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Have we really seen a widespread, aggressive deployment of APS equipped tanks yet? A tank that can swat half a dozen infantry antitank weapon shots and withdraw or kill the shooters is an incredible obstacle in close terrain. How do you even fight that without an artillery or pgm strike?
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Aug 11, 2020 19:23
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wiegieman posted:Have we really seen a widespread, aggressive deployment of APS equipped tanks yet? A tank that can swat half a dozen infantry antitank weapon shots and withdraw or kill the shooters is an incredible obstacle in close terrain. How do you even fight that without an artillery or pgm strike? with infantry, because you can't get friendly infantry close to current APS systems, and tanks without infantry cover are extremely vulnerable also anti-APS penaids are already in use/on the drawing board (much like anti ERA penaids - just takes some time)
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Aug 11, 2020 19:28
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Neophyte posted:As alluded to in posts above, one of the lessons of Donbass is that future boot camps should have an industrial grinder by the bus stop where every incoming recruit has to throw every single smart phone, device, wearable, tablet, and laptop the second they get off the bus. When you are separated or retire you get free replacements, so quit your bitchin'. Continuous high level jamming of your own sides cellular telecommunications doesn't strike me as particularly unlikely to be honest.
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Aug 11, 2020 19:29
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Yes, it's like a lava lamp.
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Neophyte posted:As alluded to in posts above, one of the lessons of Donbass is that future boot camps should have an industrial grinder by the bus stop where every incoming recruit has to throw every single smart phone, device, wearable, tablet, and laptop the second they get off the bus. When you are separated or retire you get free replacements, so quit your bitchin'. The policies regarding mobile phones in armies are usually quite severe. 
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Aug 11, 2020 19:53
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Cythereal posted:Huh, my understanding was that in Iraq and Gaza tanks haven't been useful at all except in cases where the opposition simply doesn't have anything that can penetrate them. Most anti-tank weapons have some significant limitations, particularly range, that make it so 'tank here' is not immediately 'tank dead'. People saying the RPG made tanks obsolete are way off base when they think about the actual effective range of such weapon against point targets like tanks. RPGs can fling frag rockets out pretty far, but tanks are point targets and require a degree of accuracy. ATGMs are more effective at range but also vulnerable and somewhat limited. The proliferation of improvised armored vehicles in places like Syria i think shows that obviously people fighting there think a small-arms hardened vehicle has some use, even if they'll get blown up by a good RPG or ATGM hit. Just because tanks can't road column through the ardennes and blow through weak AT defenses like it's 1940 like they were nothing doesn't mean they're useless or going to go away.
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Aug 11, 2020 20:10
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Fly Molo posted:More like releasing a compromised smartphone app so you can hunt down and destroy your enemy’s artillery. Modern warfare’s been going in some weird directions. wiegieman posted:Have we really seen a widespread, aggressive deployment of APS equipped tanks yet? A tank that can swat half a dozen infantry antitank weapon shots and withdraw or kill the shooters is an incredible obstacle in close terrain. How do you even fight that without an artillery or pgm strike? evil_bunnY fucked around with this message at 20:33 on Aug 11, 2020 |
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Aug 11, 2020 20:31
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Neophyte posted:As alluded to in posts above, one of the lessons of Donbass is that future boot camps should have an industrial grinder by the bus stop where every incoming recruit has to throw every single smart phone, device, wearable, tablet, and laptop the second they get off the bus. When you are separated or retire you get free replacements, so quit your bitchin'. More like don't settle down for the night with three brigades in the same field when you know the Russians are watching you.
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Aug 11, 2020 21:04
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Alchenar posted:More like don't settle down for the night with three brigades in the same field when you know the Russians are watching you. What unit was it that came back from the sandbox for near-peer training and camped the entire battalion in an open field with no dispersal and got sighted and obliterated by OPFOR almost immediately?
