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ManicParroT posted:One of the key issues with Taiwan is whether the Chinese have the naval and aerial capability to get enough troops and tanks onto the island. If Taiwan was a peninsula things would be much grimmer for them, but as it is, China doesn't have all that many aircraft and boats. The U.S. doesn't recognize Taiwan as a country, but Congress did pass 臺灣關係法 to gently caress with Carter.
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Feb 1, 2011 04:43
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ManicParroT posted:Question: In that earlier picture of the different tank shells, etc, are any of those the famed German 88? The 571R was fired by the KwK L/56 gun (the Tiger's gun) and the Flak 36, which was the famous 88mm field/AA/AT gun. The BIG 88mm shell (x822) was fired by the L/71 gun which was on the King Tiger, the PaK43 gun, the Jagdpanther, and some other TDs; it was probably the most effective AT gun of the war. quote:Second question: How useful are helicopter gunships like the Apache and Hind in a war against a 'real' opponent (ie, one that could seriously contest the airspace)? I don't understand how they wouldn't be very easy targets for enemy fighter jets. Personally, I think that if we'd gone head to head with the Soviets in the 70s-80s, the attack helicopters would have been absolutely mauled on both sides. Enemy aircraft weren't the big threat to attack helos, it was MANPADS (man portable air defense systems) like the SA-7 and the Stinger, plus a bunch of pretty effective gun systems. Both sides had excellent MANPADS systems and both had a shitton of them available, which would have been seriously bad news for any helos that were operating in an offensive role. The Apache in particular was really designed as a defensive system more than offensive, and in that role (hiding behind a hill, pop up, fire a few missiles at some armor, gtfo) it would have been effective, but if they'd done anything at all over enemy formations they would have been slaughtered.
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Feb 1, 2011 04:54
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^^^^Thanks for the clarification on Taiwan/US relations. The Taiwan Relations Act explains a lot, including how they could sell weapons to a "non-country". Ditto bewbies on 88s and choppers. Has anyone here got a good jumping off point for reading up on the Iran-Iraq war? It's fascinating to me, as this major war between two pretty hefty nations that receives so little coverage. Oh, and did we ever decide why the Japanese didn't use shields? I recall there being an animated discussion on this earlier in the thread, but I can't remember if any conclusive answers came up. EDIT: Last question, I keep thinking of them. Given the technology of the time, would there have been any way of preventing WW1 from turning into grinding trench warfare? Or was it inevitably going to bog down, even with the benefits of hindsight? ManicParroT fucked around with this message at 05:31 on Feb 1, 2011 |
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Feb 1, 2011 05:27
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Barto posted:The U.S. doesn't recognize Taiwan as a country, but Congress did pass 臺灣關係法 to gently caress with Carter. And that Iwo Jima dialogue is something else, goddamn.
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Feb 1, 2011 05:37
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The Americans lost 2,000+ helicopters in Vietnam fighting essentially World War 2 light infantry (no MANPADs). Helicopters aren't F15s, more like lightly armoured IFVs that can fly for a bit, in any serious fight they're going to get shot a lot.
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Feb 1, 2011 05:49
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Revolvyerom posted:Could I talk you into translating for those of us who can't read that? Sorry! http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taiwan_Relations_Act The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA; Pub.L. 96-8, 93 Stat. 14, enacted April 10, 1979; H.R. 2479) is an act of the United States Congress passed in 1979 after the establishment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the breaking of relations between the United States and the Republic of China (ROC) on the island of Taiwan by President Jimmy Carter. It more clearly defines the American position on Taiwan and its cross-strait relationship with Beijing. It was drafted by Harvey Feldman.[1]
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Feb 1, 2011 05:52
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Revolvyerom posted:And that Iwo Jima dialogue is something else, goddamn. Yah primary sources own hard, its too bad things like that don't exist for older periods.
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Feb 1, 2011 05:59
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Barto posted:Sorry! http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taiwan_Relations_Act  quote:The act stipulates that the United States will "consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States".
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Feb 1, 2011 06:01
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Reading the wiki article, I thought the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) sounds like a really dick move. Normally (not sure about the US but hey) foreign relations are seen as an executive branch function. Of course, treaties become legally binding, and it's possible to pass laws that affect foreign relations, but it sounds like a pretty intrusive bit of legislation. Supposing the Taiwan / China situation shifted suddenly, and it was no longer in the US' interest to treat Taiwan as a country? Would they then have to go and repeal that law?
