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french lies
Apr 16, 2008
So there’s this place called the People’s Republic of China. You might have heard of it. You may use this thread to talk about things relating to that place. As you may also be aware, the sovereign territory of the People’s Republic of China includes many fine places, such as Taiwan. You may use this thread to talk about this, and other provinces of China.

Index
  • 1.1 The Three Nos: Rules and suggestions
  • 1.2 Sources
  • 1.3 Twitter/Weibo
  • 1.4 Suggested Reading
  • 1.5 Links
  • 2.1 How does China work anyway? by BrotherAdso (Click here)
  • 3.1 Recommended posts (Click here)



To promote scientific and harmonious argument, we insist everyone abide by The Three Nos:

  • No Zhonglish. Don’t write posts in Chinese or in English with Chinese words substituting for English ones. Annotating names is fine, but don’t overdo it. When using characters, stick to simplified script, as that is what most people will be familiar with. The reason for this is that the trademark sprinkling of Chinese characters that ex-pats tend to use closes off the people who can't speak Chinese, and makes the discussion very cliquish.

  • No discussion about Chinese language learning or other practical matters (visa, studies, work, your girlfriend Dongdong). These topics have their own separate threads, found in the ‘Autonomous Regions’ section below. Discussion about topics like language politics is fine.

  • No discussion on hot-button topics without proper naming etiquette, e.g. don’t use the Chinese names of things like: noted dissidents, political prisoners or controversial historical events. Referring to these things by their initials is the best way. Example: LXB is good, Liu Xiaobo is okay, but using his Chinese name is probably not a good idea. This is to avoid the forum getting blacklisted and inaccessible from Mainland China.

Other than that, feel free to discuss anything China-related, be it current events, history or culture. I’ve included two lists below, one of recommended literature and another of sources in English and Chinese. Contributions to these are welcome.

In the second post you’ll find a long article by fellow goon BrotherAdso on the workings of the Chinese government. It’s really good and I recommend you set aside an hour of your time to read it.

On that note, I’ve noticed a lot of goons (including myself) currently live, study or work in China. Some of you even teach Chinese or Chinese-related subjects in university. Effortposts, regardless of topic, will be greatly appreciated by everyone. Those who take the time to write longer contributions will be rewarded with a place in the appendix of the OP, which I’ve reserved for “model posts”.

And of course, if you read Chinese, consider translating interesting articles or blog posts when you come across them. This is a ton of effort, but know that not only are you getting some excellent language practice, you are also contributing in a more abstract sense through making Chinese voices heard. I’ll try to make room for translations in the OP as well.

So without further ado, let’s get on with it!

Autonomous Regions

Ask/Tell Thread about Chinese History
http://forums.somethingawful.com/showthread.php?threadid=3447396&userid=0&perpage=40&pagenumber=1

The China Megathread (Tourism & Travel)
http://forums.somethingawful.com/showthread.php?threadid=3413886

Teaching English in Taiwan (Tourism & Travel)
http://forums.somethingawful.com/showthread.php?threadid=3330057&pagenumber=32&perpage=40#post395784789

Chinese Language Thread (Science, Academics and Languages)
http://forums.somethingawful.com/showthread.php?threadid=2683932&pagenumber=30&perpage=40#post374032197




Most of the reporting done in and on China should be taken with a few grains of salt. Sifting out what’s good from what’s bad, what’s reliable from what’s not et.c. takes time. A good place to start is the China Digital Times, which is a US-funded (and therefore free) news aggregator that picks up most, if not all of the important China stories that run in the English-language media. Or you could check out an independent website like Danwei, which has staff that reads Chinese, and the experience to put events in perspective. The WSJ China Real Time Report is a decent English-language source. Twitter and its Chinese equivalent, Sina Weibo, are also excellent ways of discovering content.

Sources in English

News
  • China Digital Times
    Operated out of Hong Kong and a great aggregator of China news. Picks up reporting and commentary from a wide range of English- and Chinese-language sources. Best of all, it's completely free! That's right, no annoying pay-walls or anything of the sort.

  • Wall Street Journal - China Real Time Report
    The WSJ does some of the better China reporting of the US newspapers, and the RTR has the added benefit of not being stuck behind a paywall like the rest of the paper is. As good a place as any to keep up to date on what’s happening in China.

  • NYT China Page
    The New York Times also has somewhat extensive coverage of China, and they're more generous with the free content, though I often find their reporting is not as good as the WSJ. Also a decent place to keep informed about China news.


Magazines
  • Danwei
    Online magazine featuring book reviews, in-depth articles and news summaries. Run by a handful of experienced China hands, with a very high standard of quality. Unfortunately, they now update very infrequently.

  • China Smack
    Webzine focusing on Chinese internet culture. Tracks memes and online reaction to events in the news, featuring translated comments from Chinese netizens. Also notable for being an independent website in English run almost exclusively by native Chinese.

  • Ministry of Tofu
    China Smack for grown-ups. A great aggregator for trending stories and items on the Chinese internet, with English translations if you don't feel comfortable reading Chinese.

  • China Daily Show
    The Onion, only targeted towards ex-pats and China watchers. Satirical commentary on China news and westerners. Surprisingly funny, even hilarious at its best.

  • Offbeat China
  • China Media Project

Blogs
  • Sinocism
    Current affairs blog by Bill Bishop. Bishop really knows his poo poo, and his command of written Chinese is extremely impressive for a foreigner. Has in common with Danwei’s writers that he is often able to cast a wider net in his articles. Includes a daily list of articles in Chinese and English. A must-have for any serious China RSS feed.

  • Patrick Chovanec
    One of the smartest and most lucid commenters on Chinese politics. Chovanec is extremely knowledgeable, has great access and best of all, he has an amazing ability to condense byzanthine events into very readable and accessible prose. Massive pro-click.

  • Blocked on Weibo
    The author of this blog runs a monthly check on several hundred thousand terms on Weibo to see which ones are banned. He publishes a monthly list, and also analysis of individual words and phrases that are banned. Many bizarre and unexpected phrases are subject to censorship, for reasons we may never know. Fascinating reading.

  • EastSouthWestNorth
    Infrequently updated blog with high-quality translations of blog posts and other items in Chinese.

  • China Financial Blog
  • China Law Blog
  • Blood & Treasure
  • Rectified.Name 正名
  • DigiCha
  • Inside-Out China
  • The China Beat
  • This is China!

Podcasts
  • Sinica
    Fantastic podcast hosted by a who's who of English-speaking China journalists, including Kaiser Kuo, Jeremy Goldkorn, Bill Bishop, Evan Osnos and more. Covers current events, Chinese society and politics.

  • China History Podcast
    Weekly podcast about Chinese history. Run by a cool old guy who is both knowledgeable and able to make otherwise dry topics interesting. I’ve listened to almost all the episodes and really couldn’t recommend it more.

Sources in Chinese

News
  • 21st Century Business Herald (21世纪经济报道)
    PRC equivalent of the Wall Street Journal, read by the political and business elites. Standard of journalism notably higher than pure propaganda outlets like People’s Daily, or hardline party rags like Global Times.

Magazines
  • Caijing Magazine (财经杂志) (iPad edition)
    News mag by and for the elites. They do, or at least used to do, a lot of serious muckracking journalism. Dense, dry and difficult to read. Founded by Hu Shuli, a female journalist, in 1998, who then left the magazine in 2009 under murky circumstances.

  • Caixin Century (新世纪周刊) (iPad edition)
    Counterpoint to Caijing founded by Hu Shuli after her departure from Caijing. Reports on issues not usually tackled at length by the Chinese press, like corruption, women’s rights and the environment.

  • CBN Weekly (第一财经周刊) (iPad edition)
    Trendy business magazine. It’s a lighter read than Caijing and Caixin Century, and does a lot interesting feature articles. If you want to know what issues are on the minds of Chinese professionals in their twenties and thirties, this is the magazine to read.

Podcasts/Youtube
  • (iTunes) Qiang Qiang San Ren Xing (锵锵三人行)
    Daily talk show by the HK-based Mandarin channel Phoenix TV. Always features interesting commentary on the issues of the day, though nothing controversial is likely to pop up.

  • (iTunes) Deutsche Welle Chinese (德国之声中文广播)
    Two daily broadcasts of 30 minutes each. Their budget has been cut pretty badly over the last few years, meaning shorter programs and less original content. Still worth listening to for the odd interview and their listener segments.

  • (Youtube) 2100 Quan Min Kai Jiang (2100全民开讲)
    Crazy, no holds barred political talk show full of unsubstantiated speculation, self-righteous rants and tons of yelling. Probably my favorite TV show in Chinese. Exemplifies both the very best and the very worst of the Taiwanese media.

Sources in Other Languages
  • (Danish) Kinablog
    Blog run by Danish journalist Kim Ratchke. Great resource for Scandinavian goons (I know there are a lot of you). Features in-depth posts and weekly summaries of the news.



Twitter and its Chinese equivalent Weibo are great sources, but can often seem overwhelming if you don’t know who to follow. That’s especially the case with Weibo, what with the added language barrier and all. Below is a list of people you can follow to begin with if you’re interested in China. (some of these were snagged from fellow SA poster SB35)

On Twitter



Interesting links that don’t fit in anywhere else are posted here.




An astonishing number of books have been produced on China. I won’t lay claim to having read more than a paltry number of them. In English, you can find books about virtually any topic from Tang underwear to Mao’s dental hygiene. And of course, even that will pale in comparison to all the material you can access if you read Chinese. For other languages, the selection is smaller but still significant. The list is compiled from my own bookshelf and suggestions from others, and is updated as new suggestions come in.

If you need a starting point, and are interested in Chinese history, I heartily recommend Patricia Ebrey’s book, Cambridge Illustrated History of China. The reason for this is that it is light on specifics and very easy to read. It is commonly used as an introductory textbook in Chinese history courses. Fairbank’s volume is good and widely available, but much denser, to the point where it may very well be unreadable without some foreknowledge. Gernet’s book has similar issues. I have heard good things about Spence’s Search for Modern China, so I am including that as well.

For history books, you can also check out this expanded reading list by Professor William Rowe from John Hopkins University. (tabris)

The University of Warwick has reading lists for its seminars on Chinese history. Professor Shawn Breslin, also at Warwick, has had the decency to make some of his research papers freely available. (Hong Xiuquan)

History - General Overviews
  • Patricia Ebrey, Cambridge Illustrated History of China (Amazon)
    Probably the best layman’s introduction to Chinese history short of an Idiot’s Guide. Lots of anecdotes, colorful pictures and other elements that help spice up the experience. Used widely as a college textbook, often along with its companion volume, Chinese Civilization: A Sourcebook.

  • Jonathan D. Spence, Search for Modern China (Amazon)
    This is often held up as the definitive English-language introductory volume to Chinese history. Written by a now-retired Yale professor, it explains the major phases of Chinese history in a very accessible style. Comes recommended by a lot of people. Has a great companion volume of translated primary source documents, called The Search for Modern China: Documentary Collection (Hong Xiuquan)

  • John K. Fairbank, China: A New History (Amazon)
    Can be found cheap almost everywhere. Fairbank writes well, but also makes a lot of strange choices: he mostly glosses over imperial history, and devotes a lot of time to parochial topics like Neo-Confucianism and the Ming tax code. Somewhat academic, and requires foreknowledge going in.

  • Jacques Gernet, A History of Chinese Civilization (Amazon)
    This is a translation of Le Monde Chinois written by the famous French sinologist Jacques Gernet. The book is comprehensive but very dense, and requires a dedicated reader.

  • Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, The Rise of Modern China: (Amazon)
    Used to enjoy wide prominence as a standard textbook on Chinese history. Deep (1136 pages, making it the single largest volume on this list) but supremely readable, though it seems to have stopped updating after the 1997 HK handover. (Hong Xiuquan)

Imperial History (221 BC - 1912 AD)
  • Jonathan D. Spence, God’s Chinese Son: The Heavenly Kingdom of Hong Xiuquan (Amazon)
    Tells the story of the Taiping Rebellion, a bloody uprising instigated by a Christian Hakka who believed himself to be the brother of Jesus. Spence recounts the events focusing on the idiosyncratic leader of the movement, Hong Xiuquan. (menino and BrotherAdso)

  • Ray Huang, 1587, A Year of No Significance: The Ming Dynasty in Decline (《万历十五年》) (Amazon)
    Huang examines the corruption and failings of the Ming dynasty, using the reign of the Wanli emperor as his starting point. The system in place during this time was, to put it bluntly, one of the most ridiculous and inefficient ways ever devised to run a country. Considered a classic in English-language literature about Chinese history. Also available in a great Chinese translation done by the author himself.

  • Paul A. Cohen, History in Three Keys (Amazon)
    An account of the anti-foreign Boxer rebellion of 1899-1901. Written by a Wellesley professor of Asian Studies, it’s engagingly written and balances good historical research with an original thesis and analytical approach. (BrotherAdso)

  • Edward Schafer, The Golden Peaches of Samarkand: A Study of T'ang Exotics (Amazon)
    A study of Tang material culture, especially exotics. Great for just skipping around (Ooo, snake bile!), it builds a compelling case of the cosmopolitanism of the dynasty. (Brennanite)

  • Edward Schafer, The Vermilion Bird: T'ang Images of the South (Amazon)
    A history through literature of Southern China and neighboring states. Covers minority peoples, customs, and places. (Brennanite)

  • Charles Holcombe, The Genesis of East Asia, 221 B.C.-A.D. 907 (Asian Interactions and Comparisons) (Amazon)
    Examines the connections between China, Korea, Japan, and Vietnam from the Han to the decline of the Tang empire. A really good book that explores their shared cultural heritage, but also important differences between the countries. (Brennanite)

Modern History (1912 - Present)
  • Jan Wong, Red China Blues: My Long March from Mao to Now (Amazon)
    Memoir written by a Chinese-Canadian woman who went to the PRC in 1972, when the Cultural Revolution was just starting to peter out. She studied at Beijing University and embraced Maoism, living like a common Chinese person, until she was unceremoniously thrown out of the country a few years later. Bittersweet reflection on the period and her own disillusionment with Maoism.

  • Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Amazon)
    Cold War history told from a Chinese perspective. The author essentially argues that Mao was at the heart of the PRC’s foreign entanglements, not only as part of a dick-waving contest with the other communist nations, but also to justify constant revolutions and sweeping political changes at home.

  • Maurice Meisner, Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic (Amazon)
    Written by a recently-deceased professor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Does a good job of explaining the internal contradictions that led to China's current political situation (Mao's utopian voluntarism vs. an entrenched Leninist bureaucracy dedicated to economic development). (Small Talk)

Politics
  • Tony Saich, Governance and Politics of China (Amazon)
    Decent overview of the political system in China, with a slightly partisan bias. Often assigned as a standard textbook on contemporary Chinese politics (and priced accordingly).

  • Richard McGregor, The Party: The Secret World of China’s Communist Rulers (Amazon)
    “Exposé” of the inner life of the CCP, written by a former FT China correspondent. Shows the diffuse nature of the CCP and how it is embedded throughout the layers of government structure. Contains many anecdotes and stories drawn from his time working in China.

  • Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World (Amazon)
    Confronts commonly held biases and assumptions in the West about China’s role in the world now and going forward, chief among these the “necessity” of democracy for a well-functioning economy. Without being alarmist or propagandist, Jacques draws up a scenario for how China will be the world’s leading superpower by 2050.

Religion and Belief Systems
  • Benjamin I. Schwarz, The World of Thought In Ancient China (Amazon)
    Authoritative overview of the Chinese schools of philosophy that arose in ancient China, most notably during the Spring and Autumn Period. Among other topics, Schwarz looks at Confucianism, Legalism, Mohism and, of course, Taoism.

  • Daniel L. Overmyer, Religion in China Today (Amazon)
    A collection of essays about the contemporary practice of religion in China. Covers Qi Gong cults, the syncretic religions practiced in Hong Kong and Taiwan, and the less mainstream practices of Islam and Christianity.

  • David Jordan, Gods, Ghosts & Ancestors: Folk Religion in a Taiwanese Village (Free online version)
    An anthropologist's account of the religious mix of a Taiwanese village and serves as a peek into traditional (diverse) Chinese religious practices. Particularly interesting in the context of some persistent and resurgent mainland beliefs/practices and some of the more interesting stuff happening in Hong Kong. Available for free online. (Hong Xiuquan)

  • John Lagerway and Liu Penglai, Early Chinese Religion (Amazon)
    A two part, four volume set covering religious thought and practice from the Shang through Tang dynasties (1250 BCE to 907 CE). A scholarly work, it is broken into a series of articles for each period. Topics cover ancestor worship, Confucian rites, ritual texts, divination, shamanism, sacred space and time, local and state cults, funerary practices, medicine and a whole lot more--plus all flavors of Buddhism and Daoism and popular religion! All of the articles are written by expert scholars. (Brennanite)

  • Isabelle Robinet, Taoism: Growth of a Religion (Amazon)
    The place to start for anyone looking to understand religious Daoism. Covers its relationship to classical/philosophical Daoism, different schools and subschools, beliefs, practices, and sacred texts. Meant as a introductory text for college religion classes. (Brennanite)

  • Stephen Bokenkamp, Early Daoist Scriptures (Amazon)
    Introduction and translation of major scriptures from the larger schools and categories. Presented chronologically and with context for ease of understanding. You can just read the introductions or skip to a specific example of a text. (Brennanite)

  • Erik Zurcher, The Buddhist Conquest of China (Amazon)
    the granddaddy of all books about the introduction and spread of Buddhism in China. If you only read one book on Chinese religion, read this one. (Brennanite)

  • Kenneth Ch'en, Buddhism in China (Amazon)
    Good overview of the history of Buddhism throughout imperial China. Covers the establishment of different schools, and especially its relationship with the state/emperor. (Brennanite)

  • Stephen Teiser, The Ghost Festival in Medieval China (Amazon)
    Uses the very popular Ghost Festival (yulanpen) to show how Chinese society mixed together elements of Buddhism and folk beliefs. A good discussion of how most Chinese actually engaged in religious practices. (Brennanite)

Biographies
  • Simon Winchester, The Man Who Loved China: The Fantastic Story about the Eccentric Scientist Who Unlocked the Secrets of the Middle Kingdom (Amazon)
    Fascinating biography of Joseph Needham, the principal author of Science and Civilization in China. Needham had a distinguished academic career, which was unfortunately tarnished by his personal idiosyncracies and a blind love of China that clouded his judgment, with disastrous results.

  • Ezra Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (Amazon)
    Great book about one of the most important men of Chinese history. Vogel’s biography is divided into two parts, one tracing Deng’s rise to de facto head of the PRC in the 70s, and the other the sweeping changes enacted after he got into power.

  • Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China (Amazon)
    Sympathetic account of the life of Chiang Kai-shek, leader of the KMT and arch rival of Mao. The book, among other things, argues that the failings of KMT came about in large part due to the unreliable assistance of the Americans (a controversial viewpoint), and that it was Chiang’s vision for China, not Mao’s, that triumphed in the end. (menino)

  • Jonathan Spence, To Change China: Western Advisers in China (Amazon)
    Chronicles the lives and works of sixteen Western advisers working in China, from the Jesuit missionaries during the Qing dynasty to American military advisors assisting the KMT. Long story short; lots of starry-eyed white guys hope to fulfill their dreams of fame/fortune/preaching the good word by selling their technical/medical/organizational skills to the Chinese. Each one leaves just as dejected and cynical as the other. Should be considered a must-read by current and would-be expats.

Business
  • Dan Breznitz, Run of the Red Queen: Government, Innovation, Globalization, and Economic Growth in China (Amazon)
    Interesting book that doesn’t fit into the usual mold of business literature about China. It looks at the development model of China, why it has been successful and how the state, through various methods, has tried to wrangle it into something it’s not.

Education
  • Andrew Kipnis, Governing Educational Desire: Culture, Politics and Schooling in China (Amazon)
    An academic look at education in China. Kipnis starts at ground level in a small county called Zouping, then zooms further out to look at the country as a whole and how the state is shaping educational desire among the populace. (Curved)

Women and Gender
  • Dorothy Ko, Cinderella’s Sisters: A Revisionist History of Footbinding (Amazon)
    Examines footbinding, women's history, modern China, the influences of western norms upon China, and social constructions of beauty. Tries to show footbinding in a more wide cultural context, rather than dismissing it as just an oppressive tool of the patriarchy. (nerdpony)

  • Dorothy Ko, Teachers of the Inner Chambers: Women and Culture in Seventeenth-Century China (Amazon)
    By the same author as Cinderella’s Sisters. Examines the more general role of women in cultural transmission and domestic management of households. (BrotherAdso)

  • Bret Hinsch, Women in Early Imperial China (Amazon)
    Addresses women's roles in family life/kinship circles, labor, legal rights, education, literature, participation in government and rites, and cosmology (yin-yang). Written for those with little or no background in Chinese studies. (Brennanite)

  • Susan Mann and Yu-yin Cheng, Under Confucian Eyes (Amazon)
    Uses a variety of contemporary sources to examine how gender was written about by the Chinese literati. Some of the sources are written by women. Good for skipping from topic to topic. Covers Tang through Qing (618-1911), but most of the documents are from the Qing (1644-1911). (Brennanite)

  • Nina Wang, Images of Women in Chinese Culture and Thought (Amazon)
    Similar to Under Confucian Eyes, only containing more primary source material. Covers Shang through Song (1600 BCE-1279 CE). The two are good companion pieces. (Brennanite)

  • Wilt Idema and Beata Grant, The Red Brush: Women's Writings in Imperial China (Amazon)
    A monstrous volume (seriously, you could kill with it) of women's writings from the Han to the Qing. Poets are particularly well-represented. Biographical sketches and historical context are included with the literature. (Brennanite)

  • Patricia Ebrey, The Inner Quarters: Marriage and Women's Lives in the Sung Period (Amazon)
    Examines the simultaneous expansion of women's place in society and the restrictions placed upon them by Neo-Confucianists. Haven't read it, but I like her other works on similar topics. (Brennanite)


Multi-volume works
  • Various Authors, The Cambridge History of China
    Expensive as gently caress. Don’t even consider this unless you are literally living on piles of money (or in a university). The Chinese edition is cheaper but extensively censored. Supposed to be good, though I haven’t yet earned the required millions to know.

  • Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China
    Joseph Needham was a genius-level weirdo biologist who caught yellow fever and later in many ways became the prototypical white CCP apologist. He learned Chinese and devoted the rest of his life to the so-called Needham Question, e.g. why China, with its relatively early development of gunpowder and other inventions, was to lag so much behind later on in history. He answered it (partly) by writing this crazy multi-volume monstrosity about the development of science and technology in China.

Books in Chinese
  • Lung Yingtai - Big River, Big Sea: The Untold Stories of 1949 (《大江大海一九四九》) (books.com.tw)
    This book became a big hit in Taiwan, selling over 100,000 copies. Comes recommended by several Chinese friends of mine. The author, who’s a famous writer in Taiwan, looks at the untold stories of the mass migration to Taiwan from Mainland China following the Kuomintang’s defeat in 1949. Banned in the PRC.

  • Fei Xiaotong - From The Soil: The Foundations of Chinese Society (《乡土中国》) (Amazon, English translation)
    A classic in Chinese anthropology. Fei takes a macro view, examining how the countryside has shaped Chinese society over the centuries. He also looks at problems like rural literacy and poverty, and gives suggestions for how to solve them. Available in an English translation by Gary Hamilton.

  • Yang Jisheng - Tombstone: An Account of Chinese Famine in the 1960s (《墓碑:中国六十年代大饥荒的纪实》) (HK Book City)
    Massive work about, you guessed it, Chinese famine in the 1960s following The Great Leap Forward. Compares favorably to the Jung Chang-approved Mao’s Great Famine by Frank Dikötter. Also banned in the PRC, meaning what’s in there is likely to be true.

Books in other languages
  • (German) Helmut Schmidt, Nachbar China (Amazon)
    A short book consisting of conversations between Frank Sieren, a journalist for Die Zeit, and Helmut Schmidt, ex-Chancellor of Germany. I’m a big fan of Schmidt’s, and his insights into China and its position in the world are remarkably astute for someone without a formal China background. Other world leaders would have much to gain from following his example.

Comedy
  • Jung Chang, Mao: The Unknown Story (Amazon)
    Hilarious screed by the West’s favorite defected Red Guard. Fascinating new evidence and witness accounts, all highly unfavorable to Mao, pop up throughout the book. Did you know that the Long March was more like a nice evening stroll, without any fighting whatsoever? You see, we read that in a ‘newly discovered archive’ (we won’t tell you where though).

  • James Mann, The China Fantasy: Why Capitalism Won't Bring Democracy to China (Amazon)
    Short, vacuous polemic which argues confusingly and impotently against a grab bag of straw men. Notable for being pushed by a lot of China watchers, many of whom I suspect are either on drugs or friends with the author.

french lies fucked around with this message at 19:44 on Aug 22, 2013

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french lies
Apr 16, 2008
The following is an excellent write-up about the Chinese government, courtesy of LF superstar BrotherAdso. It should be considered a must-read by everyone. I’ve taken the liberty of correcting a few minor mistakes, mostly typos. Some of the original pics seem to have been lost, so you’ll see some phantom captions pop up here and there.

BrotherAdso posted:

How Does China Work Anyway?

So how the hell does China work? We post post post about it all the drat time.

Well for one thing it is functionally a one party state, but the party and state are not the same thing.


Though they do wear the same drat suits

Huh?

Well, the Communist party doesn’t have the numbers (it has about 78 million members, not all of who are active, and about 40 million cadres), coordination, or expertise to staff every village and township office and every judgeship with its members. Since the 1980s, there has been an ongoing diversification of power expression.

So in China, you have to make two important distinctions: the central government, where Communist Party affiliation and official rank are similar if not identical, and the local and regional governments, where there is divergence of authority.

This bifurcated system is one of the main reasons the PRC’s central government and administration have remained so effective into the 1990s despite the slow erosion of some of the ideological and party elements of power in previous years.



State Central Government
In the central government of the PRC, the highest authority is the National People’s Congress, the 全国人民代表大会. In practice, the Standing Committee of the NPC excercizes a legislative power for most of the year, and consists of a select group of members of the NPC. Though they exercise a lot of constitutional power, they’re typically well-trained Communist party functionaries with a lot of experience in the Politburo or other bodies. Within the Congress, it is the Standing Committee which functionally exercises power — full meetings are rare and mostly symbolic in nature.

