Register a SA Forums Account here!
JOINING THE SA FORUMS WILL REMOVE THIS BIG AD, THE ANNOYING UNDERLINED ADS, AND STUPID INTERSTITIAL ADS!!!

You can: log in, read the tech support FAQ, or request your lost password. This dumb message (and those ads) will appear on every screen until you register! Get rid of this crap by registering your own SA Forums Account and joining roughly 150,000 Goons, for the one-time price of $9.95! We charge money because it costs us money per month for bills, and since we don't believe in showing ads to our users, we try to make the money back through forum registrations.
 
  • Post
  • Reply
Beeftweeter
Jun 28, 2005

a medium-format picture of beeftweeter staring silently at the camera, a quizzical expression on his face

A Man With A Plan posted:

Where I work a lot of business processes depend on a basically defunct software suite that has 90s era password requirements like no punctuation except exclamation points, no more than 3 of the same character class in a row, etc. So if you don't want random things to fail, your domain password also has to follow these requirements

this is sadly the case in a lot of massive businesses, especially banks and financial services because they rely on a bunch of crap running on old rear end mainframes that don't really support modern authentication because accounts were meant for timesharing

Adbot
ADBOT LOVES YOU

Raymond T. Racing
Jun 11, 2019

Subjunctive posted:

if they misenter the email address, where exactly do you send the reset email?

that's the customer retention team's problem, not the sign up team

ate shit on live tv
Feb 15, 2004

by Azathoth

A Man With A Plan posted:

Can anyone explain why, with full benefit of doubt, a website would disallow pasting passwords? What conceivable security benefits are there?

Most security is theater. The average user is an idiot and thinks more restrictions = more security. This guides 90% of security rules. See the TSA, websites, corporate security, etc.

Subjunctive
Sep 12, 2006

✨sparkle and shine✨

mystes posted:

Weird requirements are great for making it hard to use randomly generated passwords

and reducing reuse!

~Coxy
Dec 9, 2003

R.I.P. Inter-OS Sass - b.2000AD d.2003AD
my favourite password field allows pasting and autofill, but has an event handler on it that disallows submitting the form without having at least one keypress event

luckily, tab counts or it would be even more annoying

sb hermit
Dec 13, 2016





CMYK BLYAT! posted:

still higher than when i sold off my options in april 2020 lol

look, i was correct on tech stocks and the economy in general taking a dive, just like 2 years early

i wish i were a fly on the wall privy to these security discussions but i don't know why im expecting vigorous debate or w/e. most of my brain tells me "no, it's exactly like what you saw recently": there's a mid-50s management person who is driven to show that THEY ARE EXPERIENCED AND KNOW THINGS, so they take personal control over dictating what the contractors implement, so they recommend the state of the art in password security circa 1992 without consulting anyone with actual domain knowledge, and don't bother changing this when subordinates inform them it's outdated af because THERE ARE MORE IMPORTANT THINGS TO DO, LIKE ADDING MORE OUTDATED poo poo TO THE DESIGN. the idiot idealist parts of my brain continue to shout that this can't be the case.

anyway, i am thankful my small CU is inexplicably way ahead of the curve on this; ask me why the passwords to our very needfully highly secure support ticket portal requires 4 classes of characters in passwords that expire monthly

The hilarious thing is that NIST, who gathers and verifies and disseminates standards, specifically changed the standard so that arbitrary password expiration (including periodic expiration) is not recommended. Password expiration should instead be done only when there is evidence of compromise (such as malicious activity or if someone steals the hash). They also specifically say that password complexity is not recommended and a blacklist of common passwords is a better alternative.

They also recommend that users be able to paste passwords in order to use password managers.

sb hermit
Dec 13, 2016





https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-FAQ/

Here's a faq with more info. I like to forward this information to people so that they know that their security theater policies are actively harming user security.

Zamujasa
Oct 27, 2010



Bread Liar

A Man With A Plan posted:

Can anyone explain why, with full benefit of doubt, a website would disallow pasting passwords? What conceivable security benefits are there?

i looked for a result on :google:

quote:

Premise
Disabling paste facilitates barrier-less 2FA.

