, aid itself was a minor and almost insignificant part of what happened there. The main thing is that Nixon essentially froze the credit Chile got from most foreign institutions, like the IDB, IRBD, Import Export bank, etc. For an export oriented economy like Chile that was essentially a blockade.

Regarding the cutting of aid and assistance (note the date):
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/docs/doc09.pdf

Regarding the economic relief after the coup:
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/docs/doc10.pdf



quote:

I stand corrected! But does striking over price controls and shortages of parts (among other things) make things different?


It's important to differentiate "CIA spent some money to support a thing" from "A thing happened because the CIA spent money on it." Especially in Chilean politics. The grievances behind the initial strike were real and the heavy handed government response escalated the matter into a general strike against the UP.
How much was the CIA involved? This is how the footnote of the same document describes CIA involvement.


So, private groups the CIA gave money to also gave some money to the strikers, over objections (probably tepid) by the agency. Anyone want to hunt up Covert Action in Chile, if it's available? Maybe it identifies which groups and how much.

No, it is not important to differentiate, because they are no different. It is sort of a purely rhetorical exercise to speculate whether or not the money flowing into the opposition helped them decide to go on strike or not. What is important is that without external financial support, the truck company owners would not have been able to stop the country for nearly a month.

quote:


That is a really awesome source and I would encourage everyone to read the whole thing. It's really interesting.


:devil: Possession is 9/10ths of the law and all that!

Nationalization of copper was extremely popular in Chile, and eventual full nationalization was the goal of the Frei administration in the late 60's. IMO that was ultimately a good thing. However, Allende's confiscatory approach was extremely controversial and caused a lot of unnecessary turmoil. There was certainly some normal commercial dickering over the value of the assets, but the two largest categories of deductions were for "excess profits" and "loans the government deemed had not been invested usefully", which were criteria related to social justice rather than business or the economics of the mines. And when taken in total the scheme was highly questionable.

From the same document you linked:


Graciously, the Chilean government declined to go after Kennecott for 310 million dollars. :a2m: Chile's takings fell well outside of international norms and, understandably, the international community and the companies involved had a problem with that. Pages 53-55 of the PDF talk about some of the consequences.


Mentioned as a footnote (because the document is about copper nationalization, nationalization of other businesses was going on at the time.


The combined effect of all of this was to push international business out of Chile and make it much harder to get international financing or capital, for understandable reasons. Since Chile's economy depended on trade that meant the Chilean economy and Chilean people were absolutely screwed. Frei's more moderate approach of negotiated nationalization would have avoided much of that at the expense of slowing down the process and I guess causing revolutionary socialists to pop less wood.

First of all, note that I chose that document precisely because it was an English source that opposed the nationalization (also note the date). So that even by that type of source what you had said regarding nationalization wasn't true.


quote:

Again, let's not be D&D ok? The quote below the link contains the info I linked to the article for and it's talking about aid money (in response to Helsing's assertion that Nixon cut off all financing).

First, the link led directly to the covert operations bit.
Second, did you notice that the paragraph you quote is in stark contrast to the rest of the section you mentioned? That is because that last paragraph is based on a frontpagemag "Article." I don't know if you are aware of what front page magazine is, but might as well quote world net daily at that point. Now, the interesting thing is even frontpagemag (the source for your wikipedia quote) admits that all those loans were agreed on before Allende took power, and no new loan agreements were made afterwards. The part about the IMF is specially hilarious, since it says "between 1970 and 1973." Here's the reality:

The last loan the InterAmerican Development bank gave Allende was in January of 1971. It only lent Chile money again after the coup. The World Bank made no loans to Chile while Allende was president. The IMF made a few loans to cover export shortfalls (mostly because if they didn't whoever Chile was importing from would go unpaid), but not the more usual standby loans. And all of this info can be found on Paul Sigmund's book on the matter mentioned above, and he hardly be claimed to be biased in favor of Allende (prior to the release of documents showing Nixon and Kissinger pressuring these institutions to cut off Chile Sigmund argued that the US had not exerted much pressure on these organizations).

Luckily, we also have easy to find economic data available to us:

http://databank.worldbank.org/

Lot's of data are not directly available on this site, but quite a few important ones are. For example, select Chile and Net ODA (%of GNI). Net ODA refers to net flows of Official Development Assistance as a percentage of gross national income:

1968 1.271328492
1969 1.233029595
1970 0.850003907
1971 0.465984943
1972 0.447106847
1973 0.307695632
1974 0.154510686
1975 1.829608533

Notice a pattern? Keep in mind that there is a lag in approving new aid, but not on cutting aid (i.e., aid approved now will only be disbursed in a few months, but if aid is cut it can stop immediately). That explains why 1970 already shows a decline, and it doesn't increase back again until 1975.

Same for all multilateral loans


Full disclosure, the image above comes from the Committee for Abolition of Third World Debt, which is fairly left leaning. But the graph contains the source of the data, so you can check for yourself if you'd like.

joepinetree fucked around with this message at 23:10 on Jul 28, 2014

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wateroverfire
Jul 3, 2010

joepinetree posted:

How about we also avoid that "typical D&D thread" part where people who get contradicted immediately go "D&D amirite?" This thread is all in one page, we don't really need to argue over what you or someone else really said. Of course, the bit he said about terminating "most" of the aid is correct, as evidence is once again clear as day that aid was cut prior and increased after the coup. Of course, aid itself was a minor and almost insignificant part of what happened there. The main thing is that Nixon essentially froze the credit Chile got from most foreign institutions, like the IDB, IRBD, Import Export bank, etc. For an export oriented economy like Chile that was essentially a blockade.