Next on the ‘state functions side’ is the State Council (国务院), which replicates the functions of an executive branch and administrative agency. More than the NPC or it’s Standing Committee, the members of the State Council control administrative priorities and decisions on a day-to-day basis. The leaders of the State Council are always members of the Party, and usually of the Central Committee, and its head, the Premiere, is the main domestic authority.

Because the State functions are so heavily interpenetrated with the Party at high levels, the bifurcated model of government is much less powerful and evident than at provincial and especially local levels, which brings us to…

Party Central Government
On the Party side, the Politburo (中国共产党中央政治局) and Central Committee make key decisions – especially high level personnel appointments. They’re self-perpetuating committees with several potential interlocutory agencies that check them (or promise to check them) if they become openly abusive. In particular, the Politburo is constitutionally appointed by the Central Committee, even though this hasn’t been really the case since the 1980s.

The Central Military Commission (中央军事委员会), also on the Party side (but with implications for the pure State side), is a lynchpin because it exists on both sides of the coin. It actually has two different names and administrative functions which are both administered by the same committee.


Now that’s brutalism! Go military commission!

so wait, this is a poo poo-ton of information, why do I care?
Well, because it’s interesting.

But more importantly, because the way the Chinese organize their Party-State relations can give people who actually think about how to build or not build leftist states some important food for thought.

For example, the model of the highest levels of State and Party – bifurcated but interlaced – provides a leadership which can make effective decisions, but which spreads out authority enough to ensure that unstable or ineffective individuals are less able to set bad priorities or cripple the system. In addition, the consultative model inherent in the central committees creates an effective way to share the expertise and perspective of good leaders while make sure ideas can cross-pollinate across branches and individuals.


Illustration of the relationship between party and state in China. Click here for a clearer version.

so what else does the Central Party do then?
The central party also runs a couple of other very important institutions. The first is the Central School (共中央党校), whose purpose and goal is to educate and train future party leaders, not just in ideological modes and doctrines, but in cooperative techniques, geopolitics, administration, anti-corruption, and so on. The establishment of the school also creates a place for connections to be made among each group and generation of Party leadership, and a way to retrain or utilize party members not currently in rotation on one of the main power committees. For example, the incumbent President after Wen Jiabao, Xi Jinping, is the current head of the Central Party School.


Congratulating graduates of this august institution…wearing totally western-style graduation regalia. Huh.

The other is the Discipline and Inspection Committee (中国共产党中央纪律检查委员), which is actually remarkably similar to the role of the office of the Imperial Censorate and other associated offices in the late Imperial era. The Committee is huge – employing at least 2,000 people centrally in Beijng and many thousands more in the provinces, and many more indirectly. Its counterpart on the State side (since the CDIC is technically Party-internal) is the Ministry of Supervision (中华人民共和国监察部). Together, they exercise a lot of authority to bring cases, indict individuals, and move the levers of power on the state and party apparatuses to enforce their decisions (even though their own real power is very poorly defined).

What about local governance?
Just like the Central Government technically has divisions between Government office and Party office at most levels, all the localities are also governed in a two-half system, from province to township.

So let’s take Liaoning Province as an example. Liaoning has a Governor, at the moment Chen Zhenggao (陈政高), who has extensive experience in the Party and is a party member, but at the moment isn’t sitting on any major Party committees. His counterpart is the CPC Committee Secretary, currently Zhang Wenyue (張文岳), who is politically extremely reliable but less well connected in the region than Chen Zhenggao. The Governor has some autonomous power over the police and everyday administration of the region, but Zhang, as the CPC secretary, has much more final executive control and fewer symbolic duties of state.

This bifurcation continues down the scale, until at the local level you see power balance much more evenly between the local party and the local government, resulting in competition for bribe money etc.

OK, now this is a bunch of names and poo poo – what’s the upshot?
The dual-official system at the lower level creates an effective interlocking beaurocracy. At the highest levels of the government, where CPC rank and effective state authority are closely associated, but serve to spread out power among a larger number of high party officials. However, at the lower levels, it is not so likely that all people in the State side of the apparatus will be Party members at all, much less high ranking ones (note: this isn’t true of Province-level positions and most of the Autonomous Regions). This means there can be effective rivalries for power and dialogues between different wings of the apparatus. In addition, the State side can encourage inspection of the Party side, and Party officials can rotate into and out of State side positions. This is an effective way for the Party to educate or shake up positions and prevent too much local-institutional corruption.

The Chinese have also studied closely models of local and institutional governance in other countries, particularly Latin America and Singapore, and are trying to implement some of the corporatist models of countries like Chile. This model allows the state to actively intervene and place Communist and State officials in positions of power in powerful commercial and NGO groups. These models add a third leg to the stool of the State-Party model. In addition, they strengthen civil outlets outside the party, which has a relatively small membership.

Yeah, but what about all those propaganda campaigns that Maggotmaster so loved?
Well, the ‘golden age’ of silly propaganda is certainly over. But there are two remaining slogans it is still vitally important to understand and engage with. The first is the Scientific Development Concept campaign.
Scientific Development, pushed by Hu Jintao and members of his political clique into being included in the Chinese official party constitution and statements in 2007, makes it clear that an emphasis will be put on three things:

1) Equalizing economic gain and opportunity across the country
2) Creating intra-party democratic checking mechanisms.
3) Creating extra-party democratic and activist organizations that share membership with the party, to solve environmental problems.

Two of the most interesting examples of how these are working: masses accusation centers, which are anonymised phone lines, tip boxes, emails, and physical locations where citizens have direct access to the party-side disciplinary and inspection committees, and can bypass other party-side institutions to bring allegations of abuse and corruption to light. Second is approval period and party elections – most villiage and sub province level party branches and state organs have begun conducting elections among intra-party candidates for the office, and, once a candidate is elected or appointed, there is a ‘lag time’ of several weeks or a month where individuals can lodge complaints or worries about the individual who is going to occupy the post – and possibly halt their investiture.

This is further developed by the Harmonious Society Program, a subset of the Scientific Development campaign. The Harmonious Society program aims specifically to involve different sectors of society in government initiatives to create greater citizen investment in local offices – for example, environmental cleanups or ‘patriotic initiatives’ like community classes. This also includes a promotion of economic development of inland, western provinces at the expense of large technologically cutting-edge projects in Eastern cities – an approach which has proven very controversial.

The second is the Three Represents.



Jiang Zemin introduced the Three Represents in 2000, intending it as his standing contribution to Chinese ideology and to reflect the problems he saw as emerging in the increasingly powerful economy his policies had allowed to grow. The Three Represents aimed to include new groups of people in the ranks of the party – particularly young high-achievers and intellectuals, and entrepeneurs and business-owners. The Three Represents took (and takes) a variety of approaches to this – perhaps the most interesting is A ‘decoupling’ of State enterprises. Many state-run factories and shops were separated from the funding and supervision of central planners, but retained the same staff, function (and many times, the same mission and limitations). The managers and owners of these enterprises were suddenly ‘independent entrepreneurs’, but also long-time party members. Voila! A more representative party.



Of course, there are advantages that emerged in the late-1990s and early-2000s that drew some members of the commercial class – for example, the higher level leadership of most of China’s main lending banks is subject to Party approval, and contain party representation in decision making at many levels. Thus, businesses with party members in their leadership are more likely to get good commercial loans and development funding.

Whew!

Sorry for the lack of picures, it’s not really a topic which is real picture-friendly. Thanks for reading if you did, I can try to answer questions too. The Special Autonomous Regions, the Inter-Party Relations Committee, and the Eight Democratic Parties are all interesting and not touched on here.

Part Two: Special Administration

Autonomous Regions in China



So the second part of this post will examine how China uses political and economic compromises to create expansion and stability without disturbing the solidity of the party system as it exists in most of the country.
There are three large ‘types’ of special administrative divisions in the PRC. The first are Special Autonomous Regions (usually but not always ethnic in nature), the second are Special Administrative Regions (political and economic in nature) and Special Economic Regions/Zones (soely economic in nature). Municipalities, while important, don’t deviate too significantly from the standard party/state structure detailed above, and also I don’t know much about them (it’s a hole).

So yeah. First off, Special Autonomous Regions.

Well, the need for Special Autonomous Regions comes from the fact that China is 92% Han (汉人), where its significant that the demonym (Hanren) in Mandarin is the same as the characters for the historical Han Dynasty and the Han river in Northern China. And in a country with such an overwhelming majority with an extremely powerful sense of identity, ethnic minorities (of which the PRC recognizes fifty-odd), will be in serious trouble.

China loves to make a big deal out of how inclusive they are, down to having special ethnicity zoos

So the CCP’s solution has been to create Special Autonomous Regions.
Special Autonomous Regions are governed via the same divided state-party system outlined above, but have special processes for appointment of certain officials, especially the Governor and members of the financial boards and bodies.

Special Autonomous Regions are allowed use of ethnic languages and scripts – which, when you consider China has recently gone so far as banning use of English words in popular press and on television, even to refer to global trends and such, is a pretty big deal. In theory, they have a lot of economic planning leeway, but in reality they are fairly tightly controlled except in their own special economic zones, especially Guangxi and Xinjiang (because the first is host to drug trafficking and the second is exceptionally rich in natural resources).

Unlike those places, Mongolia (ironically enough) is one of the safer, more placed SARs

Just like the primary divisions of China, the Special Autonomous Regions have rotating boards of officials on the State and Party side, but tend to have stronger ties to the local governments on the township and village level – which can be both a good and a bad thing, depending on levels of corruption or ethnic antagonism. It’s important to note that, though some high-level officials in the Autonomous Regions are (as they are supposed to be) appointed from the minorities in the region, the majority will often be Han Chinese officials on rotation from other provinces. This is particularly true in troublesome areas, where the local minorities simply aren’t trusted by the central government and sometimes by their own Autonomous Region government.

So does it work?


Anti-land reclaimation riots in Guangxi

No.


Riots in Urumqi

Or less well than the system for standard provinces, it seems. This might just be a function of poverty – the Special Autonomous Regions tend to be poorer and more rural as well as ethnically different – but the State-Party division of power, which tends to provide some checking and internal revision in the standard provinces, seems to break down when faced with an ethnic element. It doesn’t end well.

Guangxi, Tibet, and Xinjiang are three of the most troubled areas of China despite the presence and fairly effective management of the autonomy system.

So wait, there are two kinds of Special Autonomy though, right?
Yes – we were just talking about ethnically based special autonomous zones, which have been around more or less as long as the PRC has, and have special consideration in the constitution, etc. There are also political special zones, which don’t have a significant ethnic component, and have different political management systems altogether from the bifurcated state-party system in the provinces and ethnic regions.

There are only two politically unique administrative regions, and, like any good leftist, I bet you can guess why these areas are so different?

Whats that?


You guessed right!

Yessir, these were two of the most important bases of Western colonization of China: Hong Kong and Macau (Shanghai was, too, but Shanghai’s industrial, national, and financial importance was such that it became and important symbol in the civil war and couldn’t receive the same political exemptions). The framework for their exceptional system is as old as the Deng administration, which talked about the return of Hong Kong and Macau (and indeed Taiwan) as being feasible under “One nation, two systems” (一国两制)

Hong Kong is the more important of the two, so we’ll talk about it rather than Macau.

Hong Kong has some oversight from Beijing – the winner of their elections is appointed by the Beijing government to be Chief Executive once it is clear that he or she has won fairly – thus far, Beijing hasn’t shown any desire to interfere because of disapproval of a candidate, and has given most people their stamp of approval. These elections, and the fact that elected officials are able to appoint other administrators with a great deal of leeway (again, compared to the party-state relationship, rotational system, retraining, masses-approval and other systems on the mainland), make the Hong Kong political system remarkably free from direct control.

The economic system in Hong Kong has none of the barriers of entry or state control of financial capital you find on the mainland, either – it is more open than even the Special Economic Zones, though it has its own versions of mainland-style corruption.


Beautiful Hong Kong?

It’s worth noting, though, that Hong Kong isn’t exactly an open society – which is rather the way Beijing wants and needs it to be. For example, Falun Gong (established in a court case as legal and protected) has been repeatedly repressed on flimsy grounds, anti-PRC radio stations have been shut down, and street demonstrations are subject to pretty tremendous police brutality and very very strong regulation and prior approval.



Hong Kong is, according to the Communist Party itself, a testing ground for a Singaporean style of governance in China, and many people in openness-leaning cliques look to Hong Kong for ‘best practices’ and guidance for implementing certain accountability and openness reforms in the PRC itself without causing too many problems.

Alright, the last kind of special zone is the solely economic one: the Special Economic Zone. Interestingly, the biggest and most important Special Economic zones roughly coincide to the treaty ports China was forced to open to western occupation during the 19th century, but, y’know, that couldn’t possibly be of symbolic or real importance. Nope.

The biggest Special Economic Zone is probably Shenzhen, but the growth and creation of Shenzhen is closely intertwined with the special political and economic nature of Hong Kong, so there are more typical and useful cases to look at farther North.

Xiamen and Dalian are both excellent examples. Xiamen is one of the older SEZs, and was originally chosen because of its proximity to Taiwan, Macau, and Hong Kong back in 1979-1980. What makes the SEZs so special?
Well, first is availability of capital. In most of the provinces and areas, the Chinese system of government-party connected banking controls capital more closely, but there are tremendous incentives to invest in the SEZs – these take the form of both tax breaks and lower rates of interest or ease of getting loans. In addition, Chinese firms are free to seek partnerships with and capital from foreign firms when they are operating in a SEZ, which they typically cannot do elsewhere.

