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 Wait what is this? America against America 《美国反对美国》 is a 1991 book published by Wang Huning, then a professor of International Relations at Fudan University in Shanghai, one of the most pre-eminent schools in the country. Wang turned out to be a bit of a political wunderkind - he gained the attention of some close allies of the then-head of state Jiang Zemin in the 1990s. He has headed the Central Policy Research Office of the Chinese Communist Party since 2002. He has been part of the Politburo Standing Committee since 2017, and he was appointed as the head of the Central Guidance Commission on Building Spiritual Civilization that same year. He has been a part of the administrations of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao before Xi Jinping came to power, and it is unusual he would hold that office for so long given the expected turnover of personnel at that level. He is regarded by outside observers as one of the most influential theorists in the country.  From left to right: Paramount Leader, Chairman of the CCP, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, Chairman of the Central Military Commission Xi Jinping, Wang Huning, and Premier of the State Council Li Keqiang. Before all that, however, he was just a young professor who was able to visit the United States on a six-month extended stay. He spent much of his time with the University of Iowa, which gave him a front-row seat to the state primaries and the vicious 1988 election between George H. W. Bush and Michael Dukakis. When this book was first published in 1990, it accompanied a period of renewed tension with the United States after the tragic events of summer 1989. His harsh criticisms were novel after a period of detente. As far as I am aware, no English translation exists, except for a few brief paragraph-length summaries that exist in academic papers. So I will be providing a word for word translation of the most interesting bits, and then content summaries of the rest. So why read this? I mean I think this is interesting. China is big and it's interesting and people should know more about it. If there is interest, I may add some 'compare and contrast' posts about scholarly research about China. There are several ways this could be useful: -To see what a true-believer party ideologue thinks about the United States, to try and figure out what he's citing in addition to the expected Marxist works. -To try and figure out where the party's later campaigns had their roots -To have a look back at the United States in the same time period, which I think we all can agree had issues Didn't he write anything more up to date? Sure. As a senior member of the government, he's very likely had influence in multiple policy directives and campaigns, although only so much has been directly attributed to him - some speeches and policy circulars. As for published books, his output only goes up to 1995. I picked this book because people said they were interested in it. I'm going to make a more detailed biographical post later. How are you doing this? I will be posting quotations in quote boxes, summaries of the text unformatted, and my own commentary in italic. I will not be posting long blocks of Chinese unless somebody really is concerned with the translation. Mandarin is my third language, so I may slip up on some of the more technical details. Table of Contents Preface Chapter 1, Part 1- Doubt, Made in America Chapter 1, Part 2 - Manhattan and Chinatown Chapter 1, Part 3 - The Four Cs Chapter 1, Part 4 - The Heights of Commodification Chapter 1, Part 5 - Frontiers Chapter 1, Part 6 - The Amana Colonies Chapter 1, Part 7 - Native Landscapes Chapter 1, Part 8: The Decline of the Farm Chapter 2: An Ancient Political Spirit Chapter 2, Part 1 - The American Mind Chapter 2, Part 2 - The Mayflower Chapter 2, Part 3 - A Political Creed Chapter 2, Part 4 - Equality or Freedom? Chapter 2, Part 5 - A Constitution's Bicentennial Chapter 2, Part 6 - Political Genes Chapter 2, Part 7 - Political Standards Chapter 2, Part 8 - "The Third Republic" Chapter 3: A Colorful National Character Chapter 3, Part 1 - International People Chapter 3, Part 2 - Making a Show of Being Original Chapter 3, Part 3 - Demystification Chapter 3, Part 4 - Sacralization Chapter 3, Part 5 - A Misleading Space Shuttle Chapter 3, Part 6 - The "Work Ethic" Chapter 3, Part 7 - Sexual Liberation (by chezhead) Chapter 3, Part 8 - Lonely Spirits Chapter 3, Part 9 - Future World Chapter 3, Part 10 - People are always People Chapter 4: Multileveled Societal Control Chapter 4, Part 1: The Invisible Hand Chapter 4, Part 2: Money-Managed Society Chapter 4, Part 3: Human Standardization Chapter 4, Part 4: Legal Culture Chapter 4, Part 5: Taxation System Chapter 4, Part 6: Scientific Administrators Chapter 4, Part 7: Cats and Dogs are not Free Chapter 5: Interwoven Political Power Chapter 5, Part 1: Rule of Donkey and Elephant Chapter 5, Part 2: Parties Share the Spoils Chapter 5, Part 3: Interest Groups Chapter 5, Part 4: Lobbyists Chapter 5, Part 5: Radical Organizations Chapter 5, Part 6: Pluralism or Meritocracy? Chapter 5, Part 7: Participative Democracy Chapter 6: Incomplete Elections Chapter 6, Part 1: Battle for the White House Chapter 6, Part 2: Road to the Presidency Chapter 6, Part 3: A Tri-County Democratic Party Luncheon Chapter 6, Part 4: TV Debate Chapter 6, Part 5: A Representative's Dream Chapter 6, Part 6: Election Day Chapter 6, Part 7: Who rises and falls? Chapter 7: Political Pyramid Chapter 7, Part 1: Capitol Hill Chapter 7, Part 2: Fifty States Chapter 7, Part 3: County Politics Chapter 7, Part 4: Politics in the Cities Chapter 7, Part 5: Grassroots Politics Chapter 7, Part 6: Transparency Chapter 7, Part 7: Selection of Officials Chapter 7, Part 8: Contacting Representatives Chapter 8: Soft Governance Chapter 8, Part 1: Drivers Licenses Chapter 8, Part 2: Factory Principles Chapter 8, Part 3: A Company is Not a Democracy Chapter 8, Part 4: Human Services Chapter 8, Part 5: Coca-Cola Headquarters Chapter 8, Part 6: God on Earth Chapter 9: Reproducing the System Chapter 9, Part 1: The Educational System Chapter 9, Part 2: MIT Chapter 9, Part 3: The Kennedy School of Government Chapter 9, Part 4: Talent Factories Chapter 9, Part 5: The US Naval Academy Chapter 9, Part 6: Educational Exports Chapter 9, Part 7: A Furnace of Technology Chapter 10: Active Intelligence Chapter 10, Part 1: 'Knowledge Factories' Chapter 10, Part 2: The Brookings Institute Chapter 10, Part 3: The Carter Center Chapter 10, Part 4: The Secretary of Defense's Talk Chapter 10, Part 5: Regional Affairs Centers Chapter 10, Part 6: Think Tanks Chapter 10, Part 7: City Libraries Chapter 11: Hidden Crises Chapter 11, Part 1: Family Values Chapter 11, Part 2: An Ignorant Generation? Chapter 11, Part 3: Wandering Youths Chapter 11, Part 4: America has its own Poisons Chapter 11, Part 5: Criminal Underworld Chapter 11, Part 6: A Beggar Nation Chapter 11, Part 7: Black Crisis (by chezhead) Chapter 11, Part 8: The Natives' Situation Chapter 11, Part 9: A Mental Crisis Chapter 11, Part 10: Empire of the Sun Kangxi fucked around with this message at 20:24 on Jan 16, 2021 |
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Nov 15, 2019 02:44
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in on the ground floor 
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Nov 15, 2019 02:49
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Looks neat! Thanks for doing this.
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Nov 15, 2019 02:58
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Cool as gently caress. Don't abandon this midway through like most goon projects!