Regarding the cutting of aid and assistance (note the date):
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/docs/doc09.pdf

Regarding the economic relief after the coup:
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/docs/doc10.pdf

On the topic of the "economic blockade", Paul Sigmund wrote an essay for the January edition of Foreign Affairs that investigates the question of Washington's roll in the disappearance of credit toward Chile by looking at the timing of credit decisions, notes from the senate hearings after the coup, corporate memos from ITT (AT&T) and interviews with sources at various foreign institutions. Whole article reproduced below because it's worth reading in full and because at FA you have to register (though it's free).

tldr - poo poo was kind of complicated. When you look at the timing and statements by the principals, it's apparent that international loan and bank credit reductions were made in response to worsening economic conditions and a political environment that implied increased repayment risk. It's also clear that Washington applied pressure to block some financing - sometimes successfully and sometimes not - to force Chile to the bargaining table after the copper expropriations, and that the rhetoric surrounding the 1970 election had a lot of people nervous about the ideology of Allende. Chile obtained a lot of funding from non-US sources despite Washington's eventual opposition. In Sigmund's own words:

quote:

The problem, of course, is to sort out motives. Progressively, the negative long-term economic outlook provided an excuse for those who wished to put pressure on the Allende government by cutting off credit. That excuse, a bit flimsy at the outset but increasingly persuasive by the end of the year as Chile's economic problems mounted, was that the Chilean government was not "credit-worthy." It is thus hard to distinguish between what could have been seen by many to be legitimate reasons for not making loans and credits available (serious doubts about Chile's likelihood or capacity for repayment) and illegitimate ones (economic warfare in defense of private corporations or in order to promote a military coup). While not finally conclusive, a review of the policies of various institutions during this period may be helpful in making this assessment.



quote:

A striking aspect of the world reaction to the military coup that overthrew Salvador Allende as President of Chile in September 1973 has been the widespread assumption that the ultimate responsibility for the tragic destruction of Chilean democracy lay with the United States. In a few quarters, the charge includes an accusation of secret U.S. participation in the coup. However, a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, headed by Senator Gale McGee, has just investigated this accusation and concluded that there is no evidence of any U.S. role whatever.

More commonly, however, the bill of particulars relies on what President Allende himself, speaking before the United Nations in December 1972, called the "invisible financial and economic blockade" exercised by the United States against his government. Articles taking this line have appeared, for example, in The Washington Post, the National Catholic Reporter and The New York Review of Books. On the other hand, The Wall Street Journal has been critical of what it calls a "simplistic plot" theory espoused by members of the academic community-that "Washington by simply turning off the spigot of low-interest loans" was able to bring down Allende.

Was there in fact an undeclared economic war between the Nixon administration and Salvador Allende-to use Allende's own words, "an oblique underhanded indirect form of aggression . . . virtually imperceptible activities usually disguised with words and statements that extol the sovereignty and dignity of my country"? Did this warfare have a direct relationship to the bloody events in Santiago? A critical examination of the considerable evidence on this subject available in this country and in Chile can help to answer these questions, and possibly suggest whether wider conclusions are in order about the relations between capitalist nations and a democratic Socialist regime.

II

Even before Allende won a 36.2 percent plurality in a three-way popular election for the Presidency on September 4, 1970, American business interests in Chile, including the International Telephone and Telegraph Company (ITT), which owned 70 percent of the Chilean Telephone Company, had been concerned over the possible effect on their investments of Allende's accession to power. The Chilean constitution provided that in the event that no presidential candidate received an absolute majority, the Chilean Congress was to choose between the top two candidates 50 days after the popular election. Unquestionably Allende's election produced an immediate financial panic and run on the banks in Chile. Is there persuasive evidence that U.S. interests or the U.S. government deliberately contributed to the panic, or otherwise attempted to prevent Allende's election by use of their financial and economic influence?

The most important available evidence on this question appears in the confidential ITT papers published by Jack Anderson in March 1972, and in the hearings on these papers conducted by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee a year later. This material establishes that offers of financial aid aimed at stopping Allende were made by ITT president Harold S. Geneen to the CIA in July 1970 and to Henry Kissinger's office in September. The record indicates that the July offer was rejected by the CIA and that the September offer was never passed on to Kissinger by the assistant who received it. However, the ITT papers also include a report to Geneen from his senior vice president, E. J. Gerrity, describing a discussion on September 28 with William Broe of the Clandestine Services Division of the CIA, in which Broe outlined a program "aimed at inducing economic collapse" in Chile before the congressional runoff election in late October. The Broe proposals, said Gerrity, included nonrenewal of bank credits, a slowdown in deliveries of spare parts, pressure on Chilean savings and loan companies, and withdrawal of technical help by private companies. Gerrity reported to Geneen that following his conversation with Broe, ITT's New York office had contacted several other companies about the plan, but those companies had responded that "they had been given advice which is directly contrary to the suggestions I received." Broe himself testified to the Senate committee that Gerrity had been negative about his plan, and subsequent documents confirm that the other companies were unwilling to coöperate. When questioned by the Senators, Charles Meyer, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs at the time, insisted that U.S. policy had been strict nonintervention and described the Broe conversations as merely an exploration of "the possibility or a series of possibilities which might have been inputs to changed policy but were not." The only contrary evidence in the papers and hearings is a report on October 15 to the ITT Washington office by its Chilean representative that the American ambassador, Edward Korry, had indicated that he was reducing the amount of U.S. aid "already in the pipeline" as much as he could. The report added: "The ambassador said that he had difficulty in convincing Washington of the need to cut off every possible assistance to Chile."1