Banking: key to controlled and created capital movement?

While the actual format of provincial administration and registry for the population and so on is the same as in the rest of China, the governments of the SEZs get special considerations, just like the firms that operate there. They aren’t usually part of large scale initiatives and projects that come from the central province administration, they have their own financial structures and goals partly separate from the province, and have their own looser and central-local cooperative regulations on import, export, and other trade activities.



The final catch, though, is that they must be export-focused, capital-focused enterprises. The regulation of this is tough, of course – it is done on an industry by industry basis by special boards maintained within the SEZs.

So if you look at Xiamen and Dalian, you have two different models. Xiamen, like Shenzhen, was in many ways a “labor camp” – access to shipping and migrant labor from interior Fujian and Guangdong combined with the strictures above to create a place where industrial manufacturing could absolutely explode – including food processing and export and light manufacturing. In the past five or ten years, a second stage of development has built on the first, and the Party has taken a very strong interest in the relationship of the second stage to the first. Second only to Shanghai and Hong King, Xiamen has become a finances and communications service city, because of the relaxation of the import/export and capital-intense regulations in their SEZ (and the relative wealth and infrastructure built up from 1980-1996 or 2000). Dalian, on the other hand, embraced the basic strictures of SEZ development and has become a petrochemical, electronics, shipbuilding, and trade processing center – high capital, high investment industries which require relatively little labor force, but still propel the economy forwards in ways which would’t be possible without the SEZ policies.



So how on earth does all this dynamism coexist with a political structure that’s fundamentally the same as the one in the first part of this post? It’s an interesting question – the other two experiments (different political structure without different economic structure, radically different political and economic structure) are both problematic and hard to evaluate or manage effectively for the CPC, but the SEZs (despite some of the local unrest over state evictions and the nascent labor movement) have proven to be much more of a benefit than a cost.

So there you have it – a broad outline of the current Chinese political system and some of its exceptions.

The United Front and the Eight Democratic Parties
Well, so far we’ve covered the structure of the Chinese government, the way that interacts with specialized structures for ethnically or economically distinctive regions, and seen current event (the White Paper On Corruption) come into the narrative.

The last part of this post is about China’s nods to representation and the “alternative parties” in the Chinese system.
First off, you have to understand the origin of the CCP’s relationship with the ‘Eight Democratic Parties’.


The Second United Front: Getting Along with Whitey

Back during the Civil War and the post- Sun Yat-Sen/孫中山 reorganization of power by imperial interests, Communist parties were shattered or simply ill-funded and organized. There was a huge multiplicity of political factions in China, which ranged from monarchist to fascist to center-democratic. In order to get political bargaining power during truce periods, the CCP cultivated an early and close relationship with certain leftist elements of the main factions, especially the China Democratic League and the Zhi Gong Party.

Most of these parties were founded formally in the mid-1930s, and did not find themselves in formal alliance with the CCP until near the end of the civil war. Initially, many of them found a very functional role in the new Chinese state, since the CCP didn’t have the resources to totally consolidate political and economic power until the mid-to-late 1950s, especially in complex urban areas like Shanghai, Wuhan, and Nanjing.


Survivors during the Civil War in Shanghai, living in a very different world than 90% of the rest of China

So, that’s why they exist in one sense – as a historical legacy.

The most important historical-legacy parties are the

China Zhi Gong Party
This party is the legacy of the political and economic influence of Chinese expats in Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines, and the United States – hell, it was founded in San Francisco, not Sanxing. So what value does such a puppet of capitalist interests have, you ask?


The Early congress of the Zhi Gong party, which threw its lot in with the CPC

Well, initially, it acted as a counterweight to the China Lobby in the US Government in the 1930s and 1940s, which was badly dominated by Chiang Kai-shek’s partisans, and as a bulwark in the CCP’s finances (though the majority were still supplied by the International). It had a lot of political clout because of its age and its closeness to Sun Yat-Sen’s already just about sacred memory. In addition, it was a powerful force for aid in the fight against the Japanese, though it has been accused of being too cozyed up to the British after they moved their headquarters to Hong Kong.

But when the Japanese took Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia, the overseas Chinese communities there took a big chunk of the occupation’s brutality, and both the financing and membership of the Zhi Gong Party evaporated.

Hong Kong, and much of the network of overseas Chinese, burns.

So the CCP invited the Zhi Gong to return to formal coalition after the party, a shattered shell of itself, abandoned Chiang Kai-shek in 1947 to strike out on its own. The party came along, and as soon as the People’s Republic was inaugurated, it had a significant number of reserved seats in the NPCC (which is symbolic but ineffective – see the very first post), and, more importantly, seats in county and city government and on specific boards and initiatives.

Today, the Zhi Gong, which was very badly damaged during the Hundred Flowers and especially during the Cultural revolution, is undergoing a rapid increase of relevance. The modern CCP uses the Zhi Gong as an intermediary with Hong Kong democrats, international organizations and other countries, and to keep the wealthy and influential Chinese communities overseas in the orbit of Beijing and inclined to lobby for pro-Chinese trade parties. Numberically, it’s one of the larger parties, with a little over 150,000 registered members, but that is little clue as to their real influence as a favored tool of the CCP itself during a period of internationalization.

The head of the Zhi Gong party at the moment, Li Peng, is the former Chairman of the NPCC standing commission, and was treated as both a senior diplomat and legislative authority for many years. He had tremendous influence in the 1990s and he, along with other secondary party officials, make state visits to conferences and so on.

The Zhi Gong taking part in negotiations about trade and technology

The other highly influential and important secondary party is the China Democratic Leaguge. Just like the Zhi Gong party, the CDL was tremendously influential during the Second Sino-Japanese War and World War II – in fact, probably more so. Why? Because far from simply being a second voice outside of the GMD/China Lobby, the US State Department saw the CDL as a viable third power group in China, without the corruption of Jiang’s GMD or the unacceptable Communism of Mao.


The original CDL

Today, the CDL serve the same purpose internally that the Zhi Gong party does with regards to overseas Chinese. It’s actually pretty damned influential for a small party – its leader gets to be on the Standing Committee, which means he can influence appointments and legislation.

The modern CDL has almost 200,000 members – again not something which should be taken too strongly as a measurement of its power and influence. For example, the current head of the CDL is also a world-famous physicist, Jiang Shusheng, and he represents the highly elite scientific and intellectual membership of the CDL quite well.

The CDL routinely does “wonky” stuff on food security, infrastructure, and education, and serves a great political purpose by redirecting some of the reforming energy of the university-educated elite into an acceptable, controlled, and vetted “fourth party”.


Guo Quan, who was the model CDL member until recently — now in jail for ten yeas.

The third important party is the Revolutionary Committee Of the GMD.

Huh? I thought, you say, that the GMD was in Taiwan/the hated enemy of the people. How do they have a revolutionary committee? What kind of revisionist poo poo is this?

What are these fuckers doing here?

Well, the GMD split (like many other parties) in 1949-1950, as the war was lost and the exodus to Taiwan began. The RCGMD went through a really pronounced period of recession in the 1950-1980 period. However, it has always maintained a large number of seats and a relatively large numbers of members, sometimes people who were ‘quarantined’ from the regular political system because of ties to Taiwan and the GMD. Today, the GMD has a very important role as the symbolic ‘reform party’ of the post-1990 Chinese government. The GMD, many of whose membership are government-side bureaucratic insiders, have taken a strong role in proposing internal legal reforms to create anti-corruption oversight and increase the interaction of the government-side appointment process and the people.



The other minor parties are much smaller, typically with less than 100,000 members. Each one is analogous to the GMD – for example, the Chinese National Democratic Construction League plays a strong role in the proposition of policy with regards to industrial development, tax policy, and industrial-applied scientific research.

So what’s the goddamned point of all these tiny 100-200,000 person parties?

Well, for the CCP, they provide extremely useful tools for a number of situations.

First, they neatly segregate interest groups which could be troublesome and put a closer track on them.

Second, they provide a slightly outside-the-box viewpoint on problems, since their well-educated members don’t have the same worries about internal party advancement as regular members of the Central Committee but have more standing than many NPCC members.

Third, they provide a method of outsider interaction for both diplomatic and political purposes. China can claim a much stronger image of democracy as long as it keeps these parties active, and can use them to relate to countries and factions that reject the central CCP.

Fourth, as the CCP moves, as per the recent White Paper, to increase certain kinds of controlled internal democracy and anti-corruption, pro-press campaigns, the infrastructure and known-quantity high level members of the Eight Democratic Parties will provide a controlled alternative and set of personnel to implement those policies.
So in the next decade, you’ll be seeing more of the past and future members of the United Front – remember where they fit into the larger structure of the Chinese Government.

french lies fucked around with this message at 09:41 on Feb 16, 2012

french lies
Apr 16, 2008


Part of my intention while making this thread was to draw out more of the expertise on SA that you’ll sometimes catch glimpses of here and there: In case you haven’t noticed, goons know poo poo. So far I’ve been amazed at the depth and breadth of knowledge you guys possess about China, and I hope the trend of longer and more in-depth posts continues throughout the thread. Now, I know it takes time and effort to write those, so to make sure they’re appreciated (and to keep the same questions from popping up over and over again), I’ve created this section for model posts. Those who write a lot of these will be rewarded with “model worker” status”.

Model posts as of 13.08.2012

french lies fucked around with this message at 12:26 on Jan 2, 2013

french lies
Apr 16, 2008

Typo posted:

I'm literally going to Shanghai tomorrow, anyone know of any good way to bypass the famed great firewall? I'm planning on using my own proxy server but backups would be appreciated.
There's a China thread in the Tourism & Travel sub-forum which has a lot of information on this. You might have noticed it, it's right there in the OP:
http://forums.somethingawful.com/showthread.php?threadid=3413886

Edit: Literally two posts later and we have our first violation of The Three Nos! This doesn't bode well...

french lies
Apr 16, 2008

Cefte posted:

Does't noes take an e?
Both are fine. :eng101:

quote:

What's your read on the Wang Li-Jun embassy business?
I agree with Xujun Eberlein's assertion that Wang wasn't seeking asylum, but likely using the Consulate as a place to take refuge until forces from Beijing arrived (meaning Bo's own men couldn't take him in). Eberlein also speculates that this is part of a deal between Wang and certain people in Beijing, trading sensitive information about Bo, most likely corruption charges, for more lenient handling of a case he's implied in. I haven't kept up to date on this over the last two days though.

Any way you look at it, Bo is probably hosed as far as his political future is concerned.

One interesting aside is how the FLG has reacted to this. Wang Lijun and Bo Xilai were two of the main guys involved in the 1999 crackdown on the FLG, so the Epoch Times and NTDTV are going crazy right now. Two days ago, one of their commentators even speculated that Wang Lijun was directly involved in organ harvesting operations, and that he had leaked details of an ongoing harvesting scheme lead by him and Bo Xilai to the US Government. Needless to say, anything the FLG says can be safely disregarded.

quote:

How's real-name registration going to work for foreigners and their Sina weaboos?
China Daily found out that they essentially have no policy in place for foreigners. You can bypass the requirements altogether by registering your account as "overseas".

french lies fucked around with this message at 23:13 on Feb 14, 2012

french lies
Apr 16, 2008

BrotherAdso posted:

Thanks. French Lies did a fabulous job formatting and bringing in the great book list -- I did that post on the govt long ago now.

I've also got one I did on Confucianism -- would that fit into the thread well, you or French Lies? It doesn't look like it made it into the LF Effortposts wordpress.

I have a visual representation of the party/state relationships, let me dig it up.
I should put your post in quotes, actually: a lot of people seem to assume I wrote it myself.

Also. the Confucianism effortpost definitely deserves a place in the thread, and the OP for that matter. Send it to me via PM and I'll put it in the third post.

french lies
Apr 16, 2008

Adar posted:

I'm not an expert about China proper, but as the resident professional gambler, here are some words about Macau:
Fascinating stuff, thanks for sharing. I added yours and skyedge's posts to the OP (along with a shitton of other stuff).

quote:

It'd be great to have a list of (non-sensitive, I guess) Twitter/Sina Weibo accounts to follow. Eg Kim Jensen of Kinablog mentioned above is available on Twitter @kinablog. @NiuB is a good source of interesting blogs and news. @KaiserKuo works in Beijing for BaiDu and has some great links/commentary on Chinese tech developments.
This was actually on my to-do list, it's in the OP now. Just Twitter for the time being, I'll get around to adding some weibos shortly.

french lies
Apr 16, 2008

Fiendish_Ghoul posted:

By the way, I just wanted to point out for anyone who didn't know, since the OP didn't, that the tub of guts at the top of the post is Mao's grandson. Looks like someone needs to take a couple of Long Marches, har har.
Don't forget, he's a CPCC member and the youngest Major General in the PLA. Also noone knows what happened to his first wife. I really need to start writing that princeling effortpost I've been thinking of.

Edit: Here, have some Mao Xinyu for Page Three:






https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XHyNy7OHeNQ
Ladies and gentlemen, a Ph.D. and Major General.