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Nov 15, 2019 03:13
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So who is this Wang Huning guy? Wang's ancestry is from Shandong province on the coast, but he was born in Shanghai in 1955, to a family of committed party members. His father, a military officer, was persecuted in Mao's campaign against Marshal Peng Dehuai in 1959. Wang graduated from high school in 1972 but was not sent to a rural area with other urban educated youth as part of the "Down to the Countryside" campaign in 1972, because of his poor health. He attended a vocational training school near Shanghai and learned the French language. In 1978, after Mao's death, Deng Xiaoping established himself as ruler of the country. As part of his reforms, Deng reopened the country's institutes of higher education, which had been closed as outposts of bourgeois thinking. Although Wang lacked the qualifications to attend a master's degree program, his scores on the standardized higher examination test were so good that he was immediately admitted into the master's in international relations program at the elite Fudan University in Shanghai. His advisor was Chen Qiren, an authority on Marx's works and Das Kapital. Wang wrote a thesis, "From Bodin to Maritain: On Sovereignty Theories Developed by the Western Bourgeoisie." He stayed at Fudan for several years and worked as a teacher and writer. By 1985, before he turned 30, he was promoted to Associate Professor, the youngest in the school's history. He wrote several books, including National Sovereignty (1987), Comparative Political Analysis (1987), An Analysis of Contemporary Western Political Science (1987), Fighting Corruption: China's Experiment (1990), and co-edited books such as Logic of Politics: Marxist Principles of Political Science (1989). After all this, he had time to write magazine articles, translate books by the political scientists Raymond Aron and Robert Dahl, and even coach the university's award-winning debate team. Oh yes, and he was eventually promoted to full professor and head of the Law School. All this was getting people's attention. Officials in the Shanghai municipal government, such as Zeng Qinghong and Wu Bangguo kept a close eye on him. They, in turn, were close associates with Jiang Zemin, who was mayor of Shanghai in the 1980s. Jiang Zemin was eventually handpicked by Deng Xiaoping to be his successor, and Jiang brought with him many of his close associates from Shanghai, who were in turn called the Shanghai clique. By 1995, when Jiang had consolidated his position at the top, he eventually cajoled Wang to join the government. His time as a public intellectual was over, and his time as a party employee begun. He started off in the Central Policy Research Office, which wrote on policy analysis, ideological matters, and even wrote speeches for Central Committee members. Wang was soon promoted to lead that, too. By 2002, with the start of the Hu Jintao administration, he was a member of the Central Committee. By 2007, he was part of the Central Secretariat. By 2012, he was in the Politburo, or the top 25 members of the Chinese Communist Party. You get the picture. {Continued}
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Nov 15, 2019 04:32
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So what does this guy even do? What did he think anyway? The role of intellectuals and writers has been a major part of the Marxist critical tradition - the contrast is between the romanticized ideal of the proletariat liberating themselves, and of intellectuals taking a leading role. In the Chinese Communist Party, the role of intellectuals has veered between extremes. On the one hand, one of the terms for party education is still 'thought work' 思想工作 , with implications on the role of ideology in personal education. At their nadir, Mao is said to have regarded intellectuals and writers as the ‘stinking old ninth' 臭老九, borrowing a term from the Mongolian Yuan Dynasty, where he regarded intellectuals as the very lowest class, even worse than reactionaries and landlords. Their position has improved after the Deng reforms, but successive heads of state noted that the party faced a legitimacy crisis after the domestic turmoil of the Cultural Revolution, with doubts over the future of socialism, a crisis of belief in Marxism, and a lack of trust in the party. Afterward, subsequent leaders of the party continued to emphasize the importance of social sciences as part of the process of 'socialist modernization'. College students to this day still have required classes on policy issues and the fundamentals of Marxism. There are some recurring trends in Wang Huning's work, and it is possible these concepts are a reason for why the party leadership took such an interest in him personally. His first book, State Sovereignty 《国家主权》, traces the importance and evolution of the concept of sovereignty in political science. He contrasts it with the older Chinese concept of zhuquan, which uses the same characters and was borrowed by a nineteenth-century translator in his edition of the works of Montesquieu. He starts with a historical survey of the concept and then ties it to Marxist-Leninist concepts of national equality and self-determination, and with the specific example of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence, a stated doctrine in foreign policy. His other famous book, Comparative Political Analysis 《比较政治分析》 introduced concepts of comparative politics to a Chinese audience, and defines the 20th century as being so 'political' that such issues as transportation and ecology are now 'political'. Aside from discussions of historical, cultural, and social elements in political analysis, he still draws upon the Marxist ideal of the 'withering away of the state' as still a useful concept because it still provides a long-term goal for which to draw historical comparisons. While Orthodox Marxism is well known for emphasizing the relationship between economic forces in determining social development in certain circumstances, Wang still emphasizes that the Marxist concept of historical materialism does not deny the role of politics in certain circumstances. He cites the Cultural Revolution as an example of where this went wrong, where unchecked class warfare led to mass destruction and societal breakdown. His essays also cover an eclectic range of topics. He often tends to his broad trend of borrowing from historical examples, but he does caution against "grafting flowers onto trees" 移花接木 or the belief that Western-style democracy is not compatible with the People's Republic at its current stage of development. To continue along with his gardening metaphors, he says that would be "pulling saplings to make them grow taller" 拔苗助长. He has often been labeled with the phrase 'neo-authoritarian'. While he does reject the label, he has advocated for strengthening the power of the central government on multiple occasions, as seen in an interview in the journal "Socialist Studies". So what's the point of reading about this dude again? He rose up to power very quickly and stayed there, even after starting his career in academia. This is unprecedented in contemporary Chinese politics so far. It's very likely he's played a role in shaping the policy initiatives at the highest level. Articles crediting him with developing or influencing several ideological banners are allowed in state media and academic journals, and they have not been censored. While Chinese elite politics is opaque and a lot of outside observers can only guess at how the top committees make decisions and who's the boss and who reports to who, the fact that the top leadership hasn't thrown him out suggests that he has played a role in these ideas. The "three represents" 三个代表 campaign of Jiang Zemin aimed at the further growth of the economy and working with private entrepreneurs and other beneficiaries of the Deng-era reforms - organizations that would have been denounced in the previous years. Hu Jintao's "scientific outlook on development" 科学发展观 by contrast, focused on gaps between regions and within populations and represented a retrenchment from the previous policies of market reform, and a focus on issues that would destabilize a 'harmonious' society. Xi Jinping's "China Dream" 中国梦 ties into a speech given in 2012, where Xi talks about the 'great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" 伟大复兴的中国. It's not the same as Mao's mass mobilization campaigns, and they're not really policy summaries either; they're narratives given to frame policies at the very top level or trying to solve a national identity crisis after a period of disorder. Wang Huning doesn't hold a specific ministry like the Foreign Ministry; he doesn't have control over the military, he doesn't have political power. But he's a 'hidden leader' and policy advisor, and that's why successive administrations have kept him along. On to the book. Kangxi fucked around with this message at 02:16 on Nov 22, 2019 |
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Nov 15, 2019 22:25
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Very interested to see where this goes
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Nov 16, 2019 02:22
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Turn to page 56 OP
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Nov 16, 2019 19:06
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This is the first part I'm actually doing. So please let me know if I'm going over it in too much detail, too little, if there is anything I should explain or provide context for, etc. I apologize in advance for the faults in the translation. Preface Wang was invited to the US in late August 1988 and stayed there for about six months. He is aware that he is not a specialist in American society, he knows he cannot describe everything in the United States with one book. But he hopes to use a variety of analyses to produce something useful for his own people and for the development of China - again drawing from his experience in writing Comparative Political Analysis. Wang Huning, pg. 1 posted:
The approach of this book is to consider American society through frameworks of historical, social, or cultural conditions; and he won't consider each factor in isolation. If anything else, I suspect he's read or heard of complexity theory or the use of complex systems analysis in the field of strategic management. Julian Gewirtz has written a paper on how complex systems theory and the 1980s theories of futurism gained readership among CCP officials in the 1980s. While Wang considers himself a theorist by training, he hopes to at least base the bulk of this book off of what he sees and to give people enough to think about. While he is a specialist in Chinese policy, he feels obligated to study the "America phenomenon" because he'd need to know how a country with such a comparatively short history becomes the world's leading developed country. Likewise, he feels compelled to answer how China could have declined in the modern era. He then explains the title, which he says some readers will find strange. He claims that we can't dogmatically rely on terms like "exploiting surplus value" and "bourgeois" alone, nor should observers go to the other positive extreme. With more careful study, he hopes to discard a superficial look at the country and uncover the hidden contradictions. The obvious example he gives of this is seeing the "People's Park" in Berkeley California, which was filled with homeless people in miserable conditions. Sad to say that the People's Park in Berkeley has so many homeless people in it still. Dialectical materialists do love discussing contradictions - or Marxist dialectical materialists do it, they refer to the opposition of various social forces. Mao was devoted to the concept, devoting an entire essay to it, and saying that all of reality was composed of 'contradictions'. There is also a People's Park in Shanghai, built on the grounds of a former racing track. It neighbors several museums, the Shanghai Grand Theatre, and a major shopping center. In the 70s and 80s, university students practiced their English here. Though by the late 1980s it was the site of student protests. By the mid-2000s, the People's Park in Shanghai was also the site of a 'marriage market', where parents attempted to find suitable matches for their children. Page 5 posted:The average person also believes that the United States is a Western democracy; indeed a model Western democracy. Americans are also proud of this. The Constitution, taking part in elections, separation of powers, citizen participation in politics, and so on, show one aspect of this system, but from another perspective, can every civilian population really dominate the politics of this country? My analysis in this book shows that the dominant political power group is above the civilian population. Under the capitalist system of the United States, the restrictions of private property on democracy cannot be ignored. Even American scholars have said that the difference in economic power is so large that a group can use non-political means to determine the misfortune of another group and that democracy cannot function properly. Therefore, true political democracy must include the right of the ruled to control economic policy through their representatives. (Sydney Hook: "Reason, Social Myths and Democracy", p. 286) The economic decision-making power of the United States is mainly controlled by private consortia. Is this democracy? Is this undemocratic? I fear it cannot be answered so simply. Sidney Hook was an American political philosopher who studied under John Dewey. He started off as a Marxist, writing enthusiastic articles about the Soviet Union and supporting the CPUSA candidate in the 1932 elections, then he shifted to social democracy and then anti-Communism and 'anti-totalitarianism' after the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1939. He grew opposed to the 'New Left' over the course of his life, supporting Governor Reagan's removal of Angela Davis from her professorship at UCLA and he defended US involvement in the Vietnam War. Hook also advocated a ban of 'democratic centralist', i.e. Marxist-Leninist, parties from political office. Wang goes on and on about further contradictions, and how the 'real' United States opposes the 'ideal' of the United States. It is only one capitalist country and cannot represent them all, but again he hammers on this point there can be lessons for socialist countries from this study. Page 6 posted:One hundred and fifty years ago, Marx and Engels declared in the Communist Manifesto: "The development of Modern Industry, therefore, cuts from under its feet the very foundation on which the bourgeoisie produces and appropriates products. What the bourgeoisie therefore produces, above all, are its own grave-diggers." Lenin declared that imperialism is "degrading" and "corrupted". One only wonders what he thought after 2008. Page 7 posted:There are eleven chapters in this book. I want to emphasize the following points: (1) social inequality and its characteristics; (2) the values of the dominant political life and its changes; (3) the diversity of the nation and its social effects; (4) formal and informal mechanisms of regulating people's social activities; (5) political forces and their relationships that are active in society; (6) democratic and non-democratic factors in electoral campaigns; (7) Top-down political operations and their characteristics; (8) non-political coordination mechanisms and socialized control; (9) the association between culture, values and the reproduction of the system through education; (10) the idea of social development and management (11) The hidden currents that threaten future development. This last chapter, he says, will be short and incomplete. He apologizes for what he views as the books' shortcomings - that it's too short and won't be as detailed as he'd like. He thanks the many people and organizations who helped him in writing this book, including the many Chinese friends he made in America. Many of the guys he talks to are China specialists. Douglas Madsen is professor emeritus of political science at the University of Iowa, but he was primarily a comparativist. Benjamin Stavis was a China specialist and moved to Temple. Lucian Pye, of MIT, advised the Kennedy and Johnson administrations and was president of the American Political Science Association from 88-89. He also wrote a pretty off the wall Mao biography. Michel Oksenberg of Michigan was a Scoop Jackson Democrat who worked for National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski in the Carter administration, and also played a major advocate for normalizing relations with China in 1979. Ken Lieberthal, also of Michigan, served in the Clinton administration and was a senior fellow at Brookings. David H. Rosenbloom was a scholar at Syracuse and is now a professor at the City University of Hong Kong. Robert Scalapino, at Berkeley, was a founder of the National Committee on US-China relations. He also met with Professor Kokubun Ryosei at Keio University in Japan, among others. Kangxi fucked around with this message at 02:43 on Nov 18, 2019 |
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Nov 16, 2019 23:19
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WAR CRIME GIGOLO posted:Turn to page 56 OP 
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Nov 16, 2019 23:19
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Chapter 1: An Imbalanced Land Part 1: Doubts Made in the USA Page 1 posted:Air China Flight CA985 passed through Tokyo Japan, over the rough and turbulent waters of the Pacific to San Francisco. Due to a flight delay, planes from Europe, Asia, and North America were all crowded together. On weekdays, the spacious luggage and customs halls are full and crowded with people, a boiling cauldron of voices. No matter where you come from, there is a feeling of excitement when arriving in the United States. A plane might have come from France and many people around speak French. After waiting in line for more than an hour, everyone complained that it was like China and the wait took too long. Many people think that there are no lines in the West. How could anyone think it would be so crowded? The customs counters at the San Francisco Airport Immigration Office fall into three categories: first, US citizens, second, non-US citizens, and third, new immigrants. The first two entrances on the left are the entrances of American citizens, sparsely populated, showing the advantage of being a US citizen. Non-US citizens suddenly have a feeling of inferiority. A whole lot of airport journalism, which is a funny parallel to how many people write stories about China based on how nice the airport in Shanghai is. Thankfully this section is very short. Page 1-2 posted:Groups of Japanese people passed through customs. Nowadays, Japanese people travel everywhere in the world to go on tours and carry out business in large crowds, showing the strength of a wealthy country and wealthy people. Although many foreigners feel that the Japanese are not lovable, this economic power has made people sit up and take notice. Reportedly, due to too many Japanese people, the US government is considering giving the Japanese visa-free treatment: Japan, like most of Europe, Chile, Taiwan, Australia, and New Zealand, all have a visa waiver with the United States. A reminder that this book was written in the late 1980s, before the asset price bubble crash of 1991-1992. Japan at this time was the world's second-largest economy, and conspicuous purchases of US-based companies, Japanese investment in modern technology, high levels of Japanese exports contributed to fears of American decline. Page 2 posted:The United States is a society that is quite developed in many aspects. Anyone who arrives in the United States will feel a "future shock." Then Wang talks a lot about tradition, the origins of