The Senators also questioned representatives of the major New York banks with interests in Chile about their lending policies in the period between the popular election in Chile on September 4 and the runoff on October 24. All denied being contacted by ITT or putting economic pressure on Chile. First National City Bank testified that it had made available $5.4 million in credits to Chilean government agencies in the last three months of 1970; Manufacturers Hanover reported that by the end of November its "exposure" in Chile had increased from $68 million to $72 million; Chase Manhattan explained that a slight reduction of its lines of credit in the last quarter of 1970 was due to the failure of one customer to utilize its facilities; and the Bank of America testified that its correspondent banks in Chile had been asked to hold their short-term lines of credit at an approximately constant level-a policy which was followed until December 1971.2

Thus there appears to be no substantial evidence in the ITT papers or hearings of an effort by the government or by private companies or banks to create an economic crisis to prevent Allende from coming to power in 1970. There is no doubt, however, that such a policy was discussed in at least one instance.

III

The next crucial period runs from Allende's accession in November 1970 to early 1972. During this period the Chilean government moved to nationalize American interests and carried out internal economic policies with serious effects on both domestic investment and its international economic position. Finally, in November 1971, Chile declared a moratorium on most of Chile's foreign debts, while on the U.S. side President Nixon issued a formal policy statement in January 1972 that, unless there were "major factors" to the contrary, the United States would not itself extend new bilateral economic benefits, and would oppose multilateral loans, to countries expropriating significant U.S. interests without taking "reasonable steps" toward compensation.

In July of 1971 the Chilean Congress unanimously passed a constitutional amendment nationalizing the remaining American ownership in the Chilean copper companies (part having already been taken over in 1967 and 1969 under President Frei). The amendment provided for an independent evaluation of the foreign-owned assets by the Controller-General, but added a provision for deducting from that evaluation a sum to be fixed by the President covering excess profits since 1955. When the evaluation and excess profits figures were announced in October, the two major copper investors in Chile, Anaconda and Kennecott, were to receive no compensation whatsoever, since the excess profits figure exceeded the Controller's evaluation of their copper holdings. ITT's telephone holdings were also taken over in this period, when the Chilean government "intervened" the Telephone Company in September.

As for Allende's domestic economic policy, designed to stimulate the sluggish Chilean economy by massive government spending and income redistribution, its initial success obscured for a time its fundamental economic weakness. One of his first measures was to use the annual wage readjustment to increase the purchasing power of the lowest economic groups without reducing that of other groups. Combined with stricter enforcement of price-control laws, this resulted for a time in an expansion of industrial production without serious inflationary pressures (by Chilean standards), because Chilean industry had been operating well below capacity, especially after the September election. The government also sharply accelerated the agrarian reform program, but this did not have a serious adverse effect on the 1971 harvest because the planting season was already completed before Allende came to power. The result for 1971 was an increase in production and consumption, a decline in the inflation rate, and a considerable drop in the unemployment rate.

Yet there were problems with Allende's apparently successful policy of "socialist consumerism." Even with a 5.8 percent increase in agricultural production, the increase in mass purchasing power necessitated a $100-million increase in food imports in 1971. Investment, especially in the private sector, dropped sharply, and by the end of the year it was apparent that the government refusal to grant price increases or to devalue the escudo sufficiently (it was partially devalued in December 1971) was creating serious economic dislocations. Moreover, a sharp drop in the world price of copper had begun almost at the time of Allende's accession, and continued through 1971 and 1972.3

In sum, the year 1971 saw a series of quasi-confiscatory measures against U.S. economic holdings in Chile, and the development of internal economic conditions that, as the end of the year approached, appeared fundamentally unsound for the longer term. Relations with the United States became increasingly strained. By the end of 1971 U.S. banks had sharply reduced their short-term loans and the Export-Import Bank had deferred indefinitely all new loans and guarantees to Chile, and in early 1972 the Congress enacted (without visible opposition from the Administration) the Gonzalez Amendment instructing U.S. representatives in multilateral lending institutions to vote against loans to countries expropriating U.S. companies without compensation.

The problem, of course, is to sort out motives. Progressively, the negative long-term economic outlook provided an excuse for those who wished to put pressure on the Allende government by cutting off credit. That excuse, a bit flimsy at the outset but increasingly persuasive by the end of the year as Chile's economic problems mounted, was that the Chilean government was not "credit-worthy." It is thus hard to distinguish between what could have been seen by many to be legitimate reasons for not making loans and credits available (serious doubts about Chile's likelihood or capacity for repayment) and illegitimate ones (economic warfare in defense of private corporations or in order to promote a military coup). While not finally conclusive, a review of the policies of various institutions during this period may be helpful in making this assessment.