A Youtube Commenter posted:

He ate all the Food during the Great Leap Forward, no wonder 30 million Chinese died from starvation...
:xd:

french lies fucked around with this message at 10:03 on Feb 17, 2012

french lies
Apr 16, 2008

Arglebargle III posted:

Oh hey forums poster shots shots shots, glad to see you responded to my question, although it looks like you forgot part of it. I'm gonna guess you were talking about Xi Jinping. Maybe you could have googled him instead of sounding so ignorant?
He's talking about Li Keqiang, who's likely to succeed Wen Jiabao. I believe this is the quote in question (translation mine):

quote:

Li Keqiang, vice-premier of the State Council, pointed out that the strategy of expanding internal consumption must continue to be implemented, with an emphasis on increasing citizen [consumer] spending. This must be done through measures such as encouraging employment, entrepreneurship and strengthening public services, and a fair adjustment of income distribution, in order to increase the disposable income and buying power of the citizenry.

This was made in response to reports earlier last year that consumer spending was down in 2010 from 2009.

I also think you're being uncharitable by interpreting the previous comment in a literal sense. To me, it doesn't seem like he's talking about Potemkin villages, but rather that the modern consumer economy in China is largely isolated to first-tier cities and the kind of places that westerners are likely to visit. So a lot of times, you'll have people like Thomas Friedman going to Shanghai, seeing iPhones, and writing enthusiastic op-eds on the importance of Chinese consumers, all while ignoring the fact that the economy is still largely an agrarian and developing economy.

french lies
Apr 16, 2008

Throatwarbler posted:

Unfortunately right now they seem to have having hosting issues (or the MSS are on to them :tinfoil:) and the podcast is inaccesible [...]
http://webcache.googleusercontent.c...n&ct=clnk&gl=ca
I was able to download the episode using a link in one of the comments. Seems to me the episode is still up, it's just the link that's broken. Thanks for the tip anyway, I'll give it a listen.

Edit: And I'm really glad I did. Very informative podcast, I'll put it in the OP. Some highlights:

  • Many of the bearish China analysts are permanently pessimistic about China's economy, and actually used to clamor for things like higher capital outflows and reduced surplus. Now that these things have come to fruition, they are using them to predict the country's collapse.
  • The Wenzhou private lending collapse is largely isolated to WZ and the surrounding area in Zhejiang, and not symptomatic of any national trend .
  • China today structurally resembles Japan in the late sixties, meaning that it is likely to continue experiencing high investment-driven growth over the next few decades.
  • Housing demand is likely to stay high for the foreseeable future, and to meet that demand China needs to build at least 10 million housing units each year. Developers weren't building too much housing, they were building the wrong kind of housing.
  • Because of things like reduced exports and wage inflation, China will see a permanent decrease in growth rate over the next ten years, from double-digit to high single-digit.

quote:

Glad to see this thread in D&D. I majored in Chinese in undergrad, and am currently teaching English in a rural area. If anyone is interested about Chinese pre-college education, rural life, or the true penetration of standard Mandarin, I'd be happy to contribute. Also, Classical Chinese Poetry.
Your contributions would be welcome. I'm interested in your take on characters. Do you feel that they suppress rural literacy, like Victor Mair argues, or is this more a problem of education standards and economic distress? The PRC literacy standards are unhelpful in this respect, so I'd appreciate a view on the ground.

french lies fucked around with this message at 10:28 on Feb 20, 2012

french lies
Apr 16, 2008
I was just about to say, the general debate on sweatshops deserves a thread of its own. That, or take it to the Parecon thread instead (since that seems to be touching on modes of production and socialism).

french lies fucked around with this message at 03:57 on Feb 21, 2012

french lies
Apr 16, 2008
Seriously, don't continue this derail. Either take it to another thread or stop.

I've started listening to back episodes of Sinica, which I really recommend if you're into China news. In the one I'm listening to now, they went over the Taiwan elections, and the suzhi argument for why democracy won't work in China.

If you don't know what this is, it's a common belief among urban Chinese who essentially argue that rural Chinese would screw things up if elections ever were held. This is because the sum of their moral, spiritual and intellectual quality, otherwise known as suzhi, is too low to make informed decisions.

If you live in China, I'm sure you've heard some version of this argument before. And personally, I've remained skeptical that the success of Taiwan can scale to match the needs of the PRC. But hearing the example of Indonesia mentioned in the podcast, I'm starting to reassess my opinions.

Do you guys have any input on this? Do you think democracy is feasible in China, considering the scope and size of the country?

french lies
Apr 16, 2008

Throatwarbler posted:

french lies says he doesn't want a generalized discussion on the nature of capitalism and then goes off and immediately start us off on a generalized discussion on the nature of democracy. :rolleye:
Sorry, but it was very obviously a sweatshop debate and not a China debate. And I disagree that a discussion about suzhi equates to a generalized discussion on the nature of democracy.

Solis posted:

Kind of unrelated to the thread topic at hand but I'm quite interested in modern Chinese history, especially in geopolitical terms... Thus far I've only managed to take a brief course and go through a few books, but I'd like to know more.

I can't help but notice Jung Chang's book is in the comedy section... I admittedly didn't comb through the sources in it in any depth, mostly just focusing on the text itself, but why is this book so derided? A quick google search tells me that there are serious issues with the factual interpretations within it, but are there any specific points someone could elaborate on for me?

Secondly, I read through Li Zhi-Sui's Private Life of Chairman Mao and I was wondering if this was similarly considered, as it seems to be largely the one man's account.
It's been a while since I read The Unknown Story, but as I remember it, the source list was extremely fishy, and full of references to "newly unearthed archives" and anonymous people who happened to have new information contradicting the established consensus and supporting Chang's thesis. Some of the people referenced in the book have since claimed that her interviews were more like interrogations, and that she would prod them into saying things that supported her allegations.

One example is the battle of Luding Bridge. IIRC Chang claims that no fighting actually took place here, citing an unnamed old woman. However, journalists were later unable to find this witness, though they did find someone else who gave an account saying fighting did take place. So who's right?

I think there's a natural distrust in the West of China and the CCP in particular, and it's gotten to where you can claim almost anything and not get challenged on it. I mean, look at how much traction the FLG has gotten with its claims of large-scale organ harvesting, despite the fact that outside journalists have found nothing to corroborate it. From what I can see, both Li Zhisui and Jung Chang have profited immensely from their lurid and controversial allegations about Mao, which doesn't automatically discredit them but does raise some serious questions about their motives.

I'm open for a longer discussion on this, and I'd welcome input from someone who's read the academic rebuttal of Chang's book.

french lies
Apr 16, 2008
Just got done adding a heap of literature recommendations to the OP. These are from Brennanite.

For those who complained that there was too little on women's history, your pleas have been heard:

Brennanite posted:

  • Bret Hinsch, Women in Early Imperial China (Amazon)
    Addresses women's roles in family life/kinship circles, labor, legal rights, education, literature, participation in government and rites, and cosmology (yin-yang). Written for those with little or no background in Chinese studies.

  • Susan Mann and Yu-yin Cheng, Under Confucian Eyes (Amazon)
    Uses a variety of contemporary sources to examine how gender was written about by the Chinese literati. Some of the sources are written by women. Good for skipping from topic to topic. Covers Tang through Qing (618-1911), but most of the documents are from the Qing (1644-1911).

  • Nina Wang, Images of Women in Chinese Culture and Thought (Amazon)
    Similar to Under Confucian Eyes, only containing more primary source material. Covers Shang through Song (1600 BCE-1279 CE). The two are good companion pieces.

  • Wilt Idema and Beata Grant, The Red Brush: Women's Writings in Imperial China (Amazon)
    A monstrous volume (seriously, you could kill with it) of women's writings from the Han to the Qing. Poets are particularly well-represented. Biographical sketches and historical context are included with the literature.

  • Patricia Ebrey, The Inner Quarters: Marriage and Women's Lives in the Sung Period (Amazon)
    Examines the simultaneous expansion of women's place in society and the restrictions placed upon them by Neo-Confucianists. Haven't read it, but I like her other works on similar topics.

And some really interesting books on religion which I'll probably never have time to read.

Brennanite posted:

  • John Lagerway and Liu Penglai, Early Chinese Religion (Amazon)
    A two part, four volume set covering religious thought and practice from the Shang through Tang dynasties (1250 BCE to 907 CE). A scholarly work, it is broken into a series of articles for each period. Topics cover ancestor worship, Confucian rites, ritual texts, divination, shamanism, sacred space and time, local and state cults, funerary practices, medicine and a whole lot more--plus all flavors of Buddhism and Daoism and popular religion! All of the articles are written by expert scholars.

  • Isabelle Robinet, Taoism: Growth of a Religion (Amazon)
    The place to start for anyone looking to understand religious Daoism. Covers its relationship to classical/philosophical Daoism, different schools and subschools, beliefs, practices, and sacred texts. Meant as a introductory text for college religion classes.

  • Stephen Bokenkamp, Early Daoist Scriptures (Amazon)
    Introduction and translation of major scriptures from the larger schools and categories. Presented chronologically and with context for ease of understanding. You can just read the introductions or skip to a specific example of a text.

  • Erik Zurcher, The Buddhist Conquest of China (Amazon)
    the granddaddy of all books about the introduction and spread of Buddhism in China. If you only read one book on Chinese religion, read this one.

  • Kenneth Ch'en, Buddhism in China (Amazon)
    Good overview of the history of Buddhism throughout imperial China. Covers the establishment of different schools, and especially its relationship with the state/emperor.

  • Stephen Teiser, The Ghost Festival in Medieval China (Amazon)
    Uses the very popular Ghost Festival (yulanpen) to show how Chinese society mixed together elements of Buddhism and folk beliefs. A good discussion of how most Chinese actually engaged in religious practices.

By way of the Sinica podcast, I also picked up a recommendation for this amazing blog post by Patrick Chovanec. It's a primer on the China leadership transition, written in very concise and understandable prose. Maybe a good companion piece for the BrotherAdso post in the OP? Either way, you should read it pronto if you're interested in the coming transition in the fall.

french lies
Apr 16, 2008
Just a quick heads-up about romanization: I see some of you hyphenating and/or double capitalizing connected syllables, like Li Zhi-Sui or Wang LiJun. These are both holdovers from the now-antiquated Wade-Giles system, and do not feature in the current Hanyu Pinyin system of transcription. In Hanyu Pinyin (which is the correct system to use since both of them are mainlanders), these names would be written Li Zhisui and Wang Lijun.

Where it gets confusing is with Taiwanese names and especially those of overseas Chinese. For example, the name of the current president of Taiwan is generally transcribed as Ma Ying-jeou (no double capitalization), not Ma Yingjiu. Taiwan uses a mish-mash of different transcription systems, like Tongyong Pinyin, which I have never been able to wrap my head around. And who knows how Cai became romanized as Chua, as it is in the case of Cai Mei'er aka Amy Chua.

For simplicity's sake, I'd recommend that we stick to whatever Wikipedia gives main billing, and try to avoid double capitalization, hyphenation for mainlanders and antiquated spellings where they've fallen out of fashion (Mao Tse-tung vs. Mao Zedong).

french lies
Apr 16, 2008

Cefte posted:

Because the family were probably south-east Asian Hokkien speakers. Fie on your prescriptivism, Professor 孔法谎!
I just checked it, and yes, you're absolutely right.

Since we're on the topic of romanization, is anyone here in support of pinyin as the official writing system in China? I remember having a debate about this (which I lost badly, btw) with an LFer who supported abolishing characters. His case rested mostly on the fact that characters suppress the literacy of the poor, whereas I tried to argue that pinyin is impractical, drawing out old chestnuts like the Lion-eating poet in the Stone Den et.c.

Now, I've since revised my position on this, and if I'm not supportive of them, I have become more sympathetic to the arguments of those who want to abolish characters. But I'm really more interested in what you guys think. Does the cultural significance of characters, and their place in Chinese history, excuse a possible suppressing effect on literacy? Are arguments by Westerners to abolish characters cultural imperialism, even if they are motivated by a genuine concern for the rural poor of China?

french lies
Apr 16, 2008

Barto posted:

Probably not as much as you'd think- the characters are pretty important. If you get rid of them, humor, literature, colloquialisms, etc. will all have to be destroyed and reinvented: it basically amounts to linguistic genocide. It would change the language in huge ways totally apart from cultural issues.
Right. Here's where I play devil's advocate and ask you: which are these colloquialisms, specifically, that would not get through in pinyin subtitles? And are these slight subtleties really worth suppressing the literacy of the poor? Does a dirt-poor peasant who can barely read signs really care about whatever word games are used in bourgeois popular culture?

french lies
Apr 16, 2008

Barto posted:

I've lived in Taiwan/China for about six years now, and I wrote my master's thesis, all 100,000 words of it, in Chinese. That poo poo ain't happening in pinyin.
How do you know, have you tried? I've read longer texts in pinyin and it was completely understandable to me, even when broaching more complex and academic subjects. And the problem of naming could be solved quite easily by annotating with characters, something akin to what's done in Korean. Characters would not be abolished completely, but relegated to the situations where they are necessary. Basically, I think you're hugely exaggerating the difficulties of transitioning to a full pinyin system.

Of course, the argument is moot anyway because it'll never, ever happen. And for me personally, characters are why I started learning Chinese so obviously I'd be sad to see them go. But I still think it's a really interesting discussion to have on a theoretical level, and that it shouldn't be dismissed off-hand like this.

french lies
Apr 16, 2008

Barto posted:

And why is it always western people who suggest this? I mean...I know characters used to be a big deal for me way back when I started studying, but now they're just as natural as anything and I don't even notice them- I just use them. I think foreigners blow it out of proportion because of their own learning difficulties.
You know, there's a proverb one could use to answer that question.