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Feb 1, 2011 06:11
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ManicParroT posted:Reading the wiki article, I thought the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) sounds like a really dick move. They would just ignore it. Who will call them on it?
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Feb 1, 2011 06:21
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ManicParroT posted:EDIT: Last question, I keep thinking of them. Given the technology of the time, would there have been any way of preventing WW1 from turning into grinding trench warfare? Or was it inevitably going to bog down, even with the benefits of hindsight? Probably not. Given the advent of enlisting every able bodied man to fight, the fact that the power of artillery outpaced every other branch of the military, and the lack of effective close air support; all other possibilities of warfare are practically thrown out. Until Brusilov came up with the strategy of bypassing strong points and not announcing where an attack was going to take place with days of artillery shelling, the only option was the grind. Even then, when Germany adopted the same tactic to make storm troopers, it was still something that could be stopped by an indepth defense, which most trench systems were by this time in the war. Back to the daily grind.
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Feb 1, 2011 06:40
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Barto posted:They would just ignore it. Who will call them on it? An opposition politician who wants to make political capital out of it. Kick up a stink, file a law suit and demand that the government obey the law and stop working with them commie pinkos. It seems to me that it's giving Congress a pretty long oar directly into foreign policy issues in this area.
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Feb 1, 2011 08:00
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Acebuckeye13 posted:-What exactly WAS the Crimean War? I hear about it a lot, but I have no idea what actually happened. Why the hell was Britain fighting in Russia? Britain was interested in maintaining a status quo in Europe, since she was the dominant sea power at the time already and didn't need more competitors. Russia, on the other hand, wanted to divide the Ottoman empire and make Constantinople part of the Russian empire, along with Slavic parts of the Balkans if possible. This would make the Black Sea their inland sea and allow access to Mediterranean and Atlantic - a good thing for Russian navy and merchant fleet, as the Baltic Sea froze during winters. Turkey had proved to be fragile in the previous wars, and Britain and France couldn't accept Russian expansion, so they went to support the Turks. To neutralize Russian naval threat in the Black Sea, Russia's main naval base, Sevastopol, was besieged. Crimean War is a misleading title, as the war was not only fought in the peninsula but also in present day Romania, Caucasus Black Sea region in general, Baltic Sea and White Sea. Even more confusingly, in Finland we traditionally called it the Åland War because the French and British allied fleet attacked and pillaged the Russian Bomarsund fortress being built in the Åland islands at the time. They also attacked many Finnish coastal towns, including Helsinki, but the latter assault failed in fully knocking out the sea fortress there. The results of the Crimean War can still be seen in Åland: the peace accords forbid any fortifications there during peace time, and this demilitarization was continued in WW2 peace accords.
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Feb 1, 2011 08:00
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ManicParroT posted:Oh, and did we ever decide why the Japanese didn't use shields? I recall there being an animated discussion on this earlier in the thread, but I can't remember if any conclusive answers came up. I only know a little about East Asian warfare but just as a guess, maybe it had to do with holdovers from previous eras of warfare? The characteristics that are identified with Japanese Feudal Warfare and the Samurai mostly come from the Sengoku period of the 15th-17th centuries, but prior to that (the Muromachi period) Samurai primarily fought from horseback as archers, in which role they would not have particularly needed shields nor been able to use them effectively with their bows. At the same time, the peasant levies (ashigaru) who fought on foot were mostly equipped with two-handed weapons like long spears, so they couldn't use shields either. The conditions of warfare as they developed during the Sengoku period dictated that samurai sometimes fought on foot, but having no tradition of using shields, they did not make use of them. Though I have to say that's is a slapdash justification and I have no particular expertise.