IV

In January 1971, The Inter-American Development Bank approved two loans to Chile, $7 million for the Catholic University in Santiago and $4.6 million for the Universidad Austral in Valdivia. These were the last IDB loans made to Chile during the Allende administration, although according to figures published in the Senate ITT hearings, $54 million from earlier loans was also disbursed by the Bank between December 1970 and December 1972.4 Loan proposals submitted by earlier Chilean administrations for a $30-million petrochemical complex and for electric power and natural gas projects were "under study" throughout the period, but never came up before the IDB board for a vote. The Allende government also submitted proposals for educational loans to the Catholic University of Valparaiso and the Universidad del Norte, and these proposals too were never acted on.

It appears almost certain that U.S. influence was exercised to delay the submission of Chilean projects to the Bank board, on which the United States controlled 40 percent of the votes, sufficient to block approval at least of the university loans under Bank rules requiring a two-thirds affirmative vote for this lending category. On the other hand, non-U.S. Bank officials now assert that by the time of the coup the two university projects were well on the way to being financed by the Bank using Norwegian resources, and that very substantial political pressures from member-nations were building up for some kind of loan to Chile before the next annual meeting of the IDB, scheduled for Santiago in early 1974. What the U.S. position would have been by that time can only be speculated. What is not true, however, or at least is misleading, is the report carried by The New York Times and other newspapers that following the September 1973 coup the Bank promptly approved $65-million worth of new loans, a move which would have lent weight to the charge of a prompt and decisive U.S. policy reversal; it appears from Bank sources that the $65-million figure was based only on tentative budget planning for 1974, and at this writing no new IDB loans to the military government have been approved.

Turning to the World Bank, it sent several missions to Chile in early 1971 to review projects which were under consideration. Chile had been the first recipient of a World Bank loan shortly after that institution's establishment and in 25 years had received approximately $250 million in World Bank assistance. In February 1971, at the annual country review conducted by the Inter-American Committee of the Alliance for Progress (CIAP), the World Bank representative noted that there was "an element of uncertainty in the short-run economic outlook" and warned that "the basic criteria of rationality and efficacy apply to socialist as well as capitalist oriented economies." The issue of economic rationality was relevant to the Bank's consideration of a pending loan for electric power; when the Allende government, concerned to keep the inflation rate down, rejected Bank advice to raise its rates for electricity, the Bank dropped further consideration of this loan. Consideration of the second stage of a cattle breeding program was postponed in April 1971, when it was discovered that there were sufficient funds in an earlier loan to last at least another year. This left only a fruit and vineyard development project on the Chile docket, and this project moved rapidly through the preparation and appraisal stages so that by September it was nearly ready to be considered by the Bank's board of directors.

In the intervening period, however, the Chilean Congress had nationalized the copper mines, and in late September Chile was notified that although work on the loan was nearly completed there were questions concerning both Chile's credit-worthiness and the pending issue of compensation for the copper properties. A World Bank mission was sent to Santiago from mid-September to mid-October, in order to study the question of credit-worthiness. When Chile objected to consideration of the copper compensation, the Bank replied that the very large excess profits determination raised a question whether the "reasonable progress" toward the settlement of nationalization disputes required by the Bank's long-standing lending policies was likely to be made. When the Bank's mission returned from Chile in mid-October it reported that declining investment, the rapid rundown of Chilean foreign reserves, and the creation of sharp inflationary pressures put in doubt not only the effective utilization of any loans, but also Chile's ability to continue to service past debts. This prediction appeared to be confirmed in November when Chile suspended service on all debts except those to international lending organizations, and (although this was not publicly announced) past military assistance loans.

At the 1972 annual meeting of the Bank, in September, Alfonso Inostroza, the president of the Central Bank of Chile, attacked the Bank's actions on these matters as "manifestly precipitate and prejudiced," and argued that they demonstrated that the World Bank was acting "not as an independent multinational body at the service of the economic development of all its members, but in fact as a spokesman and instrument of private interests in one member country." Replying to this criticism at an emotion-laden meeting of the U.N. Economic and Social Council in October, President McNamara of the World Bank recalled that in instances involving Bolivia, Guyana and Iraq the Bank's board of directors had approved projects despite nationalization disputes, but that in the Chilean case "that question has not yet arisen because the primary condition for Bank lending-a soundly managed economy with a clear potential for utilizing additional funds efficiently has not been met."

Whether it was due to its lack of credit-worthiness or its nationalization policies-or, more likely, to both-the Allende government did not receive any further new loans from the World Bank, although it continued to receive disbursements from loans approved earlier. In the three fiscal years between July 1, 1970 and June 30, 1973, Chile received a total of slightly over $46 million from the World Bank. At the time of Allende's overthrow, $22 million still remained undisbursed under existing loans to Chile.