Confused? OK, let me explain...

Traditional e-authentication systems monitor what you type (your password, for example). This, by definition, provides 1FA or single-factor authentication; you've demonstrated to the site (or verifier, for those of a NISTy disposition) that you "know" the password.

As we know, passwords can be and are frequently stolen, guessed, intercepted, cracked or bypassed... thus requiring a drive towards 2FA or multi-factor authentication.

For many years, companies have focused on introducing a "possession" factor, allowing you to present something you have (along with something you know) to further prove you are who you're purporting to be. That's great, in theory... but the adoption rate of this type of 2FA is pretty abysmal; with some firms (Google et al) seeing figures of < 5%.

Other firms have opted to use a little-known technique called behavioural biometrics/keystroke dynamics. These systems monitor how you type; the periodicity of your keystrokes, how long you dwell between each key, how often you make mistakes, how long each key is pressed and so on. These metrics can be used, with astonishing & near 100% accuracy, to determine who's typing. This is known as an inherence factor. Here's a more detailed explanation of behavioural profiling.

You could, in theory, give someone your password and they'll be unable to login... simply because their typing pattern differs enormously from your own. Think of it as a signature; something unique to you.

it's not what you shitpost, it's how

Shame Boy
Mar 2, 2010

sounds like a great way to make sure i can't log in if i'm even slightly drunk, or if my keyboard is at a different angle, or a bunch of other reasons

Zamujasa
Oct 27, 2010



Bread Liar
don't worry, password managers actually work fine, i tested 4 of them that are all in-browser extensions

what's that? not using a browser based password manager?

quote:

Now it's true, some password managers don't auto-populate fields and have little/no integration with your browser; KeePass is a prime example. In that scenario, you would be unable to copy/paste from KeePass to the password field. You still haven't "broken" the password manager or measurably decreased security... only the user-experience (UX) is affected.

if you remove guard rails from a cliff, you haven't broken or decreased safety, you've just changed the user experieeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee💨

Grace Baiting
Jul 20, 2012

Audi famam illius;
Cucurrit quaeque
Tetigit destruens.



Subjunctive posted:

if they misenter the email address, where exactly do you send the reset email?

blast each password reset email to every possible email address within an edit distance of 1 of the typed-in address

for important things though you want to make super sure the user gets their password reset emails, so mb use an edit distance of 2 or 3 if you're a financial institution

Beeftweeter
Jun 28, 2005

a medium-format picture of beeftweeter staring silently at the camera, a quizzical expression on his face

Zamujasa posted:

i looked for a result on :google:

it's not what you shitpost, it's how

that's loving horseshit, and not just because

Shame Boy posted:

sounds like a great way to make sure i can't log in if i'm even slightly drunk, or if my keyboard is at a different angle, or a bunch of other reasons

while that's a valid concern, even if you're completely sober i guarantee your typing habits on a touch keyboard vs a physical one are very different

Zamujasa
Oct 27, 2010



Bread Liar
oh absolutely, the entire argument is dumb as poo poo and that guy is a clown

4lokos basilisk
Jul 17, 2008


sb hermit posted:

https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-FAQ/

Here's a faq with more info. I like to forward this information to people so that they know that their security theater policies are actively harming user security.

cant take nist advice, its the us which means its basically cia and the recommendations are in some clever way actually weakening your security

this is a tinfoil hat take but i am sure people think like this in countries other than the us

otoh did the same org not recommend those weakened ecc curves?

sb hermit
Dec 13, 2016





Funny enough, I use keepass because it doesn't integrate with my browser. That way, I know how to backup, migrate, and test my password databases.

Also, if there's some insane 0day that completely breaks firefox and chrome and forwards all passwords to a website using a watering hole attack, I'll still be ok because keepass would be in a completely separate process.

