SmokaDustbowl posted:

which country do you guys think will be the first to get hit with a "rod from god"?

quote:

A 15-year-old sophomore is accused of a shooting at Oxford High School with a semiautomatic handgun Tuesday afternoon, killing three students and injuring six others, including a teacher.

LanceHunter posted:

Anyways, here's another one for the "Joe Biden, cool and good" file:

https://twitter.com/ryanlcooper/status/1465701515482464275?s=20

hobbesmaster posted:

what about africa

Jonny 290 posted:

now post the graph of number of abandoned US tanks currently shelling the taliban's opponents

Jonny 290 posted:

that buddy that went in the army was in motor pool for a while and every hmmwv had to have its wheels chocked and a drip pan slid under the engine every time it was parked bc of environmental regs lmao

they're pieces of poo poo

Kenny Logins posted:

https://twitter.com/kennethlogins/status/1224688868877852673?s=21

Cat Face Joe posted:

keep 'em comin!

https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/oakland/2021/11/30/oxford-high-school-active-shooter-victims/8810588002/

AnimeIsTrash posted:

https://twitter.com/Telegraph/status/1465640620505063432

AnimeIsTrash posted:

https://twitter.com/Telegraph/status/1465640620505063432

psiox posted:

MrQueasy posted:

What's Goku's thoughts on immigration?

MrQueasy posted:

What's Goku's thoughts on immigration?

PokeJoe posted:

why doesnt the jet have a cheap rear end sensor for whem the intake cover is in place or is not enough air in getting ingested

quote:

f-35

PokeJoe posted:

why doesnt the jet have a cheap rear end sensor for whem the intake cover is in place or is not enough air in getting ingested

Sagebrush posted:

we all like to lol about the f-35 but this one is 100% human error

PokeJoe posted:

he's an immigrant from planet saiyan OP

Poopernickel posted:

Yeah, but also humans _do_ make mistakes. Nothing should be so fragile that one small fuckup will destroy a 100 million doller plane.

Like if I gave you a panel of 37 unmarked buttons and said "push them all in this exact order or the plane explodes", a technician might do it right 20 times in a row. Then they'd gently caress up, because people make mistakes. Sure, you can call it "human error" when it happens and fire the technician. But that's kind of counter-productive and doesn't fix the underlying design issue.

Sagebrush posted:

that's not the correct analogy here. this isn't one small fuckup destroying the plane; it is a chain of mistakes that all had to happen one after another.

if the rumors are true, the situation might be:

- maintenance crew did not properly remove and stow the intake covers
- maintenance crew improperly used the intake covers as kneeling mats
- maintenance crew left the kneeling mat inside the intake after finishing their work
- pilot did not perform adequate preflight inspection
- pilot did not perform adequate engine run-up, or did not realize engine performance loss in run-up
- aircraft was not designed to alert the pilot to foreign debris in the intake
- engine was not able to recover from ingestion of intake cover
- pilot did not respond quickly enough to power loss to stop before going over the edge
- brakes were not powerful enough to reject the takeoff before going over the edge

if any one of those things were different, the plane would not have been lost.

to use your analogy, this is a case where there is one button you have to push to have the plane not crash. you could have the plane check if the button was pushed, but it wasn't designed that way. it's okay though because there are 37 people who are supposed to inspect the button before takeoff and make sure that it was pushed, and this time every one of them failed to do so.

Sagebrush posted:

There is a concept in risk analysis called the "swiss cheese model." Each aspect of a job (cheese slice) has a certain number of possible failures in it (holes). When you perform all the aspects in sequence (stack up the cheese slices), most of the time a failure in one aspect is addressed by a safety protocol at another level. It's only when you have failures at every level that line up in just the right way (holes in every cheese slice in the same location) that an error can propagate all the way through and cause the bad outcome.



In this case the death could have been prevented by:

Using a plugged or fake gun that could not fire real ammunition
Not having live ammunition on set
Not using the gun for target practice in between takes
Properly unloading and clearing the gun before use on set
Using a gun where it is immediately obvious if any bullets are loaded
Having multiple people check the gun at each handoff from armorer to director to actor
Not pointing the gun directly at a human being
Using a rubber prop gun for rehearsals instead of the real thing
Hiring an armorer who was competent and who would enforce all of the above safety procedures
Having a medic on set who might have been able to successfully perform life-saving measures
Stopping work when the majority of the crew voiced their safety concerns and walked off

The point of the Swiss cheese model is to make clear that it's never a case of "oh, if only they had done this one thing differently nothing would have gone wrong." Tragic incidents like this are caused by everything going wrong, at every level, and it's only dumb luck that all the failures didn't line up until today. If the job were run properly every one of the safety protocols would be followed, and a failure in one area would be immediately addressed (e.g. firing the person who brought a box of live ammo to set) even though "nothing happened" because all the other layers worked correctly.

Sagebrush posted:

Ultimately it's the swiss cheese model:



This is a standard model for understanding process risk. Engineering controls attempt to prevent the risks by engineering them out of existence. Administrative controls prohibit actions or decisions that increase the risk. Behavioral controls teach the user how to operate the system safely and correctly. When an error gets through all of those, it becomes an incident, and then you have physical barriers (failsafes, shields, etc) that try to stop the damage. If those too fail, you have a catastrophe.

In this case no single factor was entirely responsible for crashes, and changing any one would be enough to prevent them.

- The plane was designed with less than optimal handling characteristics in the first place. (engineering)
- There was not enough physical redundancy in the AoA system. (engineering)
- There was no standard warning system to indicate a failure in the AoA system to the pilots. (administrative/enginerering)
- The MCAS system was not designed with much thought put into its ergonomics or the consequences of its failure. (engineering/behavioral)
- The MCAS system and its effects on the airplane's flight characteristics was poorly documented. (administrative)
- The Boeing lobbyists managed to get simulator conversion training waived when it really should have been required. (administrative/behavioral)
- The training that was given, in the case of Lion Air at least, was probably insufficient in the first place. (behavioral)

Change any one of those factors and things probably would have been different. The people blaming the pilots for not disconnecting the trim are focusing on the "mitigate" step in the image above, where the error has already happened and it's now up to the pilot to correct it in the moment. It's true that that could have saved the planes; there were indeed dozens of cases of probably MCAS-related "runaway trim" with the 737 MAX before the two crashes, where the pilots disconnected it in time and flew the rest of the flight uneventfully. But focusing on mitigation ignores all the other factors that had to line up to let it get that far.

Poopernickel posted:

Yeah, but also humans _do_ make mistakes. Nothing should be so fragile that one small fuckup will destroy a 100 million doller plane.

Like if I gave you a panel of 37 unmarked buttons and said "push them all in this exact order or the plane explodes", a technician might do it right 20 times in a row. Then they'd gently caress up, because people make mistakes. Sure, you can call it "human error" when it happens and fire the technician. But that's kind of counter-productive and doesn't fix the underlying design issue.

Sagebrush posted:

they tried really hard to do that! but eventually some rear end in a top hat managed to get the f-35 to fly

Sagebrush posted:

they tried really hard to do that! but eventually some rear end in a top hat managed to get the f-35 to fly