On the other hand, neither the issue of credit-worthiness nor that of copper compensation seemed to discourage the International Monetary Fund from lending to Chile in the same period. In December 1971, it lent Chile $39.5 million and in December 1972 $42.8 million in three-to-five-year loans to offset the drop in the price of copper on the world market. The Fund's willingness to aid Chile doubtless reflected the fact that it is not a bank but a mechanism to assist member-countries with foreign exchange difficulties; moreover, since the Fund had clear authority to make compensatory loans for this type of foreign exchange shortfall, the United States did not object. However, the Fund was not able to enter into a so-called "standby" agreement with Chile for the provision of additional foreign exchange, since under standing Fund practice this would have required austerity measures which the Chilean government was unwilling to undertake.

A verdict on the relative weight of credit-worthiness and copper compensation as factors in denying Chile assistance is clearer in the case of the U.S. Export-Import Bank than in the case of the World Bank. The sequence of events and external evidence both clearly indicate which factor was operative. In mid-August of 1971, one month after the nationalization of copper and two months before the final decision on compensation, the Export-Import Bank informed the Chilean ambassador that a pending request for $21 million in loans and loan guarantees for the purchase of three Boeing passenger jets for the Chilean airline was being deferred, pending, it was said, further information on the compensation question. The ambassador immediately held a press conference in which he denounced the deferral decision as a blatant attempt to pressure the Chilean government. On August 14 a New York Times story quoted an anonymous State Department official to the effect that the decision had been "basically political" in nature and made "at the White House level" under pressure from business interests. The head of the Bank then commented that "the door is open" for this and other loans if Chile demonstrated her credit-worthiness. Referring to the Export-Import Bank's earlier guarantees of loans by the copper companies to Chile under the preceding administration, he added, "If and when Chile assures us it has assumed the obligations of the companies it has taken over, we may be able to justify new extensions of credit." Disbursements under existing loans continued until June 1972, but after the moratorium of November 1971 Chile was notified that no new loans or guarantees would be made.

In defense of its actions, the Bank could perhaps appeal to its own concern about the status of earlier loans it had guaranteed, but as the Times story indicates, its response on the Boeing loan seems to have been related to a broader governmental review of policy toward the expropriation of American interests. In March 1969, in the case of Peru, the Nixon administration had decided not to invoke the Hickenlooper Amendment to cut off U.S. aid after that country nationalized a subsidiary of Standard Oil. However, in July 1971 the copper nationalization, the balance-of-payments crisis, and not least the strong influence of John Connally as Secretary of the Treasury seem to have stimulated an intense policy debate which culminated in the January 1972 policy statement on expropriation. The exact wording of the statement was the subject of lengthy negotiations between the Treasury and State Departments.5 Its net effect was a clear-cut new American position, framed in general terms but obviously aimed directly at Chile.

By the time the presidential statement was made, Chile had announced a payments moratorium, so that the arguments against her as a credit risk were by then valid. However, credit-worthiness would have to be defined broadly enough to include willingness to pay all claims by foreign companies, if the August decision by the Export-Import Bank is to be defended on those grounds.

Moreover, the question of pressing Chile still harder, in fact of engaging in government-directed economic warfare, came up in October 1971 after the intervention of the Telephone Company and the announcement of the copper compensation decision. Two days after the Chilean announcement on October 11 that most of the expropriated copper mines would not be paid for, Secretary of State Rogers issued a statement criticizing the excess-profits deduction and warning that "should Chile fail to meet its international obligations, it could jeopardize the flow of private funds and erode the base of support for foreign assistance."6 A few days later, when Rogers held a meeting to discuss the situation with the principal U.S. companies with investments in Chile, ITT submitted to the State Department what it described as a Chile White Paper. This proposed a seven-point program which included an embargo on Chilean exports to the United States, a halt to all AID assistance in "pipeline," a veto on Chilean loan projects before the Inter-American Development Bank (ITT memo-writers noted with dismay that after the July 1971 earthquake the Allende government had received additional IDB assistance from previously approved projects), the use of "a U.S. veto or pressure" to shut off pending or future World Bank loans, and advice to the U.S. banking community and "if possible" to international banking circles to refrain from extending any further credits to Chile.7

The ITT memo on the meeting reports that the reaction to its proposals both on the part of the other participants and of the State Department was mixed if not negative. Secretary Rogers responded to ITT's suggestion for curtailment of IDB loans by saying that the United States does not have veto power on loans (a statement actually not accurate, as already noted, for certain loans by the IDB). When Rogers raised the question of an embargo on spare parts, the ITT memo reports that "the consensus of the group was quite mixed." The Ford Motor Company representative indicated that Ford would continue to supply spare parts "with firm letters of credit on reputable banks." When Rogers asked for comments on the Export-Import Bank refusal to finance aircraft purchases, "the view that the Ex-Im loan refusal was helpful to the U.S. position was shared by two or three and was 'questionable' on the part of the others." The ITT memo concludes that despite Secretary Rogers' repeated statements that "the Nixon administration was a business administration," Rogers "is pretty much going along with the . . . soft-line low profile policy for Latin America" of Assistant Secretary Meyer.8