traditions, and innovation, noting that 'today's tradition were nothing more than innovations thirty or fifty years ago'. Page 3 posted:Today, when people flood into the United States, we cannot but think deeply. A few days before I came here, domestic theoretical circles were discussing a theoretical new understanding of socialism and capitalism. The reason why this issue is currently causing people's discussion in China is that socialism has been engaged for decades and is not as economical as capitalism. Is the social development program that Marx demonstrated 150 years ago in line with the development of human history? Can socialism finally defeat capitalism? This causes one doubt. I remembered the movie "Red Guards on Honghu Lake" on the Boeing 747 that flew to the United States. The Chinese have overthrown the three mountains that have long been a burden on them, but does this have a direction to ensure the development of Chinese society? What kind of impact will a revolution like the Chinese revolution, which is dominated by rural areas and with the rural population as the main force, on the development of a society? It is indeed worth thinking about. The 'three mountains' are a reference to Mao's essay On New Democracy, which argues for a distinct Chinese path to socialism. The three mountains are imperialism, feudalism, and comprador capitalism/crony capitalism. Red Guards on Honghu Lake is a 1961 movie based on a 1956 opera, where a rebel band of warriors fights an evil feudal lord who is allied to the Kuomintang. Page 3 posted:Today's development in the United States, with its economic prosperity, its political process, its way of life, and its international status, has created great doubt in the world today. People in developed countries have this suspicion about how human science and material life have developed up to this point. Does it violate human nature? Will it lead to the earth's capital: the exhaustion of the source? Will it eventually lead to the destruction of mankind? The colleagues in the club of Rome are worried about this, and they sigh in worry. People in developing countries have very different doubts: What forces have created such a dazzling material civilization? What system has created good conditions for this development in management and intelligence? Is such a state accidental or inevitable? People began to doubt this system, and so people began to doubt their own system. In any case, the United States has created doubt. The Club of Rome, founded in 1968, is a non-profit NGO loosely defined by its interest in humanitarian and environmental issues. It first came in the public eye with its 1968 report, "The Limits to Growth", which raised concern over finite stocks of natural resources and the dangers of overconsumption and came up with figures for peak production followed by rapid decline. quote:When I entered the United States, I entered into this doubt. If you don't enter the United States, you will sink into this doubt. It's a strange feeling: it's easy to start feeling doubt; it's harder to get out of it. Kangxi fucked around with this message at 02:17 on Nov 22, 2019 |
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Nov 18, 2019 04:38
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Thanks for doing this OP. I was hoping a close relative of mine would have found an English copy for me during their last trip to China. Hopefully some good discussion will follow.
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Nov 19, 2019 13:52
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Never heard of any of this stuff, looks interesting! Don't know if I have much to comment on, but I'm smiling a bit at the airport journalism at the start.
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Nov 19, 2019 14:15
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This is fascinating, thanks for doing this! Interesting that he talks about the doubt that the Americans inspire. What kind of doubt is he talking about?
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Nov 19, 2019 23:22
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Chapter 1: An Imbalanced Land Part 2: Manhattan and Chinatown Wang lands in New York. He's a bit scared waiting for his friend to pick him up. New York, like most cities across the US at the time, was in the middle of an extreme crime wave. He feels relieved when his ride finally arrives. Violent crime was truly awful in the 1980s. I think New York City alone has experienced a 90% decline in the total number of murders since 1990. The causes for this decline are contested, although declines in air and water pollution are often discussed as a cause. Then he goes to the United Nations, where he marvels at all the artifacts and has his picture taken at the PRC delegation's desk. quote:This [the display of gifts] shows that the citizens of the world want to improve their reputations at the United Nations, but how many countries in real life believe in the UN's principles? It's like people in an organization where everyone wants to join it and say how much they love it, but actually go against it. In today's world, interests are diverse, yet the barriers between ideology are sharply divided, and the world's conflicts continue in endless succession. However, the UN has played a role that cannot be underestimated, especially in terms of social and economic development. In terms of eliminating conflicts, the ceasefire between Iran and Iraq is an outstanding example. Another case where the book shows its age, considering the infamous counterexamples of the UN's failure in Rwanda and impotence in the leadup to the 2003 Iraq War. The UN issued three security council resolutions on the Iran-Iraq War, the latest being UNSCR 598, which called for a ceasefire. It was passed unanimously and came into effect in August 1988. UN peacekeepers under the UNIIMOG mission were deployed to the Iran-Iraq border to ensure the ceasefire was kept. The last of these peacekeepers were withdrawn in 1991. There are some good posts on the Iran-Iraq War by Polyakov in the Milhist thread in A/T. quote:The world today is still a world that needs human control. Looking at the statue in front of the United Nations building, I thought over how a sword can be turned into a plowshare. Past history shows that many still believe war is a means to an end and that the sword is the result.  The statue he is referring to is Evgeniy Vuchetich's Let Us Beat Swords into Ploughshares, a quotation from the Book of Isaiah. Vuchetich (1908-1974) was a Soviet sculptor, most notable for his gigantic statue at the Heroes of the Battle of Stalingrad memorial complex, The Motherland Calls. After this, he heads to Chinatown. quote:In New York's Chinatown, I feel the style is quite familiar. It looks a bit messy compared to other places in the city. It is said that Chinatown is a complex area and that the specific characteristics of Chinese people are here. It makes one recall Bo Yang's "The Ugly Chinaman." I'm rather surprised to see him bring this up. Bo Yang (1920-2008) was the pen name of a Taiwanese dissident and writer. He was arrested in Taiwan in 1967 for translating a Popeye the Sailor comic in a way that was said to defame the country's then-dictator, Chiang Kai-Shek. (Bo said he had no intention of doing anything like that.) After his release from prison in 1977, he published a book of harshly satirical essays called "The Ugly Chinaman" where he vents his spleen at Chinese culture and political beliefs. An English translation is available. quote:I didn’t go much into Chinatown, I looked at it from the outside and did my business very cheaply. In this bustling area, looking at the street full of Chinese characters, it is reminiscent of distant China. This is in stark contrast to other parts of Manhattan. Wang then segues into the relationship between China and the United States, and the relationship between economic development and political democracy. quote:The economic achievements and scientific and technological progress that the United States has achieved in this century are obvious to all. No country in the world today can surpass it. Although the Japanese are menacing and ferocious, and pupil has surpassed the master, but in addition to their economic competitiveness, they cannot be compared with the United States in the fields of military affairs, culture, and natural resources. What needs to be analyzed is exactly what role the US economic development has played in its political development. In both respects, the United States has attracted worldwide attention. China has too much debt in these two areas. Therefore, these two aspects have become an eternal topic of discussion in the process of modernization. At this point, I should add that the text version of the book that is online has some errors - probably due to human error - so I had to rely on the paper copy. quote:How is China's economic modernization to be realized? The most fundamental problem is that is there a process to complete economic modernization under the conditions of public ownership? Most developed countries in the world today are not public ownership. This reality gives people the biggest challenge to think over. The second is how political democracy develops. Does this keep in step with the economy, or not? These two major issues have become hot topics of discussion this year. One argument is that without political democracy, economic modernization cannot be achieved; one refutation is that Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea have no political democracy during the economic take-off phase, Hong Kong is colonial, and Taiwan is a one-party dictatorship. South Korea is led by a military official. Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea were referred to as the 'Four Asian Tigers' for their rapid industrialization and economic growth in the latter half of the twentieth century. Taiwan is a liberal democracy now, but in the 1980s it was only in the middle of political reforms, and the 'temporary provisions' of martial law were not yet lifted. South Korea had its first free and fair presidential elections in 1987, shortly before this book was published. Hong Kong's elections were only introduced a few years before the handover to China in 1997. Singapore still has elections but the People's Action Party has held a dominant position since 1959. quote:Another way of saying this is that the economy has developed and political democracy has conditions. The examples are the democratization movements of emerging industrial regions and countries. The rebuttals are also very strong: after the bourgeois revolutions in western developed countries, their economy was not developed. It is far from being comparable to the economic strength of some developing countries today, but the system of democratic republicanism has basically been established. This issue is deeply considered by the Chinese intellectual community. By bourgeois revolutions he refers to national independence movements; liberal revolutions in the 19th and early 20th century, etc. quote:Economic development is only a phenomenon. [Political] concentration or democracy has the potential to promote or inhibit economic development. The matter of concern is what societal changes after economic development will be conducive to the development of political democracy. Because their economy does not develop, developing countries have no choice but to economically rely on developed countries, mainly in high-tech equipment, precision instruments and so on. However, depending on the stage of development of each country, such as African countries, they mainly need food to maintain basic living conditions. Whatever the need, the result is a special exchange mechanism: developing countries need to come up with the best things to exchange with developed countries. Therefore, the people of developing countries cannot enjoy the best products produced in the country, and even the second-class products cannot enjoy them, because the second-class products are to be consumed by foreigners who come to these countries. He seems to be describing the resource curse, if not the use of cash crops for export. quote:Products in various regions of the United States are available in China, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, Jamaica, and Mexico. The best products from all over the world are flocking to the US market in exchange for the US dollar. Since everyone wants to get the US dollar and form a strong competition, the quality of the products is very high and the price is very low. This situation has caused unprecedented prosperity in the US market. Note the last bit - he's discussing the US' massive imports of goods, whereas American pundits then and now, to various extents, were concerned about the trade deficit. It's an accounting identity that refers to how many foreign-produced goods the US consumes. quote:This is the result of the market mechanism, and it is also the benefit of the United States dollar status determined by the Bretton Woods Conference after the Second World War. Of course, foreign products have entered the United States in large numbers, impacting the industry of the United States itself, causing factories to close down and increasing unemployment. This cannot be seen, so the two forces of free trade and protectionism have been fighting endlessly. The Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates collapsed after 1971, but the international economic institutions and agreements that resulted after the conference are still around for now. The US dollar was and is still the world's foremost reserve currency, used to denominate transactions between central banks. Even after the 2008 economic crisis, it is still held as a safe-haven currency. US trade policy has been disputed between free trade and protectionism for years. See Irvin's book on the history of US trade policy for more detail.
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Nov 20, 2019 00:01
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ewiley posted:This is fascinating, thanks for doing this! Interesting that he talks about the doubt that the Americans inspire. What kind of doubt is he talking about? He went into this a little in the parts of the chapter I've added already. Doubt, or misapprehension that a country still this rich and powerful still had such pervasive structural issues, and (I could be reading into this too much?) if China could develop or how it would develop.
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Nov 20, 2019 00:03
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A couple interesting things I noticed. First, and least importantly, despite the book being (I assume) primarily a critique of America, at the start of the first chapter he essentially criticizes Japan from an American perspective. Of course, there are obvious reasons why a Chinese person in the 20th century would have a bone to pick with Japan. What's really interesting is the doubts he openly entertains about Marxism and "socialism." It surprised me to see that in a book published in China by someone who was already writing for CCP publications and would later become a top CCP leader, even in the Deng Xiaoping era. Though perhaps he's not entertaining actual doubts so much as adopting a false pose of neutrality - the "every coin has two sides" rhetoric that goons in the Venting About Students/Something TOEFL thread in A/T are always complaining about. Then again, he seems to be expressing some pretty heterodox thoughts in general; Kangxi has already noted the surprising "Ugly Chinaman" reference. It's odd that someone who expressed that kind of ambivalence, even in the context of a critique of the US, would become one of the top people in a government as hostile to dissent as Xi Jinping's.
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Nov 20, 2019 02:50
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China thread is lately about HK drama and fishmech drama, so I'm going to leave this here: https://www.reddit.com/r/geopolitics/comments/dhjhck/what_are_the_chances_and_possible_consequences_of/f3p48op/ It's several pages of interesting stuff about internal CCP politics and threats to the PRC from inside and outside of the ruling party.
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Nov 20, 2019 03:35
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Vivian Darkbloom posted:China thread is lately about HK drama and fishmech drama, so I'm going to leave this here: https://www.reddit.com/r/geopolitics/comments/dhjhck/what_are_the_chances_and_possible_consequences_of/f3p48op/ A depressing but interesting analysis. It ignores regional/“separatist” dissident movements, but it can be argued that they’re irrelevant in this context.
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Nov 20, 2019 04:20
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Chapter 1: An Imbalanced Land Part 3: The Four Cs Wang hopes to parse out some trends about the organization of American society due to the distribution and use of technologies and various consumer goods. 1) Cars. There are many of them, in various models, and transportation between and within cities is impossible without them. There is fierce competition between US and Japanese brands. Yes, he's explaining the obvious to us, but it would be alien to the average Chinese reader. As late as 1985, the People's Republic of China had only produced 5,000 passenger cars per year, with the majority of their cars being imported from the Soviet Union in the early 1980s. Imports of cars rose rapidly by the later 1980s, with taxi companies importing massive amounts of Japanese cars. The cash outflow was so great that the central government had imposed a two-year moratorium on car imports in 1985. 2) Calls. This part is charmingly outdated, with how many public payphones there are, and how international phone calls are paid for with credit cards. Telephones were largely reserved for military and government use in most of the Mao era - subscriptions and phone line installations only really took off after the mid-1980s and early 1990s. 3) Computers. Wang marvels at how both government institutions and private corporations have computers, making referencing data faster and more efficient. He cites his brief visit to the National Security Council(?!) and to Yale Library, where the head of the library showed him they have both of his books. Again, another industry that was scarce before, but grew rapidly in the 80s and 90s. Although the PRC did develop transistor-based computers independently, the PRC remained far behind in computer technology into the late 1980s The first Chinese supercomputer was built in 1983, and the first personal computer, the Great Wall 0520CH, was on the market by 1985. They were still in use in the mid-1990s. 4) Cards. By these, he's referring to all the plastic cards with magnetic stripes on the back. Bank cards, drivers' licenses, business loyalty cards, facility access cards. Although identity cards were issued, I can't find anything about magnetic stripe cards in use in the PRC at this time. quote:The important thing is their role in social organization and social management: These four technologies are a means and a channel for political socialization and political communication, making it easier to communicate principles and ideas more effectively, to communicate to the people more effectively with less paperwork, and to make society stronger. Of course, these four technologies have their own downsides (pollution, wiretapping, hacking, identity forgery, etc.), which he views as necessary problems that come with strengthening societal organizations and political systems. quote:How societies can strengthen their institutions is a major issue. It is difficult to develop strong institutions and systems from the beginning. Only when institutions are truly a part of the people's lives is there real societal strength. This was a short chapter and I don't have very much to add.