I really don't see what you're getting at, other than a desire to string together loosely connected anecdotes, and brag about your Chinese. You say that scientific texts would be impossible to write, but don't cite any specific examples of where possible misunderstandings could arise (purely anecdotal, but scientific texts in Chinese seem increasingly to use the Western system for elements and molecular structures, like Co2 instead of erhua tan). You post a chat log in Chinese, then don't even bother to critically dissect what your friend says. I doubt the lack of vertical writing would be a huge loss to Chinese culture, for example. And who's to say chunlian need to be written in pinyin?

He then brings up huanjing as an example, but if those were three different syllables you would use an apostrophe to demarcate them, like this: hu'an jing. Supposing China ever went over to a fully pinyinized writing system, people would likely adapt by using apostrophes more actively.

french lies fucked around with this message at 10:43 on Aug 27, 2013

french lies
Apr 16, 2008

Barto posted:

I guess it sounds like bragging, but if your Chinese is good enough you will understand why you can't get rid of them. Just today I went to the trouble of getting opinions about it from two researchers in Chinese Second Language Studies for you and they agree too. Maybe you can go read more academic papers about it? Anyway, I don't think you got my point. Maybe you can reread it (or not), I can only offer my own opinion and those of the experts I know. So I will leave it at that. I feel my point has already been made substantially.
The problem with your points is that you offer up little to nothing to substantiate them. You can't just throw out a claim like "scientific texts will be impossible to write in pinyin", and then not show specific examples of where misunderstandings may arise. What did your researchers say? Where are these papers?

It's pure argument from authority, basically waving away a discussion on hypotheticals by saying that you know some Taiwanese people and read a lot of Chinese. I personally don't have any problems with characters, they're my livelihood after all. But I don't think that makes them essential, or impossible to replace. That's what we're arguing about, after all.

french lies
Apr 16, 2008

Arglebargle III posted:

You're asking him to prove that something doesn't exist or won't work, which is kind of hard regardless of his position. Do you have an example of a large scale implementation of pinyin that intentionally displaced characters and worked? The Chinese have done a lot of thinking about this themselves and I don't know of any real efforts to promote a phonetic system as a replacement for characters, even though there's been a lot of discussion from people who could potentially enact such a change.
It might not amount to an 'effort', but the example most commonly cited by pro-Pinyin activists is Dungan, which uses the Cyrillic alphabet as its writing system. Their language is tonal and very similar to Mandarin. Seems to work for them, and they don't even write tones! Of course, they don't produce a lot of academic works, or much writing at all for that matter.

As you touched on, Mao was very clearly in support of alphabetization, as were a significant number of Chinese intellectuals, including Lu Xun. DeFrancis has a great article about this which shows some of the efforts that have been made towards this end. Among some of the interesting things he mentions is a program of experimental elementary school classes where the children were being taught to read and write exclusively in Pinyin for the first two years, only to significantly outperform students being taught with traditional methods.

John DeFrancis posted:

Rohsenow further expands on the details of the Z.T. experiment, both in Heilongjiang and after its spread to every province and autonomous region in the PRC. Of special interest are his notes on further examples of the astounding success of the program, of which I mention only three: (1) In a 1988 writing competition, of the 4,091 students who took part, three Z.T. students received first prizes and four received second prizes. None of the non-Z.T. students won prizes. (2) Of the same 4,091 students, 6.61 percent of Z.T. students recommended for admission to “key middle schools” were accepted, whereas only 2.15 percent of the non-Z.T. students were accepted. (3) In a countrywide graduation competition based on the sixth-grade curriculum, a Z.T. fifth-year class had a pass rate of 100 percent compared to a sixth grade pass rate of 88.89 percent.

If that is true, I do think it is significant enough to merit serious consideration.

I should probably clear things up by saying that I do not support a switch to pinyin, nor have I ever done so, and that I'm purely arguing for the sake of discussion here. That being said, the arguments against have been pretty bad so far. Barto's argument seemed to boil down to "it will be impossible because X will happen", then when I asked him to cite specific examples of X he posted some chat logs from a random Taiwanese person and invoking argument from authority, saying that "if your Chinese is good enough, you will agree with me". Well, not to brag but my Chinese is likely better than his and I don't agree.

Claims that pinyin would be unworkable because of homophones and possibilities of misunderstandings are baseless IMO, other than in the remotest of situations.

BrotherAdso and Cream_Filling had a better approach, accepting the fact that people will work around and find solutions to the problems that arise, but stressing how disconnected people will become to their heritage. This is probably one of the more incisive argument against a full switch, and probably part of the reason why revolutionaries like Mao were in support of it in the first place: They were advocating a break with traditional Chinese culture and abolishing characters would hasten the process.

But let's suppose I was a hardcore MTWer, couldn't I just say that a poor peasant cares squat about reading the original versions of the Analects or the Dream of Red Mansions, and more about the educational prospects of his children? Wouldn't a ton of literature be produced in Pinyin explaining the contents and significance of these texts? I mean, I can't read Norse but I can read Snorre and the Eddas in translation, which works fine for me.

What you're left with is the linguistic unity argument, but wouldn't Pinyin based on Putonghua as the official writing system actually further promote the spread of Putonghua and therefore linguistic unity?

I dunno, I think it's an interesting discussion to have. And funnily enough, the better my Chinese has gotten the less I'm convinced that it is somehow impossible or impractical to do.

french lies
Apr 16, 2008

Arakan posted:

Maybe I'm missing a large and obvious point, but how would switching to a pinyin based system increase literacy? The same kids still would and would not be attending school. Is it just because you think a pinyin system would be easier to teach yourself or learn from a sibling who went to school or whatever?
The argument that's put forward a lot is that China, and the PRC in particular, has a large subset of people who are literate according to the standards of the government, but still functionally illiterate. It's been shown IIRC that officials will fudge the numbers to make them look better, and that the official literacy statistics mask the true extent of the problem.

I'm really not sure what kind of effort is required to learn characters when we're talking about primary school children. For me, as an adult learner, it took about three years to get to the point where I had full comprehension of simplified and traditional characters and could write most of them by hand. This was as a full-time student, including a pretty intense year of study at NTU in Taipei.

The account I've gotten from Chinese friends is that they would learn a set number of characters per week in their first years of primary school. Now, compare this to learning the alphabet, which took, I don't know, maybe a month or something in total when I went to primary school? If you are talking about rural areas where funding for education is scant, and children are routinely taken out of school to work, I guess you could make the argument that the teaching of characters is a huge waste of the students' time.

I don't know how relevant this is, but I know two heritage learners that taught themselves characters when they were children by watching Chinese TV and singing karaoke with their parents. They don't know how to write them by hand, obviously, but using a pinyin input system they get along just fine. So for all I know, pro-Pinyin advocates might be greatly exaggerating the difficulties of reaching a level of passive reading comprehension in Chinese.

french lies
Apr 16, 2008

Hong XiuQuan posted:

I can't for the life of me find the story (no Chinese input on this work PC) but if anyone's got a source for that story would love to have it to hand.
Could it be this? It seems a bit different than your version. Here's my quick and dirty translation, huge apologies for any mistakes.

quote:

After Zhang Fei became aware that Guan Yu had met with misfortune, he hastened back to Xichuan, to urge Liu Bei to send out soldiers to exact revenge. He also ordered Fan Jiang and Zhang Da to make him a white coat and a suit of white armor, but Fan and Zhang did not make them well enough. This made Zhang furious as a thunderstorm, and he gave them hundred lashes each with the whip.

He then gave them seven days to complete the assignment; if they did not manage this they would be decapitated. Both Fan Jiang and Zhang Da believed that seven days was not enough to finish. Killing Zhang Fei, and reporting the deed to the Eastern Wu, was better than being decapitated when the time was up. With Zhang Fei sound asleep, they murdered him, and with his head in tow, they proceeded with haste to the Eastern Wu.

french lies fucked around with this message at 17:03 on Feb 24, 2012

french lies
Apr 16, 2008
If you are posting stuff in Chinese, make sure to include translations of everything, and post summaries if you're including links to Chinese websites. I'd prefer it if we stick to English exclusively. Otherwise the discussion just becomes too cliquish.

Edit: Taiwan is fine.

french lies
Apr 16, 2008

Pro-PRC Laowai posted:

Remember that panic run on salt because of Fukushima? Yep, that was started by someone selling salt. The chaos that resulted was beneficial to no one.

Want to liberalize the media some more? First step is to stop the rumor mongering and make it 100% clear that it won't be tolerated and there are consequences for spreading bullshit.
This is an argument I hear CCP apologists put forward a lot, and I don't think it holds any water. In my experience, Chinese people believe rumors like this precisely because they don't trust official media outlets. The government's handling of the SARS outbreak, the Wenzhou train crash and similar high-profile incidents makes ordinary people extremely suspicious of official reports. It makes them that much more likely to accept extreme rumors that run contrary to what the official line says.

Loosening the restrictions on the media would get rid of much, if not all of the rumor-mongering.

french lies
Apr 16, 2008

Pro-PRC Laowai posted:

It really wouldn't get rid of it all. The only difference in the end is who is censoring what and for what purpose. It's something that needs to be eased into and regulated properly. This is one nice step towards that goal... holding people responsible for the crap they spew online and when it's something legit, hopefully they will back up their claims with things like evidence.

Hearsay is so strongly ingrained here that it's not even funny. I have had neighbors go to court on rather legit claims, only to lose their cases because they have no documentation to back up a drat thing they claim apart from "this and that happened.. no, i dont have pictures, but everyone knows about it... no, i can't name anyone specific". I have also personally consulted several other residents pursuing the same exact claims... they won outright. The reason? Strong documentation and evidence.

Legally, of course, poo poo ain't perfect, but it's not as bad as some people seem to think it is. Want to talk about crazy poo poo? document document document, then come forward with it publicly and it's a lot harder for anyone to deny it. Give me a cultural shift that has that mentality and then we can talk about loosening restrictions.
The difference between a state and a corporate censor is enormous. For one, the state has armed force to back up its requests for censorship, and the power to directly shut down publications that don't tow the line. Trading one censor for another is a fair deal to make when the differences in power between the censors are this significant. Even moving to a corrupt and money-dominated system like the one in the US would be an enormous improvement over the current SARFT- and CCP-controlled state of things in China.

Rumor-spreading, distrust of official announcements, reliance on hearsay, have all come about more or less directly because of the government's (especially local government's) insistence on censoring everything that is damaging to their interests. The consequences of this information suppression can be deadly to the common man, as they were in the case of the 2008 tainted milk scandal, or the 2003 SARS outbreak. This again gives ordinary citizens a powerful incentive to ignore official announcements (which, as you touched on, are often quite reasonable), and in turn give credence to extreme rumors.

As is typical, the party here is itself the cause of the problems that it says makes changes impossible. Ironically, removing or loosening the party-state's control over the media would actually go a long way to remedy these problems. Re-instating the rule of law and proper legal proceedings would go a long way in fostering a culture where people are less likely to believe any absurd claim as fact. The problem is that since all of these things are detrimental to CCP rule, they are not likely to ever come about.

french lies
Apr 16, 2008
Sorry for the double-post, but I just wanted to make another plug for the Sinica podcast that was recommended a few pages back. I've been listening to it during work-outs over the past few weeks and it's such a fantastic resource for understanding current affairs in China. I'm not exaggerating when I say it's probably the best China-related thing I've discovered in years.

french lies
Apr 16, 2008
Pro-PRC Laowai is what happens when you integrate too well and end up with the political opinions of a shaokao vendor or a middle-aged cab driver.

french lies
Apr 16, 2008

Xandu posted:

Pretty good article about the recent events in Chongqing.

http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2012/mar/19/chinas-falling-star-bo-xilai/
That's a good article, thanks for sharing.

The writer also mentions Wen Jiabao's comments about Bo Xilai's populism and the parallels to the Cultural Revolution. For anyone in the PRC, how hard is the official Chinese media pushing this angle? I've had more than a few mainland friends paraphrase Wen's comments to me when I asked about Bo being sacked, so I would assume they're a significant part of the official narrative right now.

french lies
Apr 16, 2008
More Bo Xilai news! Apparently, some people now think the ouster was part of a political coup.

Foreign Policy posted:

Mainland media sites have begun to strongly censor discussion of Bo Xilai and entirely unsubstantiated rumors of gunfire in downtown Beijing (an extremely rare occurance in Beijing). Chinese websites hosted overseas, free from censorship, offer a host of unsupported, un-provable commentary on what might have happened in the halls of power. Bannedbook.org, which provides free downloads of "illegal" Chinese books, posted a long explanation of tremors in the palace of Zhongnanhai, sourced to a "person with access to high level information in Beijing," of a power struggle between President Hu Jintao, who controls the military, and Zhou, who controls China's formidable domestic security apparatus. The Epoch Times, a news site affiliated with the Falun Gong spiritual movement (which banned in China), has published extensively in English and Chinese about the coup.

Kong Qingdong said a thing. Apparently he is now barred from teaching at Beida, and his program has been suspended.

Radio France International posted:

(my translation) Xinhua reports that after Bo Xilai was forced to resign, Peking University professor Kong Qingdong stated that this was a “Counter-Revolutionary Coup” during the March 15 showing of his program “Kong Qingdong Has Something to Say” on V1. Kong also said this move “hurt the feelings of hundreds of millions of Chinese”, and claimed that China “is bound to sink into the kind of Cultural Revolution chaos that Wen Jiabao talked about. Everyone will suffer, it would probably be a huge disaster.”