V

On this record, the term "invisible blockade" appears something of an exaggeration when applied to the policies adopted by the U.S. government in the last half of 1971. Pipeline credits and aid from multilateral lenders were not cut off; only new projects were "deferred." If the ITT memo is to be believed, at least by October 1971 the U.S. government had not made any effort to influence the decisions of private banks. As the private bankers later described it to the Senate investigators, credits were in fact gradually suspended in response to the worsening Chilean economic situation. The Bank of America representative testified that short-term credits remained at approximately their 1970 level until December 1971, when following the debt moratorium announcement all such credits were suspended, to be resumed later "on a lower level with selected borrowers." Chase Manhattan testified that "the Chileans made an honest effort to pay American banks in the year or so following the election" (i.e. between September 1970 and September 1971), but that "because of our own appraisal of the deteriorating economic conditions in Chile" lines of credit were reduced from $31.9 million in the first quarter of 1971 to $5 million in the last quarter. Manufacturers Hanover testified that: "We cancelled lines or withdrew little by little over a period of a year and a half. . . . The first cancellation occurred in early 1971 and the last ones in early 1973.9

As described in November 1972 by Chile's Finance Minister, Orlando Millas, Chile's lines of short-term credit from American banks had been reduced by that time from $219 million to $32 million. It appears, however, that this was the result not of a coördinated strategy but of many individual responses to an increasingly cloudy economic outlook in Chile. The lack of short-term credits plus the exhaustion of the dollar reserves built up at the end of the Frei regime, the nearly total lack of new foreign investment coming into Chile after Allende's election, and the drop in the price of copper on the world market in 1971 and 1972 (in early 1973 it rose again to record levels of over $1 a pound) meant a serious dollar shortage for Chile. But none of these factors appear attributable to a U.S. government-initiated "invisible blockade."

"Blockade" is also the wrong term to use with reference to U.S. bilateral assistance in the Allende period. It is true that the U.S. reaction to Allende's election was quite different from its response to the election of Eduardo Frei in 1964. A month after Frei took office, an $80-million program loan for general budget support was signed. Additional program loans for $80 million and $20 million were signed in 1966 and 1968, as well as $130 million in loan agreements for specific purposes between 1965 and 1969. (The considerable foreign reserves built up at the end of the Frei regime made new loans unnecessary in the last part of the Frei regime.) No new assistance projects were requested or developed by the Chileans after Allende's accession to power, and of course it was clear after President Nixon's January 1972 statement that there was no possibility of new bilateral loans. In his November 1972 budget message, the Chilean Finance Minister mentioned $45 million in pending AID projects, but he seems to have been referring to projects under previously negotiated loans. According to a State Department report submitted to the Senate ITT hearings, a total of $5.5 million in AID loan disbursements from previously negotiated loan agreements went to Chile in 1971 and 1972, although this was more than counterbalanced by Chilean payments of amortization and interest charges on loans contracted by previous governments, even allowing for the cessation of such payments after November 1971.10

In addition to disbursements under earlier loans, Chile continued to receive technical assistance grants averaging about $800,000 a year, between 26 and 50 Peace Corps people continued to work there, and the Food for Peace Program distributed $10-million worth of food between November 1970 and September 1973. Total food shipments under the Program actually rose during the Allende period (40,051,000 pounds in 1973 against 37,875,000 pounds in 1971). Ironically a part of this assistance was used to fulfill an Allende campaign promise: 10,738,000 pounds of powdered milk, delivered in 1971, helped President Allende to carry out his pledge to give a daily free pint of milk to every school child. In January 1973, El Mercurio of Santiago carried a report of the ceremonies accompanying the arrival of the billionth pound of food shipments to Chile from the United States under the Food for Peace Program.11

Finally, U.S. aid to the Chilean military forces, under the Military Assistance Program in operation since the early 1950s, continued throughout the Allende regime. In June 1971 a new $5-million credit for the purchase of C-130 transport planes and paratrooper equipment was approved. U.S. military advisers remained in Chile, the Chilean navy continued to lease U.S. naval vessels, and Chile continued to participate in the Inter-American Defense Board. In May 1972, well after the Nixon statement, another $10-million loan to the Chilean military was approved.

Critics have noted the inconsistency of the continuation of military aid after the announcement of a policy against new bilateral and multilateral economic assistance, and have attributed this to an American effort to strengthen a group which was known to be out of sympathy with Allende. The fact that the Chilean military had made it clear that it would oppose any effort by Allende or his supporters to impose a Marxist dictatorship must certainly have been in the minds of U.S. government policy-makers. But what alternative policy would the critics have recommended? The loans had the full support of the Allende government, which from the outset had been careful not to alienate the military (a policy which was successful until late 1972, and in the case of the top commanders of the army and the national police until just before the September 1973 coup), and the loans were certain to be repaid since Chilean legislation specifically earmarked a percentage of foreign-exchange earnings from Chilean copper for use by the military, so that payments for past military loans were not affected by the November 1971 debt moratorium.

VI

By early 1972, it was clear that Chile was indeed no longer credit-worthy. In a little over a year she had run through most of the substantial foreign exchange reserves built up at the end of the Frei regime. Inflationary pressures were building up, and finally exploded in the period from July to September when the official inflation rate since the beginning of the year climbed from 33 to 99.8 percent. Chile had stopped paying most of her international debts, copper production and prices were falling, and there was an incipient crisis in agriculture.