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Feb 1, 2011 09:53
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EvanSchenck posted:I only know a little about East Asian warfare but just as a guess, maybe it had to do with holdovers from previous eras of warfare? The characteristics that are identified with Japanese Feudal Warfare and the Samurai mostly come from the Sengoku period of the 15th-17th centuries, but prior to that (the Muromachi period) Samurai primarily fought from horseback as archers, in which role they would not have particularly needed shields nor been able to use them effectively with their bows. At the same time, the peasant levies (ashigaru) who fought on foot were mostly equipped with two-handed weapons like long spears, so they couldn't use shields either. The conditions of warfare as they developed during the Sengoku period dictated that samurai sometimes fought on foot, but having no tradition of using shields, they did not make use of them. Though I have to say that's is a slapdash justification and I have no particular expertise. No, pre-samurai Japanese used shields, like during the Kofun period. The common soldiers prior to the samurai periods are depicted with shield and sword. The use of mantlets never stopped, and was used in sieges even after the introduction of arquebuses. The few times they fought with foreign armies (Mongol invasion and the two Imjin War campaigns in Korea) they met enemies using shields. So they clearly knew what a shield was and why they are great to have in many cases. It makes sense for the samurai to not fight with shields: they were primarily horse archers who went on to become horse shock cavalry. Many warriors filling these roles didn't use shields in other places of the world. However, if you look at infantry using spears across the world, they almost always use spears together with shields until the development of the halberd and the pike, and most pre-gunfire pikemen also carried shields. This is what vexes me. Why didn't the ashigaru use shields before about 1570, when we first get real pike and shotte weaponry which is usually the point where other infantry finally ditch the shield? It's sure not because they are asians, as Chinese and Korean infantry carried shields until the 17th century. It sure isn't because they put a lot of stock in cavalry, since other horseback cultures such as the Mongols and the Turks both used shields on horseback and for their infantry. In the case of the cavalry it can be related to their heavily armours that were developed to protect from arrows, but again, most of the infantry didn't carry those heavy armours. It just would make sense for some poor infantryman to pick up a bit of wood and say "hey, wouldn't it be a good idea if this was in front of my face, you know, with everyone we fighing always shooting arrows in our faces and all that?". It's not like they didn't use mantlets ALL THE TIME in sieges.
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Feb 1, 2011 11:10
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lilljonas posted:No, pre-samurai Japanese used shields, like during the Kofun period. The common soldiers prior to the samurai periods are depicted with shield and sword. The use of mantlets never stopped, and was used in sieges even after the introduction of arquebuses. The few times they fought with foreign armies (Mongol invasion and the two Imjin War campaigns in Korea) they met enemies using shields. So they clearly knew what a shield was and why they are great to have in many cases. I seem to recall that William Wayne Farris said that there was evidence that every time the Japanese sent expeditionary forces to Korea they basically ended up adopting the Korean way of fighting, which included using shields, so they used them in some situations it would seem. Of course I read that book like 5 years ago, so I could be misremembering. Anyway it could just be that they didn't like them enough to continue to use them or their specific way of fighting caused them to fall out of favor. It wouldn't be the first time in history that people once used some technological innovation only to later abandon it. LimburgLimbo fucked around with this message at 14:24 on Feb 1, 2011 |
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Feb 1, 2011 14:22
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ManicParroT posted:EDIT: Last question, I keep thinking of them. Given the technology of the time, would there have been any way of preventing WW1 from turning into grinding trench warfare? Or was it inevitably going to bog down, even with the benefits of hindsight? I'm not sure bogging down was inevitable based on technology, but based on concentrations of forces and the relative equipment and training levels in the Western Front you probably were going to see inevitable stagnation. Same with Italy, with terrain as a factor. The Eastern front (Austro-Hungary and Germany v Russia) was a hell of a lot more dynamic than the Western front. Trench warfare definitely occurred, but it wasn't as static as in the West. The Russians also put together infiltration type tactics before anyone else. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brusilov_Offensive is interesting
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Feb 1, 2011 15:01