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Aug 11, 2020 21:10
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Alchenar posted:More like don't settle down for the night with three brigades in the same field when you know the Russians are watching you. quote:Russian drones spied on the camp. The Ukrainians managed to shoot down one Orlan-10 drone, but could not stop the Russians from pinpointing their location. On the morning of July 11, Russian forces hacked the Ukrainian command post’s network and jammed its radios. Yikes 
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Aug 11, 2020 21:24
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It's kind of like how when Tiger I was introduced, the crews learned that their tanks were impervious to normal 45mm to 76.2mm guns and could just park on top of a hill with a good view and exterminate everything with their 88mm deathray. Then come circa 1944 and the heavy tank battalions still trust in the old tactics and now when that box of steel parks its huge silhouette on top of the ridge it's immediately riddled with holes made by 76.2mm tungsten, 17pdr, 85mm, 122mm shells or the entire turret is evaporated by a 152mm shell. Tiger crews soon learned that their place in the food chain wasn't apex predator anymore and they had to evolve into a new niche. For a while main battle tanks were like Tiger in 1942, then they had to find their place again. It's the same with all arms. Okay, you don't see a lot of horse cavalry these days, but mostly different arms don't die off, they evolve because combined arms has only gotten more crucial for winning battles, not less. And the only reason why horse cavalry did disappear was because motorized units could do the same things but more efficiently. Yes, they were also more vulnerable to machine guns and artillery barrages so cavalry charges were going to disappear anyway, but without internal combustion engines we'd still have recon done by dudes on horses and some on bicycles. Cythereal posted:Huh, my understanding was that in Iraq and Gaza tanks haven't been useful at all except in cases where the opposition simply doesn't have anything that can penetrate them. In urban fighting an infantry force only supported by artillery and air is not nearly as capable as one that also has a 120+ mm direct fire cannon with armour protected crew and all kinds of hitech sensors available to silence a strongpoint. They could bring that firepower as some kind of shoulder launched missile, but then the guy operating that missile could be shot in the head while he was taking the aim. Combined arms leans heavily on having a good doctrine and good training, though. You will need pros with specialization on MOUT and a good plan to handle that. Just driving a tank column down the boulevard is just asking for trouble. The opposition probably has something that can damage an AFV, but they probably don't have an unlimited amount of them and moving an RPG or missile around the front for a clean shot is difficult if the attacking side has a strong infantry presence. Valtonen posted:As long as taking out a tank requires a more specialized weapon system than taking out an IFV does, and that by sacrificing Its purpose as IFV you can fit it with direct fire capability that outmatches an IFV a tank will exist. emptyquote.txt
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Aug 11, 2020 21:27
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Nenonen posted:It's kind of like how when Tiger I was introduced, the crews learned that their tanks were impervious to normal 45mm to 76.2mm guns and could just park on top of a hill with a good view and exterminate everything with their 88mm deathray. There were a lot of Tiger kills with the 6-pounder in 42, because the Germans would do just that, or charge straight into Allied positions confident in their invulnerability.
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Aug 11, 2020 21:29
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What was that german self propelled mortar they used on the eastern front? It had a huge bore, very squat barrel. It wasn't the karl gerat
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Aug 11, 2020 21:44
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Milo and POTUS posted:What was that german self propelled mortar they used on the eastern front? It had a huge bore, very squat barrel. It wasn't the karl gerat Sturmtiger? 
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Aug 11, 2020 21:52
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Polyakov posted:Sturmtiger? I don't think they ever used that on the Eastern front though. The Brummbär did though. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brummb%C3%A4r Fangz fucked around with this message at 22:00 on Aug 11, 2020 |
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Aug 11, 2020 21:56
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Milo and POTUS posted:What was that german self propelled mortar they used on the eastern front? It had a huge bore, very squat barrel. It wasn't the karl gerat Are you thinking of the Brummbär?
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Aug 11, 2020 22:01
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evil_bunnY posted:Turns out you gently caress with former superpowers at your own peril and they get to gently caress with you forever. Except if you're finland, where little green men are kill on sight. Please let us know how you think Ukraine was "loving with" Russia.