Beeftweeter
Jun 28, 2005

a medium-format picture of beeftweeter staring silently at the camera, a quizzical expression on his face

Penisface posted:

cant take nist advice, its the us which means its basically cia and the recommendations are in some clever way actually weakening your security

this is a tinfoil hat take but i am sure people think like this in countries other than the us

otoh did the same org not recommend those weakened ecc curves?

nist has nothing to do with the cia or encryption (beyond publishing standards other agencies or entities come up with). they send out a rfc and get responses, pick one and publish it. the cia actually has to follow their guidelines, not the other way round

e: you might be thinking of the nsa, which is responsible for cryptanalysis. they did modify some pseudorandom number generator, but that's the nsa's remit anyway

Beeftweeter fucked around with this message at 07:50 on May 8, 2022

Zamujasa
Oct 27, 2010



Bread Liar

sb hermit posted:

Funny enough, I use keepass because it doesn't integrate with my browser. That way, I know how to backup, migrate, and test my password databases.

Also, if there's some insane 0day that completely breaks firefox and chrome and forwards all passwords to a website using a watering hole attack, I'll still be ok because keepass would be in a completely separate process.

keepass on dropbox has been very needs-suiting (at least before dropbox added the client limit)

4lokos basilisk
Jul 17, 2008


Beeftweeter posted:

nist has nothing to do with the cia or encryption (beyond publishing standards other agencies come up with). the cia actually has to follow their guidelines, not the other way round

my point is that an american security recommendation ended up being malicious, thereby tainting subsequent recommendations
i dont think it matters here which institution does what

Beeftweeter
Jun 28, 2005

a medium-format picture of beeftweeter staring silently at the camera, a quizzical expression on his face

Penisface posted:

my point is that an american security recommendation ended up being malicious, thereby tainting subsequent recommendations
i dont think it matters here which institution does what

well, until the eu starts mandating standards for this poo poo i don't know if some other country or intergovernmental agency would be much better or less susceptible to pressure (and tbh the eu would be a stretch to trust too)

sb hermit
Dec 13, 2016





Penisface posted:

cant take nist advice, its the us which means its basically cia and the recommendations are in some clever way actually weakening your security

this is a tinfoil hat take but i am sure people think like this in countries other than the us

otoh did the same org not recommend those weakened ecc curves?

Yes. That was the insane dual ecc backdoor. Although I have hardly ever seen it used in practice, even when it was part of the standard (and yes, it has already been withdrawn).

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dual_EC_DRBG

It is an incredibly big black eye for NIST, who recommended it based on guidance from NSA. Given that NSA is responsible for other lapses including the accidental release of their EternalBlue exploit (which lead to the WannaCry worm: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/WannaCry_ransomware_attack), they seem to be more interested in finding and fixing vulnerabilities than hoarding them (see: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ghidra)

You don't have to trust NIST, but a lot of US based organizations have to follow their guidance and they have a lot of good common sense suggestions that are backed by a lot of analysis. If you have to convince someone of something, and NIST already backs that position, then it's not a bad idea to crib their work and save you some time.

One last point. NIST is pretty clear and public about requirements for systems that require high security. This is because they want to encourage use of commercial tech instead of expensive custom built solutions (see: csfc). So it makes little sense to require use of insecure curves or algorithms if other countries would be able to find any flaws.

sb hermit
Dec 13, 2016





I mean, there's little point to thinking that there's a conspiracy afoot when NIST recommends against arbitrary password expiration. A lot of it is just reasonable stuff, although quite exhaustive.

It's the inscrutable stuff, like crypto algorithms, that would rightly tend to attract a more jaundiced eye. Probably why wireguard doesn't use any of the NIST approved algorithms (as far as I know).

But as another poster said before, NIST generally just picks whatever makes sense. It should be pointed out that AES was not initially developed in the states, but in Belgium. Same with the SHA-3 family. If there was a flaw introduced, then surely the original developers would have spoken up.