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LimburgLimbo posted:I seem to recall that William Wayne Farris said that there was evidence that every time the Japanese sent expeditionary forces to Korea they basically ended up adopting the Korean way of fighting, which included using shields, so they used them in some situations it would seem. Of course I read that book like 5 years ago, so I could be misremembering. That sounds weird, as it was actually the other way around with the Imjin War. At the start of that war the Koreans were technologically behind Japan and relied on bows with a smattering of ineffective handguns, and subsequently had most of their army completely wiped out by the superior Japanese forces at the start of the 1592-93 campaign. After that they soon developed arquebus weaponry and tactics, both taking hints from the Ming Chinese armies that saved their bacon and the Japanese armies that had mauled them so badly on land. And no, the Japanese did not pick up the use of shields after the Imjin War. The main effect of that campaign on Japanese doctrine was that it escalated the development of the arquebus as dominant weapon at the expense of pretty much everything else. The political effect of the campaign was probably just as large though as it bled the western realms closest to Korea, which played heavily into the hands of Tokugawa in the east as he made his bid in 1600. But that is another topic entirely. I assume he didn't mean "every time" and meant the Yamato-Paekche relationship, but that's way back in 7th century, and hardly a connection to 15th century infantrymen. I can also not imagine how he meant that the Yamato military involvement in the fall of Paekche had changed Japanese fighting style, as we know extremely little of those fighting styles. But it did have very big effects on Japan in areas such as religion, politics and science, that is clear. lilljonas fucked around with this message at 15:47 on Feb 1, 2011 |
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Feb 1, 2011 15:30
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lilljonas posted:That sounds weird, as it was actually the other way around with the Imjin War. At the start of that war the Koreans were technologically behind Japan and relied on bows with a smattering of ineffective handguns, and subsequently had most of their army completely wiped out by the superior Japanese forces at the start of the 1592-93 campaign. After that they soon developed arquebus weaponry and tactics, both taking hints from the Ming Chinese armies that saved their bacon and the Japanese armies that had mauled them so badly on land. Ah, I should've been more specific. The book I read this in only talks about Japanese warfare between 500-1300. There were apparently a couple of times when Japan sent forces over to Korea in that time period. And I don't mean that all of Japan stated using shields, I mean that specifically the forces in Korea, for the time that they were there, realizing that the tactics which they used in Japan were ineffective, mimicked the Korean way of warfare. But like I said this is all stuff I read years ago so I could be misremembering. The book was Heavenly Warriors: The Evolution of Japan's Military, 500-1300. I don't have my copy on me so I can't look it up to confirm/
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Feb 1, 2011 16:08
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I've been reading lately on the fighting at Delville Wood and Longueval, which was one of the major fistfights right at the heart of the Somme. It is really interesting to me for three reasons, first, it is in a lot of ways a perfect encapsulation of all that the Western Front was, second, it might be the most awful and brutal battle I've ever read about. It was also something of a watershed moment in the history of warfare: it was one of the last times that infantry would take on other infantry in static, close-quarters, hand-to-hand type fighting in open terrain as the primary means of engagement. After this, it would be all tanks, artillery, and eventually planes doing the heavy lifting. Longueval is about 10km east-northeast of Albert, about 80km southwest of the Belgian border. Before the war, just like today, Longueval was a tiny farming commune much like thousands of others in northwestern France. It was essentially still a medieval farming village, with an old parish church, an inn and a few shops, the mill and manor house of the minor nobility who had once ruled over the local peasantry (you can still see all these things on Google Maps). When you look at the farmland surrounding the town, you can still see the fields divided as they were in the middle ages, complete with the "strips" of land preferred by the medieval farmer. It is a forgettable little place in every way, except it happened to be just a few kilometers south of the Albert-Baupame road, which happened to be the primary axis of advance for a couple hundred thousand Commonwealth soldiers who were opposed by a couple hundred thousand German soldiers in the summer of 1916. Just east-northeast of the Longeuval, there is a small wood, not more than half mile across: Delville Wood. It is just like a thousand other little woods in northwestern France, very beautiful (especially in the summer), full of big deciduous trees, with a couple of little creeks running through it. When you look at it on Google, you're looking at the wood almost exactly as it was in the spring of 1916; the outline of it is identical, the trails running through it are much the same. The only difference is the huge memorial cross at its center. The battle that took place here was due in large part to the very common perception at the time that a "straight line" was needed to conduct a successful major attack: if your line moved forward and it was not "straight" due to an enemy strongpoint, then your force would be split in two and would be subject to enfilading fires from the enemy who remained mired in your line. This strategy drove a huge number of small scale engagements during many Great War battles. The Somme in particular was noted for them: a major army-wide offensive would be conducted (eg: July 1st), easy-to-take ground would be taken in the offensive, strongpoints would not be. Thus, before you conducted your next major attack, all of the little strongpoints jutting out into your new line had to be taken. These "secondary" battles wound up being some of the most brutal ever fought. Typically they were fought