Yet despite all this a total collapse of Chilean international credit was somehow avoided. In January 1972 the Chilean Central Bank arrived at a refinancing agreement with private banks, covering all of Chile's outstanding debts to the banks and providing for what the Chilean Finance Minister called a "symbolic payment" of 5 percent in 1972 and 1973 and higher payments thereafter-most of them after the Allende regime was to go out of office in 1976. And in April Chile arrived at an agreement with the members of the "Club of Paris" (the United States, Canada, Japan and the Western European countries to which Chile owed money). That agreement provided that 70 percent of the debt payments due between November 1, 1971 and December 31, 1972 would be postponed until 1975, and debt payments due in 1973 would be renegotiated at the end of 1972. (The 1973 debts were still being renegotiated at the time of Allende's overthrow, and no payments were made to any debtors in 1973 pending successful conclusion of the negotiations. No payments at all were made to the United States after November 1971, since Chilean and U.S. negotiators could not arrive at the bilateral agreement called for by the April 1972 meeting.) Chile also agreed in Paris to accept "the principles of payment of a just compensation for all nationalizations in conformity with Chilean and international law," a formula which left a good deal of leeway for divergent interpretation in the copper dispute.

In addition, and of great significance in assessing the practical consequences of U.S. actions, Chile also had surprising success in securing loans from countries other than the United States-and these were by no means restricted to the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China. In November 1972 Finance Minister Millas reported that Chile had obtained short-term credits amounting to $250 million from Canada, Argentina, Mexico, Australia and Western Europe and $103 million from the U.S.S.R. He also mentioned $446 million in long-term loans from the U.S.S.R., Eastern Europe and China as well as $70 million in long-term loans from other Latin American countries, and unspecified amounts "of great importance" from Western European countries. The Chilean government publication, Chile Economic News, listed a total of over $200 million in loans and credits from Great Britain, Spain, France, Holland, Belgium, Sweden and Finland during the period between November 1971 and December 1972. Even allowing for some overlap in these figures, it thus appears that the principal result of the half-hearted American effort to put pressure on the Chileans to persuade them to come to terms with the copper companies was a considerable increase in alternative sources of loans and credit to Chile, which more than counterbalanced reductions from U.S. and U.S.-influenced sources.

Why were so many countries willing to loan Chile money? Although the IMF report on Chile written for the Club of Paris negotiations in early 1972 is confidential, reportedly it was sufficiently optimistic about Chile's economic future so that it could be used to persuade reluctant lenders. More important, most of the loans were tied to the purchase of goods in the countries concerned and thus formed part of a government policy of encouragement of exports. Finally, as one banker put it in an interview with a reporter for the North American Congress for Latin America, "Chileans are the world's most charming mendicants."

The result of the extensive borrowing by the Allende government-much of it to finance food imports, which rose from $165 million in 1970 to $535 million in 1972-was to increase the Chilean debt in three years from $2.4 billion to $3.4 billion-an increase which, if combined with the expenditure of foreign reserves inherited from the Frei government, substantially exceeds the total indebtedness incurred in the preceding six-year presidential term.12 In fact, on August 30, 1973, Allende had more short-term credits available to him ($574 million) than at the time of his election to office ($310 million).13

V

The argument that an American invisible blockade was responsible for or a major contributing factor to the overthrow of Allende is therefore not persuasive. Certainly new American aid as well as new loans from the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank dropped off sharply, although assistance from the IMF in 1971 and 1972 was considerable and "pipeline" aid continued from the other agencies. The termination of Export-Import Bank loans and guarantees and the gradual reduction of short-term credits from American banks also created serious problems in the flow of spare parts, which contributed to the dissatisfaction of the truckers whose strikes in October 1972 and July-September 1973 initiated the chain of events which led to Allende's downfall. In addition, the shift away from American suppliers undoubtedly caused serious dislocations in areas like the copper industry which had relied exclusively on American sources for machinery and parts. But until the end the Allende government was able by clever footwork to continue to secure the foreign assistance needed in ever-increasing amounts to cover food imports as domestic food production dropped.

To be sure, U.S. policy is open to criticism, either as too harsh-or, to a few, as too soft. If the Nixon administration had set out to promote the overthrow of the Allende government, it could have taken much more vigorous measures than it actually undertook-including embargoes on spare parts and on Chilean imports as well as a cutoff of the considerable assistance in the pipeline. Instead, in an effort to pressure Chile into a settlement with the copper companies and, more generally, to deter further cases of expropriation of American property without compensation, it chose the January 1972 policy statement against new economic aid to expropriating countries. That statement was in accord with the intent of the U.S. Congress as expressed for over a decade in the Hickenlooper Amendment on U.S. foreign assistance and in the Gonzalez Amendment concerning multilateral aid which was reported out of a House committee almost simultaneously with its issuance. Given the ineffectiveness of these policies in deterring nationalizations in the Third World and the problems that they create for U.S. relations with economic nationalists in many countries, one may indeed question the advisability of linking U.S. foreign policy so explicitly to the defense of the economic interest of overseas investors. The policies pursued in the furtherance of that objective, however, do not seem to have contributed in any significant way to, or to have been aimed specifically at, the overthrow of the Allende government.

One can also criticize a certain disingenuousness in the constant references to credit-worthiness at a time when Chile was still paying her debts. (Even after the debt payment moratorium, payments continued to be made in 1972, though not in 1973, to the multilateral lending organizations.) As the Export-Import decision demonstrated, and the January 1972 policy statement confirmed, the U.S. government's concern, which it was not always willing to admit openly, was to assist U.S. companies to secure compensation when their assets were expropriated.