Hu Xijin, the editor of hardline nationalist rag Global Times, issued a response to Mitt Romney's recent comments about China. He is uncharacteristically civil, and pretty much just states the obvious.

Hu Xijin posted:

As for the U.S.-China row over things like rare earths, the exchange rate, and even human rights, all these conflicts have been very specific, and they haven't capsized the whole relationship. We believe the person whom the Americans elect to enter the White House will, at the very least, have rational thoughts. Romney won't make the mistake of turning a specific conflict into a showdown with 1.3 billion Chinese people.

french lies
Apr 16, 2008
Falun Gong is just putting its US funding to good use and smearing the CCP any chance it gets (with good reason, I might add). The fact that their propaganda outlets NTDTV and Epoch Times are pushing the coup angle is a surefire sign that it's bullshit. You just know that somewhere along the way, they'll cite some "unnamed sources" and claim that the Politburo was really fighting over who gets the biggest cut of its countrywide FLG organ harvesting operations.

They're good for entertainment, I'll give them that.

french lies
Apr 16, 2008
More rumors! No coup, but the likelihood of very strong tensions within the party is high. It'll be interesting to see how this plays out over the coming weeks.

LA Times posted:


State media reported this week that 3,300 party cadres from the security apparatus would be sent to Beijing for ideological retraining. The order was unusual enough, but even more so was the fact that the report omitted mention of internal security czar Zhou Yongkang, who heads the Political and Legislative Affairs Committee that is recalling the cadres.

Zhou, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee and until now one of the most powerful men in China, had been the committee's strongest backer of Bo Xilai, the Communist Party secretary of Chongqing who was removed from his post last week. Some overseas Chinese-language Internet sites carried wild (and unsubstantiated) rumors that Zhou and Bo, a popular figure among Maoist traditionalists, had tried to stage a coup.

A level of edginess was apparent this week in the unusually large security presence in central Beijing, complete with armed SWAT teams in some subway stations.

Jin Zhong, a veteran political analyst based in Hong Kong, dismissed the more fantastic rumors, while acknowledging the underlying tension between economic reformers and Maoist traditionalists.

"It hasn't reached the point where you are going to hear gunshots. It is not like when China arrested the Gang of Four in 1976, but there is a very strong conflict going on," Jin said

Wow, the Chinese government does not want people talking about Bo Xilai. Netizens are now resorting to noodle brands and children's shows characters as code words to discuss the Bo Xilai ouster.

The Guardian posted:

With facts in short supply since leadership contender Bo Xilai was dismissed as party chief of Chongqing last week, the online rumour mill has been in overdrive – fuelled by the opaque nature of Chinese politics and the knowledge that a power transition is fast approaching.

Internet users disguise their references by using nicknames for the leaders they cannot mention.

"[A few] days ago, Beijing was hosting an innovative tug-of-war for the elderly; this game has nine contestants in all," wrote one internet user on Thursday, in a thinly veiled reference to the nine members of the Politburo Standing Committee, the country's top political body.

"The first round of the contest is still intense … The teletubby team noticeably has the advantage and, relatively, the Master Kong team is obviously falling short."

"Teletubby" is code for Wen Jiabao, who chided Bo publicly before his ousting – the Chinese for the children's show, tianxianbaobao, shares a character with the premier's name. The popular instant noodle brand Master Kong is known as Kang Shifu in Chinese and stands in for Zhou Yongkang, who is reportedly supportive of Bo.

On the topic of Hong Kong, they are holding an election! Yay! Oh wait, it's just a bunch of rich assholes picking from a pre-screened selection of candidates. Apparently, this leads to trouble when one of them pretends to give a poo poo about the poor. HK's elite are now in open conflict with Zhongnanhai.

Wall Street Journal posted:

The race for Hong Kong's top political post that will reach the finish line Sunday is the liveliest the city has ever seen, and one last surprise could be in store: no winner.

That would be an embarrassment for Beijing, analysts say. China's government has worked hard in the background to script Hong Kong's politics and ensure stability ever since the former British colony returned to Chinese sovereignty in 1997 under "one country, two systems."

This week, Beijing signaled it prefers the candidate who for months has led in public-opinion polls, Leung Chun-ying, a charismatic politician with close ties to China's Communist Party. Local political leaders confirm the central government's liaison office is lobbying members of Hong Kong's election committee, which will actually choose the city's next chief executive, to back Mr. Leung.

But Beijing's choice is regarded with suspicion by many of the electors. The committee's 1,200 members are mostly top professionals, politicians and tycoons, and the city's business leaders are wary of Mr. Leung's populist rhetoric, with its emphasis on public housing and poverty reduction. Allegations that Mr. Leung has ties to organized crime, which he denies, have also dented his support levels.

A University of Hong Kong poll published Thursday showed ordinary Hong Kongers, who don't get to vote, are unhappy with both Mr. Leung and his opponent, Henry Tang, the city's former No. 2. For Mr. Tang, who has never enjoyed much popular support, his prospects grew worse after he admitted last fall to an extramarital affair and last month to having illegally added a basement to his home. The survey showed 75% of Hong Kongers would be content to see neither candidate win a majority.

french lies
Apr 16, 2008
New Sinica! :toot:

Sinica posted:

If you smell anything burning, it's likely your Internet cable melting from the heat of all these rumors. Which is why at Sinica we turn our unforgiving gaze this week at unsubstantiated press foreign and domestic, focusing first on reports of heightened police security in Beijing, midnight tank appearances, gunshots near the square, luxury car crashes, and even whispers of a coup d'etat. And more internationally, we can't help but discuss This American Life's recent retraction of a China-related story that was heavily fabricated: L'affaire Daisey.

China is ending the practice of harvesting organ from death-row prisoners. Sounds good, but it may cause problems with the supply. Voluntary donations are extremely rare in China, as Chinese tradition requires the body to be kept intact after death.

Wall Street Journal posted:

China officials plan to phase out organ harvesting of death-row inmates, a move to overhaul a transplant system that has for years relied on prisoners and organ traffickers to serve those in need of transplants.

Huang Jiefu, China's vice minister of health, said on Thursday that Chinese officials plan to abolish the practice within the next five years and to create a national organ-donation system, according to a report from the state-run Xinhua news agency.

[...]

Officials in the world's most populous country have conceded that China has depended for years on executed prisoners as its main source of organ supply for ailing citizens. Human-rights groups say the harvesting is often forced and influences the pace of China's executions. Mr. Huang has been quoted in state media reports as saying that the rights of death-row prisoners have been fully respected and that the state asks for written consent prior to donation.

Due in part to traditional beliefs and distrust of the medical system, voluntary donations are rare in China, where the need for organs far exceeds the supply. An estimated 1.5 million people in China are in need of organ transplants annually, while only 10,000 receive them, according to government statistics. In the U.S. in 2009, 14,632 organs were donated, while the transplant wait list had 104,898 patients, according to data from the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network and the Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients.

Life continues to suck for Tibetans in post-Harmonious Society China. If only their outlook was more ... scientific!

Tom Lasseter posted:

Although he was speaking in a teahouse with no obvious security presence, the monk on Wednesday said that he had to be careful.

"It's very difficult now for monks from Rongwo monastery to come outside," he said. "There are cameras watching where we go, and later on they will of course ask us where we went."

Asked whom he meant by "they," the monk would not answer. He said only that life at the monastery hasn't been comfortable lately.

"If we were not in pain, we would not be setting ourselves on fire," he said. :(

Lawyers now have to swear fealty to the CCP. How's that legal system working out for you, Pro-PRC Laowai?

Voice of America posted:

China's Justice Ministry has for the first time ordered lawyers to take a loyalty oath to the Communist Party, in a move that is raising the ire of human rights lawyers who defend critics of the authoritarian Beijing government.

In a notice posted Wednesday on its Website, the ministry said first-time applicants and lawyers seeking to renew their licenses will be required to take an oath.

The oath requires lawyers to “pledge to faithfully fulfill the sacred mission of a legal worker under the socialist system with Chinese characteristics.” It also demands that they “be loyal to the motherland, loyal to the people, uphold the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the socialist system.”

Some more links:

  • Charlie Rose interview with Richard McGregor and Damien Ma - Richard McGregor, for those who don't know him, is the author of The Party, which is in the OP's book list and I reviewed recently in the D&D book thread. This is a good recap/introduction for those of you who are interested in the ouster and what it means. I did pause, however, when the other guy mentioned that Hu Jintao may retain control over the CMC for another term? WTF? Is there even any plausible evidence that this is happening? Wasn't the Politburo super-pissed when Jiang stayed on for another two years?
  • Insight: China's Bo exits stage left in succession drama - Another great summary/introduction to the Bo Xilai ouster.
  • China faces 'timebomb' of ageing population - Great piece by Tania Brannigan about the challenges of the Chinese populations' rapid ageing and the change in social norms that has accompanied them. Make sure to watch the video for some of the most awesome old people in existence. Some of them are in greater shape than me!

french lies
Apr 16, 2008
Yessss give me more of those rumors. The bizarre the better. People are now saying that Bo Guagua, Bo Xilai's son, is missing and that his (apparently male) nanny was murdered by his mother in Chongqing. See what happens when you don't give people information? They make poo poo up.

Wenxue City posted:

(my translation) Caijing reporter Yang Haipeng revealed on her Weibo today that the "English nanny" of Bo Guagua, Bo Xilai's son, died in Chongqing. The person in charge of the investigation at the time was Wang Lijun (written as "Wang Lijuan" here - Weibo innuendo). The cause of death was not revealed, and the body was cremated immediately afterwards.

Shortly thereafter, Southern Weekly reporter Chu Chaoxin leaked this on his Weibo: At five in the morning on February 15, a text message was received on a number used exclusively to contact Wang Lijuan. The gist of it was that Neil Wood, an Englishman, was murdered in Chongqing. Wang Lijuan's investigations pointed at Bo's wife. This was why he was put on vacation-style medical treatment, and entered the US consulate. Yang Haipeng posted a similar weibo from Shanghai today: The deceased: Guagua's nanny. Nationality: English. Location: Chongqing. Case handler: Wang Lijun. Cause of death: Wang was not allowed to investigate. The body has not been preserved, it was cremated immediately. No way to confirm, seeking a debunk.

Moreover, after Bo Xilai stepped down, nothing has been heard from Bo Guagua, the son of him and his current wife Gu Kailai. In her Weibo, Yang Haipeng revealed that "Information concerning Gu's corruption problems have already been circulated among officials of sub-provincial level and over". An informant on the net said there have been rumors that Bo Guagua has not been attending his classes at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government since his father was removed from his position on March 14, and Gu Kailai was isolated for questioning by relevant authorities in the central government.

A few Chinese friends of Bo Guagua have tried to contact him on his cell phone, and they have not heard anything from him either. It is said that the whereabouts of Li Wang, Bo Xilai's son from an earlier marriage to Li Danyu, are also unknown.

More trouble in the South China Sea (as good as a time as any to post Sinica's discussion on the topic). Just wait till they get those aircraft carriers.

AFP posted:

HANOI — China said Thursday the detention of two Vietnamese fishing boats and 21 crew near the disputed Paracel Islands was lawful, after Hanoi demanded their "immediate and unconditional" release.

Hanoi has said the March 3 arrests "seriously violated Vietnam's sovereignty" and that China must stop its "hindrance of Vietnamese fishermen".
Beijing maintained that it held "indisputable sovereignty" over the islands in the South China Sea.

"The actions of the Vietnamese fishing boats violated China's sovereignty and maritime rights. The actions taken by Chinese authorities were valid law enforcement actions," Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Hong Lei told reporters.
Hong further urged Hanoi to "manage and educate" its fishermen and end "illegal poaching" in Chinese waters.

Today is D-day for HK's "democratic" (plutocratic?) elections. Looks like ordinary people aren't all that excited to see which one of the two Beijing-approved rich guys that get voted in by the establishment. Can't say I'm waiting with bated breath either.

Bloomberg posted:

Stephen Chung gave up on buying an apartment in Hong Kong after realizing it would take him 10 years to save the $115,000 deposit for a two-bedroom box in the northern part of the former British colony. He isn’t expecting any help from the city’s next leader.

“In this place there are only two kinds of people -- those who can afford to buy a home and all the good stuff, and those who can’t,” said Chung, 25, who quit his advertising job last year to start a tourism firm. “There’s no more middle class.”

Chung’s bitterness reflects a broader disillusionment with the city’s leadership ahead of a March 25 election, which will see a 1,193-member committee of billionaires, businessmen, lawmakers and academics choose a new chief executive for the next five years. While China’s tacit approval is seen as necessary to win, the campaign -- with two candidates dogged by personal scandal and conflict of interest allegations -- has exacerbated public discontent over collusion between business and politics and fueled accusations that leaders are out of touch with regular people.

The new chief executive will inherit a city with the biggest wealth gap in Asia, which has been spawned by an influx of money from mainland China and eight years of rising property prices that have made Hong Kong the world’s most expensive place to buy a home. At stake is the city’s ability to maintain its status as the best place to do business and as a gateway to the world’s fastest-growing region, as the new leader tries to balance China’s demands for stability with the aspirations of Hong Kong’s 7.1 million residents.