with piecemeal manning and without proper artillery support, as resources were being "reserved" for more major actions rather than these little "cleanup operations". In addition, by their very nature they were conducted against the strongest part of the enemy's defenses, and the Germans were incredibly good at turning advantageous bits of terrain into effective defensive positions. Hills, small towns, forests, even manor houses became fortresses, and getting the Germans out was almost always awful, for both sides. Such was Longueval and Delville Wood. The attacks of 1 July took all of the land surrounding the town and wood, but two German brigades remained umoved in their fortified positions. This made Longueval quite literally a wedge between two BEF divisions, and Haig decided it must be taken lest the British line become separated. This order trickled down to the 9th (Scottish) Division, who was given the task of taking both the town and the wood. In very direct contrast to the attacks during the previous weeks, the days (weeks) long artillery bombardment was abandoned for this attack. Instead, a short bombardment would be conducted and the infantry would move in fast, to take and hold the area. Three brigades (26th, 27th, 28th) would conduct the attack simultaneously, while one (the South African brigade) would be held in reserve. The attack on Longueval began on 13 July, and initially things went exactly as planned. The artillery bombardment was effective, the Germans' first line just outside the town was taken easily. However, once the infantry got into the town of Longueval, they were having to go from house to house, bombing the Germans out of fortified dugouts and machine gun positions, and it bogged down very quickly as no one was at all trained in this sort of proto-urban fighting. Making things worse was the fact that a second German brigade was dug into the nearby wood, and they were dumping massive amounts of machine gun, rifle, and mortar fire into the British in Longueval. Eventually the 9th Division commander decided that he had to commit his reserves, the South African brigade, into taking Delville Wood...by themselves. Their attack began early on 14 July. They started off from the parts of Longueval that the rest of the division had taken, and they charged on into the wood. They easily overwhelmed a handful of German forces in the southern half of the woods, and reported they had taken the whole thing by mid-afternoon. Fairly soon after, the South Africans realized they'd be lulled into a trap. Almost 8,000 Germans were waiting in the north side of the woods and in the surrounding farmland, and they very quickly moved to encircle the South African brigade. The South African commander realized this, but since his orders were "to take the wood at all costs", he decided to dig in rather than retreat. Digging in, however, was more difficult he had anticipated. Tree roots and blown up trees made it impossible to dig proper trenches, so each man dug a shallow scrape and hoped for the best. Soon after, the Germans counterattacked in full force (they fully realized the value of the ground), and the South Africans were in for one of the worst war experiences I've ever read about. Essentially, a German brigade (from the 8th Division) was lined up on each of three sides, and all three attacked for most of the next day. Overnight, somehwere between 100 and 120 German guns and mortars dropped both HE and gas on the wood in what was probably the single most concentrated artillery bombardment in the history of the world to that point: around midnight, the shells were falling at a rate of around four per second on an area not much bigger than a city block. This was made worse by tree bursts (a shell hits a tree and explodes throwing its shrapnel downwards), which made the slit trenches they'd dug even less effective. The South Africans took all this on the chin. The next day, the British started firing back. They conduced another absolutely massive bombardment on the north half of the wood, hoping to blast the Germans out of their positions. The South Africans, after having endured the horrors of the previous night, had to attack the area following the bombardment, and their attack was beaten back with heavy casualties. They still had something of a perimeter at this point, but a third of their numbers were casualties at this point and they were running low on food, water, and ammunition. A relief force was organized from the remaining 9th Division brigades, but they too were blown apart by German artillery, and so the South Africans remained alone and surrounded in the middle of what remained of the woods. On the 18th, the Germans made their final attempt to clear the South Africans out of the wood. They were having great success breaking up reinforcement attempts with artillery fire, but they could not dig out what was left of the guys in the wood. Again, a simultaneous attack was conducted on three sides, and this was when the battle probably reached its most ridiculous: all forms of command and control had broken down, and the South Africans no longer had any sort of coherent defensive structure. Small units built little forts out of downed trees, and simply fought individually for survival. The Germans barged into the woods and likewise had all forms of command dissolve, and the whole thing devolved into company-sized elements fighting hand-to-hand with no semblance of a coherent strategy. The Germans were never able to clear them all out. Finally, on the 19th British reinforcements started to break through and relieve what was left of the South African brigade, who had been stuck in the woods for 5 days. By this time, there was nothing left of the woods, it was just a scape of shell holes, blown up trees, and corpses: in an area less than half a square mile, 25,000 soldiers had fought one another for nearly a week. Somewhere between 5,000 and 8,000 