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Nov 20, 2019 19:42
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Silver2195 posted:A couple interesting things I noticed. First, and least importantly, despite the book being (I assume) primarily a critique of America, at the start of the first chapter he essentially criticizes Japan from an American perspective. Of course, there are obvious reasons why a Chinese person in the 20th century would have a bone to pick with Japan. The CCP has to find itself in a careful balancing act with appeals to nationalism; tolerating or encouraging nationalist protest can be used to signal resolve in foreign negotiations, but it also limits its own actions and wouldn't want to be perceived as appeasing or giving up too much for too little gain. In the next chapter, Wang will reference more of Marx, specifically a discussion on commodities. He doesn't discard Marx completely. Vivian Darkbloom posted:China thread is lately about HK drama and fishmech drama, so I'm going to leave this here: https://www.reddit.com/r/geopolitics/comments/dhjhck/what_are_the_chances_and_possible_consequences_of/f3p48op/ /r/geopolitics is really hit and miss but this series of posts raised multiple informed points; it is not impossible the person who posted them was who he said he was. Jude Blanchette wrote a book, The New Red Guards, on the resurgence of Maoist and nationalist rhetoric and how much of that was coopted by later administrations.
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Nov 21, 2019 04:48
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Can you tease out any thoughts or musings from the car section that would imply a connection to the PRC's heavy focus on connecting housing, employment and recreation in their high-speed rail networks?
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Nov 22, 2019 01:20
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Yadoppsi posted:Can you tease out any thoughts or musings from the car section that would imply a connection to the PRC's heavy focus on connecting housing, employment and recreation in their high-speed rail networks? You're anticipating his argument a little bit - the next section talks about 'commodification', real estate, and transportation. It's the first chapter I've seen where he's more explicitly drawing from Marxist analysis - that is, Marxist 'commodity'.
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Nov 22, 2019 01:54
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Ace job translating for us man, one small thing, in your passage here:Kangxi posted:Groups of Japanese people passed through customs. Nowadays, Japanese people travel everywhere in the world to go on tours and carry out business in large crowds, showing the strength of a wealthy country and wealthy people. Although many foreigners feel that the Japanese are not cute, this economic power has made people sit up and take notice. Reportedly, due to too many Japanese people, the US government is considering giving the Japanese visa-free treatment: Cute is probably not the best word you could use, my guess is that the original characters for this passage is 可爱, which could mean cute but in this context is better translated as "loveable," as in the Korean war-era essay 谁是最可爱的人民, which is not who are the cutest people but who are the most loveable. It's a strange word to translate, loveable is just shorthand imo for "the quality of being liked and admired by others" quote:Telephones were largely reserved for military and government use in most of the Mao era - subscriptions and phone line installations only really took off after the mid-1980s and early 1990s. It was even worse than that. To make a telephone call was a big loving deal, and you either had to be on time at the china post office with public telephones to wait for a call (and pay out the nose), or use one at work for non work purposes. Important communications were better and more cheaply sent via telegram, which again was subject to a PSB goon reading your private correspondence. The absurdity of it was a big part of the movie black cannon incident: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V8j--RJMtqs
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Nov 22, 2019 01:55
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CAPS LOCK BROKEN posted:Cute is probably not the best word you could use, my guess is that the original characters for this passage is 可爱, which could mean cute but in this context is better translated as "loveable," as in the Korean war-era essay 谁是最可爱的人民, which is not who are the cutest people but who are the most loveable. It's a strange word to translate, loveable is just shorthand imo for "the quality of being liked and admired by others" You are right. The full sentence, near the bottom of page 1, is 尽管不少外国人觉得日本人不可爱，但这种经济力量使人不得不刮目相看。 Again remember that Mandarin is my third language, and we've got some Marxist terminology coming up... I knew about the telegraphs but I didn't remember phones were that scarce. Edit: She, btw Kangxi fucked around with this message at 03:47 on Nov 22, 2019 |
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Nov 22, 2019 02:31
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Chapter 1: An Imbalanced Land Part 4: The Heights of Commodification quote:Another feature of American society or American culture is its high degree of commodification. It can be said that this is a model capitalist world with its myriad temptations. Entering every kind of store, you find a glimmering lineup of products on display inside, with all one can think of on hand, and it dazzles the eyes. In this typical capitalist society, almost anything can be a commodity, from the physical body to the air, to abstract concepts; all become commodities without exception. Therefore, when Marx analyzed capitalist society, it was a penetrating insight to regard commodities as the cells of society with this mode of production. In today's capitalist society, this feature develops more fully, although there are many differences in this form of expression. Marx starts his 'critique of political economy', Das Kapital, with commodities; he treats them as the 'the economic cell-form of bourgeois society'. Commodities, in his definition, are any 'products' or 'activities' produced by human labor and offered as a product for sale on the market. In mainstream economics, commodities are fungible; that is, they are 'goods' and 'services' are treated as nearly equivalent without any regard to who produced them. quote:Commodities are still the basic elements of this society. The most representative manifestation of this is that human beings become commodities. This extensive, total commercialization is the fundamental tendency of capitalist production methods that dominates, and it is not the subjective will of people. This is all Marx. Marx's discussion of commodities and 'commodity fetishism' begins with the idea that people perceive that the value of commodities is objective; the result of relationships between money and other commodities, whereas they are actually the result of relationships between people who make commodities, or at least between producers and other peoples' labor they're using. This is one of his ideas that really draws people's attention. Partly because 1) he is approaching a big question about how societies changed after industrialization, and 2) Anybody who talks about pulling back the curtain on how things work has its own mystique. quote:The question that needs to be raised is not how the commodification of this kind came about, nor is it just how this degree of commodification is achieved. To study the management process of a society, what we need to study is: What effect does commodification have on the intricate and complicated management process of a society? Is the governance of such a modern society with complicated systems and more advanced technology possible? Wang notes that other countries that have been held up as models, such as South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, have a much smaller geographic area and population than China. quote:For larger countries, especially those with a population of hundreds of millions of people, the government is not likely to manage all aspects of society directly and comprehensively. History has shown that societies that have embarked on this path through institutional planning do not solve many basic needs and accumulate a heap of problems. This looks to me like a criticism of command economies, with a central administrative structure determining the allocation of resources Therefore, Wang says, efforts to make segments of society organize themselves, and motivated to meet their own needs so that political or administrative structures only act as indirect supervisors, are an effective means of government. This dovetails with the reforms made in the first years Deng Xiaoping era. The first and perhaps most famous of these was the household responsibility system. After the formation of agricultural communes in the 1950s, the central government bought agricultural produce from the communes at low prices but did not allow communes or the farmers in them to sell the surplus. With no incentive to produce anything beyond the quota, local workers only bothered to produce what was assigned to them. By the 1980s, peasants were given drastically reduced quotas and then allowed to sell their surplus at local markets for a profit. According to the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics, the per-capita income of rural residents had increased five-fold between 1978 and 1988, and the output of grains increased by almost a third in the same period. The story goes that this policy was inspired by a group of farmers in the more impoverished province of Anhui, who had begun to ignore the quotas and swore an oath to feed each others' families if one of them was arrested. This also feeds into the development of town and village enterprises (TVEs), which were allowed to independently produce their own goods or establish services. With labor freed from farming due to increased output, local enterprises were able to produce more, establish a broader income base for the population, and local governments had a greater income themselves from the proceeds. Some were run by local government, while others were more independent and adopted the 'collective' title to avoid scrutiny. They also provided considerable competition for state-owned enterprises and drove further reform. By 1996, 135 million people were employed in TVEs. quote:Commodification is the catalyst for this transformative process. The problems of housing, food, transportation, employment, and education are the basic problems that plague every society. Many governments are troubled by these issues and cannot free themselves from them. They can neither advance nor retreat. The high degree of commercialization has led to a distinctive structure in the domain of American society. Wang gives four major examples: 1) Real Estate/Housing; which is bought and sold on private markets, and where housing prices vary by location; where government housing only provides a modest amount of the total housing stock. (The sad thing here is that prices, even before accounting for inflation, were better than they are now.) 2) Food; which produced to excess here and even wasteful; where producers what the market needs and sell it to consumers through the market system 3) Transportation; airplanes, bus systems; people are free to go wherever so long as they can pay for it. Wang even has nice things to say about Greyhound (before the 1993 bankruptcy). 