EDIT: fix misspelling

sb hermit fucked around with this message at 08:22 on May 8, 2022

El Mero Mero
Oct 13, 2001

Penisface posted:

cant take nist advice, its the us which means its basically cia and the recommendations are in some clever way actually weakening your security

this is a tinfoil hat take but i am sure people think like this in countries other than the us

otoh did the same org not recommend those weakened ecc curves?

The real power in a NIST policy guidance document isn't whether it's right or not. It's that if you do it that way it's also harder to sue you or deny insurance claims if something goes tits up and that the opposite applies too - if you don't it's easier to have both of those things happen. That only applies to US companies though.

That NIST is objectively correct in their guidance means that the above is useful in forcing people to abandon stupid timewasting stuff like automatic password expirations.

El Mero Mero fucked around with this message at 08:23 on May 8, 2022

spankmeister
Jun 15, 2008






The Dual_EC_DRBG was an awful idea and it really undermined trust in the NIST, which is unfortunate because they do make good standards.

What bugs me about this though is that people just think NIST = NSA = bad without applying critical thinking.

The whole point of Dual EC was that it was supposed to be a NOBUS backdoor. You needed to know secret values to be able to use it.*

Weakening password requirements has no such limitations, anyone can crack passwords more effectively that way, there's no secret keys you need to know, you don't need a secret NSA supercomputer or something. Anyone can do it.

Do you really think the NIST would want to weaken password complexity requirements for everyone? Coupled with the fact that NIST standards are applied mostly within the US, why would they want to weaken US password security mainly? How does weakening US security and not other countries help the NSA in any way?


*This worked until someone else figured it out, hacked
Juniper and replaced those secret values with their own. So much for NOBUS. More like NOBTHEM.

Shame Boy
Mar 2, 2010

Penisface posted:

my point is that an american security recommendation ended up being malicious, thereby tainting subsequent recommendations
i dont think it matters here which institution does what

tbf NIST was as mad as everyone else that that happened, they genuinely didn't seem to be in on it at all.

4lokos basilisk
Jul 17, 2008


spankmeister posted:

Do you really think the NIST would want to weaken password complexity requirements for everyone? Coupled with the fact that NIST standards are applied mostly within the US, why would they want to weaken US password security mainly? How does weakening US security and not other countries help the NSA in any way?

i dont really think they want that. its just that thanks to this past violation of trust, i am sure people are more distrustful of any recommendations, and sometimes those people are not technical enough to think about it more than “americans lied”, and sometimes those people are decisionmakers too

of course this applies mostly outside of the united states

4lokos basilisk
Jul 17, 2008


i guess the real question is: how much are nist a tool of united states foreign policy? and will their quality of service suffer if its needed for us global hegemony? idk

this is probably not so relevant for information security either, so sorry about the derail

Qtotonibudinibudet
Nov 7, 2011



Omich poluyobok, skazhi ty narkoman? ya prosto tozhe gde to tam zhivu, mogli by vmeste uyobyvat' narkotiki

sb hermit posted:

The hilarious thing is that NIST, who gathers and verifies and disseminates standards, specifically changed the standard so that arbitrary password expiration (including periodic expiration) is not recommended. Password expiration should instead be done only when there is evidence of compromise (such as malicious activity or if someone steals the hash). They also specifically say that password complexity is not recommended and a blacklist of common passwords is a better alternative.

They also recommend that users be able to paste passwords in order to use password managers.

this is precisely the document i quoted in the "why are we doing this, don't" ticket

however, the person implementing the system roundly ignored this, since "making an actually good system" was less their goal than "making a system, that they think is good, so they can tell execs they made a good system". improving the system would take valuable time that could be instead spent talking up how good of a system they made

Penisface posted:

cant take nist advice, its the us which means its basically cia and the recommendations are in some clever way actually weakening your security

thankfully most people in charge of this stuff are not c-spam posters. it's kinda a hanlon's razor deal--they don't think the recommendations are bad, they simply have no idea that recommendations exist or that recommendations may exist outside whatever tribal knowledge they've accumulated at all