soldiers were dead in the immediate area, plus as many who were terribly wounded and couldn't yet be evacuated. It took another two days to finally clear the area entirely, and the men who fought this final phase of the battle did so literally crawling over bodies stacked two or three high from one end of the wood to the other. The South African brigade suffered around 80% casualties, of the 3,100 or so who entered the woods on July 14th, just over 600 came back out. The population of South Africa was pretty tiny at this time (1m "citizens", read: white people), and they'd only been able to man the one brigade at this point of the war. Proportionally, this loss was simply unbelievable. To compare, it would be as if modern day American lost about 800,000 soldiers in a single battle over the course of less than a week. The German 8th Division suffered similarly. Incidentally, if you're interested you should take a look at the site on Google Maps, link is here I think, or just search for Longueval. The town is a beautiful little place. bewbies fucked around with this message at 18:41 on Feb 2, 2011 |
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Feb 2, 2011 18:33
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ManicParroT posted:EDIT: Last question, I keep thinking of them. Given the technology of the time, would there have been any way of preventing WW1 from turning into grinding trench warfare? Or was it inevitably going to bog down, even with the benefits of hindsight? There wasn't any real reason (at least in terms of technology) that the Western Front should have been the static stalemate that it was. The Russians and the Germans both showed that infantry was still perfectly capable of conducting successful offensive operations without armor or air support. Machine guns weren't the end-all impregnable defensive masterweapon that history has recorded them as, and artillery (especially the big guns) wasn't effective at all against a fast moving attack. Now, whether or not a more mobile war would have been "better" is kind of another issue. Even in a more mobile kind of war, the casualties between two armies form industrialized nations are going to be horrific. In a mobile war, you've got more units overrun, more counterattacks, and the localized fighting tends to be just as bad or worse...the only real difference is you are taking more territory per man lost. Using more modern tactics might have been a net gain if one side or the other had been able to completely outmaneuver an opponent and end the war by taking key strategic assets (like the Germans did against the French in WWII, where casualties on both sides were relatively light), but a mobile war can just as easily descend into a battle of attrition as a static trench war can, as the Eastern Front did in WWII. bewbies fucked around with this message at 19:05 on Feb 2, 2011 |
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Feb 2, 2011 19:03
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It should also be remembered (using my memory of The Guns of August as a reference) that the French suffered absolutely horrific casualties in the first month of the war. A cursory glance at wikipedia finds this quote:quote:By the end of August, the French Army had suffered 75,000 dead of which 27,000 were killed on 22 August alone, making it a day to rival the first day on the Somme for bloodshed. Total French casualties for the first month of the war were 260,000 of which 140,000 were sustained during the climactic final four days of the battle of the Frontiers. (To put it in perspective, wikipedia notes that France suffered in sum around 1.3 million military deaths and 4.3 million casualties. In other words, in the span of I guess 2% of the war, 6% of France's casualties were sustained. Which seems small until you realize that the previous major French war, the Franco-Prussian war in 1871, saw maybe 500 thousand casualties total for Germany and France over a period ten times as long.) If the whole war were fought like this (unlikely but still), the casualty rates could've been even worse than they already were. . . .
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Feb 3, 2011 03:56
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gohuskies posted:I found an interesting story on another forum. Apparently on Iwo Jima, a destroyer off shore picked up transmissions from a Marine tank company in battle. Thought people might be interested in reading it, it's a look into what it might have been like to have been in a tank in battle. That was awesome. Good WWI posts ITT. I might of asked this before, but can anyone explain how submachine guns were distributed in armies? For 50 years it seems like squads were mixed with rifles, submachine guns, light MG's, etc.
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Feb 3, 2011 10:10
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KurdtLives posted:That was awesome. Submachine guns first became common in 1918, but they were considered to be more of a trench warfare weapon, like tanks, so their use remained marginal for most of 1920's and 1930's. During WW2 their usefulness was recognized, especially by Soviets who had hardly any SMG's in the army in 1939 but had built millions of them by the end of war. The way the SMG's were treated depended on the army, and also on the SMG's themselves. Eg. a cheap gun like Sten made of stamped steel parts could be given as a side arm for truckers and such. In Finland, the Suomi SMG was also practically a LMG replacement: it was still accurate at 300 meters, and in Finnish forests that was enough. In a 1939 Finnish rifle platoon, two squads had 9 rifles and 1 SMG, while two squads had 6 rifles and 1 LMG. By 1944 this had changed so that each squad was supposed to have 1 LMG, 2 SMG's and 6 rifles. During assaults and breakthroughs, all SMG soldiers from the company could be put together to lead the attack.