4) Employment; another series of contradictions where technology reduces employment in the name of efficiency and higher output, and where individuals are left to search for employment. All of these were pressing issues by the late 1970s, although my impression was that they had improved considerably by the mid-1980s. To list one example: Dramatic housing shortages and deteriorating conditions in housing stock were some of the severe problems left behind in the Maoist era; as housing construction was simply not a priority compared to the competing demands of heavy industry, resource outputs, or national defense and could not keep track with population growth - not to mention the violence in urban areas between different factions during the Cultural Revolution. Housing was already overcrowded by the 1950s and became worse in urban areas by the 1970s. A 1986 book estimated that housing stocks shrank to an average of 3.6 square meters (or 38.7 square feet!) per resident and that waiting lists for apartments were years long. By the late 1970s, about 1/3rd of urban residents lived in apartments assigned to them by their work units, or 'danwei'. Many of the larger and more important work units such as government agencies and armaments factories became communities with employees living near or on-site and staying there after retirement. The better work units had their own free medical clinics, daycare, libraries, cinemas, vacation tours, intramural sports teams, etc. Those assigned to work units with lower priority for resource allocation had to barter or use connections for better living conditions or consumer goods. By the late 1970s, food production had stagnated for so long that some officials feared a repeat of the late 1950s - that is, famine conditions. quote:The development of a commodity economy has formed a dual structure of social governance: the system social self-organization is responsible for all kinds of specific affairs, and the political system is responsible for coordinating various self-organizing systems. This is a major feature of this society's macro-management. These are just a few examples, but one can't think that commodification will make things perfect. This simply means that commodification offers the possibility of reducing the government's administrative burden. If the government is involved in all of the affairs of the society, it will not work effectively. However, after the government is lightly loaded, it still has to control activities in various fields, but it has changed from direct to indirect control.  The thought of a future communist party politburo member knowing about or maybe seeing the porno theatres of 1980s New York makes for a very funny mental image. quote:Therefore, commodification can lessen the burden on political and administrative systems, but there are two important prerequisites: political and administrative systems must regulate commodification. The real essence of commodification is not that everything is a commodity, but that the commodity is in a rationally operated mechanism. Economic leverage is what coordinates this mechanism, and the political and administrative systems work in concert. When many basic areas of society become self-organizing systems, political and administrative systems will be conditionally separated from them, with conditions ranging from direct management to indirect management. The process of commercialization is the process by which these areas become self-organizing systems. This process can not be formed in a short period of time. Even after a long period of development, the contradictions, conflicts, obstacles, and chaos are still unavoidable. However, political and administrative systems managing tens of large self-organizing systems will be more powerful and effective than managing thousands of specific operations. I wonder where he read about this idea of self-organizing systems 自组织系统. Market economics tends to consider itself self-organizing but the phrasing here reminds me of sociologists. Has he been reading Niklas Luhmann? Or an economist?
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Nov 24, 2019 23:38
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I had no idea you guys started a new thread. Would help with some advertisement in the other China threads. Subscribed.
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Nov 25, 2019 14:00
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Kangxi posted:Chapter 1: An Imbalanced Land Rationing didn't end until 1986 and life was still pretty tough by cushy American standards. For example, my grandpa returned from the US with a color TV and a Toshiba refrigerator sometime in the early 1980s and people from the entire building were camped out at his apartment waiting to see a color TV for the first time. Either as a result of youth or because young people simply had their basics met most people who were born in the 60s and educated in their 80s preferred the state run rationing vs. the market economy. I will try and see if I can dig up some pictures of 粮票 that my mom's family have hoarding ever since rationing ended-- apparently they are now sought after collector's items.
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Nov 26, 2019 03:42
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Chapter 1: An Imbalanced Land Part 5: Frontiers There is a pretty glaring error in this chapter, I don't know if this is Wang's fault or his editors. He's obviously talking about the Amish people in extensive detail, but instead, the text talks about 亚美尼亚人 or Armenians. This has been corrected in the translation. quote:I am borrowing the word 'frontier' for this chapter, but these are places not so distant nor are they border regions. They are near modern cities. By 'frontiers' I mean areas where Amish people live. The Amish are a strange group. Their mean feature is the rejection of modernization, which is incompatible with advanced and developed science and technology, and they still maintain the traditional lifestyle of the 17th and 18 centuries. This is an interesting historical phenomenon. The modernization of western society has attracted and impacted the whole world, but it has not impacted the Amish people in front of us.  If you've ever passed through or near Amish country, you've probably seen those orange reflective signs on the back of their horse-drawn buggies.  Kalona, with a population of 1,942 in the 1990 census, is about 30 minutes away from Iowa City on State Highway 1. As it turns out, the Kolona Amish of the area are among the most accepting of modern technology, with the use of mechanical tractors, mechanical milkers, propane gas, and running water. The most 'conservative' Amish don't even use running water or kerosene lamps. Wang then briefly outlines the history of the Amish, their geographical distribution, the number of settlements, and their origins in European religious disputes. He goes on to describe their "simplicity, naturality, and self-sufficiency", and notes their patriarchal society and how some retain a German dialect. Any Amish specialists are free to add on to this. quote:Over the years, despite the different changes in Amish society, the basic spirit of this group has not changed much. It is strange: why have such a powerful modern civilization failed to influence and transform them? Didn't Western civilization impact many very distant peoples? I haven't found much about Mr. Zielinski, but Amazon lists him as having written several books on Amish history and culture as well as the history of the state of Iowa and one on the Meskwaki. quote:This is a social phenomenon that is really worth considering. In the heartland of global modernization, there are so many people who refuse to modernize. Their remoteness is not geographical, but psychological. They voluntarily separated themselves from modernization. From this we can draw a conclusion: if people refuse to internalize modernization, then modernization is difficult to intrude upon them. This phenomenon can be seen in different societies. The real power of modernization lies in a person's inner world.
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Nov 29, 2019 18:53
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Kangxi posted:Chapter 1: An Imbalanced Land Probably both. I doubt at the time of publication that people knew how to transliterate "amish" given the lack of contact between Chinese people and the pennsylvania dutch. As promised, ration tickets from the state socialism era:  Ration ticket for goods produced in beijing  Nationwide ticket
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Nov 29, 2019 21:14
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It is really fascinating to see an outsider interpretation of the Amish and you can really see how he is using them to make arguments about the failures of centralization. From the perspective of the Chinese government the Amish might seem like an unacceptable liability because they refuse to fully integrate with the larger society, but Wang clearly thinks that this is a superior system when he writes that: "Some management methods in American society are actually unmanaged. This is a more effective management method under certain conditions." This is a fascinating criticism of China but is it an accurate read on the Amish? I think Wang overstates the case. The Amish might not drive cars but plenty of them use modern tractors. I think there are also more institutionalized vectors for engagement with the outside world than this author admits - the Amish are a lot more influenced by and integrated into modern society than they might seem to be at first blush. That having been said, I don't think any of this undermines his overall point about hands-off management of different social groups being a potentially more effective way of buying social peace.