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Aug 11, 2020 22:17
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Gnoman posted:There were a lot of Tiger kills with the 6-pounder in 42, because the Germans would do just that, or charge straight into Allied positions confident in their invulnerability. The British noted that Tiger crews acted like they were invulnerable in Italy in 43-44, but learned better than they found out that it was impossible to evacuate and repair Tigers with damage to running gear or cooling system. Grenrow posted:Please let us know how you think Ukraine was "loving with" Russia. This line of questioning is going to lead into modern politics. Don't.
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Aug 11, 2020 22:22
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Nenonen posted:It's kind of like how when Tiger I was introduced, the crews learned that their tanks were impervious to normal 45mm to 76.2mm guns and could just park on top of a hill with a good view and exterminate everything with their 88mm deathray. (snip content) Yeah, very much this. I mentioned the introduction of the Sagger above. It was first used in 1973; the Egyptian army (who had done very badly in 1967) used them to badly hurt the formerly invincible Israeli armor. But the Israelis adapted, and within a matter of days they started using - you guessed it - combined arms tactics to deal with the Saggers. In reality the Sagger wasn't all that great; most of them missed and there were severe limitations on their effectiveness. The Israelis learned and adapted. Nonetheless, it's hard to overstate how much the first reports shocked the tank community. Mere infantry, destroying the vaunted Isreali tanks! It went so far that Armor Magazine - a professional journal for tankers - ran a front cover that said "Is the Tank Dead?" More astute observers looked at the situation and said, "yep, use combined arms, and don't charge ATGMs firing at you across open ground." That lesson comes up over and over and over. Tanks are impressive. It's hard not to feel like an invincible badass when you're in the TC's station of an M1A1. But tanks - like every other weapons system since the dawn of time - have their limits, and using them sloppily will end in bad results. They're very useful, but they're just one part of the big holistic combined arms picture. Edit: Video showing Egyptian Saggers: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q9coa0r_GLQ Cessna fucked around with this message at 22:35 on Aug 11, 2020 |
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Aug 11, 2020 22:27
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Fangz posted:I don't think they ever used that on the Eastern front though. Sure they did, here's one shooting up Warsaw: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gc_BuTptGDY
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Aug 11, 2020 22:30
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Polyakov posted:Sturmtiger? Hah I thought I found it and I thought it was the Brummbar but yeah I meant this one.
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Aug 11, 2020 23:19
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Cythereal posted:Huh, my understanding was that in Iraq and Gaza tanks haven't been useful at all except in cases where the opposition simply doesn't have anything that can penetrate them. A lot of the assumptions that tanks were terribly vulnerable and useless in urban terrain came from some Russian gong show in the 90s...Chechnya I assume? Anyway, in Iraq they were unbelievably useful. It is hard to describe what it was like to be in contact and then have an Abrams platoon roll up...it was basically the end of the discussion. Sometimes they'd eat an RPG or someone would see if a machine gun could do anything about it, but more typically, it was just a signal to everyone that the firefight was over and we can all go home. Their main limitations were more operational in nature...not being able to take streetcorners, or grinding down curbs, stuff like that. I'm sure against a better trained/equipped opponent that tanks wouldn't fare as well, but that assumption applies just as much to open terrain.
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Aug 11, 2020 23:30
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It's absolutely a bad idea to use tanks in urban terrain if there is anything else they could meaningfully be doing, but that's a comparative problem rather than an absolute one.
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Aug 11, 2020 23:42
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Ensign Expendable posted:The policies regarding mobile phones in armies are usually quite severe. What the hell happened in the bottom left? Someone has a very novel take on how to use nails.