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Feb 3, 2011 10:57
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Nenonen posted:
 This is what the crimean war was about. British soldiers charging at guns because two aristocrats did not get on. "C'est magnifique, mais ce n'est pas la guerre." As if the UK has ever had to take advice from the French about fighting a war.
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Feb 3, 2011 12:19
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Nenonen posted:Submachine guns first became common in 1918, but they were considered to be more of a trench warfare weapon, like tanks, so their use remained marginal for most of 1920's and 1930's. During WW2 their usefulness was recognized, especially by Soviets who had hardly any SMG's in the army in 1939 but had built millions of them by the end of war. Also as a general principle, just about all armies increased the amount of sub machine guns they distributed to the troops as the war went on, because it was found that at the range where a rifle was a lot better than the SMG, most soldiers weren't that accurate anyway. The Germans even tried using an increased number of SMGs to offset a lack of support assets in the Volksgrenadier division(a common misconception was that these were last-ditch militia, that's the Volkssturm.). This wasn't very successful. The Soviets even had SMG companies, which would add punch to assaults when needed, owing to their doctrine of concentration.
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Feb 3, 2011 13:27
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There's also just not a whole lot of opportunity for aimed rifle fire, even if you're a really good shot with a rifle. LMGs are better for most of that type of work.
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Feb 3, 2011 19:57
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bewbies posted:!!!!! I've been following this thread for over a month, and this is one of the most harrowing things I've seen so far. Where did you read up on this, and would you recommend it?
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Feb 3, 2011 22:49
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Does the United States Navy have a single flagship, or is it too large for it? It seems that some of the individual fleets have flagships, but I haven't found any conclusive info on if the entire Navy has one ship above all others.
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Feb 4, 2011 18:27
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DarkCrawler posted:Does the United States Navy have a single flagship, or is it too large for it? It seems that some of the individual fleets have flagships, but I haven't found any conclusive info on if the entire Navy has one ship above all others. The closest thing we have is probably the USS Constitution; the bad-rear end little frigate that's been flying the stars and stripes for over 200 years. Setting a front line vessel as the flagship for your whole navy doesn't serve any purpose and just makes it a bigger target due to the PR hit if it is attacked or sunk.
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Feb 4, 2011 19:29
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What does a 'flagship' mean today? Back in the day when it took weeks or months to send a message to your fleet, it was the ship where the fleet's admiral kept his staff. But today the admiral might as well be located in a ground base, or an airplane. Yet some navies still call some of their ships as flagships. Eg. FNS Pohjanmaa is the Finnish flagship, yet I struggle at seeing the situation where the admiral of the Finnish Navy and his entire staff would be stationed onboard a minelayer ship in a real war situation.
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Feb 4, 2011 21:27
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I'd guess it is more of a symbolic thing these days. The "Leader" of the navy. Constitution would be a good fit from that viewpoint. Pohjanmaa too, though not because it's age but because it's our biggest and baddest ship. Russians have Admiral Kuznetsov for the same reason. I think Enterprise occupied kind of a flagship position during World War II?
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Feb 4, 2011 22:36
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I think that was mostly due to the absurdly good luck Enterprise had, but it's always seemed that way to me.
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Feb 5, 2011 03:55
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Nenonen posted:What does a 'flagship' mean today? Back in the day when it took weeks or months to send a message to your fleet, it was the ship where the fleet's admiral kept his staff. But today the admiral might as well be located in a ground base, or an airplane. Yet some navies still call some of their ships as flagships. Eg. FNS Pohjanmaa is the Finnish flagship, yet I struggle at seeing the situation where the admiral of the Finnish Navy and his entire staff would be stationed onboard a minelayer ship in a real war situation. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flagship#Naval_use You're looking at it from too narrow a view. A flagship is the ship that has an admiral or commodore aboard and is used to coordinate the action of the ships under his command. While that might be the ship that the senior naval officer in the Finnish Navy hoists his flag from, there are probably other flagships that more junior admirals use to command the ships placed directly under their charge. Essentially, there is generally more than one admiral and more than one flagship in any reasonably sized navy. For example, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carrier_Strike_Group_One The flagship in this case is the carrier.