:siren: UPDATE :siren:

Leung Chun-ying has won the election with 689 of 1193 votes.

french lies fucked around with this message at 08:16 on Mar 25, 2012

french lies
Apr 16, 2008
Remember those rumors I posted about? Turns out they had some punch to them. They got the name wrong (it's Neil Heywood, not Neil Wood), but someone did die in Chongqing, he was connected to the Bo family and he was English. My guess is we'll still be hearing about this case months from now.

The Wall Street Journal posted:

U.K. Seeks Probe Into China Death
BEIJING—The U.K. has asked the Chinese government to launch an investigation into the death of a British businessman who claimed to have close links to the family of Bo Xilai, the Communist Party leader whose downfall has thrown Chinese politics into turmoil.

The mysterious death of Neil Heywood in the Chinese city of Chongqing last year is emerging as a key element in the drama surrounding Mr. Bo, who was sacked as Chongqing's Communist Party chief this month.

Mr. Bo was brought down after his former police chief, Wang Lijun, triggered the political drama by seeking refuge from Mr. Bo in a U.S. consulate in the nearby city of Chengdu. Chinese police cars surrounded the building after he went inside on Feb. 6. After spending the night, he was taken away by Chinese security agents the following day and hasn't been seen since.

Mr. Wang claimed to have fallen out with Mr. Bo after discussing his belief with his boss that Mr. Heywood was poisoned, people familiar with the case said in interviews with The Wall Street Journal. Mr. Wang also claimed that Mr. Bo's wife, Gu Kailai, was involved in a business dispute with Mr. Heywood, according to one of those people.

Old news by now, but if you didn't catch it last week: China's law enforcement agencies can now legally "detain" (essentially kidnap) people for six months without informing their relatives or closest kin, so long as "national security" calls for it.

Want China Times posted:

China legalizes secret arrests, 6-month detention without charge

China's rubber-stamp legislature, the National People's Congress, approved Wednesday a revision to the country's Criminal Procedure Law that contains a controversial article empowering the police to make secret arrests. The approval was gained through a vote of 2,639 to 170 and 57 abstentions.

The new rule is certain to come under fire from the governments of other countries and human rights groups as a blatant pretext for silencing dissenting voices within China.

The revised Article 73 of the Criminal Procedure Law will take effect from the beginning of next year. It relieves the law enforcement department of the obligation to inform the closest kin of arrested suspects within 24 hours of their arrest if the individuals are suspected of crimes against national security or of terrorist acts, or if informing relatives would impede investigations.

In other news, state-run media outlets are now calling the Dalai Lama a nazi.

The New York Times posted:

China Attacks Dalai Lama in Online Burst

BEIJING — As the Chinese government’s relationship with the Dalai Lama, the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader, has gone from bad to worse over the years, Beijing’s propaganda machine has churned out increasingly florid descriptions of him. He has been called a “jackal,” a “wolf in sheep’s clothing” and, routinely, a “splittist.”

On Saturday, the state-run news media sought to equate the Dalai Lama, a recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, with the Nazis and their genocidal war on European Jews.

The commentary, posted on China Tibet Online and carried by the official Xinhua news agency, said the Dalai Lama was advocating policies that would result in the expulsion of ethnic Han Chinese from traditionally Tibetan parts of the country.

“The remarks of the Dalai Lama remind us of the cruel Nazis during the Second World War,” it said, adding, “How similar it is to the Holocaust committed by Hitler on the Jews!”

It also called him a “tricky liar skilled in double-dealing.”

The editorial is here, for those who want to read it. It's built up as a series of questions to the Dalai Lama, including such gems as "Why did you build up a “Berlin Wall” of national antagonism?". Oh state propaganda, what won't you do? :allears:

french lies fucked around with this message at 10:12 on Mar 26, 2012

french lies
Apr 16, 2008
All this forced demolition chat made me think of the Fuzhou bomber last year.

From Wikipedia:

quote:

In 1995 Qian Mingqi's home was demolished by government authorities to make way for a highway. He then saved up enough money to build a second home, which was also shattered by a second forced demolition. His second house cost about 500,000 yuan, and the authorities paid him only half of that for compensation. Because of the lack of compensation, he posted slogans to resist the demolition. According to his neighbors, Qian's wife was then hung upside down by the demolition team. She died a few years later from gall bladder disease. From the police report of the Fuzhou Police, Qian's wife has been dead for several years.
What this summary fails to mention is that he had made renovations on the new house totaling at least a million yuan. It all added up to two million yuan of lost value for him by his own account. But you know what the funny thing is? His second home was also demolished to make way for a highway. And not only that, it was the same highway.

french lies fucked around with this message at 10:50 on Aug 27, 2013

french lies
Apr 16, 2008
Details are emerging on Neil Heywood. He was connected to the Bo family mainly through his wife, and had done various jobs for them, with some suggesting that he played a role as a low-level fixer. Others are saying that he was entrusted with taking care of Guagua at various points, corroborating the rumors that he was a "nanny". Maybe butler is a more apt description?

Wall Street Journal posted:

Briton in China Advised Intelligence Firm
BEIJING—The British businessman whose death has emerged as a key element in China's biggest political scandal in two decades periodically consulted for a British strategic-intelligence firm founded by ex-spies, a spokesman said Monday.

Neil Heywood, who was found dead in a Chongqing hotel room in November, wasn't a full-time employee of the firm, Hakluyt & Co., and wasn't involved in projects in Chongqing, the spokesman said. The work was apparently one of several jobs Mr. Heywood held. The level of sensitivity of his projects wasn't clear.

The revelation adds a layer of intrigue to the scandal, which increasingly appears to mix the worlds of international diplomacy and corporate sleuthing with China's shadowy domestic security apparatus and opaque politics.

Mr. Heywood's death is one of the events in the drama surrounding the fall of the Communist Party chief in Chongqing, Bo Xilai, whose dismissal this month has thrown Chinese politics into turmoil.

Suspicions about Mr. Heywood's death were raised by Wang Lijun, the former Chongqing police chief who triggered the political drama, The Wall Street Journal reported Sunday. Mr. Wang, who sought refuge from Mr. Bo in the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu on Feb. 6, claimed to have fallen out with Mr. Bo after discussing with him his belief that Mr. Heywood was poisoned, according to people familiar with the matter. He also claimed Mr. Heywood had been involved in a business dispute involving Mr. Bo's wife, Gu Kailai, according to one of those people.

The British government said Sunday it had asked China's central government to investigate the case fully in light of fresh suspicions about Mr. Heywood's death, and that Chinese officials promised to "take it forward."

The new revelation about Mr. Heywood's work with Hakluyt suggests he might have been engaged in activities that are considered highly sensitive—and sometimes dangerous—in China.

Gathering business intelligence and investigating Chinese firms is a growing industry here, and inevitably those engaged in it often delve into issues of corruption, nepotism and vested bureaucratic interests.

More bear chat, and it ain't the sexy kind. Many analysts are predicting a hard landing may be imminent, some even say it's already begun.

China Digital Times posted:

CDT Money: More Signs of a Slowdown
Despite suggestions last week that the yuan exchange rate had reached equilibrium and hints of possible liberalization in its trading range, officials at the People’s Bank of China set the yuan’s U.S. dollar reference rate at a record high on Friday as macroeconomic concerns continue to mount.

The move by China’s central bank reflects an effort to mitigate selling pressure after the release of preliminary but disappointing manufacturing data, as a number of global currencies sensitive to Chinese growth fell against the dollar on Thursday when an unofficial reading showed that Chinese factory activity had hit a four-month low. Following dismal trade data for February, including a record trade deficit, the 48.1 level indicated by the HSBC flash purchasing managers index (PMI) frightened global markets.

I won't pretend to understand even half of what's in there, but what I do know is that most of the bearish predictions so far have tended to be premature and overblown (ref. The Coming Collapse of China, where Gordon Chang predicted that China would collapse in 2006). I'd be happy if someone with more economic know-how than me took a look through the links in the CDT article and gave some input on this.

At this point it's probably unnecessary for me to mention that a slowdown, if it really happens, will result in a worst-case scenario of civil unrest and a lot of bloody crackdowns. This is probably why Wen Jiabao is out there right now giving lip-service to popular issues like corruption fighting and political reform: The government is trying to be pro-active in staving off any coming waves of discontent.

french lies fucked around with this message at 09:12 on Mar 27, 2012

french lies
Apr 16, 2008

Deceitful Penguin posted:

So what can the Brits do, other than ask? Is it likely for anything to come out of this at all or will it get swept under the carpet?
Not much, to tell you the truth. The UK holds very little sway over China aside from absorbing a large amount of its elite student population. Cameron's visit to China in 2010 pretty much underlined how skewed the power balance is between them: His visit essentially boiled down to "please import our poo poo". Britain, remarkably, even had to beg to let Cameron wear a poppy on Armistice Day. Now, of course ostensibly this has to do with the Opium War and the countries' shared history, but the Chinese wouldn't have dared to ask if they didn't feel pretty drat sure about their position.

As far as the investigation is concerned, we'll get whatever details the party deems convenient for us to know. In this instance, the central leadership likely has an interest in killing domestic and international sympathy/support for Bo Xilai, so don't be surprised if we get some major dirt on him and his family a few months out from now. This kills two birds with one stone: The party appears tough on corruption by showing that no one is above the law, and it changes the story of the Bo ouster from one of party in-fighting to a purging of criminal elements within the leadership.

french lies
Apr 16, 2008
China Digital Times sums up the fallout from "Mr. Daisey and the Apple Factory", including Chinese/American reactions to the piece and its subsequent retraction. Lots of soul-searching, introspection and even some sweet burns from the Global Times:

Global Times posted:

NPR scandal shows US addicted to savior myth



In both [Kony 2012 and Mike Daisey's monologue], the locals were stripped of agency. Daisey claimed to have met Chinese workers who have never thought about how they would change things at their factory, and who saw the iPad as “magic,” like primitive tribesmen encountering a more sophisticated world. He imagined hordes of under-aged workers, flocking to Shenzhen factories to be chewed up in the gears of the machine.

But in reality, Chinese workers are increasingly opinionated, self-aware, and increasingly active in defending their own rights. There are under-aged workers at foreign-invested factories, but they're late teenagers posing as adults, using borrowed identity cards from other people in their home village in order to get an early jump on the job market. Meanwhile, the "Kony 2012" video portrayed Ugandans as helpless victims of Kony's rampaging forces, even though the Ugandan army long ago succeeded in reducing Kony's once-substantial militia to a few hundred men and drove him beyond their borders.

Leslie T. Chang (the author of Factory Girls) agrees and finds Daisey's underlying perception of Chinese workers to be insulting. IIRC this is also a big part of her book: She found that the Chinese workers she followed didn't really discuss their working conditions or their relative poverty to the people who bought the products they made. They were mostly interested in things like love, marriage and their own personal aspirations. The hard work they did in the factory was a way for them to actively realize their ambitions, not something they were forced into by capital and the circumstances of their life. You might of course discuss whether this was really the case, but that is how they perceived their own lives.

I also found interesting the parallels to 8964 and how that incident was misrepresented in the Western media. Jeffrey Wasserstrom has a pro-click piece about this that you all should read.

But what strikes me most while reading through the links in the article is the willingness of some people (Steve Wozniak, for example) to excuse Daisey lying because it was in the service of the greater good, meaning awareness-raising in this case. Setting aside the issue of him lying to his audience, what good is awareness when it's predicated on a set of false beliefs? Is there any point in me boycotting the iPad because I think it's made by Hexane-poisoned 13-year-old girls with lobster hands, when that is really not the case at all?

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french lies
Apr 16, 2008
If you haven't heard yet, commenting is now blocked on Sina and Tencent's Weibo services.

From The Jakarta Globe:

quote:

Beijing. China’s two most popular microblogs, Sina Weibo and Tencent QQ, on Saturday blocked web users from posting comments on the sites, saying they were acting to stop the spread of rumors.

The Internet giants said the measure would remain in force until Tuesday. It came just hours after authorities said they had shut down Web sites they accused of spreading misinformation and made a string of arrests.

China has been strengthening its control of the Internet after being rattled by a flood of online rumors and criticisms.

Groundless rumors of a coup in Beijing began circulating on the Internet earlier in March following the dismissal of political star Bo Xilai.

“Rumours and illegal, harmful information spread via microblogs have had a negative social impact and the comments contain a large amount of harmful information,” said a message on Tencent’s Web site.

“From March 31, 8:00 am to April 3, 8:00 a.m., Weibo’s comment function will be temporarily suspended,” said Sina, which runs China’s most popular microblogging service, Sina Weibo.

Authorities early Saturday said they had shut down 16 Web sites for spreading rumors of “military vehicles entering Beijing and something wrong going on in Beijing,” the official Xinhua news agency quoted a spokesman for the State Internet Information Office as saying.

Six people had also been detained for “fabricating or disseminating online rumors,” the State Internet Information Office and Beijing police said, according to Xinhua.
I seriously wonder how much longer the CCP can keep this poo poo up before people start to get pissed for real. Now it's not just a minority of netizens who get their posts censored - nobody can comment on anything, not even innocuous status updates. State propaganda is trying to shift blame for this over to "rumor-mongers", but as far as I can tell from my friends almost nobody buys this line of argument. They think the CCP has something big to hide and this measure is just making the rumor mill run even faster. Even people I know who aren't politically engaged are starting to talk about the Bo Xilai rumors, since now they're suddenly affecting them as well.

Nothing big is going to come out of this, but my guess it will add to the trickle of discontent that is slowly shaping into a big problem for the CCP.

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