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Aug 12, 2020 00:39
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The ”no tanks to urban combat” Ur-example is the first battle of Groznyi on first chechen war. It consisted of muddled battle plan, executed with massive delay with constant communication issues with main emphasis literally being ”hope we have So many tanks the opponent refuses the fight in face of the odds” - and this was against an opponent that had a clear plan of ambushing using the terrain the best they could, that had one hell of a resolve. Oh, and Russian air support was lacking due to inclenebt weather. So whilst it is a Good lesson on ”play stupid games, lose your entire brigade”, it is flawed Because it assumes that you are using your armor assets in urban operations without any kind of thought on their abilities. The more modern consensus on armor in urban terrain is that if force A has all the same assets as force B, but also has heavy armor on direct support, they have a massive direct firepower overmatch. Thats really all there is, and just like bewbies mentioned the ability to direct-raze anything every 5 seconds accurately up to a mile away is.. nice to have backing you.
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Aug 12, 2020 00:57
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Valtonen posted:The ”no tanks to urban combat” Ur-example is the first battle of Groznyi on first chechen war. It consisted of muddled battle plan, executed with massive delay with constant communication issues with main emphasis literally being ”hope we have So many tanks the opponent refuses the fight in face of the odds” - and this was against an opponent that had a clear plan of ambushing using the terrain the best they could, that had one hell of a resolve. I don't know much about the first Chechen War, but browsing the Wikipedia page holy hell was it an absolute cluster gently caress. It wasn't that long after the breakup of the Soviet Union, and I imaging the Russian Army still had most of the Soviet command structure, troops, weapons, ect all intact. So how the hell did they do so badly?
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Aug 12, 2020 01:40
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Cessna posted:As far back as the 80's this was recognized, and planners referred to this factor as "come as you are war." That is, you fight with what you've already built. Yeah, this sort of planning that a peer-to-peer war will always be short and brutal and then over was prevalent prior to 1914 and then something happened to change people's minds. Wish I could remember what it was.
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Aug 12, 2020 03:25
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Would the longer procurement timelines lead to an army in being doctrine where the focus is on preserving material? Similar to avoiding decisive engagements with a fleet? Ground forces seem like that would be harder to execute with.
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Aug 12, 2020 03:35
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Vincent Van Goatse posted:Yeah, this sort of planning that a peer-to-peer war will always be short and brutal and then over was prevalent prior to 1914 and then something happened to change people's minds. Wish I could remember what it was. And nothing whatsoever has changed in the past century. Edit: Seriously, why the hostility? The fact is that neither of us knows for sure what would happen. No one does. I presented the theories that past planners worked under, and if anything things have become more efficiently destructive in the forty years since those ideas were first developed. It's certainly possible that after the initial overwhelming strike a war between superpowers could continue, but I suspect that things would probably go nuclear after that, in which case "design and produce new tanks" just wouldn't be a priority. Cessna fucked around with this message at 04:04 on Aug 12, 2020 |
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Aug 12, 2020 03:36
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Solaris 2.0 posted:I don't know much about the first Chechen War, but browsing the Wikipedia page holy hell was it an absolute cluster gently caress. It wasn't that long after the breakup of the Soviet Union, and I imaging the Russian Army still had most of the Soviet command structure, troops, weapons, ect all intact. So how the hell did they do so badly? 1990's was an era when people were seriously concerned that someone in former Soviet Union with access to the nuclear weapon stockpile would sell a warhead or two to whoever made the right kind of offer. That's how reliable the command structure was known to be.
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Aug 12, 2020 04:15
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1990s was also an era when you'd read newspaper stories about Russian military bases having their power cut off because no one had paid the bill in two years, or conscript soldiers selling their rifles because they hadn't been paid in ten months.
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Aug 12, 2020 04:24
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How did the Soviet military perform during the Afghanistan war? I realize that I hardly know anything about it, other than its outcome. Were they generally competent and thus didn't meet their grand strategic objectives for other reasons? Or did they lack in some military capability?
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Aug 12, 2020 05:06
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FMguru posted:1990s was also an era when you'd read newspaper stories about Russian military bases having their power cut off because no one had paid the bill in two years, or conscript soldiers selling their rifles because they hadn't been paid in ten months. To be fair, if I had a rifle issued I'd also have sold it for booze money, and they haven't missed one of my paychecks yet.