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Feb 5, 2011 04:34
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Back to the attack helicopter question. Tom Clancy's Red Storm Rising (excellent book btw) shows attack helicopters on both sides getting absolutely slaughtered in conventional warfare between evenly matched opponents. Mobile SAMs, MANPADs, AAA, etc. all make for a very short life expectancy for a chopper pilot, without even considering enemy fighters. Things might have improved slightly since the late 80's, with newer stand-off weapons that allow the helicopters to shoot from greater ranges. However, this also means that air defense has also improved greatly. Also, the tactical situation might dictate that helicopters must close to within visual range of the battle, making them excellent targets. Now assymetrical warfare, where you're blowing up Hajji's wedding party with smart missiles, the advantage obviously lies with the helicopter.
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Feb 5, 2011 04:57
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INTJ Mastermind posted:Back to the attack helicopter question. Tom Clancy's Red Storm Rising (excellent book btw) shows attack helicopters on both sides getting absolutely slaughtered in conventional warfare between evenly matched opponents. Mobile SAMs, MANPADs, AAA, etc. all make for a very short life expectancy for a chopper pilot, without even considering enemy fighters. At the risk of re-igniting the tank destroyer discussion - Some people say "well if TDs are so good why did we get rid of them?" And here you see that we didn't. We put them in the air, or on foot as Javelin teams. The assets will be very effective when used in their specific role - when an enemy armored assault breaks through, these units can flood to the wound zone and stop the enemy advance through shoot-and-scoot ambushes and harassment. They ought to fulfill roughly the same doctrinal role, and we shouldn't be surprised when they fail to do things they weren't designed to do. So we see helicopters fail on the offensive, in - doesn't mean that they couldn't set some mean ambushes - popping out of dead ground, taking a shot, and getting behind cover again.
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Feb 5, 2011 06:16
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INTJ Mastermind posted:Back to the attack helicopter question. Tom Clancy's Red Storm Rising (excellent book btw) shows attack helicopters on both sides getting absolutely slaughtered in conventional warfare between evenly matched opponents. Mobile SAMs, MANPADs, AAA, etc. all make for a very short life expectancy for a chopper pilot, without even considering enemy fighters. During my conscription days in the Swedish Army I was in an armoured batallion, and we studied the result of the Swedish anti-air tank Luftvärnskanonvagn 90 against attack helicopters. The US wanted to test their Apaches in the forested areas of northern Sweden were our armoured batallion was situated. Every time the Apaches approached over the treetops they had been spotted and "taken down" by a Lvkv 90 before they even knew the tanks were out there. So yes, attack helicopters would probably die in droves against someone with good enough equipment.
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Feb 5, 2011 11:15
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gohuskies posted:At the risk of re-igniting the tank destroyer discussion - The decline in the deployment of tank destroyers really had more to do with the development of good dual-purpose guns on medium tanks than anything else. When it became clear that the medium tank, and later the MBT, was adequate both to support infantry and to kill enemy armor the tank destroyer and assault gun lost their roles. The development of guided missiles just put the final nail in the coffin when everyone and his grandma on the battlefield got a can of whoop-rear end to unleash on enemy armor at a moment's notice.
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Feb 5, 2011 12:36
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lilljonas posted:During my conscription days in the Swedish Army I was in an armoured batallion, and we studied the result of the Swedish anti-air tank Luftvärnskanonvagn 90 against attack helicopters. The US wanted to test their Apaches in the forested areas of northern Sweden were our armoured batallion was situated. Every time the Apaches approached over the treetops they had been spotted and "taken down" by a Lvkv 90 before they even knew the tanks were out there. So yes, attack helicopters would probably die in droves against someone with good enough equipment. Haha, seriously another LVKV-crew member on this very forum! The LVKV90 owned especially versus helicopters. But then again I only go to train versus the old Swedish ones. I think the biggest advantage that it provides is the radar allowing the tanks it supports to be aware of nearby helicopters so they can take them out.
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Feb 5, 2011 13:18
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Godholio posted:I think that was mostly due to the absurdly good luck Enterprise had, but it's always seemed that way to me. Honestly, it was a sin that it got scrapped. What the gently caress, United States, how could you not make it a museum ship? 
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Feb 5, 2011 13:24
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