Qtotonibudinibudet fucked around with this message at 09:28 on May 8, 2022

Shame Boy
Mar 2, 2010

Penisface posted:

i guess the real question is: how much are nist a tool of united states foreign policy? and will their quality of service suffer if its needed for us global hegemony? idk

this is probably not so relevant for information security either, so sorry about the derail

NIST's primary purpose is internal standards for the US domestically, like maintaining the atomic clock that sets the government official time, stuff like that. they're probably not going to be used as an international political tool any more than like, the department of fish and wildlife

BattleMaster
Aug 14, 2000

I don't do anything infosec with NIST but I use a lot of datasets they provide and it's good poo poo

but maybe my radiation cross section figures have been sabotaged by a three letter agency :tinfoil:

sb hermit
Dec 13, 2016





Penisface posted:

i guess the real question is: how much are nist a tool of united states foreign policy? and will their quality of service suffer if its needed for us global hegemony? idk

this is probably not so relevant for information security either, so sorry about the derail

Other countries will likely have their own standards, likely written in their own language, so on the surface, the effect is minimal. Businesses will likely only implement the minimum needed to fulfill legal requirements and insurance requirements and whatever will ultimately save enough money to be worth the time to implement.

However, for companies providing services to the US government or are otherwise subject to US laws (like HIPAA), or even companies providing services to US government contractors, may need to implement NIST guidance to be able to sell their wares. For example, if you do any encryption of certain kinds of data, you'll need to provide documentation that your cryptographic modules are FIPS 140-2 certified. It's why Samsung phones and the Ubuntu Linux OS have spent a large amount of time and money to be certified.

But at any rate, the NIST standards are generally gold, and provide exhaustive coverage on a lot of expansive topics that simply aren't available elsewhere. Unless your requirements demand their use, however, nothing stops you (or anyone else) from just ignoring them.

It should be pointed out that weakened standards will be pointed out by researchers and further undermine trust in the organization. Not to mention potential leaks if another backdoored algorithm is shipped. No one wants to buy american products with state mandated back doors and vulnerabilities, so international trust in NIST is key.

4lokos basilisk
Jul 17, 2008


Shame Boy posted:

NIST's primary purpose is internal standards for the US domestically, like maintaining the atomic clock that sets the government official time, stuff like that. they're probably not going to be used as an international political tool any more than like, the department of fish and wildlife

i think in reality this means that software will tend to be built to NIST standards/requirements, because for better or worse most software is built to united states standards, so if the software maker wants to have the biggest market, they better be compliant with NIST

i am also quite sure that other countries take heed if NIST changes guidance, since small podunk places simply do not have the resources to build up and maintain a comprehensive information security guidance

Qtotonibudinibudet
Nov 7, 2011



Omich poluyobok, skazhi ty narkoman? ya prosto tozhe gde to tam zhivu, mogli by vmeste uyobyvat' narkotiki

Penisface posted:

i think in reality this means that software will tend to be built to NIST standards/requirements, because for better or worse most software is built to united states standards, so if the software maker wants to have the biggest market, they better be compliant with NIST

i am also quite sure that other countries take heed if NIST changes guidance, since small podunk places simply do not have the resources to build up and maintain a comprehensive information security guidance

there aren't many alternatives for the stuff that matters. NIST is basically codifying "we, an official US govt org, recognize these algorithms that the math researchers came up with". sure, there's like, say, alternatives in the sense that GOST has certified other algorithms developed by Russian cryptographers, and they're sound, but what the gently caress benefit are you getting by using those over the US ones? there's like maybe <100 people with the expertise needed to develop these things in the world, and they're pretty drat good at it. the academics doing so in public are perfectly competent. the academics doing so in private (for the NSA or whatever) aren't magically some order of magnitude more capable, they're just tasked with breaking things rather than building hard to break things, and sometimes they succeed.