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Aug 12, 2020 05:07
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Cessna posted:Are you posting this from 2035? Is Trump still President? For some reason I was thinking mid 60s this morning, anyways you’re correct. Either way that’s still 45+ years in active service and still in very active production.
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Aug 12, 2020 05:19
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Mazz posted:Either way that’s still 45+ years in active service and still in very active production. It is amazing that they're still made today.
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Aug 12, 2020 05:34
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EggsAisle posted:How did the Soviet military perform during the Afghanistan war? I realize that I hardly know anything about it, other than its outcome. Were they generally competent and thus didn't meet their grand strategic objectives for other reasons? Or did they lack in some military capability? The book to read is The Bear Went Over the Mountain, which is a collection of Soviet General Staff after action reports, translated and edited by US military historian Lester Grau. And the short answer is they pretty poorly, over all. Soviet doctrine was based around high intensity deep battle in Western Europe. Tank heavy shock armies, massive artillery bombardment, maybe nuclear weapons, against a similar foe. Afghanistan is massive, and the scale of the terrain to be garrisoned, disease, and casualties meant that fighting units were at absolute minimum strength. Infantry tactics and equipment was notably poor. Doctrine called for troops to operate close to their AFVs, which had limited mobility in large portions of the country. The standard flak jacket was too heavy for marches over 3 km, and Soviet web gear didn’t carry enough ammo or water for long patrols. Boots and sleeping bags were notably awful for the mountains, and troops tried to replace them with tennis shoes and captured western bags. And on a political-strategic level, heavy handed Soviet counter-insurgency tactics meant that their intelligence was bad, and as the war dragged on, morale plummeted. Helicopter were vital, and always in short supply. When operations came together, the Soviets could be quite effective, using helicopter assaults to insert troops into blocking positions, and the crushing encircled militants with heavy firepower. But far more frequently the Afghans would just withdraw away from a heavy sweep, and then hit isolated outposts or convoys on their tempo. It’s not exactly like the Americans in Vietnam, but it’s real similar, with heavy mechanized equipment that’s of limited use in harsh terrain, rough parity in the light infantry fights, and an unworkable political situation. It’s difficult to get a foreign population to regard a government you’ve installed as legitimate by shooting and bombing them, and an insurgency with inviolate sanctuaries across an international border and logistical support from the other superpower can just wait out domestic morale.
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Aug 12, 2020 06:25
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Xiahou Dun posted:What the hell happened in the bottom left? Squaddies, man
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Aug 12, 2020 08:45
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There were a host of problems with the Russian army in the 90s that are summed up in the context of Chechnya in this document pretty succinctly. Specific to tanks, one issue they had is the plan was to lead the attack with tanks into dense urban terrain and as a bonus the tanks couldn't elevate their guns to hit the upper floors of buildings full of anti-tank infantry.
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Aug 12, 2020 14:56
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glynnenstein posted:the tanks couldn't elevate their guns to hit the upper floors of buildings full of anti-tank infantry. this is like, the classic problem for tanks in dense urban terrain though and why SPAAGs are shockingly useful outside of killin planes
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Aug 12, 2020 15:02
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glynnenstein posted:There were a host of problems with the Russian army in the 90s that are summed up in the context of Chechnya in this document pretty succinctly. That document was really useful and insightful thank you. It's amazing how fast the army of a former super power, what was once the premier Army in the world 10 years before, can fall apart.
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Aug 12, 2020 15:09
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KYOON GRIFFEY JR posted:this is like, the classic problem for tanks in dense urban terrain though and why SPAAGs are shockingly useful outside of killin planes Yeah. They eventually remembered this after losing 87.5% of their armored vehicles in the initial assault. They may also eventually have given the tanks machine gun ammo that they didn't have to start.
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Aug 12, 2020 15:20
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