Additional criticism may be leveled at the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank for their apparent subordination to American policies. The World Bank rejects this criticism, arguing that it was following its own long-established policies and citing the credit-risk argument again. It maintains that in 1973 it was in the process of approving a $5-million loan for pre-investment studies in Chile, but the indefinite postponement of the submission of the 1971 fruit and vineyard loan seems closely related to the copper compensation question. In the case of the IDB, the fact that no new loans were made to Chile after the copper nationalization (although some were moving, slowly, toward the final stages for submission to a vote) seems clearly related to American opposition.

The basic causes of Allende's overthrow lie elsewhere, however. They were, in my judgment: (1) eventual runaway inflation (323 percent between July 1972 and July 1973) caused not by lack of foreign assistance but by a domestic economic policy, initiated well before the steps taken by the Nixon administration in the latter part of 1971, which relied on massive printing of money to solve all economic problems;14 (2) Allende's ideologically motivated policy of intensification of the class struggle, which was more effective in solidifying middle and lower middle class opposition than in broadening his worker and peasant support; (3) an Allende administration policy of circumventing the law through legal "loopholes" or nonenforcement of its provisions-a policy which was opposed by the Congress and a majority of the voters (56 percent in the March 1973 congressional elections) and declared illegal by the courts and the Controller; and (4) complicity in the stockpiling of arms by leftist groups, the discovery of which finally moved the Chilean armed forces to act. None of these factors would have been substantially altered by increased U.S. or international assistance.

To sum up, the economic and political policies of the Allende government were a failure, in and of themselves. Our justified horror at the excesses of the September military coup has prevented us from appreciating the enormity of that failure. For in many ways the Allende experiment was not an adequate test of whether it is possible to achieve democratic socialism-in the sense of government control and direction of basic economic activity for the benefit of low-income groups-in a less-developed country. No effort was made to persuade the competing Chilean interest groups of the necessity for self-restraint and austerity in order to achieve economic independence. Allende's coalition politics were plagued by his fear of alienating the left wing of his own Socialist Party, and so, except for the adoption of the copper nationalization amendment, he never attempted to broaden his support by an appeal to nationalism ("I am not president of all Chileans"). As the experiences of Peru and the United Arab Republic (to name but two cases) have demonstrated, defiance of international corporations and foreign governments need not lead to economic or political collapse. The Allende policy, however, which combined inflation with deliberate class polarization, was a formula for disaster.

The lesson, if there is one, in the relations between the United States and the Allende government is that a government which is determined to nationalize U.S. companies without compensation and to carry out an internal program which effectively destroys its ability to earn foreign exchange cannot expect to receive a subsidy to do so from either the U.S. government or from U.S. private banks. It may, however, receive some assistance from other countries either for political (aid to a fellow "socialist" country) or economic (encouragement of exports) reasons-at least for a time. What it cannot do is blame all its problems on foreign imperialists and their domestic allies, and ignore elementary principles of economic rationality and effective political legitimacy in its internal policies. No amount of foreign assistance can be a substitute for these, and no amount of foreign subversion or economic pressure can destroy them if they exist.

Footnotes

3 For a fuller discussion of Chilean economic policy in this period, especially the nature of "socialist consumerism," see Paul E. Sigmund, "Chile: Two Years of 'Popular Unity,'" Problems of Communism, November-December 1972.

4 Hearings, p. 533. Over the same period Chile's payments to the IDB for interest and amortization on past loans totalled $44 million.

5 See articles by Dom Bonafede and Mark Chadwin in The National Journal, November 13, 1971, January 15, 1972, and January 22, 1972.

6 Hearings, p. 957.

10 Hearings, p. 533.

11 Food for Peace figures were provided by the Santiago AID office, July 18, 1973.

12 El Mercurio (International Edition), August 12-19, 1973.

13 Qué Pasa (Santiago), October 25, 1973. The Chilean Foreign Minister, in his speech to the United Nations on October 9, 1973, placed the 1970 debt at $2.6 billion but agreed with the figure of $3.4 billion for 1973. Since the latter figure is described by both sources as the projected debt at the end of 1973, it may be inflated by including in it unexpended foreign credits.

14 The money supply increased by over 1,000 percent during the Allende administration, and in 1973 52 percent of the national budget and even greater amounts to cover losses in the nationalized industries were financed by currency emissions.


quote:

No, it is not important to differentiate, because they are no different. It is sort of a purely rhetorical exercise to speculate whether or not the money flowing into the opposition helped them decide to go on strike or not. What is important is that without external financial support, the truck company owners would not have been able to stop the country for nearly a month.

On what basis would you be confidant of that?

quote:

First of all, note that I chose that document precisely because it was an English source that opposed the nationalization (also note the date). So that even by that type of source what you had said regarding nationalization wasn't true.

I'm not sure how to parse this at all. That source laid out both sides of the dispute and the relevant international law and precedents, and by the weight of the evidence the law was not on Chile's side. What would you consider a neutral source? What was it that I said about nationalization that wasn't true?


Absurd Alhazred posted:

No rush, Chile will still be around next week!

Hopefully. :(

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