ultimately, market forces (read: someone making a good implementation of X rather than Y) end up favoring one or the other, but that's not really a comment on suitability or robustness most of the time. offensive cryptographers at the NSA try to break whatever's in use: if everyone was using GOST algorithms, they'd invest far more work into that than they do against the NIST algorithms (or popular non-NIST stuff--surely someone's tasked with finding weaknesses in CHACHA20-POLYwhatever despite it lacking a government endorsement). in practice, the poo poo everyone else uses is good enough for you, since you're on the not-Mossad side of the Mossad/not-Mossad threat model, so GOST crypto is relegated to a smattering of Russian government sites and various post-Soviet militaries

there's certainly historical precedent for interference for advantage in both dual EC DRBG or the bullshit around the clipper chip and/or "export grade" cryptography, but there's also precedent in the other direction re the DES improvements. privately and covertly writing algorithmic backdoors in an active area of mathematical research is hard, so most of it ends up being of the explicit "we can gently caress you if we want to" variety like export crypto (a laughably pointless endeavor where the US tries to treat math like advanced manufacturing processes and tooling). dual ec is the odd one out where they tried to do poo poo via math because EC standardization means choosing specific curves to optimize, so there was an actual opportunity, and even then it meant fuckall other than the scandal since nobody used it

the NSA is far more likely to, and entirely capable of, compromise vulnerable implementations. compromising the math covertly is hard as poo poo, so they don't rely on it--it's just "wow our jobs our easy af now" gravy if they actually manage to

Subjunctive
Sep 12, 2006

✨sparkle and shine✨

El Mero Mero posted:

That NIST is objectively correct in their guidance means that the above is useful in forcing people to abandon stupid timewasting stuff like automatic password expirations.

what makes you feel that it’s objectively correct? I waved that doc in the face of a lot of people because I hate password rotation, but I admit I don’t know enough to actually analyze the evidence and determine that it’s correct. they could be mistaken or manipulated again in some way—what tells you that this is not the case here?

(to be clear, I’m not saying rotation is good, I’m just interested in the notion of “objectively correct” here because I don’t have the expertise to come to that sort of conclusion myself)

mystes
May 31, 2006

Routine password rotation is dumb because it just makes people increment numbers

If you only make people change passwords when they're actually compromised, you have a better chance of persuading them to actually change it to something completely different

Subjunctive
Sep 12, 2006

✨sparkle and shine✨

sure, I can imagine (and have) lots of intuitive reasons to not have it as a policy. I argued them before NIST!

but NIST aren’t themselves security experts, and I haven’t analyzed the sources they used to come to the conclusion, so it’s sort of a hollow appeal to authority for me to just namedrop NIST

Phone
Jul 30, 2005

親子丼をほしい。

Beeftweeter posted:

this is sadly the case in a lot of massive businesses, especially banks and financial services because they rely on a bunch of crap running on old rear end mainframes that don't really support modern authentication because accounts were meant for timesharing

eh, TOPSECRET has moved past 8 character long passwords. I forget how long pass phrases can be.

fins
May 31, 2011

Floss Finder
now i want to see a NIST procedural drama. bustin' down doors and kickin rear end for crimes against the metric system, or a hot tip on a group policy enorcing allll the password complexity requirements, rotated weekly.

Phone
Jul 30, 2005

親子丼をほしい。

Zamujasa posted:

i looked for a result on :google:

it's not what you shitpost, it's how

switching to colemak for your health and security :nsa:

shame on an IGA
Apr 8, 2005

fins posted:

now i want to see a NIST procedural drama. bustin' down doors and kickin rear end for crimes against the metric system, or a hot tip on a group policy enorcing allll the password complexity requirements, rotated weekly.

Nonzero chance that happens, the postal inspection service ran their saturday-morning version of "CSI: Mailbox" for almost 5 years

Adbot
ADBOT LOVES YOU

duz
Jul 11, 2005

Come on Ilhan, lets go bag us a shitpost


shame on an IGA posted:

Nonzero chance that happens, the postal inspection service ran their saturday-morning version of "CSI: Mailbox" for almost 5 years

there was also one for the cdc/nih https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0411011/

  • 1
  • 2
  • 3
  • 4
  • 5
  • Post
  • Reply