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Nov 30, 2019 20:39
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Chapter 1: An Imbalanced Land Part 6: The Amana Colonies quote:The Amana Colonies are a special place in Iowa. Americans call it "socialism" or "collectivism." How can such a place survive in a capitalist society like the United States? What kind of organization is it? It aroused great curiosity from me, a Chinese person. How do Americans engage in "collectivism"?  The 'Amana Colonies' term today refers to seven villages in Iowa County, IA, clustered around the Iowa River and about 10-20 minutes drive east of the county seat of Marengo. As of the 2010 census, all of the villages combined have a population of less than 1,700. To be more specific, the two founders of Amana, Eberhard L. Gruber, and Johann F. Rock, were dissatisfied with the strict dogmatism of the Lutheran Church and were inspired by a religious school called Pietism, founded by the German theologian Philipp Spener. quote:Earlier Amana's charter stated that the goal of the community was: "The goal of a community as a religious group is not worldly or selfish, but it is a love for God who blesses us, working together to serve God, and obeying God's laws and requirements ... … To achieve this goal, our collective promise here is to accept and sign this charter together." It can be seen that the initial collectivism of this group was indeed inspired by a religious spirit. Collectivism must be led by a certain spirit, otherwise, it will be difficult to maintain. Is that the case? Worth pondering. I'm going off of his translation of the charter here, and I couldn't find the original. quote:Inspired by this spirit, all property in Amana is collectively owned, including land, grain, livestock, housing, and farm tools. Amana has various characteristics of collectivism. In addition to collective ownership, the collective is also responsible for educating children, publishing, and caring for the elderly, the sick, and the disabled. Song of Songs, Chapter 4, Verse 8. quote:In 1932, the largest historic change occurred in Amana. By voting, Amana gave up the system of living together and strode into the system of free enterprise that surrounded them. Church and state separated, and the church elders are no longer responsible for all the affairs of the leadership. This transition is well worth exploring. What factors have caused Amana to abandon the system of living together? Is this system faulty? Or are other external systems too strong? Or did people lose their basic religious beliefs for the new year? The co-living system still faces severe challenges, and why? My first impulse is to say it had something to do with the Great Depression. quote:The responses from the officials who hosted us were very familiar to us: a basic shortcoming of the communal living system was that individuals did not have the initiative to work diligently; there were many lazy people at the time. Another reason is that the younger generation is skeptical of Amana's spiritual principles. They are tempted by outside life and are unwilling to do mass eight times a week. Each year, the elders of Amana send young people to higher education, such as doctors, teachers, and businessmen. The wishes of young people cannot be fulfilled. Boys don't have good jobs, and girls can only work in the canteen in Amana. Another reason is political. Elders are always the same people and have a hereditary tendency. This hierarchy destroys the spirit of the group. These last two paragraphs, to me, make it clear he's still a true believer, trying to figure out whatever socialism is after the Mao era. He still believes in historical stages, he doesn't believe the party should completely abandon whatever socialism might turn out to be, he's interested in maintaining party discipline. There is also a long history of various utopian communities in the United States; some of which were influenced by religious principles; others by early non-Marxist socialists such as Charles Fourier and Robert Owen. Many collapsed after <5 years. The Amana Colonies were some of the longest-lived of these communal experiments, although some live on as tourist attractions. While some of these communities were not long lasted, other 'cooperative enterprises', broadly defined, are still extant today.
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Nov 30, 2019 22:38
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There's no way the nationalist coalition would ever let that happen, though. You've seen how they've started cracking down heavily on the autonomous regions once Xi got into power.
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Dec 1, 2019 00:02
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Helsing posted:It is really fascinating to see an outsider interpretation of the Amish and you can really see how he is using them to make arguments about the failures of centralization. From the perspective of the Chinese government the Amish might seem like an unacceptable liability because they refuse to fully integrate with the larger society, but Wang clearly thinks that this is a superior system when he writes that: "Some management methods in American society are actually unmanaged. This is a more effective management method under certain conditions." It seems really odd to me that he thinks of the amish as ethnic minorities. they certainly don't think of themselves as non-white. they may seem technologically backwards now, but even in the 1930s the average us farmer still used horses for farming instead of tractors; when the amish settled in iowa they wouldn't have been seen as inferior technologically. the only time the amish were ever discriminated against was for speaking german during wwi. they are allowed to reject modernity now because they participated in settling 'empty' lands from which the indians had been removed, and because they are actively participating in capitalism. they may still use horse-drawn carriages, but they put the proceeds from their organic produce and hand-made furniture into modern banks. they aren't really separately managed economically, they still take out loans from banks like the rest of farmers in the us. they may not use atms, but local banks have teller windows that can fit horse-drawn carriages.  also, thank you for translating this kangxi. i'm not sure i've read anything quite like it before.
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Dec 1, 2019 01:28
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GoluboiOgon posted:It seems really odd to me that he thinks of the amish as ethnic minorities. they certainly don't think of themselves as non-white. they may seem technologically backwards now, but even in the 1930s the average us farmer still used horses for farming instead of tractors; when the amish settled in iowa they wouldn't have been seen as inferior technologically. the only time the amish were ever discriminated against was for speaking german during wwi. I don't think he thinks about them as ethnic minorities. They're distinct, in his mind, but he doesn't describe them in that way. If that was the case, he might have written it down as Amish people using 民族 (min2zu2) or just used 族(zu2), which has more of a meaning of a nationality/ethnic group. But he just uses 人 (ren2). That, to me, makes it sounds like 'people'. Thanks for the context, btw.
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Dec 1, 2019 01:46
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Yeah when I listen to the audiobook my mind swing back and fore between Amish and Armenians. I was going to cross reference the town he mentioned and comfirm it was really Amish. But I have a 2 year old toddler and never enough time.
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Dec 1, 2019 01:59
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whatever7 posted:Yeah when I listen to the audiobook my mind swing back and fore between Amish and Armenians. I was going to cross reference the town he mentioned and comfirm it was really Amish. But I have a 2 year old toddler and never enough time. Do you have a link to the audiobook? Would like to listen on the plane/train.
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Dec 1, 2019 02:18
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CAPS LOCK BROKEN posted:Do you have a link to the audiobook? Would like to listen on the plane/train. It's just a dude reading off the book. I love that this is not illegal in China https://www.ximalaya.com/renwen/6090917/ If you want to listen to it on your phone, download the Chinese version of the app. The Google Play Store Himalaya app doesn't show the book when you search it.
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Dec 1, 2019 02:34
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GoluboiOgon posted:It seems really odd to me that he thinks of the amish as ethnic minorities. they certainly don't think of themselves as non-white. Not non-white, but non-Anglo, surely? They speak their own German dialect and refer to non-Amish as "English," after all. Though on the other hand, the Old Order Amish themselves would consider "Amish" a religious designation rather than an ethnic one.
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Dec 1, 2019 23:59
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2020 = year of wang gang Kangxi posted:This is all Marx. Marx's discussion of commodities and 'commodity fetishism' begins with the idea that people perceive that the value of commodities is objective; the result of relationships between money and other commodities, whereas they are actually the result of relationships between people who make commodities, or at least between producers and other peoples' labor they're using. Kangxi posted:The thought of a future communist party politburo member knowing about or maybe seeing the porno theatres of 1980s New York makes for a very funny mental image.
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Dec 2, 2019 09:16
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